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REDREDREDREDRED A A A A A CTCTCTCTCT OR {EFOR {EFOR {EFOR {EFOR {EF General maior (r) dr. MIHAIL E. IONESCU , Directorul Institutului pentru, Directorul Institutului pentru, Directorul Institutului pentru, Directorul Institutului pentru, Directorul Institutului pentru

Studii PStudii PStudii PStudii PStudii P olitice de Ap\rare [i Istorie Militar\, Ministerul Ap\r\rii Na]ioolitice de Ap\rare [i Istorie Militar\, Ministerul Ap\r\rii Na]ioolitice de Ap\rare [i Istorie Militar\, Ministerul Ap\r\rii Na]ioolitice de Ap\rare [i Istorie Militar\, Ministerul Ap\r\rii Na]ioolitice de Ap\rare [i Istorie Militar\, Ministerul Ap\r\rii Na]io -----nale, Rnale, Rnale, Rnale, Rnale, R omniaomniaomniaomniaomnia

COLEGIUL DE REDCOLEGIUL DE REDCOLEGIUL DE REDCOLEGIUL DE REDCOLEGIUL DE RED A A A A A C}IEC}IEC}IEC}IEC}IE General de brigad\ (r) prof General de brigad\ (r) prof General de brigad\ (r) prof General de brigad\ (r) prof General de brigad\ (r) prof ..... MICHAEL CLEMMESENMICHAEL CLEMMESENMICHAEL CLEMMESENMICHAEL CLEMMESENMICHAEL CLEMMESEN ,Colegiul R,Colegiul R,Colegiul R,Colegiul R,Colegiul R egalegalegalegalegal

Danez de Ap\rare, Copenhaga, DanemarcaDanez de Ap\rare, Copenhaga, DanemarcaDanez de Ap\rare, Copenhaga, DanemarcaDanez de Ap\rare, Copenhaga, DanemarcaDanez de Ap\rare, Copenhaga, Danemarca Prof Prof Prof Prof Prof . asociat dr. asociat dr. asociat dr. asociat dr. asociat dr . JORD. JORD. JORD. JORD. JORD AN BAEVAN BAEVAN BAEVAN BAEVAN BAEV, Colegiul de Ap\rare [i Stat Major G.S.Rakovski

Sofia, Bulgaria, JOHN BERRY JOHN BERRY JOHN BERRY JOHN BERRY JOHN BERRY, coordonator pentru Consor]iul PfP, Universitatea Na]ional\

de Ap\rare din Washington D.C., S.U.A. HENRI BIGOHENRI BIGOHENRI BIGOHENRI BIGOHENRI BIGO, director executiv al Consor]iului PfP al Academiilor de

Ap\rare [i Institutelor pentru Studii de Securitate, Garmisch, Germania Prof Prof Prof Prof Prof . univ. univ. univ. univ. univ . dr. dr. dr. dr. dr . DENNIS DELET. DENNIS DELET. DENNIS DELET. DENNIS DELET. DENNIS DELET ANTANTANTANTANT, London University, Marea Britanie SORIN ENCU}ESCUSORIN ENCU}ESCUSORIN ENCU}ESCUSORIN ENCU}ESCUSORIN ENCU}ESCU, pre[edintele Asocia]iei Manfred Wrner, Bucure[ti,

Romnia Lector univLector univLector univLector univLector univ . IULIAN FO. IULIAN FO. IULIAN FO. IULIAN FO. IULIAN FO TTTTTA A A A A, consilier preziden]ial, Pre[edin]ia Romniei DrDrDrDrDr . SERGEY K . SERGEY K . SERGEY K . SERGEY K . SERGEY K ONOPLONOPLONOPLONOPLONOPL Y Y Y Y Y OOOOO VVVVV, Harvard University Program for Black Sea

Security, SUA Prof Prof Prof Prof Prof . univ. univ. univ. univ. univ . dr. dr. dr. dr. dr . V. V. V. V. V ASILE SEC|RE{ASILE SEC|RE{ASILE SEC|RE{ASILE SEC|RE{ASILE SEC|RE{, {coala Na]ional\ de Studii Politice [i

Administrative Bucure[ti, Rom=nia Prof Prof Prof Prof Prof . univ. univ. univ. univ. univ . dr. dr. dr. dr. dr . MICHAEL SHAFIR. MICHAEL SHAFIR. MICHAEL SHAFIR. MICHAEL SHAFIR. MICHAEL SHAFIR, Universitatea Babe[ Bolyai, Cluj-Napoca,

