revista concurentei 1

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PROFIL: CONCURENA- revist editat de CONSILIUL CONCURENEI, apare trimestrial- quarterly magazine edited by the COMPETITION COUNCIL

Pentru orice relaii ne putei scrie la urmtoarea adres:For any further information, you may contact us at the following address:

CONSILIUL CONCURENEI (pentru revista PROFIL: CONCURENA)Piaa Presei Libere nr.1, sector 1, 013701, Bucureti, Romnia,Tel.021/405.44.24, fax: 021/318.48.08e-mail: [email protected]

Opiniile exprimate n articolele publicate constituie preri personale ale autorilor i nureprezint n mod necesar punctele de vedere ale Consiliului ConcureneiThe opinions expressed in the articles published are the authors' personal views and do notnecessarily represent the points of view of the Competition Council.

CONSILIUL DIRECTOR/ EXECUTIVE BOARD: Prof.univ.dr. Gheorghe OPRESCU, Alexe GAVRIL,Mihai GIUGARIU, Benedict SRBU, Lect.dr. Jzsef Nndor NEMENYI, tefan NEAGOE

REDACIA/ EDITORIAL STAFF: Maria ALEXANDRU, Jzsef Nndor NEMENYI, Carmen BUCUR,Georgeta GAVRILOIU

REDACTOR EF/CHIEF EDITOR:Jzsef Nndor NEMENYIRESPONSABIL DE NUMR/ EDITOR IN CHARGE OF THIS ISSUE: Carmen BUCUR

EDITOR EXECUTIV/ EXECUTIVE EDITOR: Florin ANDREI

ISSN 1454-2730

TIPAR/PRINTED BY: VEGA PROD


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Criza economic din perspectiva ajutorului de statEconomic crisis from state aid perspective

Gheorghe OPRESCUConsideraii asupra msurilor anticriz promovate de Comisia EuropeanConsiderations on the anti-crisis measures promoted by the EuropeanCommissionDaniel DIACONESCU, Marius POPA

Davos 2009 ntre chingile crizei i glasul participanilorDavos 2009 between the girths of the crisis and the voice of theparticipantsJozsef Nandor NEMENYI, Carmen BUCUR

Prioritile Comisiei n aplicarea art. 82 din Tratatul CEThe Commission's enforcement priorities for art. 82 EC-TreatyRupprecht PODSZUN

Complexitatea contractelor ntr-un cadru al economiei costurilor detranzacionare: legturi cu politica de concurenContract complexity in a transaction cost economics framework: links

with competition policyPeter MURRELL, Radu A. PUN

Conceptul de pia relevant i testul monopolistului ipoteticThe relevant market concept and the hypothetical monopolist testLucian BOZIAN

Posibile efecte anticoncureniale ale legturilor structurale i financiarecare se pot nfiripa ntre companii concurente

The potential anticompetitive impact of the structural links that may occuramong rival companiesDaniela ELEODOR

Politica n domeniul concurenei modele de abordare n SUA i UEThe competition policy models in US and EU approachAna IVAN-ILIESCU

Fondurile structurale n contextul actualei crize economico financiare

mondialeStructural funds in the context of the present economic- financial crisisOana TATU

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Rezumat

n situaia actual, n care efectele crizei economico-financiare s-au propagat cu rapiditate pe planmondial, economiile statelor membre ale UE se confrunt cu serioase dificulti, att n cadrul sistemuluibancar, ct i n economia real. Impactul global al crizei financiare asupra economiei reale se resimte

puternic, iar economia n ansamblul su este afectat de o ncetinire substanial a creterii, care lovete

populaia, ntreprinderile i locurile de munc.

Astfel de dificulti afecteaz nu numai companiile fragile, dar i societile solide, care se confrunt brusccu o lips a creditelor. Aceast situaie are impact negativ n special asupra IMM-urilor, care au n generaldificulti mai mari de accesare a finanrii comparativ cu societile mari. Aceste dificulti, nu numai cafecteaz grav situaia economic a multor companii i a angajailor acestora pe termen scurt i mediu, dar

pot avea i efecte negative pe termen lung, ntruct toate investiiile planificate ar putea fi ntrziate sauchiar abandonate. n acest context, o importan deosebit revine modului de utilizare a fondurilor

publice.

Cuvinte cheie: criz, ajutor de stat, fonduri publice, alocare.

CRIZA ECONOMICDIN PERSPECTIVAAJUTORULUI DE STAT

1Gheorghe OPRESCU

Ajutorul de stat

Att alocrile din fonduri europene ct i cele dinfonduri naionale reprezint msuri financiaremenite s sprijine anumite categorii de beneficiarii de proiecte. Prin urmare, n condiiile n careaceste msuri de sprijin cad sub incidena art. 87(1)din Tratatul Comunitii Europene, este absolutnecesar s fie respectate regulile comunitare deajutor de stat n acordarea lor. Astfel, se asigur

faptul c ajutoarele de stat nu permit StatuluiMembru s se ndeprteze de la principiilefundamentale ce stau la baza bunei funcionri apieei unice i s afecteze concurena i comerulcu celelalte State Membre ntr-o msur contrarinteresului comun.

Pe plan naional, Consiliul Concurenei esteinstituia abilitat s faciliteze respectarea acestorreguli, prin oferirea de consultan autoritilorpublice implicate n acordarea ajutoarelor de stat,precum i potenialilor beneficiari i prin asigurareacontactului dintre Romania i Comisia European

n acest domeniu. Proiectele de acte normative ceconin elemente de ajutor de stat sunt avizate deConsiliul Concurenei nainte de a fi notificate i a fisupuse autorizrii de ctre Comisia European

pentru a se asigura conformitatea cu prevederilecomunitare.

n exerci tarea aces tor at ribui i, Cons il iu lConcurenei acord asisten tehnic autoritilorpentru ntocmirea notificrilor i informrilorprivind diverse msuri de ajutor de stat, a

1 Preedinte al Consiliului Concurenei.


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ECONOMIC CRISIS FROM STATE AIDPERSPECTIVE

2Gheorghe OPRESCU

3Abstract

In nowadays situation, when effects of the economic-financial crisis have been rapidly world-wide spread,the EU Member States economies are facing serious difficulties, both within banking system, and in realeconomy. The global financial crisis impact on real economy is strongly felt, and the economy as a whole isaffected by a significant slowing down of growth, which is harming population, companies and jobs.

Such difficulties are affecting not only fragile companies, but also the solid ones, which have suddenly beenconfronted by a lack of credits. This situation has a negative impact especially on the SMEs, which have, in

general, higher difficulties in accessing financing comparatively with the largest ones. These difficulties havenot only negative short and medium term effects, by affecting the economic state of many companies andof their employees, but they could also have negative long term effects, by delaying all planned investmentor even by abandoning them. In this context, the way of using public funds gets a high importance.Keywords: crisis, State aid, public funds, allocation.

State Aid

The financial measures aimed at supporting certaincategories of beneficiaries and projects consist ofallocations both from the European funds and fromthe national ones. Consequently, since thesemeasures fall under the Article 87(1) of theEuropean Community Treaty,the observance of theCommunity State Aid rules in their granting is quitenecessary. Thus, one can be sure that State Aid

granting will be done by Member States in fullyrespect of the fundamental principles governing asound functioning of the Single Internal Market,without any harm, on competition and on tradebetween Member States, to an extent contrary tothe common interest.

On the national level, the Romanian CompetitionCouncil (hereinafter the RCC) is the authorityempowered to ensure the observance of theserules, by offering specialised consultancy for publicauthorities involved into State aid granting, as wellas for potential beneficiaries, and by ensuring thecontact between Romania and the EuropeanCommission (hereinafter, the EC) in this field. TheRCC gives advisory opinions on all legal draftscontaining State aid issues, in order to ensure their

compliance with community rules, beforenotification aimed at getting the EC authorization.

In the exercise of its competences, the RCC givestechnical assistance to the authorities in drawing upof notifications and information sheets, answers,statements of position, or other acts concerning

2 President of the Competition Council.3 Translated into English by Doina Mesteacn.


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rspunsurilor, formulrilor de poziii sau a altoracte, n scopul transmiterii acestora ComisieiEuropene. Totodat, Consiliul Concureneireprezint Romnia n cadrul reuniunilormultilaterale organizate la nivelul Comisiei

Europene cu toate Statele Membre i a ntlnirilorde lucru cu experii comunitari pe marginea unorcazuri concrete (de exempu, Ford Craiova,Tractorul Brasov, privatizarea Electrica MunteniaSud, aspectele legate de finanarea din fondurilestructurale a investiiilor pentru dezvoltarea i

mbuntirea reelelor de transport gaze i energieelectric din fonduri structurale etc.).

ncepnd cu luna iunie 2008, urmare a solicitriiConsiliului Concurenei, a fost iniiat un mecanismde pre-consultare cu experii din cadrul ComisieiEuropene n domeniul privatizrilor. n cadrulacestui mecanism, au fost transmise ComisieiEuropene fie de informaii cu privire la societilecomerciale ce urmau a fi privatizate de A.V.A.S. Pemarginea acestor cazuri au avut loc consultritehnice cu Comisia European, astfel nct s seevite existena unor elemente de ajutor de statincompatibile n cadrul proceselor de privatizare.

n urma acestui mecanism, autoritile romne audispus msuri corespunztoare pentru a se asigurarespectarea reglementrilor comunitare n

domeniul ajutorului de stat, dintre care pot fimenionate: modificarea legislaiei de privatizare

n sectorul minier i al cercetrii-dezvoltrii,revocarea procedurilor de privatizare n cazul unorsocieti din aceste sectoare, precum i revizuireastrategiilor de privatizare avute n vedere pentruanumite societi.

O mare parte din activitatea ConsiliuluiConcurenei n domeniul ajutorului de stat estelegat de colaborarea cu autoritile publice n

procesul de identificare i de elaborare aschemelorde ajutor de stat, astfel nct s fie asiguratcompatibilitatea acestora cu legislaia european.

n acest sens, de la nceputul anului 2007 i pn nprezent, au fost elaborate 68 scheme de ajutor destat i ajutor de minimis (24 scheme de ajutor destat i 44 scheme de minimis). Dintre acestea, 22de scheme au fost concepute n bazareglementrilor privind ajutoarele de stat exceptatede la obligaia notificrii ctre Comisia European.

