wells v. barile, alaska (2015)

7/25/2019 Wells v. Barile, Alaska (2015)

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Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFICREPORTER.

Readers are requested to bring errors to the at tention of the Clerk of the Appel late Courts,

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, em ail

[email protected].

THESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFALASKA

TAMMYS.WELLS,

Appellant,

v.

PRIMOJ.BARILE,

Appellee.

)

) SupremeCourtNo.S-15590

SuperiorCourtNo.3PA-03-00176CI

OPINION

No.7060-October16,2015

)

)

)

)

)

))

)

AppealfromtheSuperiorCourtoftheStateofAlaska,Third

JudicialDistrict,Palmer,VanessaWhite,Judge.

Appearances: Tammy Wells, pro se, Palmer, Appellant.

PrimoBarile,prose,Palmer,Appellee.

Before:Fabe,ChiefJustice,Winfree,Stowers,Maassen,and

Bolger,Justices.

MAASSEN,Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

TammyWellsappealsthesuperiorcourtsgrantofamotiontomodifychild

custodyfiledbyherformerhusbandPrimoBarile. Tammyalsochallengesthecourts

childsupportorder,itsorderthatshereimbursePrimoforhalftheirchildsPermanent

FundDividends(PFDs),andawritofassistancethecourtissuedforthecustodyorders

enforcement. Shealsoallegesthatseveralofthesuperiorcourtsrulingsshowjudicial

biasandafailuretogivehertheleniencyappropriatetoherstatusasaproselitigant.


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Weconcludethatthesuperiorcourtabuseditsdiscretionwhenitordered

TammytoreimbursePrimoforthePFDswithouttakingintoaccount,asanoffset,the

amountsthatPrimomayhaveowedTammyformedicalcare. Wereversethejudgment

onthisissueandremandforfurtherproceedings. Onallotherissueswefindnoerror

andaffirm.

II. FACTSANDPROCEEDINGS

TammyWellsandPrimoBarilemarriedin1995anddivorcedin2004.

Theyhaveason,bornin1997.TammymarriedLanceWellsafterherdivorcefrom

PrimoandhastwochildrenwithLance.

TammyandPrimosharedphysicalcustodyoftheirsonona50/50basis

pursuanttoanorderenteredinJanuary2009.1Neitherparentwasrequiredtopaychild

supporttotheother.The2009orderrequiredTammytoapplyfortheirsonsPFDsbut

dividethemequallywithPrimo.Theorderalsorequiredtheparentstokeeptheirson

ontheirhealthinsuranceaslong asitwasavailableatreasonablecostthroughtheir

employers,andtosharethecostofanyreasonablehealthcareexpensesnotcoveredby

insurance,uptoamaximumof$5,000annually.

A. LancesMotionToModifyCustody

TammyandLancedivorcedin2013.Thepermanentcustodyorderentered

intheirdivorceprovidedforjointlegalandsharedphysicalcustodyoftheirtwochildren.

Lancemovedtomodifycustodyinearly2014,seekingprimaryphysicalandsolelegal

custody. After holdingan interimhearing inFebruary,SuperiorCourtJudgeKari

KristiansenfoundasubstantialchangeincircumstancesandgrantedLancesmotion.

Asrelevanthere,JudgeKristiansenfoundmore thanampleevidencethatTammy

The2009custodyorderfollowedthiscourtsremandforanevidentiary

hearingonTammysmotiontomodifycustody.See Barile v. Barile,179P.3d944,947

(Alaska2008).

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present[ed]adangertotheminorchildrenbasedonthreatsofself-harmandsubstance

abuse, and leaving the children unattended. She ordered that Tammy undergo a

completepsychologicalevaluationandhaveonlysupervisedvisitationwiththechildren.

B. PrimosMotionToModifyCustody

InNovember2013Primohadmovedtomodifythe2009custodyorder

fromhisandTammysdivorce,arguingthatTammysrecentdivorcefromLance,her

abandonmentoftheirsonwhileshetraveledtoCostaRicaonahumanitarianmission,

and their sons worsening grades at school constituted a substantial change in

circumstances.Primosoughtsolelegalandprimaryphysicalcustody,withTammys

visitationlimitedto[e]veryotherweekenduntil[she]hasastableemotional,financial

and home life. Primo did not ask for child support, but he did ask that Tammy

reimbursehimforhalfoftheirsonsyearlyPFDsasrequiredbythe2009order.