Romnia SHA SHA SHA SHA SHA UL SHA UL SHA UL SHA UL SHA UL SHA Y Y Y Y Y, cercet\tor [tiin]ific principal la Institutul de Politic\

Interna]ional\ pentru Combaterea Terorismului, Herzilya, Israel DrDrDrDrDr. JEFFREY SIMON. JEFFREY SIMON. JEFFREY SIMON. JEFFREY SIMON. JEFFREY SIMON, Institutul de Studii Strategice al Universit\]ii

Na]ionale de Ap\rare din Washington D.C., SUA ZHOU JIANZHOU JIANZHOU JIANZHOU JIANZHOU JIAN, Institutul pentru Studii Strategice [i Interna]ionale, Beijing, China Comandor (r) GHEORGHE VComandor (r) GHEORGHE VComandor (r) GHEORGHE VComandor (r) GHEORGHE VComandor (r) GHEORGHE V ARTICARTICARTICARTICARTIC, redactor-[ef al Revistei de Istorie

Militar\, Ministerul Ap\r\rii Na]ionale, Romnia

ADRESA ADRESA ADRESA ADRESA ADRESA Str. Constantin Mille nr.6, sector 1, Bucure[ti, cod 010142,telefon> 0040 21 315.17.00, fax> 0040 21 319.58.01www.ispaim.ro www.sarindar.roe-mail>ispaim @ispaim.ro

Revista este inclus n baza de date a Consiliului Naional al Cercetrii tiinifice din nvmntul Superior,fiind evaluat la categoria B.

Revist editat de Institutul pentru Studii Politice de Aprare i Istorie Militar, membru al Consoriului Academiilor de Aprare i Institutelor de Studii de Securitate din cadrul Parteneriatului pentru Pace, membru asociat al Proiectului de Istorie Paralel pentru Securitate prin Cooperare (PHP).

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ARMAT|, STAT {I SOCIETATE- UE [i necesitatea unei abord\ri strategice a vecin\t\]ii sale

Dr. {ERBAN F. CIOCULESCU................................................................................... 5- An Overview of the Romanian Armed Forces Reform (1990-2008)

Lt.-col. LAUREN}IU CRISTIAN DUMITRU.............................................................. 10 - Considera]ii cu privire la con]inutul [i evolu]ia conceptului de planificare a ap\r\rii [iimpactul introducerii sistemului planificare-programare-bugetare-evaluare

MIREL }ARIUC......................................................................................................... 18- The Trials and Tribulations of the Russian Military-Industrial Complexs Reform

SIMONA SOARE....................................................................................................... 23

STRATEGII {I POLITICI DE SECURITATE- Armat\ [i societate ;n America Latin\> dep\[irea experien]ei de tip totalitar

Maior SIMONA }U}UIANU.................................................................................... 43- Caracterul performativ al securit\]ii

LUCIANA PUCEA ..................................................................................................... 50

PUNCTE DE VEDERE- The Five Day War. A New Security Picture in the Greater Black Sea Area

MIHAIL E. IONESCU, PhD....................................................................................... 61- Teritorialitate [i securitate. Reconceptualiz\ri geopolitice

LAVINIA ASAVEI....................................................................................................... 78- Etica r\zboiului [i a p\cii Dr. STAN PETRESCU................................................................................................... 91- Spa]iul cosmic [i sistemele globale de naviga]ie cu ajutorul sateli]ilor Lt.-Col. OVIDIU STELIAN FIZE{AN............................................................................ 103

TEORIA {I PRACTICA RELA}IILOR INTERNA}IONALE- Balan]a de putere unipolar\. Mai exist\ dup\ 1991 o balan]\ de putere global\?

SILVIU PETRE........................................................................................................... 111

EVENIMENT- Conferin]a Interna]ional\ Security Risks and Threats in the Greater Black Sea Area Dr. {ERBAN F. CIOCULESCU................................................................................... 123

- Din agenda [tiin]ific\ a Institutului pentru Studii Politice de Ap\rare [i Istorie Militar\ ANAMARIA COSTACHE.......................................................................................... 126