Acestea au fost avizate de ctre ConsiliulConcurenei i transmise spre informare ctreComisia European, n prezent putnd fi accesatede ctre agenii economici pentru obinerea definanare.

O atenie deosebit trebuie acordat finanrii dinfonduri europene a proiectelor realizate de agenieconomici n Romnia, ntruct autoritilenaionale cu atribuii n domeniu trebuie s verificeatt conformitatea cu regulile de ajutor de stat, cti cu cele privind fondurile europene. Acest faptpoate spori complexitatea procesului deimplementare, ns se asigur o respectare aobligaiilor asumate de Romnia n calitate de StatMembru al UE i se evit orice neajunsuriulterioare care ar putea apare din nerespectareaacestor obligaii.

Dei urmrete n principiu atingerea unorobiective comune (dezvoltare regional icoeziune, protecia mediului nconjurtor,promovarea activitilor de cercetare, dezvoltare iinovare, dezvoltarea capitalului uman etc),legislaia n domeniul ajutorului de stat poate limitaaplicarea procedurilor referitoare la fondurileeuropene n ceea ce privete domeniile eligibilepentru finanare, costurile eligibile ale proiectelor,

nivelul maxim al finanrii din surse publice,contribuia minim a beneficiarilor, procedura deautorizare i implementare.

De aceea, n cadrul fiecrui program operaional,autoritile de management mpreun cu ConsiliulConcurenei au identificat ajutoarele de stat i auluat msuri pentru respectarea regulilorcomunitare n domeniu, n vederea crerii cadruluilegal pentru accesarea de ctre agenii economici afondurilor europene. Astfel, 18 dintre schemele

existente n prezent n Romnia sunt finanate dinfonduri europene: 12 n cadrul ProgramuluiOperaional Sectorial Creterea CompetitivitiiEconomice, 3 n cadrul Programului OperaionalRegional i 3 n cadrul Planului Naional deDezvoltare Rural.

Cea mai mare pondere o dein schemele ce au caobiectiv principal dezvoltarea regional aRomniei prin sprijinirea investiiilor i a crerii de


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State aid measures, in order to be submitted to theEuropean Commission. At the same time, theCompetition Council represents Romania bothwithin multilateral meetings organized by theEuropean Commission with all Member States, and

within working meetings with experts of theEuropean Commission on certain cases (such as:Ford Craiova, Tractorul Brasov, privatization ofElectrica Muntenia Sud, issues related to thefinancing from structural funds of the investmentaimed at developing and improving of the gas andpower supply networks).

Since June 2008, a pre-consultation mechanismwith the European Commission experts in theprivatization field has been initiated, at the RCCrequest. Within this mechanism, informationsheets on companies intended to be privatized bythe Authority for State Assets Recovery (hereinafter

AVAS) have been transmitted to the EC. Furthertechnical consultations with the EC took place onthese cases, in order to avoid the existence of anyincompatible State aid elements within theprivatization processes. Subsequently, theRomanian authorities have ordered adequatemeasures aimed at ensuring compliance with Stateaid community rules, such as: amending of theprivatization legislation in mining and R&D sectors,

cancellation of the privatization procedures forcertain companies from these sectors, as well asrevision of the privatization strategies took intoaccount for certain companies.

The majority of the RCC activities in the field ofState aid are related to collaboration with publicauthorities, within a process of identifying andelaborating State aid schemes, in order to ensuretheir compatibility with community legislation. Inthis context, it should be mentioned that, since the

early 2007, a number of 68 schemes have beendrawn up (24 State aid schemes, and 44 de minimisschemes). Out of these schemes, 22 have beenelaborated on the basis of EC regulationsconcerning State aids exempted from theobligation of notification. The RCC has givenadvisory opinion on all these schemes, that havebeen transmitted to the EC, for informationpurposes; nowadays, undertakings have thepossibility to access these schemes in order to getneeded financing.

Special attention should be paid to the financingfrom the European funds of the projects carried outby undertakings in Romania, because nationalauthorities with competences in State aid fieldhave to check their compliance both with State aid

rules, and with rules concerning the Europeanfunds. Thus, the implementing process gets anincreasing complexity, but the observance of theobligations assumed by Romania as EU MemberState is ensured, any arising of further troublescaused by non-observance of these obligationsbeing avoided.

Although State aid legislation aims, as a principle, atreaching several common objectives (regionaldevelopment and cohesion, environmentprotection, promoting R&D&I activities, humancapital development, etc.), it could impede theimplementation of procedures related to theEuropean funds, as concerns the eligible fields tobe financed, the eligible costs of the projects, themaximum level of financing from public sources,the minimum contribution of the beneficiaries, theauthorizing and implementing procedure.

Thus, the Management Authorities within eachoperational program, in cooperation with the RCC,have identified State aids and took measures aimed

at the observance of the community rules in thefield, in order to create the legal framework for theaccessing of European funds by undertakings. Itshould be mentioned that, out of the existingRomanian schemes, 18 are financed fromEuropean funds: 12 within the SectoralOperational Program Increasing the EconomicCompetitiveness, 3 within the RegionalOperational Program, and 3 within the NationalRural Development Program.

The majority of these schemes have as mainobjective the Romania regional development, bysupporting investment and jobs creation.


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locuri de munc (8 scheme). Aceasta se justificprin faptul c toate regiunile de dezvoltare dinRomnia sunt considerate zone asistate n sensulart. 87(3)(a) al Tratatului CE, care pot beneficia deun nivel de finanare mai ridicat, att din fonduri

naionale ct i din fonduri comunitare. Totodat,avnd n vedere necesitatea susinerii investiiilor ncapital uman n scopul atingerii dezideratului decoeziune social al UE, autoritatea demanagement a Programului OperaionalDezvoltarea Resurselor Umane, mpreun cuConsiliul Concurenei au elaborat dou scheme deajutor de stat i o schem de minimis, avnd caobiectiv instruirea angajailor, ocupareapersoanelor defavorizate i a celor cu handicap,asigurarea securitii i proteciei sntii la loculde munc. n situaia economic actual,acordarea unor astfel de ajutoare poate avea un rolsemnificativ n reducerea impactului crizeieconomice, prin diminuarea omajului iasigurarea unui bazin de for de munc binepregatit, capabil s se adapteze mai uor i scontribuie la relansarea economiei.

n ultima perioad a devenit din ce n ce maievident importana covritoare a sectoruluienergetic n economia naional i internaional.

n acest context, menionm faptul c experii

autoritii de management a POS Competitivitate,Organismului Intermediar pentru Energie iConsiliului Concurenei au conlucrat pentruelaborarea unei scheme de ajutor de stat menit ssprijine investiiile pentru extinderea imodernizarea reelelor de distribuie a energieielectrice i gazelor naturale. Dat fiind specificulsectorului i al proiectelor vizate, aceast msurtrebuie ns notificat Comisiei Europene iimplementat doar dup obinerea aprobrii dinpartea forului comunitar.

Toate msurile de ajutor de stat pe care le-ammenionat pn acum au fost elaborate innd contde reglementrile comunitare existente. n prezent,avand n vedere circumstanele excepionaledeterminate de criza actual, Comisia European adecis s flexibilizeze temporar condiiile pentruacordarea anumitor msuri de sprijinire a accesului

Ajutorul de stat n contextul crizei

la finanare, att pentru instituiile financiare ct ipentru ceilali ageni economici.

n acest context, Consiliul Concurenei a ntreprinso serie de aciuni pentru a veni n sprijinul

autoritilor romne n ncercarea de aprentmpina i contracara, pe ct posibil, efectelenegative ale crizei economico-financiare asupraeconomiei romneti.

Experii Consiliului Concurenei au colaborat cureprezentanii AVAS n vederea elaborrii cadruluilegal pentru instituirea unor msuri de sprijindestinate societilor din portofoliulAVAS i menitea contracara efectele negative ale actualei crizeeconomico-financiare mondiale. n acest sens,dup consultarea prealabil a Comisiei Europene,a fost adoptat O.U.G. nr. 206/2008, prin care secreeaz cadrul general pentru acordarea deajutoare de stat pentru salvarea i restructurareafirmelor n dificultate sub form de credite iealonri la plata obligaiilor fiscale, comerciale ibancare. n temeiul acestei ordonane, a fost creatun sistem de ajutor de stat pentru salvareasocietilor din portofoliul AVAS aflate n dificultate

care presupune o schem de ajutor de stat desalvare pentru IMM-uri, precum i posibilitatea dea acorda ajutoare de stat individuale. n prezent,sistemul de ajutor de stat face obiectulmecanismului de pre-notificare derulat cu ComisiaEuropean, urmnd ca, n funcie de poziiareprezentanilor acesteia, s se efectuezenotificarea formal n vederea obinerii unei deciziide aprobare.

Totodat, menionm faptul c autoritile romne

intenioneaz s extind aria de aplicabilitate aacestui sistem de ajutor de stat i ctre ageniieconomici din portofoliul Ministerului Economiei.De asemenea, a fost elaborat un proiect deHotrre de Guvern n vederea instituirii unuimecanism de ajutor de stat privind restructurareaagenilor economici din portofoliul AVAS i alMinisterului Economiei, n scopul depiriiefectelor crizei economico-financiare. Se creeazastfel cadrul legal pentru acordarea de ajutoare de

Salvare i restructurare - agenii economici dinportofoliul AVAS i ai Ministerului Economiei


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This is a result of the special situation of theRomanian development regions, all of thembeing considered as assisted areas under the Art.87(3) (a) of the European Community Treaty; sothey have possibility to benefit by a higher

financing, both from national funds, and fromcommunity ones. At the same time, taking intoaccount the necessity to support investment inhuman capital in order to reach the EU socialcohesion objective, the Management Authority ofthe Operational Program Human ResourcesDevelopment and the RCC have together workedout 3 schemes (2 State aid schemes and one deminimis scheme), having as objective training ofemployees, employment of disfavoured people,and of people with disabilities, ensuring of securityand health protection on the working place. In thecurrent economic situation, granting such aidsmight have a significant role in the decreasing of theeconomic crisis impact, by diminishingunemployment and ensuring a well-trained labourresource, able to easily adapt and to contribute tothe re-launching of the economy.