TammyopposedPrimosmotion.Shecontendedthathisallegationsofa

substantialchangeincircumstancesreliedlargelyoninadmissiblehearsay.Shedenied

abandoningtheirsonforhertriptoCostaRica,assertingthatshelefthimtemporarily

inLancescare,withPrimosknowledge,sothathecouldcontinueattendingthesame

highschoolashishalf-brother.Shealsoassertedthattheirsonsdifficultieswithschool

wereunrelatedtothecustodysituation.ShecontendedthatPrimohadagreedtopayfor

theirsonsbraces,andshedeniedowingPrimohisshareofthechildsPFDsbecauseshe

hadusedittopayforthebracesanexpensethepartieswererequiredtosplitevenly

underthetermsofthe2009order.

InhisreplyPrimoaskedthesuperiorcourttoconsiderthefindingsmade

onTammysemotionalhealthintheproceedingsinvolvingherdivorcefromLance.InMarch2014SuperiorCourtJudgeVanessaWhiteheldanevidentiary

hearingonPrimosmotiontomodifycustody. BothPrimoandTammyrepresented

themselves,andtheybothpresentedwitnesses. Ofrelevancehere,PrimocalledLance,

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whotestifiedaboutJudgeKristiansensfindingsonhismotiontomodifycustodyinthe

separatedivorceproceeding. JudgeWhitequestionedPrimoandTammyssononthe

recordbutoutsidethepresenceofhisparents,wherehetestifiedthathewouldpreferto

livewithhismother.

Followingthehearing,thesuperiorcourtmadeextensive oralfindings. It

grantedPrimosmotiontomodifycustody,awardinghimsolelegalandprimaryphysical

custodyofthepartiesson,withTammyhavingvisitationeveryotherweekend.Itfound

asubstantialchangeincircumstancesbasedonthechildspooracademicperformance

whileinTammyscare,TammysdecisiontoleaveforCostaRicaatatimewhenherson

wasonacademicprobation,andTammysemotionalismandthreatsofself-harm.

InmakingitsfindingsonTammysemotionalstate,thesuperiorcourtcited

JudgeKristiansensinterimorderinTammyandLancesdivorce,statingthatbecause

itwasfairlycontemporaneousin timeshewas veryconfident infinding. .. that

LanceWells[had]testifiedconsistentlyinbothproceedings,andshefoundLances

testimonytobeextremelycredible.ThesuperiorcourtalsofoundPrimostestimony

credible,butitdidnotcreditTammystestimonybecauseshewasallaboutdenialand

notaboutacceptinganyresponsibility. Thecourtfoundthechildstestimonycredible

butfoundthathewasinaslightlyparentifiedrelationshipwithhismom,andalsothat

his preference for his mother was motivated partly by the difference in discipline

between the twohouseholds. Thesuperiorcourtdeclined togivecollateral estoppel

effecttoJudgeKristiansensfindingsonTammysemotionalstate,butitconcluded,as

JudgeKristiansenhad,thatTammypresentsariskofemotionalharmtothechildren

anddemonstratesasignificantdegreeofinstability.Thesuperiorcourtalsoissuedatentativechildsupportorderpendingan

opportunityforthepartiestoweighinonwhetherthecourtshouldimputeincometo

Tammy.AsforTammysuseofthePFDs,thesuperiorcourtorderedhertosubmit

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documentationtosupportherclaimthatshehadusedPrimoshalfofthefundstohelp

payforhersonsbraces.