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5 ARMAT|, STAT {I SOCIETATE

Dr. {erban F. Cioculescu

Recentul conflict ruso-georgian, degenerat ntr-un rzboi n toat regula, a suscitat nume-roase ntrebri referitoare la interesele i vizi-unea UE i a statelor membre privitoare la Re-giunea Extins a Mrii Negre. Se tie faptul cUE are obiective destul de clare n ceea ce privete rile nvecinate, adic acelea care nu aupe termen mediu ansa de a se integra. Lansareade ctre Uniunea European a Politicii Euro-pene a Vecintii n 2003-2004 a avut ca scopprincipal atenuarea unei eventuale noi cortinede fier ce tinde s se formeze ntre bloculcomunitar i rile aflate la periferia geografica acestuia, fie acestea state nord-africane, dinOrientul Mijlociu sau ri ex-sovietice. Prin aanumitele planuri de aciune, negociate curile vecine, i prin instrumentul de vecin-tate se urmrete democratizarea acestor state,aducerea lor la unison cu rile membre n ceeace privete securitatea transfrontalier, respec-tarea drepturilor omului, recompensa economi-c constnd n participarea la beneficiile pieeiunice europene. Dac statele din Caucazul deSud au puine anse teoretice de integrare, nschimb Moldova i Ucraina sunt considerate deunii politicieni i analiti ca fiind n cri. Elebeneficiaz de poziia vecintii imediate cuteritoriul UE, au sprijinitori n rndul rilormembre i afiniti politico-culturale cu acestea.

n plan geostrategic, UE i Rusia sunt doicoloi pe care realitatea geografic i geopo-litic i-a transformat n vecini direci. Fiecareare o strategie pentru vecintile directe: Politi-ca European a Vecintii, respectiv doctrinaruseasc oficial a vecintii apropiate. Aceste vecinti suprapuse (overlapping nei- ghborhoods ) vor crea n continuare problemepe termen lung deoarece Bruxelles i Moscovai vor percepe adesea scopurile, inteniile cafiind incompatibile, de tip joc cu sum nul. Dac

pentru Rusia meninerea unor focare de con-flict nerezolvate, gen Transnistria, pare beneficdeoarece permite inerea Moldovei n sfera sade influen, pentru UE aceste aciuni sunt percepute ca destabilizatoare, agresive, pericu-loase. Enclava Transnistria este un spaiuneguvernabil, dominat de oligarhii i de crimaorganizat, unde, riscul de a vedea sporind volu-mul traficului de armament, persoane, narcoticeeste din ce n ce mai mare. n acest sens, seface adesea comparaia cu Kaliningrad, teritoriurusesc de tip enclav, unde, pe fondul degradriinivelului de trai i sporirii omajului, crimaorganizat a paralizat viaa economic. Dac amadopta o viziune clasic asupra imperiilor i amconsidera c Rusia i UE sunt forme imperialecaracterizate prin expansiunea teritorial icontrolul resurselor, atunci suprapunerea veci-ntii ar fi cu siguran o cauz de conflict majorn viitor. ns vrem s demonstrm c Rusia,dei puternic ancorat mental n geopoliticasecolului trecut i ntr-un neorealism defensiv motenit din epoca Rzboiului Rece, nu mai areposibilitatea de a face tot ce dorete fr a su-porta consecine suprtoare, iar UE oscileazntre o logic de tip westfalic (ideea de supra-stat federal) i una de tip postmodern, postwestfalic, bazat pe valori comune i pe cedareatreptat a suveranitii de ctre state.

Orict de mult ar dori UE s triasc ntr-ununivers kantian, spre a l cita pe R. Kagan (euro-penii vin de pe Venus), dificultatea continuriiprocesului de extindere a Uniunii i recenteleaciuni agresive ale Rusiei fa de Georgia,soldate cu modificarea statu quo-ului teritorialdin Caucazul de Sud, demonstreaz necesitateaca UE s aib nu doar o abordare politic ieconomic a vecintii, ci mai cu seam unastrategic, spre a putea contrabalansa tendin-

UE {I NECESITATEA UNEI ABORD|RI STRATEGICE

A VECIN|T|}II SALE

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ele hegemonic-revizioniste ce se manifest, acombate riscurile asimetrice i spre a demonstrac este un actor internaional credibil. n acest sens, garantarea integritii teritoriale a statelor vecine (prin mijloace politice), participarea lamisiuni de stabilizare post-conflict i efortul sus-inut spre a crea conducte energetice alterna-tive fa de cele existente, trebuie s se adaugeeforturilor de democratizare i susinere a econo-miei de pia n regiune. UE trebuie s creezempreun cu vecinii si reele de interdependen- economic, transfrontalier, care s ancorezeaceste state n cadrul pieei unice europene.