Taking into account the significant importance ofthe energy sector, that has become more obviousboth within the national and the internationaleconomy, experts in the Management Authority of

t h e S e c t o r a l O p e r a t i o n a l P r o g r a mCompetitiveness, together with those in theEnergy Intermediate Body, and those in the RCChave worked out a State aid scheme aimed atsupporting investment into enlargement andmodernizing of the distribution networks for powerand gas. The above mentioned measure should benotified to the EC and may be implemented onlyafter getting approval from this community body,given the specific nature of this sector and of itsrelated projects.

All the above mentioned State aid measures havebeen worked out by taking into account the existingcommunity rules. Nowadays, taking intoconsideration the outstanding circumstancesbrought about by the current crisis, the EC hasdecided to temporarily get flexible conditionsrequired for granting certain supporting measures

State Aid in the crisis context

for the access to financing, both for financialinstitutions and for the other undertakings.

In this context, the RCC has undertaken severalactions aimed at supporting the Romanian

authorities in their endeavour to forestall andcounteract, as possibly as it may be, negative effectsof the economic-financial crisis on the Romanianeconomy.

The RCC experts collaborated with the AVASrepresentatives, in order to elaborate the legalframework for establishing of supporting measuresdedicated to undertakings from the AVAS portfolioand intended to counteract the negative effects ofthe current international economic-financial crisis.In this respect, after preliminary consultation withthe EC, a Government Emergency Ordinance hasbeen adopted, in the view to create generalframework for granting State aids for rescue andrestructuring firms in difficulty, in forms of creditsand of payment phasing for tax, commercial andbanking duties (namely the GovernmentEmergency Ordinance no. 206/2008). On the basis

of this Emergency Ordinance, a system of State aidfor rescuing undertakings in difficulty in the AVASportfolio, consisting in a State aid for rescuescheme aimed at the SMEs, as well as in thepossibility of granting individual State aids has beencreated. At present, the above mentioned State aidsystem is subject of the pre-notification mechanismestablished between the RCC and the EC, and,depending on the EC representatives attitude, it issupposed to be formally notified in order to get anapproval decision.

At the same time, it should be mentioned that theRomanian authorities intend to extent theapplicability area of this State aid system towardsthe undertakings in the Ministry of Economyportfolio. Also, a Government Decision draft hasbeen elaborated in order to set up a State aidmechanism for restructuring undertakings in theportfolios of the AVAS and of the Ministry ofEconomy, aimed at outrunning the economic-

Rescue and restructuring undertakings fromthe portfolios of AVAS and of the Ministry ofEconomy


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stat de restructurare, n cadrul unei scheme deajutor de stat sau ca ajutoare individuale, dup caz,pentru IMM-urile i pentru ntreprinderile mariaf late n autoritatea, coordonarea sausubordonarea AVAS i a Ministerului Economiei.

Proiectul de act normativ va fi transmis n cadrulmecanismului de pre-notificare experilor DirecieiGenerale Concuren din cadrul ComisieiEuropene, urmnd ca acesta s fie notificatComisiei Europene n vederea autorizrii.

n prezent, Consiliul Concurenei colaboreaz cuEximBank n vederea asigurrii conformitii cunoile reglementri prevzute de ComunicareaComisiei Europene privind cadrul temporar dereglementare a msurilor de ajutor de stat destinatfacilitrii accesului la finanare n actuala perioadde criz economic i financiar, fiind astfel n cursde finalizare o schem de ajutor de stat sub formade garanii.

Schema se adreseaz agenilor economici care seafl n prezent n dificultate datorit efectelor crizeifinanciare mondiale. Facilitile sub form degaranii pentru contractarea de credite de labncile comerciale se acord n scopul deblocrii

accesului la finanare a beneficiarilor i pentruasigurarea continuitii n desfurarea activitiiacestora. Schema de ajutor de stat va fi aplicabilpn la data de 31.12.2010.

- EximBank - schema de garanii

Recomandri

Una dintre msurile ce pot fi luate de autoritilecare administreaz i/sau implementeaz schemede ajutor n vigoare este aceea de a modifica

bugetul i numrul de beneficiari n situaia n careaceasta se impune pentru a rspunde necesitiloractuale de finanare identificate n practic.

Aceast msur este preferabil instituirii unor noischeme de ajutor de stat cu acelai obiectiv, pentrua face accesibil finanarea din fonduri publice ncondiii de celeritate.

Totodat, innd cont de recentele reglementriadoptate de Comisia European i n linie cumsurile de sprijin adoptate de celelalte statemembre, este posibil elaborarea de scheme deajutor prin care s se acorde agenilor economicigranturi n valoare de 500000 de euro pe operioad de 3 ani, garanii cu prime anuale redusesau credite cu dobnzi subvenionate. Mai mult,Consiliul Concurenei a purtat discuii cureprezentanii Autoritilor de Management cuprivire la posibilitatea de a transforma anumitescheme de minimis, unde ajutorul este limitat la200.000 euro, n scheme n cadrul crora asistenafinanciar poate ajunge pn la suma de 500.000euro.

Consiliul Concurenei, prin experii si, st ladispoziia furnizorilor de ajutor de stat i dorete scoopereze strns n vederea elaborrii de schemede ajutor de stat care s obin aprobarea ComisieiEuropene i a cror punere n practic s conducla rezolvarea, n msur posibil, a problemelorcurente din economie.


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financial crisis effects. Thus, it will be created thelegal framework for granting restructuring Stateaids, within a State aid scheme or as individual aids- as the case may be - to SMEs and to largecompanies being under the authority, coordination

or subordination of AVAS and, respectively, of theMinistry of Economy. The draft of the legal actshould be transmitted to experts in EC DGCOMP,within the pre-notification mechanism, and it'ssupposed to be further notified to the EC, in orderto get authorization.

At the moment, the RCC collaborates withEximbank to draw up a State aid scheme in form ofguarantees, in order to ensure concordance withnew regu l a t i on s fo re seen by the ECCommunication concerning the temporaryFramework of regulating State aid measures aimedat facilitating access to financing within this periodof economic and financial crisis.

The scheme is addressed to undertakings that, atthe moment, are in difficulty because of theinternational financial crisis effects. Facilitiesgranted as guarantees for contracting credits fromthe commercial banks have the aim to relieve the

access to financing for the beneficiaries and toensure continuity of developing of their activities.This State aid scheme will be applicable until 31December 2010.

Eximbank guarantees scheme

Recommendations

As a response to the currently identified financingnecessities, the authorities administering and/orimplementing in force state aid schemes can set up

a measure to modify the budget and the number ofthe beneficiaries for an existing scheme. Thisshould be preferable, in order to ensure the accesswith more celerity to financing from public funds.

At the same time, taking into account the ECrecently adopted regulations, and in line withsupporting measures adopted by the otherMember States, it is possible to elaboratesupporting schemes to supply undertakings withgrants until a maximum amount of Euros 500000on a 3 years period, guarantees with reducedannual premium, or credits with subsidizedinterests. Also, the RCC has discussed with theManagement Authorities representatives on thepossibility to change certain de minimis schemesthat have an aid limited at Euros 200000, inschemes where financial assistance can reach anamount of Euros 500000.

The RCC remains at the disposal of state aidgrantors, by its experts, and intends to maintain aclose cooperation with them, in order to work out

adequate state aid schemes that could be approvedby the EC and implemented in such a manner as tohelp solving the current problems within theeconomy.


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1. Criza financiar i impactul acesteia asupraeconomiei comunitare

Primele semne ale crizei au aprut la sfritul luniidecembrie 2006 pe piaa financiar din StateleUnite ale Americii. Un cumul de factori care s-aureunit n mod nefericit n acelai moment aucondus la o situaie de criz. Dezvoltarea frprecedent a unor instrumente financiaresecundare a cror complexitate ascundea uneorislabiciuni fundamentale, ncrederea nelimitat aageniilor de supraveghere a pieei n efectul autoregulator al pieei libere, boomul imobiliar isupraevaluarea de ctre clieni a posibilitilorproprii de returnare a mprumuturilor contractateau conlucrat la crearea unui blocaj. Dei criza afost previzibil, amploarea acesteia a depit cumult tot ce s-a putut imagina.

Criza din Statele Unite s-a transferat rapid pe ntreg

mapamondul. Gigani ai lumii financiare s-au trezitc trebuie s fac fa falimentului. Inevitabilefectele s-au facut simite n cazul majoritiicompaniilor i al persoanelor fizice. Creterileeconomice att de laudate n anii anteriori s-austopat iar omerii au nceput s ngroae rndurile.

Pe lng problemele specifice, legate n special depiaa american a creditelor ipotecare i degarantarea activelor prin ipoteci sau de pierderile

generate de adoptarea de ctre diferite bnci aunor strategii extrem de riscante, sectorul bancar seconfrunt cu o erodare general a ncrederii.Pierderea ncrederii pe pia are valene duble. Pede o parte, clienilor le este team s i pstrezedepozitele bancare, iar pe de cealalt parte,bncile au devenit reticente n activitatea decreditare. Lipsa general de siguran cu privire lariscul de credit al diferitelor instituii financiare asectuit piaa mprumuturilor interbancare i afcut ca accesul la lichiditi al instituiilorfinanciare s devin tot mai dificil.

Uniunea European este o parte activ aeconomiei globale, i astfel, criza s-a insinuat pevechiul continent n mai puin de un an de laapariia sa pe trmul american. Efectele asupraeconomiei comunitare au fost similare celordeclarate de partenerii americani. Recesiunea s-ainstalat iar consecinele se observ in mod clar:

scderea (n cel mai fericit caz) a creteriieconomice, creterea omajului, majorareanumrului de falimente, scderea exportului,diminuarea veniturilor bugetare. Acestora li seadaug i ameninrile la adresa existeneidiferitelor instituii financiare care se confrunt cudificulti ca urmare a modelului de afaceri adoptatsau a practicilor lor economice, ale cror carenesunt scoase n eviden i exacerbate de criza de pepieele financiare.