Tammyfiledanoticeofcompliancealongwithdocumentsshowingher

paymentoftheorthodonticbills. Shenotedthatthebracescost$5,600andthathalfof

theirsonsPFDsfortheyears2010to2013was$2,116.50,leaving$683.50thatPrimo

stillowedforhishalfofthebracescost. InresponsePrimoarguedthatorthodontic

workwasnotmedicallynecessary,thathehadneveragreedtohelppayforit,andthat

the2009ordergaveTammynodiscretionastowhethersheshouldturnoverhalfthe

PFDstohim.

C. TheSuperiorCourtsWritOfAssistanceAndTammysMotionFor

Reconsideration

InApril2014PrimomovedthatTammysvisitationbesupervisedand

askedforawritofassistancetoenforcethecustodyorder. HeallegedthatTammywas

encouragingtheirsontorunawayduringPrimoscustodytimeandwassupportinghis

delinquencyfromschool.Thesuperiorcourtissuedtherequestedwrit,whichprovided

that[a]nypeaceofficertowhomthisWritisdeliveredisauthorizedtoassistPrimoin

enforcingthecustodyorder.ThewritstatedthatTammyhadrefusedand/orfailedto

obey[thecustodyorder]andisharboringandsupportingachildthatislistedand

regardedasarunawayintheeyesofthelaw.

Tammymovedforreconsiderationofthesuperiorcourtscustodyorderand

challengedthewritofassistancebasedonfalsepremises.Thecourtdeniedthemotion

forreconsiderationbutreservedforhearingTammyschallengetothewrit.Itscheduled

ashow-causehearingonseveralissues:Tammysfailuretosubmitthenecessaryincome

informationforthecalculationofherchildsupportobligation,herfailuretopayhalfof

thePFDstoPrimo,andherchallengetothewritofassistance.

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D. TheShow-CauseHearing

Theshow-causehearingwasheldinJune2014.Afterhearingfromboth

parties,thecourtorderedthatTammysubmither2013taxreturnbytheendoftheweek

orbefoundincontempt;thatTammyreimbursePrimoforhalfoftheirsonsPFDsfor

theyears2010through2013;andthatthewritofassistancerequirednomodificationor

clarification.InJulythesuperiorcourtsignedajudgmentagainstTammyintheamount

of$2,407.44,reflectinghalfofthePFDsforfouryearsplusprejudgmentinterestonthat

amount.

Tammyraises16issuesonappeal,butwegroupherargumentsasfollows:

thatthesuperiorcourt(1)erredbygrantingPrimosmotiontomodifycustody;(2)erred

byorderingTammytopaychildsupportwhenPrimohadnotrequestedit;(3)erredby

orderingTammytoreimbursePrimoforhalfoftheirsonsPFDs;(4)erredbyissuing

thewritofassistance;(5)displayedjudicialbias;and(6)failedtoapplythelessstringent

proceduralstandards towhichprose litigantsareentitled. Primossingle-pagebrief

arguessimplythatthiscustodycaseisnowmootbecausethepartiessonturned18in

March2015,whiletheappealwasinthebriefingstage.

III. STANDARDOFREVIEW

We review the superior courts custody determination for abuse of

discretion.2Anabuseofdiscretionoccurswhenthesuperiorcourtconsidersimproper

factors in making its custody determination, fails to consider statutorily mandated

factors,orassignsdisproportionateweighttoparticularfactorswhileignoringothers.3

Weapplydenovoreviewtochildsupportissuesinvolvingaquestionoflawsuchas

2 Graham R. v. Jane S.,334P.3d688,692(Alaska2014).

3 Martin v. Martin,303P.3d421,424(Alaska2013)(quotingHeather W.

v. Rudy R.,274P.3d478,481(Alaska2012))(internalquotationmarksomitted).

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interpretingacivilrule,interpretingthetermsofachildsupportorder,anddetermining

thecorrectmethodforcalculatingchildsupport.4But[w]herenoquestionoflawis

involved,superiorcourtshavebroaddiscretioninmakingchildsupportdeterminations,

andwereviewthesuperiorcourtsdecisionforanabuseofdiscretion. 5

Wereviewdenovothequestionofwhetherajudgeappearsbiased,which

isassessedunderanobjectivestandard.6Wereviewotherproceduraldecisionsfor

abuseofdiscretion. 7

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The SuperiorCourt Did Not Err InGrantingPrimos MotionTo

ModifyCustody.