Agresiunea comis de armata rus pare s

fi favorizat momentan creterea ponderii ninteriorul UE a statelor care se pronun pentrureexaminarea relaiilor cu Moscova i, n acelaitimp, pentru o mai mare implicare a UE n regiu-nea Europei de Est prin Politica European de Vecintate (PEV). Liderii UE se bazeaz desiguri pe iniiativele europene existente, Sinergiala Marea Neagr i cele prospective, fiind cazulmai ales al Parteneriatului Estic, propus deSuedia i Polonia, n mai 2008 (i adoptat deConsiliul European din iunie), pentru a ajutastatele din Europa de Est s accelereze apro-pierea lor de UE. Acest parteneriat urmrete

s ofere o punte de comunicare i apropierentre vecinii de pe flancul Mrii Negre i UE,compensnd caracterul prea general al PEV carese adreseaz i statelor din Mediterana iOrientul Mijlociu. n timp, Parteneriatul Esticar putea deveni ceva similar cu Procesul Barce-lona sau mai noua Uniune Mediteraneean dac va trece printr-un proces de instituionalizare.efii de Stat i Guvern ai UE ar putea s aprobedocumentul pn n martie 2009.

Romnia, ca stat membru al UE i ar defrontier n zona Mrii Negre trebuie s contri-buie mai activ la edificarea unei dimensiuni

rsritene a Politicii Externe i de SecuritateComune i s ncurajeze constant i PEV, maiales prin favorizarea unei coagulri a intereselorstrategice europene care s corespund identi-tii comune n curs de cristalizare. n relaiacu Moldova i Ucraina, Bucuretiul are uninteres raional evident de a servi att intereseleUniunii ca atare, ct i pe acela al statelor mem-bre care dovedesc cel mai mare interes pentruzona est-pontic. Parteneriatul Estic este oiniiativ ce se dorete complementar cu PEV,

de aceea se cer evitate duplicrile, rivalitileinutile i clivajele de interese. Romnia sprijincele dou ri vecine, dar nu dorete evident sajung pe un teren minat, adic la mijlocul unuispaiu de confruntare ntre, pe de-o parte, sta-tele ce susin linia dur fa de Rusia i celecare prefer un compromis constructiv (Germa-nia, Frana etc.) Dac Parteneriatul Rsritean va deveni o arie de confruntare intra-european va trebui msurat atent impactul susineriiacestei iniiative, ns Romnia trebuie s iurmeze i propriile interese strategice, iar dac va exista unitate de viziune cu statele baltice,Polonia, Suedia atunci va trebui s exprimm

clar acest fapt. Parteneriatul Estic trebuie s seadreseze tuturor statelor membre ale UE, nudoar unora, iar dimensiunea estic a PEV nu artrebui decuplat de cea sudic. Dei Romnia,alturi de Polonia, Suedia, rile baltice ar dorica Moldova i Ucraina s devin cndva membriai UE, se observ c probabilitatea lrgirii Uniu-nii n urmtorii ani este foarte redus, de aceeanu trebuie confundate eforturile de apropiere de vecini cu cele de pregtire a acestora pentruintegrare.

Viitoarea Strategie de securitate european ce va fi definitivat probabil la finele acestui an trebuie

s conin referiri mai clare la ordinea teritorialconsacrat la Helsinki i la limita de toleran dinpartea UE, precum i o poziie referitoare lagestionarea vecintii comune cu Rusia.

La Summit-ul Extraordinar al UE din 1septembrie 2008, dedicat rzboiului ruso-geor-gian i implicaiilor sale politico-strategice,statele membre ale UE au luat, prin consens, oserie de decizii favorabile intensificrii coope-rrii cu statele ex-sovietice din Europa de Est Ucraina, R. Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaidjan, Ar-menia i, chiar, Belarus. Temporar au ngheat relaiile cu Rusia, dar acum sunt semne c unele

ri membre (Germania, Marea Bitanie) sunt dispuse s reia negocierile cu Rusia.n ceea ce o privete, Republica Moldova a

ezitat nc de la mijlocul anilor 90 ntre ipoteticaintegrare n UE i practica apartenenei la CSI,ajungndu-se n discursul oficial chiar la doctrinacontradictorie a integrrii concomitente n UEi CSI. Elitele de la Chiinu, aflate n crizidentitar i simindu-se vulnerabile fa de poliide putere exteriori, au dorit s cristalizeze opolitic extern de pendulare ntre cele dou