Rezumat

Criza financiar ce a cuprins economia mondial a obligat Comisia European s reacioneze prinadoptarea unor msuri care s limiteze efectele negative i s stimuleze deblocarea activitii de creditarebancar ctre societi i s ncurajeze companiile s continue s investeasc ntr-o economie cu o creteredurabil.

Cuvinte cheie: criz, Comisia European, ajutor de stat, msuri de sprijin, concuren.

CONSIDERAII ASUPRA MSURILORANTICRIZ PROMOVATE DE

4COMISIA EUROPEAN5Daniel DIACONESCU6Marius POPA

4 Cadrul comunitar temporar pentru msurile de ajutor de stat de sprijinire a accesului la finanare n contextul actualei crize financiare i economice,publicat n Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene nr.C16/22.01.2009, modificat la data de 25 februarie 2009.

5 Director al Direciei de Raportare, Monitorizare i Control al Ajutoarelor de Stat.6 Inspector de concuren, Direcia de Raportare, Monitorizare i Control al Ajutoarelor de Stat.


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1. The financial crisis and its impact on thecommunity economy

The first signs of the crisis appeared at the end ofDecember 2006 on the financial market in theUnited States of America. A multitude of factorsthat unfortunately reunited at the same time led toa crisis situation. The unprecedented developmentof some secondary financial instruments of acomplexity which sometimes hided fundamentalweaknesses, the unlimited faith that the marketsurveillance agencies had in the self regulatingeffect of the free market, the real-estate boom andthe clients' over-evaluation of their ownpossibilities of returning the contracted loans, allthese worked together and created a blocking.

Although the crisis was predictable, its magnitudewent way beyond everything that had beenimagined.

The United States crisis quickly transferred to theentire globe. Giants of the financial world foundthemselves in face of bankruptcy. Inevitable, theeffects were felt within the majority of theundertakings and natural persons. The highlypraised previous years' economic growths stopped,while the unemployed started to thicken the rows.

Besides the specific problems, mainly related to theAmerican market of mortgage loans and the

guarantee of assets through mortgages or the lossesgenerated by the adoption of different banks ofsome very risky strategies, the banking sectorconfronts itself with a general erosion of trust. Theloss of trust in the market has a double meaning.On the one hand, clients are afraid to keep theirbank deposits, and on the other hand, banks havebecome skeptical in the crediting activity. Thegeneral lack of safety concerning the risk ofcrediting of diverse financial institutions has driedup the market of inter-banking loans and made itmore and more difficult for the financial institutionsto access liquidities.

The European Union is an active part of the globaleconomy, and thus, the crisis insinuated in Europein less than a year since its appearance on the

American soil. The effects on the communityeconomy were similar to those declared by the

American partners. The recession installed itself

and the consequences are clearly observed: thedecrease (in the happiest scenario) of theeconomic growth, the increase of unemployment,the increasing number of bankruptcies, thedecrease of exports, the reducing of budgetaryincomes. Besides these, there are added threats tothe existence of different financial institutions thatconfront themselves with difficulties, as aconsequence of the adopted business model ortheir economic practices, which have their flaws

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE ANTI-CRISISMEASURES PROMOTED BY THE

7EUROPEAN COMMISSION8Daniel DIACONESCU

9Marius POPA

10Abstract

The financial crisis that engulfed the global economy determined the European Commission to react byadopting some measures that would limit the negative effects, stimulate the release of bank crediting toundertakings and encourage the companies to continue to invest in an economy with a sustainable growth.

Keywords: crisis, European Commission, state aid, measures of support, competition.

7 Communication from the Commission Temporary Community framework for State Aid measures to support access to finance in the current financial andeconomic crisis, OJ C16 of 22.01.2009, amended on February 25th 2009.

8Head of Directorate of Reporting, Monitoring and Control of State Aid.9Competition inspector, Directorate of Reporting, Monitoring and Control of State Aid.10 Translated into English by Marius Popa.


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2. Necesitatea adoptrii unor msuri temporarede sprijin

3. Instrumente utilizate pentru acordarea deajutorare de stat n contextul existenei crizei

Lund act de situaia existent, Comisia Europeana considerat imperativ necesar s adopte un plan

11

european de redresare economic pentru aaciona n vederea ieirii Europei din actualasituaie nefavorabil. Planul de redresare sebazeaz pe dou elemente care se sprijinreciproc. n primul rnd, msuri pe termen scurtpentru stimularea cererii, salvarea locurilor demunc i restabilirea ncrederii i n al doilea rnd,investiii inteligente pentru a determina ocretere mai important i o prosperitate durabilpe termen mai lung. Planul de redresare vaintensifica i accelera reformele ncepute deja ncadrul Strategiei de la Lisabona.

Msurile adoptate de Comisia Europeanurmresc dou obiective: n primul rnd, caurmare a problemelor de finanare excepionale itranzitorii legate de criza bancar, deblocareaactivitii de creditare bancar ctre societi i,prin aceasta, garantarea continuitii accesuluiacestora la finanare.

Al doilea obiectiv este ncurajarea societilor scontinue s investeasc ntr-o economie cu o

cretere durabil. S-ar putea nregistra, ntr-adevr,consec in e dramat ice dac progrese lesemnificative realizate pn n prezent ar fi stopateca urmare a crizei actuale. Din acest motiv, estenecesar s se acorde societilor sprijin temporarpentru a investi n continuare, combinnd astfelsprijinul financiar urgent i necesar cu beneficiilepe termen lung pentru Europa.

n temeiul articolului 87 alineatul (3) litera (b) dinTratatul CE, Comisia European poate declaracompatibile cu piaa comun ajutoarele carevizeaz a remedia perturbri grave ale economieiunui stat membru. n lumina gravitii actualeicrize financiare i a impactului su asupraeconomiei generale a statelor membre, Comisiaconsider c anumite categorii de ajutoare de statsunt justificate, pentru o perioad limitat, pentru a

depi aceste dificulti, i c aceste ajutoare pot fideclarate compatibile cu piaa comun n temeiulacestui articol.

Drept urmare Comisia European a emis mai multe

comunicri, una dintre ele stabilind Cadrulcomunitar temporar pentru msurile de ajutor destat de sprijinire a accesului la finanare n contextulactualei crize financiare i economice.

Una din msurile de sprijin mbrac formaajutorului de minimis. Noile condiii modific saucompleteaz prevederile Regulamentului de

12minimis , permind acordarea unor ajutoare depn la 500.000 euro.

Acordarea este posibil doar dac sunt ndeplinitesimultan mai multe condiii, printre care:

ajutorul nu poate depi o finanarenerambursabil n valoare de 500.000 europe societate;

ajutorul nu va duce la creterea valorii totale aajutorului de minimis primit de societate peperioada 1 ianuarie 2008 - 31 decembrie2010 la un nivel ce depete plafonul de500.000 euro;ajutorul este acordat sub forma unei scheme;ajutorul este acordat societilor care nu erau

n dificultate la 1 iulie 2008; acesta se poateacorda i societilor care nu erau ndificultate la acea dat, dar au nceput s seconfrunte cu greuti ulterior, ca urmare acrizei financiare i economice mondiale;ajutorul este acordat pn la 31 decembrie2010, etc.

Pentru a ncuraja i mai mult accesul la finanare ipentru a reduce actuala aversiune puternic fa derisc a bncilor, garaniile la mprumuturile

subvenionate pentru o perioad de timp limitatpot reprezenta o soluie adecvat i binedirecionat pentru facil itarea accesului

ntreprinderilor la finanare. n consecin, Comisiaconsider aceste ajutoare de stat compatibile cupiaa comun sub rezerva ndeplinirii ctorvacondiii cumulative:

11 Comunicare a Comisiei ctre Consiliul European, COM(2008) 800.12 Regulamentul CE nr. 1998/2006 privind aplicarea articolelor 87 i 88 din tratat ajutoarelor de minimis, publicat n Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

nr.L379/28.12.2006.


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emphasized and exacerbated by the crisis on thefinancial markets.

Taking into consideration the existing situation, theEuropean Commission has consideredimperatively necessary to adopt a European plan

13of economic redress in order for Europe to exitfrom the current adverse situation. The redress planis based on 2 elements that lean on each other.Firstly, short-term measures in order to stimulatethe demand, the salvage of work places and the re-establishment of faith, and secondly, intelligentinvestments in order to determine a moreimportant growth and a longer-term durableprosperity. The redress plan will intensify andaccelerate the already started reforms within theLisbon Strategy.

The measures adopted by the EuropeanCommission follow two objectives: first of all, as aconsequence of the exceptional and transitoryfinancing problems related to the banking crisis,the release of bank crediting to undertakings and,thereby, ensuring continuity of access to financing.

The second objective is the encouragement ofundertakings to continue to invest in an economywith a durable growth. There could be recorded,indeed, dramatic consequences if the significantprogresses made up to date would be stopped,because of the current crisis. For this reason it isnecessary to provide temporary support tocompanies further invest, thus combining theurgent and necessary financial support with thelong-term benefits for Europe.

Under article 87 (3) (b) of the EC Treaty, theEuropean Commission can declare compatiblewith the common market, aids that aim toremediate severe perturbations in the economy ofa member state. In light of the gravity of thecurrent financial crisis and its impact on the generaleconomy of the member states, the Commission

2. The necessity to adopt some temporarysupport measures

3. Instruments used for granting state aid withinthe context of the crisis existence

considers that certain types of state aids arejustified, for a limited period of time, in order tosurpass these difficulties, and that those kind of aidscould be declared compatible with the commonmarket, in base of this article.

As a result, the European Commission has issuedseveral communications, one of them establishingThe temporary community framework for state aidmeasures to support access to finance in the currentfinancial and economic crisis.