TammycontendsthatthesuperiorcourterredwhenitgrantedPrimos

motiontomodifycustodyandawardedhimsolelegalandprimaryphysicalcustodyof

theirson.Theboyreachedtheageofmajoritywhilethisappealwaspending.Tammys

8challengetothecustodyorderwouldthereforebemoot ifitwerenotforitsrelevance

4 Millette v. Millette,240P.3d1217,1219(Alaska2010)(footnotesomitted).

5 Id.

6 Sagers v. Sackinger,318P.3d860,863(Alaska2014)(citingGriswold v.

Homer City Council,310P.3d938,941n.6(Alaska2013)).

7 Norris v. Norris,345P.3d924,928(Alaska2015).

See Hermosillo v. Hermosillo, 962 P.2d 891, 892 n.1 (Alaska 1998)(decliningtoaddressfatherscustodyorvisitationargumentsbecausetheybecame

mootwhen[thechild]turned18yearsofage).TammyfiledherappealinJuly2014,

andhersonturned18inMarchofthisyear. SeeAS25.20.010(Apersonisconsidered

tohavearrivedatmajorityattheageof18,andthereafterhascontrolofthepersons

ownactionsandbusiness...exceptasotherwiseprovidedbystatute.).

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totheamountofpastchildsupport,whichisalsochallengedonappeal. 9Wetherefore

reviewthecustodyorderandconcludethatitshouldbeaffirmed.

Acourtmaymodifyacustodyawardifitdeterminesthat(1)achangein

circumstancesrequiresthemodificationoftheawardand(2)themodificationisinthe

bestinterests of thechild.10Tammydisputesthateitherrequirementwasmet. She

argues first that the superior court clearly erred in finding a substantial change in

circumstancesbasedonheremotionalinstability,presentingariskofemotionalharmto

herson. Shecontendsthatthesuperiorcourt,inmakingthisfinding,improperlyrelied

onJudgeKristiansensfindingsintheinterimcustodyhearinginvolvingTammystwo

childrenwithLance.

JudgeWhitenotedJudgeKristiansensfindingsinheroraldecision,butshe

expresslydeclinedtogivethemanycollateralestoppeleffect 11ongroundsthattheywere

fromaninterimhearingandthusno[t]basedoncompleteinformationandthat

onlyLancehadbeenrepresentedbycounsel,meaningthattherewasno[parity]in

termsoftheparties[]abilitytopresentevidence.JudgeWhitesthoroughreviewof

the evidence in her oral decision makes it clear that she did not rely on Judge

Kristiansensfindingsasasubstituteforherown,asTammyimplies:JudgeWhitemade

9 See Turinsky v. Long,910P.2d590,594n.9(Alaska1996)(addressing

visitationorderbecauseofitspotentialeffectonchildsupport,butfindingvisitation

issuesotherwisemootbecausechildhadreachedageofmajority).

10 Graham R. v. Jane S., 334 P.3d 688, 694 (Alaska 2014) (quoting

AS25.20.110(a))(internalquotationmarksomitted).

See Morris v. Horn,219P.3d198,208(Alaska2009)(explainingthat

[t]hedoctrineofissuepreclusion,orcollateralestoppel,permitsthatanissueoffact

which is actually litigatedin a former actionmay, undercertaincircumstances, be

regardedasconclusiveinasubsequentcase(quotingF.T. v. State,862P.2d857,864

n.13(Alaska1993))).

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herownfindingsfromtherecordbeforeherwhilenotingthatJudgeKristiansenhad

someofthesameconcerns.Weseenoerror.

Tammynextcontendsthatthesuperiorcourterredinitsdeterminationof

hersonsbestinterestsbecauseitfailedtogivesufficientweighttohispreferencethat

Tammy have physical custody.12 But a court does not abuse its discretion simply

becauseitordersacustodyarrangement that differsfromachilds statedpreference.