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Nici sprijinul dat Ucrainei nu a fost lipsit deprobleme, anumite cercuri de stnga i filorusede la Kiev afirmnd c de fapt guvernul ucrai-nean a cedat n secret Romniei platoul Insuleierpilor i a renunat la Bstroe ca rsplatpentru acest ajutor dat integrrii europene ieuroatlantice. Iar felul n care Kievul a propussoluii de rezolvare a conflictului din Transnis-tria fr a rezerva un loc i Bucuretiului la masade negociere (planul Iucenko-Poroenko din2005 SUA i UE le este atribuit doar rolul deobservator n formatul de negocieri) a fost primit cu destul enervare de opinia public dela noi deoarece era vorba de o republic trans-nistrean cu drept de autodeterminare i frretragerea obligatorie a forelor ruseti!

Lipsa reformelor consistente mpiedicacum R. Moldova s poat negocia un nou acordcu UE, unul de asociere, n locul Acordului deParteneriat i Cooperare, iar problema ridicriiobligativitii vizelor pentru moldoveni nc nuse pune. Kalman Mizsei a spus c exist ansereale pentru ca, n termen de un an, Moldovas devin cea mai important ar n proiectulParteneriatul estic, elaborat n prezent de UE.n schimb, Ucraina este mai aproape s obinun acord de asociere cu UE, dei un asemeneadocument nu garanteaz defel integrareaeuropean! La summitul UE-Ucraina, au fost recunoscute aspiraiile europene ale acestuistat. R. Moldova trebuie s ndeplineasc maiscrupulos prevederile din Planul de aciunesemnat cu UE n cadrul PEV, dei nu va aveadefel garania integrrii europene deoarecestate ca Frana cer s se supun la un referen-dum intern, francez, orice propunere de extin-dere a Uniunii. Independena justiiei nu estedestul de evident, combaterea corupiei stag-neaz, libertatea mass-media nu este destul demare, iar alegerile din 2009 vor fi monitorizate

atent. Pe de alt parte, eecul de pn acum altratatului de la Lisabona arunc o umbr dendoial i asupra eficienei PEV.

Concluziile Raportului Comisiei Europenepentru Democraie prin Lege (Comisia de la Veneia), din octombrie 2008, cu privire la amen-damentele aduse Codului Electoral al RepubliciiMoldova n aprilie 2008 au fost foarte critice laadresa oficialitilor politice care au recurs nmod arbitrar la majorarea pragului electoral dela 4 la 6%, interzicerea blocurilor electorale ilimitarea participrii n alegeri a cetenilor

moldoveni cu dubl cetenie. Aceste amenda-mente se consider c n fapt contravin Constitu-iei Republicii Moldova i Codului de bune prac-tici n materie electoral al Consiliului Europei.

Rolul asumat de Romnia n relaia cuMoldova i Ucraina pare a fi unul fix, perma-nent, acela de ancor de securitate i facilitatoral apropierii i integrrii, de aceea tergiversrilei paii napoi fcui de marii actori din cadrulUniunii (Frana, Germania) provoac anumitefrustrri la Bucureti, fiind interpretai ca lipsaunei culturi strategice la nivel european. nsnu trebuie uitat c PEV a primit cel puin douinterpretri diferite n literatura de specialitate.Pe de-o parte a fost vzut ca fiind reflectareaunei mentaliti neoimperiale, anume hege-monia economic a UE, respectiv imaginea uneilumi postwestfalice, postmoderne care ar tindes reorganizeze spaiul european conform logiciiglobalizrii i integrrii supranaionale. Evident,abordarea prin prisma culturii strategice se re-fer mai ales la prima viziune, dei opinm c ial doilea model necesit o strategie. Critica ceamai frecvent adus PEV este aceea c uniformi-zeaz n mod arbitrar abordrile vecintilorestic i sudic, dei fiecare din aceste zone arespecificitile sale.