One of the support measures is the de minimis aid.The latest dispositions modify or complete the

14provisions of the de minimis Regulation , allowingthe granting of aids up to 500.000 Euro.The grant is possible only if several conditions aremet, including:

the aid cannot exceed a non refundablefinancing in quantum of 500.000 Euro perundertaking;the aid won't lead to the rise of the totalamount of the de minimis aid received by theundertaking, during the period of time

st st between the 1 of January 2008 and the 31 ofDecember 2010, at a level which exceeds the500.000 Euro ceiling;the aid is granted under a scheme;

the aid is granted to undertakings whichstweren't in difficulty at the 1 of July 2008; thisaid could also be granted to undertakingswhich weren't in difficulty at that date, butbegan to face difficulties later, as aconsequence of the global financial andeconomic crisis;

stthe aid is granted until December 31 , 2010,etc.

In order to encourage, even more, the access to

financing and to reduce the banks' currentpowerful aversion to risk, guarantees on loanssubsidized for a limited period of time mayrepresent an appropriate and well targeted solutionto facilitate the access of undertakings to financing.

As a consequence, the Commission considersthese state aids compatible with the commonmarket, subject to the fulfillment of somecumulative conditions:

13 Communication from the Commission to the European Council, COM (2008) 800.14 Commission Regulation (EC) no 1998/2006 of December 15th 2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to de minimis aid, OJ L 379 of

December 28th 2006.


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17/9015

for SMEs, the reduction of the annualpremium that has to be paid for guaranteesshould not exceed 25%, while for largecompanies 15%;

the maximum amount of the loan should notexceed the total annual wage cost of thebeneficiary for the year 2008. In case of

stundertakings founded starting with the 1 ofJanuary 2008, the total amount of the loancannot exceed the estimated annual wage costfor the first two years of activity;

stthe guarantees should be granted until the 31of December 2010;the guarantee cannot exceed 90%of the loan,during its period;the guarantee applies to loans for investmentsand/or working capital;the reduction of the guarantee premium canonly be applied for a period of maximum twoyears from the granting of the guarantee. If theduration of the loan exceeds two years, themember states could apply, for an additionalperiod of eight years, for the safety premiumscontained in the annex to the ECCommunication regarding the temporarycommunity Framework for state aid measures,without reduction;

the aid is granted to undertakings whichstweren't in difficulty at the 1 of July 2008; theaid might also be granted to undertakingswhich weren't in difficulty at that date, butbegan confronting with difficulties later, as aconsequence of the global financial andeconomic crisis.

Undertakings could face difficulties when trying tof ind f inanc ing in the cur rent market circumstances. Consequently, in member states,

private or public loans can be granted, with a rateat least equal to the visible rate of the central bank,to which a premium is added. The element of aidincluded in the difference between this rate ofinterest and the rate of interest defined in theCommission Communication on the revision of themethod for setting the reference and discount

16rates , will be considered, on a temporary basis, tobe compatible with the EC Treaty subject tofulfilling the following conditions:

this method applies to all contracts closedstuntil the 31 of December 2010, no matter

the length of them; the reduced rates of interest may be applied

st

for payments of interests prior to the 31 ofDecember 2012; starting with this date, theloans should be charged with an interest rateat least equal with the rate defined in theCommunication on the reference anddiscount rate.

the aid is granted to undertakings whichstweren't in difficulty at the 1 of July 2008; the

aid might also be granted to undertakingswhich weren't in difficulty at that date, butbegan confronting with difficulties later, as a

consequence of the global financial andeconomic crisis.

Because of the current financial crisis, undertakingsface, as well, more difficulties in order to gainaccess to financing for the manufacturing of moreecological products. It's possible that the aid in theform of guarantees might not be sufficient tofinance the costly projects which aim to increasethe protection of the environment through theanticipated adaptation to future standards, whichhaven't yet come into force, or by adopting even

more stringent standards than these. Consequently,the additional measures of public or privatesubsidized loans may encourage themanufacturing of ecological products.

Interest rate subsidies for loans destined to financeprojects consisting in manufacturing new products,which significantly improve the environmentalprotection, may be considered compatible if theymeet several cumulative conditions, including:

the aid is necessary in order to launch a new

project; for existing projects, the aid could begranted in case the project cannot continuewithout it, because of the new economicsituation;

the aid is granted only for the projectsconsisting in the manufacturing of productsthat imply the anticipated adaptation to thefuture community standards concerning theproducts that increase the level ofenvironmental protection and that have not

16 OJ C14 of 19.01.2008.


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pentru produsele ce implic adaptareaanticipat la viitoarele standarde comunitare ndomeniul mediului sau adoptarea destandarde mai stricte dect acestea, investiia

ncepe la 31 decembrie 2010 cel trziu, cu

obiectivul de a pune produsul pe pia cu celpuin doi ani nainte de intrarea n vigoare astandardului;

mprumuturile sunt acordate pn la 31decembrie 2010;

ntreprinderile pot beneficia de o reducere aratei dobnzii de 25% pentru societile mari,i respectiv 50%pentru IMM-uri;

rata dobnzii subvenionat se aplic operioad de cel mult 2 ani de la acordarea

mprumutului, etc.

Tulburrile de pe piaa financiar au afectat n modnegativ piaa de capital de risc a IMM-urilor aflate

n faz incipient de dezvoltare prin restrngereadisponibilitii capitalului de risc. Din cauzapercepiei actuale privind existena unor riscurimult mai mari asociate capitalului de risc legate deincertitudini ce rezult din posibilitatea unorateptri reduse n ceea ce privete randamentul,

n prezent investitorii tind s investeasc maidegrab n active mai sigure, ale cror riscuri suntmai uor de evaluat n comparaie cu cele asociate

investiiilor cu capital de risc.

n consecin, anumite limitri prevzute deOrientrile comunitare privind ajutorul de stat nvederea promovrii investiiilor de capital de risc n

17ntreprinderile mici i mijlocii au fost modificatetemporar pn la 31 decembrie 2010. Principalelemodificri se refer la:

mrirea tranelor de finanare maxime de la1,5 milioane euro la 2,5 milioane euro,pentru IMM-ul beneficiar pe o perioad de

dousprezece luni; micorarea cantitii minime de fonduri careurmeaz s fie acordate de investitori privaide la 50% la 30% n cazul zonele neasistate;

Aceast adaptare temporar a orientrilornu se aplic msurilor de capital de risc carefac obiectul Regulamentului general de

18exceptare pe categorii de ajutoare .

Asigurarea creditelor la export pe termen scurtpoate reprezenta o soluie pentru deblocareatranzaciilor intracomunitare i nu numai. Pentruaceasta Comisia European permite pn la datade 31 decembrie 2010 acoperirea de ctre stat a

riscurilor ataate creditelor contractate pentrususinerea operaiunilor de export n condiiile ncare statele membre pot demonstra lipsa unorasiguratori privai care s preia aceste riscuri, prinfurnizarea unor elemente suficiente de prob cuprivire la indisponibilitatea acoperirii riscurilor pepiaa asigurrilor private.

Msurile de ajutor de stat menionate trebuienotificate ex-ante Comisiei Europene. Comisia estehotrt s asigure autorizarea rapid a msurilorde ajutor de stat aferente crizei actuale cu condiiaca statele membre s asigure o cooperare strns is furnizeze informaii complete.

Pn la 31 iulie 2009, statele membre trebuie sprezinte Comisiei o list a schemelor instituite nbaza acestor prevederi.

Totodat, statele membre trebuie s se asigure c

pstreaz evidene detaliate privind acordareaajutoarelor. Aceste nregistrri, care trebuie sconin toate informaiile necesare pentru a sestabili c au fost respectate condiiile, trebuiepstrate timp de 10 ani i furnizate, la cerere,Comisiei. n special, statele membre trebuie s fiobinut informaii care s demonstreze cbeneficiarii ajutoarelor nu erau societi aflate ndificultate la 1 iulie 2008.

n plus, statele membre ar trebui s prezinte

Comisiei pn la data de 31 octombrie 2009 unraport cu privire la msurile instituite n bazaprezentei comunicri. n special, raportul ar trebuis prezinte elemente care s indice necesitateameninerii de ctre Comisie dup 31 decembrie2009 a acestor msuri, precum i informaiidetaliate cu privire la beneficiile de mediu ale

mprumuturilor subvenionate.

4. Monitorizarea i raportarea ajutoarelor de statacordate

Statele membre

17 Publicat n Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene nr.C194/18.08.2006.18 Regulamentul CE nr. 800/2008 de declarare a anumitor categorii de ajutoare compatibile cu Piaa comun n aplicarea articolelor 87 i 88 din Ttratat

publicat n Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene nr.L214/09.08.2008.


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yet come into force or projects that imply thekeeping of even more stringent standards thanthese;

for the products that imply the anticipatedadaptation to the future community

standards in the environmental field or theadoption of more stringent standards thanthese, the investment begins, the latest, on

stthe 31 of December 2010, with theobjective of placing the product on themarket with at least two years before thestandard comes into force;

stloans are granted until the 31 of December2010;

undertakings may benefit from a reduction inthe interest rate of 25%for large companiesand respectively 50%for SMEs;

the subsidized rate of interest applies for aperiod of maximum 2 years from the grantingof the loan, etc.

The disturbances on the financial market havenegatively affected the risk capital market of theSMEs in the early stages of development byrestricting the availability of risk capital. Because ofthe current perception of the existence of muchhigher risks associated with risk capital related touncertainties arising from the possibility of some

low expectations regarding the yield, investors nowtend to rather invest in safer assets, whose risks areeasier to evaluate by comparison with thoseassociated with the risk capital investments.

Consequently, some limitations provided by theCommunity guidelines on State aid to promoterisk capital investments in small and medium sized

19enterprises have been temporary modified untilstthe 31 of December 2010. The main amendments

refer to:

increasing the maximum funding tranchesfrom 1,5 million Euros to 2,5 million Euros, forthe beneficiary SME, for a period of 12months;lowering the minimum amount of funds to beprovided by private investors, from 50% to30% in case of unassisted areas; Thistemporary adjustment of the guidelines isnot applicable to the risk capital measurescovered by The General Block Exemption

20Regulation .Short-term export crediting insurance mayrepresent a solution to unlock the intra-Community transactions and not only those. For

stthis, the European Commission allows, until the 31

of December 2010, the state to cover the risksattached to the contracted credits for sustaining theexport operations in the conditions under whichmember states could prove the lack of some privateinvestors which might assume these risks, byproviding sufficient elements of proof regarding theunavailability of covering the risks on the privateinsurances market.