Thesuperiorcourthasdiscretiontodeterminewhetherachildiscapableofforminga

trustworthypreference,13anditiswithinitsdiscretiontoconcludethatthechildsstated

preference isunreliablebecause it is based on a reluctance tohurteitherparent14 or

becauseitisotherwiseimmatureorimproperlymotivated.15

Here, the superior court stated that it was factoring in [the childs]

preference but was unwilling to give it a lot of weight. It found that the boys

preferenceforhismotherwasinfluencedbyhisbeliefthatseparationwouldbeharder

onherthanonhisfatherandalsothathewouldhavemorefreedomwithhismother

becausePrimoimposedmorediscipline,bothacademicallyandsocially. Therecord

supportsthesefindings.Thecourtdidnotclearlyerrinmakingthem,nordiditabuse

12 See AS25.24.150(c)(providingthatindeterminingthebestinterestsofthe

childforcustodypurposes,acourtistoconsider[a]childspreference[regarding

custody]ifthechildisofsufficientageandcapacitytoformapreference).

13 Thomas v. Thomas,171P.3d98,103(Alaska2007).

14

See Rooney v. Rooney,914P.2d212,218(Alaska1996)([W]hereastatedpreference [of a child] results entirely from the childs desire to satisfy his parents

wishesorbecausehedoesnotwishtooffendeitherofthemsuchapreferencedoes

notfallwithinthestatutoryambit.).

15 Thomas,171P.3dat103.

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its discretion when, after weighing all the relevant factors, it ordered a custody

arrangementthatwascontrarytothechildsstatedpreference.

B. TheSuperiorCourtDidNotAbuseItsDiscretionInOrderingTammy

ToPayChildSupport.

Tammy contends that the superior court abused its discretion when it

orderedhertopaychildsupporteventhoughPrimodidnotrequestitinhismotionto

modifycustody.WhenthesuperiorcourtgrantedPrimosmotion,thearrangement

changedfromsharedphysicalcustodyona50/50basisanarrangementunder

whichneitherparentpaidchildsupporttotheother tooneparenthavingprimary

physicalcustody.Thesuperiorcourtenteredatentativechildsupportorderreflecting

thischangeandorderedTammytosubmitherChildSupportGuidelinesaffidavitand

2013incometaxreturnsothecourtcouldcalculatechildsupport. Thiswasplainlythe

propercourse;asignificantmodificationofthephysicalcustodyscheduleislikelyto

requireanewchildsupportdetermination,regardlessofwhetheraparentrequestsit. 16

AlaskaCivilRule90.3(a)setsouttheframeworkfordeterminingachildsupportaward

whenoneparentisawardedprimaryphysicalcustody,ashappenedherewhenthe

courtgrantedPrimosmotion.

See Swaney v. Granger,297P.3d132,137n.15(Alaska2013)(even

though mothers request to modify custody was silent as tochild support, court

observedthatunderRule90.3(a)thechangeofachildsprimaryphysicalcustodian

fromoneparenttotheotherordinarilywillrequiremodificationofanexistingsupport

order).

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TammyraisesanumberofconstitutionalchallengestotheChildSupport

Guidelines.Theywerenottimelyraisedbelow,andweconsiderthemwaived.17Finding

noerror,weaffirmthesuperiorcourtschildsupportorder.

C. ItWasAnAbuseOfDiscretionToFindTheOrthodonticsExpensesIneligible For ReimbursementBasedOnFactors OtherThan The

TermsOfThe2009CustodyOrder.

Tammyarguesthatthesuperiorcourtabuseditsdiscretioninorderingher

toreimbursePrimoforhalfthePFDsshereceivedontheirsonsbehalfbetween2010

and2013.ShecontendsthatshehadarighttousePrimosshareofthePFDsbecause

Primofailedtopayhalfoftheirsonsuninsuredorthodonticexpensespursuanttothe

2009childsupportorder,andshesimplyoffsetPrimoshalfofthePFDsagainstwhat

heowedher.Weagreethatthisissuerequiresfurtherconsiderationonremand.