The mentioned state aid measures must be notifiedex-ante to the European Commission. TheCommission is determined to ensure quickapproval of measures of state aid related to thecurrent crisis, if the member states assure a closecooperation and provide complete information.

stUntil the 31 of July 2009, member states mustsubmit to the Commission a list of the schemesestablished under these provisions.

At the same time, member states must ensure thatthey keep detailed records regarding the grantingof the aids. These records, which have to contain allthe necessary information in order to establishwhether the conditions were met, must be kept for10 years and provided, on request, to theCommission. In particular, member states musthave obtained information showing that thebeneficiaries of the aids weren't undertakings in

stdifficulty at the 1 of July 2008.

Additionally, member states should present thestCommission until the 31 of October 2009 a reporton the measures introduced under this notice. Inparticular, the report should present elements thatindicate the necessity for the Commission to

stmaintain after the 31 of December 2009 thesemeasures, as well as detailed information regardingthe environmental benefits of the subsidized loans.

4. Monitoring and reporting of the granted stateaids

19 OJ C 194 of 18.08.2006.20 Regulation (EC) no 800/2008 of the 6th of August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the common market in application of Articles 87

and 88 of the Treaty (General Block exemption Regulation) OJ L214 of 09.08.2008.

20Regulation .


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Statele membre trebuie s furnizeze acesteinformaii pentru fiecare an ulterior, nainte de 31octombrie a fiecrui an.

Comisia poate solicita informaii suplimentare cuprivire la ajutorul acordat, pentru a verifica dac s-au respectat condiiile prevzute n deciziaComisiei de aprobare a msurii de ajutor.

n contextul actual, provocarea pentru Comisieeste de a menine concurena n faa presiunilorpolitice i sociale de rezolvare ct mai rapid acrizei economice, fapt care ar submina obiectivuldeclarat de a se acorda ajutoare de stat mai puinei mai bine orientate.

5. Consideraii finale

Neelie Kroes, comisarul european pentruconcuren, declara la ntrunirea de la Paris aComitetului pentru concuren al OECD, din 17februarie 2009, c trebuie s fim flexibili nproceduri dar nu n principii i c centrul de

greutate, cnd este vorba de ajutoare de stat,trebuie s fie pus pe calitate i nu pe cantitate. Cutoate acestea, n anumite condiii, este necesaracordarea temporar de noi ajutoare de stat.Expansiunea rapid a crizei impune aplicareanormelor privind ajutoarele de stat astfel nct sexiste o flexibilitate maxim n soluionarea crizei,meninnduse, n acelai timp, condiii de egalitatepe pia i evitndu-se restricionarea nejustificata concurenei.

Dei ajutoarele de stat nu reprezint o rezolvaremiraculoas a dificultilor actuale, sprijinul publicbine orientat ctre agenii economici ar puteaconstitui o component benefic n efortul generalatt de a debloca creditarea societilor, ct i de a

ncuraja continuarea investiiilor att de necesarepentru obinerea unor beneficii pe termen lungpentru cetenii Europei.


21/9019

Member States must submit this information forstevery subsequent year, prior to the 31 of October

of each year.

The Commission might request additional

information regarding the aid granted, in order toverify if it met the conditions provided in theCommission's decision to approve the state aidmeasure.

In this present context, the challenge for theCommission is to maintain competition ahead ofthe political and social pressures of resolving asquickly as possible the crisis, which wouldundermine the declared objective of grantingfewer and better orientated state aids.

5. Final considerations

Neelie Kroes, the European commissioner forcompetition, declared at a competition Committee

thof the OECD reunion in Paris, held on the 17 ofFebruary 2009, that we need be flexible onprocedures, but not on principles and that the

center of gravity, when it comes to state aids,should be on quality and not on quantity. However,in some situations, the temporary granting of newstate aids is necessary. The rapid expansion of thecrisis requires the application of state aid norms, inorder to have a maximum flexibility in resolving thecrisis, while at the same time keeping conditions ofequality on the market and avoiding an unjustifiedrestriction of competition.

Although state aids do not represent a miraculoussalvation from the current difficulties, a wellorientated public support towards undertakingsmight represent a beneficial component in thegeneral effort to unlock the undertakings' crediting,as well as to encourage the continuation of theinvestments that are so necessary in order to obtainsome long-term benefits for the citizens of Europe.


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Cu un record de participare, circa 2500 depersoane printre care 40 de efi de state i guverne,reuniunea de la Davos de anul acesta a adus nprim plan criza mondial i ncercri timide de

gsire a unor soluii. Pe fondul resimirii din plin aefectelor crizei economico-financiare, toatestatele, comunitile i companiile sunt forate s-irevizuiasc propriile evaluri legate de viitor i s-iregndeasc strategiile. Conturarea unei noi formea lumii dup criz a avut n vedere 6 obiective:

promovarea stabilitii n sistemul financiar irevigorarea creterii economice globale;asigurarea unei guvernri eficiente la nivelnaional i regional pe termen lung;modificri n asigurarea sustenabilitii idezvoltrii economiilor;conturarea de noi valori i principii deleadership n perioada post-criz;catalizarea noului val de cretere ctreinovare, tiin i tehnologie;

nelegerea implicaiilor modelelor de afacerin industrie.

a)

b)

c)

d)

e)

f)

Confirmrile celor mai importani factori decidenidin mediile guvernamentale, afaceri i societateacivil reflect nevoia de cretere sistematic iinterdisciplinar pe toate planurile economice,

politice, tehnologice i sociale.Prezent la reuniunea de la Davos, cunoscutuleconomist Joseph Stiglitz aprecia c n timp celiderii economici vorbeau despre experienele lor,

puteai aproape literalmente simi cum se ntunecacerul. Atmosfera a fost foarte bine ilustrat de unvorbitor, care sugera c am nlocuit sintagma "boom

i prbuire" cu "boom i armaghedon". Consensulcare se contura era c prognoza FMI pe 2009 dat

publicitii la nceputul ntrunirii (aceasta se refereala o stagnare global cu cea mai mic cretere din

perioada postbelic) era optimist. Singurul tonmai nltor a fost dat de remarca unui participantcare spunea ca prognozele care ntrunesc consensulla Davos sunt aproape ntotdeauna greite, aa cde aceast dat prognoza va fi de un pesimismexagerat. La fel de remarcabil a fost i pierdereancrederii n piee (s.n). ntr-o sesiune debrainstorming cu o rat mare de participare, cei din

sal au fost rugai s spun care cred ca esteprincipala eroare ce a dus la criz. Rspunsul

20

Rezumat

ntr-un orizont al incertitudinilor i manifestrii agresive a efectelor crizei economico-financiare la nivelmondial, reuniunea de la Davos din 2009 a avut o tem cel puin futurist, prin ncercarea de a trasaconturul lumii dup ncheierea crizei. Tema reuniunii Formarea lumii n perioada post criz ar induce lao prim vedere impresia c sfritul crizei este aproape, permind suficiente speculaii legate de o nouform a economiei globale. Cu toate acestea, glasurile participanilor, uneori timide iar alteori puternice,

nu au confirmat o potenial ncheiere a perioadei de criz, ci mai degrab au reprezentat ncercri timidede gsire a unor soluii de ieire din acest impas, marcate de tensiuni i divergene. Ca i pn acum,Romnia a urmrit reaciile i comentariile reuniunii de la Davos de pe o poziie pasiv, fiind absent an dean de la aceste reuniuni internaionale.

Cuvinte cheie: criz, msuri, efecte, sprijin pentru dezvoltare, stabilitate financiar.

DAVOS 2009 NTRE CHINGILE CRIZEII GLASUL PARTICIPANILOR

21Jozsef Nandor NEMENYI22Carmen BUCUR

21 Consilier de concuren, Consiliul Concurenei.22 Inspector de concuren, Direcia Cercetare-Sinteze.


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Registering a record participation - around 2,500attendants of whom 40 heads of state andgovernment - , this year's Davos reunion broughtthe world crisis and the related shallow attempts at

finding solutions into the spotlight. On thebackground of the very perceptible effects of theeconomic and financial crisis, all states,communities and companies are forced to reviewtheir assessments of the future situation and torethink their strategies. The new draw-up of theworld after the crisis envisages 6 objectives:

promoting stability within the financialsystem and reviving global economic growth;ensuring an efficient long-term governanceat national and regional level;adjustments in providing the sustainabilityand the development of economies;creating new leadership values andprinciples in the post-crisis period;accelerating the new growth wave in thefields of innovation, science andtechnologies;understanding the implications of thebusiness models within industries.

a)

b)

c)

d)

e)

f)

The opinions of the most important decision-making factors of the governmental, business andcivil society areas reflect the need of systematic andinterdisciplinary growth of the economic, politic,

technological and social environments.The well known economist Joseph Stiglitz alsoattended the Davos reunion. He said that asbusiness leaders shared their experiences, onecould almost feel the clouds darkening. The spiritwas captured by one speaker who suggested thatwe had gone from "boom and bust" to "boom and

Armageddon". The emerging consensus was thatthe IFM forecast for 2009, issued as the meetingconvened, of global stagnation the lowest growthin the post-war period was optimistic. The only

upbeat note was struck by someone who remarkedthat Davos consensus forecasts are almost alwayswrong, so perhaps this time it would proveexcessively pessimistic. Equally striking was the lossof faith in markets. In a widely attendedbrainstorming session at which participants wereasked what single failure accounted for the crisis,there was a resounding answer: the belief thatmarkets were self-correcting. The so-called "efficientmarkets" model, whichholdsthat prices fully and

21

DAVOS 2009 BETWEEN THE GIRTHS OF THECRISIS AND THE VOICE OF THE PARTICIPANTS

23Jozsef Nandor NEMENYI24Carmen BUCUR

25Abstract

While we are expecting worldwide uncertainties and aggressive manifestations of the economic andfinancial crisis, the 2009 Davos reunion focused on a futuristic subject, by attempting to sketch the futuremap of the word, as it will arise after the crisis. The theme of the reunion, Shaping the Post-Crisis World,

seems to suggest that the end of the crisis is near, thus allowing sufficient speculations concerning a newstructure of the global economy. However, the voice of the participants - shallow or powerful, by case - did

not confirm a potential conclusion of the crisis period. It was rather a shallow attempt to find solutions forgetting past the standstill, characterized by a set of tensions and divergences. As in the past, by notattending these international reunions, Romania took a passive approach on the reactions and commentsof the Davos reunion.

Keywords: crisis, measures, effects, support for development, financial stability.

23 Competition counselor, Romanian Competition Council.24 Competition inspector, Research and Synthesis Directorate.25 Translated into Eng lish by Ioan D. Popa, competition inspector, Research and Synthesis Directorate.


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majoritii? Credina n faptul c pieele seautocorecteaz. Aa-numitul "model al pieeloreficiente", conform cruia preurile reflect eficient

i pe deplin toat informaia disponibil, i-a luat iel poria de critic.

Acelai lucru s-a ntamplat i cu intirea inflaiei:concentrarea exagerat pe inflaie a distras ateniade la problema mai important a stabilitiifinanciare. Convingerea efilor bncilor centrale ceste necesar i aproape suficient s controleziinflaia ca s obii cretere economic i

prosperitate nu s-a bazat niciodat pe teoriieconomice fundamentate; acum, criza a furnizatmai multe motive de scepticism n acest sens (s.n.Este un model i pentru Romnia i pentru BNR,

care s-a concentrat, exclusiv, pe intirea inflaiei care nu s-a reuit).

n fapt, singurul consens de idei la care s-a ajuns laaceast reuniune a fost legat de constatarea cbancherii sunt responsabili pentru situaia decolaps n care a fost adus sistemul financiar. S-apropus chiar nfiinarea unei bnci care sgestioneze aa-numitele active bolnave. n rest,discuiile contradictorii, chiar aprinse, ntreparticipani nu au condus la concluzii certe, menites vin n sprijinul relansrii economiei globale, cimai de grab la exprimarea unor ofuri ale statelor

n curs de dezvoltare mpotriva marilor coloieconomici, generatori ai situaiei de crizfinanciar mondial.

Rmne ns de vzut care vor fi aciunile concreteale fiecrui stat n ncercarea de ieire din cerculvicios al crizei. Adoptarea unui set de msuriviznd stimularea investiiilor i a consumului,

crearea de noi locuri de munc i o mai atentpolitic n domeniul bancar, n ansamblu. nprivina activitii de creditare, aceasta trebuie sfie n concordan cu necesitatea dezvoltrii, chiari cu pai mici dar siguri, a economiei fiecrui stat,

ncercnd astfel a iei dinpnza de pianjendestul de gros esut, a crizei mondiale.

n loc de concluzii....

Orice nou viziune economic cere bani pentrurelansare i noi tehnologii; deci, pentru aranoastr, pe lng reforme profunde i rapide

pentru ajustri structurale att de necesare avem nevoie n 2009, din cele mai simple raiuni,de credite externe dar i de relansarea procesuluiintern de creditare (dar nu se tie precis din cesurse).

ntrebarea noastr, evident retoric, este: Se poateoare stabili n martie 2009 intensitatea i duratacrizei, sau altfel spus ce se poate face pentru a intradin nou ntr-un trend normal de cretereeconomic sustenabil cu un deficit bugetar redus?

ntre timp, numrul euroscepticilor n UE este ncretere ca i rata omajului i a srciei extreme, ise ateapt falimente rsuntoare de la Gibraltarpn n Islanda, respectiv de la Galai pn laMurmansk. Asta-i globalizarea anului 2009, cucapitalismul caduc.

Pn ce gsim punctul fix att de necesar neconomie, n doctrin i finane, ne gndim cumndrie c ceea ce am nvat n facultate acum20-30 de ani este din nou valabil:

Marx redivivus? (!)

Considerm c aceast criza economic, tot maievident i tot mai greu de stpnit, rezolv douprobleme capitale:

decimarea ntreprinderilor falimentare inecompetitive;decimarea elitei academice economicenscut n ultimii 20 de ani, care nu s-a hotrt

nc dac este de dreapta sau de stnga n

perioada de criz.

22


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efficiently reflect all available information, also camein for a trashing.

So did inflation targeting: the excessive focus on

inflation had diverted attention from the morefundamental question of financial stability. Centralbankers' belief that controlling inflation wasnecessary and almost sufficient for growth and

prosperity had never been based on soundeconomic theory; now, the crisis provided further

skepticism (we underline that this is a valid modelfor Romania and the National Romanian Bank,which unsuccessfully focused only on inflationtargeting).

In fact, the only consensus of the reunion was thatbankers are the ones responsible for the collapseof the financial system. Moreover, the participantsreflected on the establishment of a specific bank,which would manage the so-called sick assets.The challenging debates, sometimes even fiery, didnot lead to certain conclusions on the necessarysupport for reviving the global economy. In fact,they seem to express the sighs of the developingcountries concerning the great economiccolossuses, which had generated the worldfinancial crisis.

It remains to be seen how each state is going toactually act for escaping the vicious circle of thecrisis. The adoption of new measures forstimulating investments and consumption, thecreation of new jobs and a more careful bankingstrategy, especially concerning the credit activity,must be in line with the necessity of developing by making small but sure steps-, the economy ofeach state. The aim is to escape from the thick

spider web of the global crisis.

Instead of conclusions....

In order to be relaunched, any economic noveltyrequires money, as well as new technologies; so,alongside the so necessary, profound and rapid

reforms for structural changes, it is obvious that in2009 our country will need to contract externalcredits and to restart the internal crediting process(by using yet unidentified sources).

Our rhetorical question is: Can anyone establishthe intensity and the length of the crisis in March2009? Or, put in other words, what can be done forregistering again a normal sustainable economicgrowth alongside a low budgetary deficit?

In the meantime, the number of euroskeptics isgrowing within the EU. The same trend is followedby the unemployment rate and by the extremepoverty; big bankruptcies are being expectedfrom Gibraltar to Island, and from Galai toMurmansk. This is the globalization of 2009, and itsno longer valid capitalism.

Until we will find the so necessary fixed point in theeconomy, in the doctrine and in finances, we areproudly realizing that the old theories learned atthe university, 20-30 years ago, are valid onceagain:

Marx redivivus? (!)

We believe that the more and more evident anddifficult to handle crises is solving two capitalproblems:

the elimination of the noncompetitive andbankrupted enterprises;the elimination of the economic academicelite created in the last 20 years, which hasn't

yet decided weather it should embrace a left ora right political approach during the crisesperiod.

23


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I. Relevana art. 82 din Tratatul CE

1. Relevana pentru ntreprinderi

Art. 82 din Tratatul CE interzice abuzul de poziiedominant. Prevederea acoper comporta-mentele unilaterale manifestate de actorii puternicide pe pia. Pe lng recentul caz Microsoft, alte

32cazuri europene importante suntBritish Airways ,33 34Telefnica sau AstraZeneca . Aceste cazuri de

rezonan au fost de mare importan pentru

sectoarele respective.

Interzicerea abuzurilor prezint relevan pentrudou tipuri de ntreprinderi:

n primul rnd, stabilete o limit pentru practicilede afaceri derulate de ntreprinderile care deinpoziie dominant pe pia. Nu sunt vizate doar

grupurile corporatiste mari, ci i ntreprinderile dedimensiuni mai reduse, atunci cnd dein poziiidominante pe pia, indiferent de cifra lor deafaceri. Unele sectoare sunt, n mod special,vulnerabile n faa abuzurilor, respectiv cele recentliberalizate. De regul, n aceste sectoare, fotiimonopoliti deinui de stat continu s se bucurede poziii puternice pe pia; acetia nu suntobinuii s dezvolte un spirit al concurenei loiale.

Prin urmate, a trebuit ca autoritile de concurendin Europa s abordeze de nenumrate oricomportamente abuzive n telecomunicaii,transport, energie, servicii potale i n alte domeniisimilare. Dac o ntreprindere este dominant, artrebui s aib n vedere derularea un programspecial de conformitate care s asigure aliniereapracticilor sale la prevederile art. 82 EC din TratatulCE, precum i la prevederile echivalente dinlegislaia naional incident (care pot fi chiar mai

24

Rezumat

Avem acum ceea ce ateptam cu atta nerbdare? n decembrie, Comisia European a emis un Document28de orientare privind prioritile sale n aplicarea art. 82 din Tratatul CE . Documentul urmrete s pun

punct discuiilor extensive care au fost derulate n cadrul comunitii antitrust i care au privit maniera de aimplementa interzicerea abuzului de poziie dominant. De fapt, muli observatori par a nu fi de acord cuceea ce unii consider ca fiind cea mai fructuoas dezbatere n domeniul dreptului concurenei dinultimele decenii. Nu doar aplicarea art. 82 a constituit subiectul dezbaterii, ci toat problematica legat de

abordarea mai economic n dreptul concurenei. n 2005, Grupul economic consultativ privind politican domeniul concurenei a publicat un raport care milita pentru o abordare mai economic n dreptul

29concurenei . Ulterior, Directoratul General pentru Concuren (DG COMP) a ntocmit proiectul unuiDocument de discuie privind art. 82, asupra cruia s-au purtat dezbateri acerbe la adresa sa au fost

30formulate peste 100 de comentarii oficiale, publicate de DG COMP .

ntre timp, o voce de cea mai mare importan a exprimat un punct de vedere pe aceast tem: Curtea dePrim Instan a dat soluia n cel mai important caz de abuz din istoria european. Comisia a ctigat cu

31uurin btlia Microsoft . Acest fapt este destul de surprinztor, avnd n vedere c noul Document deorientare nu pare s denote un grad ridicat de siguran intrinsec.