ThesuperiorcourtheardfrombothpartiesonthissubjectattheJune2014

show-causehearing.Primodidnotdisputethatthechildsbracescost$5,600,though

heclaimedhedidnotknowwhethertheyservedalegitimatemedicalpurpose.Thecourt

17 BecauseTammyraisesthemforthefirsttimeonappeal,shehaswaivedher

argumentsthattheChildSupportGuidelinesviolatedueprocessandtherighttoprivacyandconstituteanunconstitutionaltaking.See Beach v. Handforth-Kome,314P.3d53,

57n.10(Alaska2013)(Byraisingthisargumentforthefirsttimeonappeal,Beachhas

waivedit.). Tammydidraiseotherlegalchallengestothechildsupportawardinthe

superiorcourtinamotionforreconsideration: thattheGuidelinesfailtocomplywith

federalregulations,violatetheSupremacyClauseoftheU.S.Constitution,violateequal

protection,andusurppowersdelegatedtothefederalgovernment.Thesuperiorcourt

deniedreconsiderationwithoutspecificallyaddressingthesearguments,butitwasnot

requiredtoaddressthem,asargumentsraisedforthefirsttimeonreconsiderationare

waived.McCarter v. McCarter,303P.3d509,513(Alaska2013).WealsonotethatwehaverejectedsimilarconstitutionalchallengestoCivilRule90.3inthepast. See, e.g.,

Lawson v. Lawson ,108P.3d883,886(Alaska2005)(holdingthatRule90.3doesnot

violatetheFourthAmendment,theFifthAmendment,ortherighttoprivacy); Coghill

v. Coghill,836P.2d921,928-30(Alaska1992)(holdingthatRule90.3doesnotviolate

equalprotectionanddueprocess).

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foundthatthepartieshaddiscussedtheirsonsneedforbracesbutthatPrimowas

disinclinedtopayforthembecauseofhisownfinancialcircumstances.Thecourt

faultedbothparentsfortheensuingimpasse:Primobecausehefailedtofollowupwith

theorthodontisttoseewhetherbraceswereanecessaryexpensethathewasobligedto

share,andTammybecausewhenPrimorefusedtosharethecostshetookunilateral

action bykeeping Primoshalfofthe PFDs and putting it toward the orthodontic

expenses.ThesuperiorcourtruledthatTammyshouldhavecontinuedtopayPrimohis

halfofthePFDspursuanttothe2009orderregardlessofwhatshethoughtheowedher

andshouldhavesoughtassistancefromthecourtifshewantedhimtoshareinthe

orthodonticexpenses.Thecourtalsodeterminedthat,bygettingthebraceswithout

Primosconsent,Tammyhadactedat [her]ownexpenseand wasnot entitled to

reimbursement.ItenteredjudgmentinfavorofPrimointheamountof$2,407.44forthe

unpaidPFDsandprejudgmentinterest.

Weconcludethatthiswasanabuseofdiscretion. The2009custodyorder

requiredthepartiestoshareequallyintheirsonsPFDs,butitalsorequiredthatthey

shareequallyin[t]hecostofthechild[]sreasonablehealthcareexpensesnotcovered

byinsuranceupto$5,000inacalendaryear.Thecustodyorderfurtherspecifiedthat

[a]partyshallreimbursetheotherparty...within30daysafterreceivingthehealth

carebill.Thecustodyorderimposednootherconditionsonreimbursement.Therewas

norequirementthataparentconsenttomedicalcarebeforehavingtoshareinitscost,

andnoindicationthataparentcouldforfeittherighttoreimbursementbyproceeding

unilaterallytoincuranotherwisevalidhealthcareexpense.Thesuperiorcourtcorrectly

observed that both parties shared fault for the impasseover their sons orthodonticexpenses. ButitsdecisionthatTammyshouldnotbe reimbursedforthecostofthe

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braceswasbasedonfactorsotherthanthoseimposedbythe2009orderthatgoverned

thepartiesrightsandresponsibilitiesunderthecircumstances.