Cuvinte cheie: articolul 82, aplicarea legislaiei, Comisia European, principiu.

PRIORITILE COMISIEI N APLICAREA26ART. 82 DIN TRATATUL CE

27Rupprecht PODSZUN

26 Tradus n limba romn de Ioan D. Popa, inspector de concuren, Consiliul Concurenei, Direcia Cercetare - Sinteze.27 Autorul deine funcia de cercettor senior n cadrul Institutului pentru proprietate intelectual, concuren i drept fiscal Max Planck din Munchen, Germania. Este

expert pe termen scurt n cadrul Programelor Phare din Europa Centrala i de Est.28 Orientri privind prioritile Comisiei n aplicarea articolului 82 din Tratatul CE n cazul practicilor ntreprinderilor dominante de excludere abuziv Comunicare aComisiei, 3.12.200, disponibile la adresa http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/index.html i publicate n JO nr. C 45, 24.2.2009, p. 7.

29 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/studies/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf.30 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/contributions.html.31 TPI, 17.9.2007, Cazul T-201/04 - Microsoft.32 CEJ, 15.3.2007, Cazul C-95/04 P - British Airways.33 Comisia European, 4.7.2007, Cazul COMP/38.784 - Wanadoo/Telefnica.34 Comisia European, 19.7.2006, Cazul COMP/A.37.507 - AstraZeneca.


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I. Relevance of Art. 82 EC-Treaty

1. Relevance for Undertakings

Art. 82 EC-Treaty prohibits the abuse of a dominantposition. The provision covers unilateral conductby strong market players. Important Europeancases, apart from the recent Microsoft case

40 41 included British Airways , Telefnica or42AstraZeneca . These high-profile cases were of

great importance for the respective sectors.

The prohibition of abuses is of relevance for twodifferent types of undertakings:

First, it sets the yardstick for the business practicesof undertakings that hold a dominant position inthe market. This does not just address huge

corporate groups. Smaller-sized undertakingsmight also be addressed if they hold a dominantposition in the market, regardless of their turnover.Some sectors are particularly susceptible to thefocus of abuse-provisions, namely those that wererecently deregulated. In these sectors the formerstate monopolists usually continue to hold a strongmarket position; they are not used to develop a faircompetit ive spiri t . Throughout Europe,competition authorities therefore have had to

tackle, time and time again, abusive conduct intelecommunications, transport, energy, postalservices and similar fields. If an undertaking isdominant, it should envisage a specificcompliance-programme to align its practices with

Art. 82 EC-Treaty and the equivalent provisions oftheir national laws (which might actually be more

43strict ). Such a compliance programme must takethe new Enforcement Priorities into consideration.

25

THE COMMISSION'S ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIESFOR ART. 82 EC-TREATY

35Rupprecht PODSZUN

Abstract

So, is this what we have been so eagerly awaiting? In December, the European Commission issued a36Guidance Paper on its enforcement priorities in the field of Art. 82 EC-Treaty . This paper is aimed at ending

the extensive discussions within the antitrust community on how to enforce the prohibition of abuses indominant positions. In fact, most observers seem to be put off by the result of what some have perceived asthe most fruitful debate in competition law since decades. It was not just the enforcement of Art. 82 thatwas at stake in this debate, but the whole issue of a more economic approach towards competition law.

In 2005 the Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy had published a report asking for a more37economic approach to competition law . The Directorate General for Competition (DG COMP) thendrafted a Discussion Paper on Art. 82, that was subject to a heated debate and to more than 100 official

38comments published by the DG COMP .

In the meantime, someone raised a voice of utmost importance to speak out on this matter: The Court ofFirst Instance rendered its decision in the most important abuse-case of European history. The Commission

39won the Microsoft -battle hands down. Surprisingly enough, though, the new Guidance Paper does notbeam with self-confidence.

Keywords: article 82, enforcement, European Commission, principle.

35 The author is a Senior Research Fellow with the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law in Munich, Germany. He is involved as short-termexpert for Phare funded Programs in Central-Eastern Europe.

36

Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings Communicationfrom the Commission, 3.12.2008. Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/index.html. and published in OJ C 45, 24.2.2009, p. 7.37 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/studies/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf.38 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/contributions.html.39 CFI, 17.9.2007, Case T-201/04 - Microsoft.40 ECJ, 15.3.2007, Case C-95/04 P - Briti sh Airways.41 European Commission, 4.7.2007, Case COMP/38.784 - Wanadoo/Telefnica.42 European Commission, 19.7.2006, Case COMP/A.37.507 - AstraZeneca.43 Cf. Art. 3 para. 2 Reg. 1/2003.


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44stricte ). Un astfel de program trebuie s in contde noile prioriti n aplicarea legislaiei.

Al doilea tip de ntreprinderi, care trebuie sacorde o mai mare atenie Documentului de

orientare, sunt cele care doresc s atace n instananumite practici ale companiilor dominante. Astfelde aciuni pot fi demarate prin intermediulprocedurilor de natur civil. n ceea ce privetepracticile de abuz, Curtea European de Justiie adecis c legislaiile naionale trebuie s asigureposibilitatea obinerii de remedii efective prin

45intermediul aciunilor private n instan. Astfel deaciuni vor urmri, n mod normal, obinereadeciziilor instanelor privind impunerea de remedii

n cazul practicilor celor mai nocive. Astfel dedecizii judectoreti pot fi obinute relativ uor, darnu toate instanele sunt suficient de bine pregtites fac fa caracterului special al aspectelor dindreptul concurenei. Alternativa este de se adresaautoritilor de concuren: Comisiei Europene,dac n respectivul caz este afectat comerul ntre

46statele membre (aa cum se ntmpl deseori ) sauautoritilor naionale ale statelor membre. De celemai multe ori, alegerea acestei ci implic costurimai mici. Totui, exist dou dezavantaje:autoritile dispun de puteri discreionare nalegerea cazurilor pe care le vor investiga, iar

perioada de timp necesar instrumentrii cazuriloreste la latitudinea autoritilor n ciuda faptului ctimpul este un element esenial, deoareceabuzurile pot determina ieirea de pe pia aconcurenilor afectai de comportamentul ncauz.

Documentul de orientare al Comisiei nu este

obligatoriu dect pentru aceasta. Totui, el a fostdezbtut, ntr-o anumit msur, cu autoritilenaionale de concuren. ntreaga discuie aimplicat, de asemenea, i persoanele interesate.Prin urmare, documentul va influena n aceeaimanier autoritile naionale i instanele

judectoreti. De asemenea, acesta ar putea stabiliun precedent pentru autoritile naionale n a-iadopta propriile prioriti n aplicarea legislaiei.

2. Relevana pentru cei care apliclegislaia naional

De cele mai multe ori, astfel de prioriti se situeazn afara controlului judectoresc. De exemplu,exist cazuri recente cnd instanele naionale auconfirmat deciziile autoritilor de concuren de a

nchide anumite cazuri sau de a stopa investigarea47

lor . Prin urmare, principiile autoritilor naplicarea legislaiei au cptat o anumit relevan.n mod normal, autoritile naionale deconcuren nu sunt obligate oficial s ia nconsiderare notele Comisiei Europene, n afarapotenialelor cazuri ce in de circumstaneexcepionale. Chiar i aa, obligaia de stabilire aprioritilor n aplicarea legislaiei nu poate fiextins la nivelul autonom al autoritilornaionale.

Prin cele 26 de pagini ale sale, solidul document ipropune s defineasc - dup o scurt introducere- anumii termeni cheie ai art. 82 i ncearc sofere orientare privind cadrul general alproblematicii. n continuare, sunt tratate tipurileparticulare de comportament, pe care Comisia leva instrumenta n mod prioritar.

Pentru a intra n sfera de aplicare a art. 82, ontreprindere trebuie s dein o poziiedominant pe pia. Poziia dominant pe piaeste definit ca o poziie de putere economic decare se bucur o ntreprindere i care i permiteacesteia s mpiedice meninerea unei concureneefective pe pia relevant, prin posibilitatea de ase comporta, ntr-o msur apreciabil,independent fa de concurenii si, clienii si i,

48n ultim instan, fa de consumatori . Cel mai

important indicator al poziiei dominante este cotade pia. n prezent, Comisia consider explicitnivelul de 40 % ca fiind pragul limit: o cot sub40% nu poate susine sau demonstra o poziiedominant pe pia; pe de alt parte, poziiadominant este probabil s existe dac cota depia depete 40%. n fapt, aceast cifr estesuperioar celor stipulate de prevederile unoradintre statele membre - aa cum este Germania,unde prezumia existenei unei poziii dominante

II. Principiile fundamentale ale Documentuluide orientare

1. Puterea pe pia

26

44 Cf. art. 3, paragraful 2 din Regulamentul 1/2003.45 CEJ, 13.7.2006, Cazurile conexate C-295/04 - C-298/04 - Manfredi; CEJ, 20.9.2001, Cazul C-453/99 - Courage.46 Cf. Comisia European, Liniile directoare privind conceptul de afectare a comerului, JO C 101, 27.4.2004, p. 81 ff.47 Cf. Curtea Administrativ a Regatului Unit, 20.1.2009, Cazul CO/7886/2006 - Cityhook [http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2009/57.html];OLG Dsseldorf, 28.9.2005, Case VI-Kart 7/05 (V) - Sperrfusion.48 Documentul de orientare, paragraful 10.


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The second type of undertaking that should take acloser look at the new Guidance Paper are thosethat wish to take action against certain practices ofdominant companies. Such action can be taken incivil court proceedings. The European Court of

Justice ruled that national law needs to provideeffective remedies against abuse through private49action . In abuse cases, the action will normally

aim at provisional injunctive relief againstparticularly harmful practices. Such rulings can beobtained relatively fast, but not all courts are wellenough-prepared to deal with the delicacy of theproblems within European competition law. Thealternative is to address the competitionauthorities: The European Commission, if the caseaffects trade between Member States (as it often

50does ), or the national competition authority. Thisway is often cheaper. There are, however, twodisadvantages: The authorities have discretionarypowers to choose their cases, plus the fact that theyusually take their time in dealing with a case althou

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