The superiorcourt was correct toobserve thatpartiesare expected to

complywiththecourtsorderswithregardtocustodyandthesharingofexpenses,and

wesympathizewiththecourtsapparentfrustrationwiththelitigantsinabilitytoresolve

thismatterthemselves.Butenteringamoneyjudgmentinfavorofoneparentagainst

theotherinordertoresolvearelativelyminordisputeoverchildrenssharedexpenses

shouldbealastresort,especiallyincaseslikethisonewhereeachparentallegesthatthe

otherowesmoney.

WereversetheJuly2014judgmentandremandthisissuetothesuperior

courtsothatitcanreconsiderwhetherTammyisentitledtoreimbursementunderthe

termsofthe2009childcustodyorder.Thecourtshouldmakefindingswithregardto

theamountofthereasonablynecessaryorthodonticexpensesandwhetherthatamount

ispartiallyorwhollyoffsetbywhatTammyowesPrimoforhishalfofthePFDs. We

leaveittothesuperiorcourtsdiscretiontodeterminewhethertheexistingfactualrecord

issufficientforthesepurposesorwhetheritneedstoinvitefurthersubmissionsfromthe

partiesbeforedecidingtheissue.

D. TammysChallengeToTheWritOfAssistanceIsMoot.

Tammychallengesthewritofassistancethesuperiorcourtissuedforthe

enforcementof its custodyorder,contendingthat it falsely identifiedtheir sonasa

runawayandfalselyaccusedTammyofencouraginghimtoleavePrimoslawful

custody.Butbecausetheirsonhasreachedtheageofmajority,anydisputeovertheuse

of the writ to enforce the custody order has lost its character as a present, live

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controversy.18Tammywouldbeentitledtonoreliefonthisissueevenifshewereto

prevail,andwethereforeconsideritmoot.19

E. TammysAllegationsOfJudicialBiasAreWithoutMerit,AndThe

SuperiorCourtDidNotAbuseItsDiscretionInItsTreatmentOf

TammyAsAProSeLitigant.

Tammyrefers toseveralof thesuperiorcourtsrulingsastend[ing]to

proveprejudiceandbiasoftheCourt.Buttheseallegationsofbiasaremerelyanother

iterationof[her]owndiscontentwiththecourtssubstantiverulingsandthereforefail

toestablishbias.20 Wealso rejectTammys contention thatseveral ofthesuperior

courtsrulingstend[]todemonstrateitsfailuretoholdhertolessstringentstandards

thanifshewerealawyer,asrequiredunderBreck v. Ulmer.21

Tammyrefersspecifically

tothesuperiorcourtsdenialofamotionthataskedthecourttoexplainwhyitrejected

Tammysclaimsofbiasinhermotionforreconsiderationofthecustodyorder.Butthe

superior courtbasedits rulingson the lackofmeritin Tammyspositions, not on

18 Jacob v. State, Dept of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Childrens Servs.,

177P.3d1181,1185(Alaska2008)(quotingPeter A. v. State, Dept of Health & Soc.

Servs., Office of Childrens Servs.,146P.3d991,994(Alaska2006)).

19 Peter A.,146P.3dat994(Ifthepartybringingtheactionwouldnotbe

entitledtoanyreliefevenifitprevails,thereisnocaseorcontroversyforusto

decide.).

20 Ward v. Urling,167P.3d48,58(Alaska2007).

21 745P.2d66,75(Alaska1987),cert. denied,485U.S.1023(1988).

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proceduraldefectsinTammyspleadingsthatcouldhavebeencorrected.22Thecourtdid

notviolatetheruleofBreck inmakingitssubstantiverulings.

V. CONCLUSION

WeREVERSEthesuperiorcourtsorderandjudgmentrequiringTammy

toreimbursePrimofortheirsonsPFDsandREMANDforfurtherfindingsonwhether

anoffsetfortheorthodonticexpensesisappropriate. InallotherrespectsweAFFIRM

thejudgmentofthesuperiorcourt.

Bauman v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs.,768P.2d1097,1099

(Alaska1989)(decliningtoextendBreck torequirejudgestowarnproselitigantson

aspects of procedure when the pro se litigant has failed toat least file a defective

pleading);Breck,745P.2dat75.

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wells v. barile, alaska (2015)

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