Literatura de specialitate explic apariia ievoluia culturilor strategice (de securitate) prinfactori psiho-cognitivi precum rolurile, poziiasocial i ateptrile, teoria nvrii din istorie,teoria imaginilor i simbolurilor mentale, dar iprin aspecte sociologice: dominaia elitelor poli-tice asupra celor militare sau invers, ridicareaunor noi clase sociale etc. Gndirea de tip stra-tegic-neorealist se lovete de limitri clare, gene-rate de absolutizarea anarhiei, a mecanismuluide tip joc cu sum nul i dilema securitii.Pentru ca UE s se doteze cu putere militarreal (hard power J. Nye) i s fie eventual un

jandarm global, ar trebui s se transformetreptat ntr-un supra-stat, cu leadership unificat i gndire strategic clasic, caz n care artriumfa modelul westfalic. Dac UE va rmneputere regional, preponderent civil i econo-mic, atunci va avea o cultur strategic de tipsoft, inapt s fac fa att unor agresori,ct i actorilor asimetrici i transnaionali.Clivajul acesta dintre cultura strategic stato-centric, neorealist i cea supranaional iliberal a fost descris de cercettorul britanic Julian Lindley French ca fiind schizofrenie

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strategic, generatoare de paralizie decizionali tentaia revenirii la politici naionale de puteredin partea marilor actori gen Frana, Germania,Marea Britanie. Cultura strategic comun, nopinia noastr, se poate crea fie ca rspuns laameninri (threat-driven response J.L.French), fie ca reacia la balana puterii, sau dinmotive ideologice-culturale.

Prin urmare, UE are nevoie de o abordarestrategic grefat pe o cultur de securitatecomun n relaia cu Rusia i cu ali actori cucare va ajunge s mpart vecintile, nseste nevoie de un consens ct mai larg asupragrilei de lectur a istoriei i RI. Un model neorea-

list de gndire strategic ar sugera valabilitateamodelului neoimperial al extinderii UE pe seamaRusiei, n logicawin-lose , pe cnd un modelconstructivist ar permite o strategie adaptatmodelului postwestfalic de organizare politic aspaiului european. Dac accesul la resurseenergetice i la piee emergente pare s aparinmai ales primului tip de logic, stabilizareastatelor slabe, reconstrucia celor euate i pro-blematica umanitar in de al doilea tipar. Rom-nia va trebui desigur s aleag crui tip de logici se va asocia, deoarece n funcie de opiunearespectiv rezultatele pot fi complet diferite.Primul tipar, cel neorealist, dac va fi aplicat consecvent i cu plata costurilor aferente arputea treptat s izoleze Rusia i s o scoat dinacest spaiu printr-un amestec de presiuni istimulente, ns UE ar avea parte de un actornvecinat ostil i nc puternic. Al doilea modelar permite o coabitare panic cu Rusia, ntr-olume care nu mai e att de preocupat de teritorii,granie, resurse i fore militare, ci mai mult denorme i valori comune, de economie i schimburi.

Momentan, Rusia este puternic ancorat nmodelul de comportament neorealist-imperial, de

aceea se ateapt s vad ceva similar i la UE,dup cum consider i SUA a fi. Cnd nu poateidentifica aa ceva, crede c este vorba de disimu-lare sau pur i simplu de slbiciune, de unde unanumit dispre fa de UE ca actor unitar de politicextern. UE trebuie s aplice consecvent PEV fade statele de pe flancul estic i s nvee s trasezelinii roi care nu pot fi transgresate de state terefr riscuri substaniale i costuri semnificative.n cazuri grave, UE trebuie s poat s i exprimeopoziia n mod ferm i chiar s aplice sanciunicontra celor care acioneaz contrar normelorinternaionale. Rusiei trebuie s i se transmitmereu mesajul c strategiasoft pentru o ordine

postmodern i post-naional nu nseamn defelslbiciune, ci un alt mod de a vedea lucrurile, caretrebuie respectat chiar dac nu e neles perfect.n mod cert, preferina la nivelul UE pentru normei valori umaniste i postmoderne i repugnanafa derealpolitik i realism (balana puterii)reflect accentul pus pe un viitor mai panic i pedepirea anarhiei ca relaie dintre naiuni.

Nefiind un supra-stat sau un imperiu de tipclasic, UE nu dispune de instrumentele politico-militare specifice statului, de aceea are un uorhandicap atunci cnd se confrunt cu rivalitateasau ostilitatea unui stat (cum e cazul Rusiei), fapt ce explic, n opinia unor cercettori, preferinapentru norme. Agresiunea comis de Rusia iinterferenele care au creat conflicte ngheatealimenteaz tensiuni etno-politice, iar naiona-lismul poate fi marele duman al lumii postmo-derne i postwestfalice, deoarece ancoreazoamenii n imaginarul de grup, n tribalism isectarism. De aceea, aplicnd PEV, UE nu trebuies aib neaprat o strategie contra Rusiei, care arcorespunde logicii neorealismului defensiv, ci unade blocare a resureciei naionalismelor iidentitilor locale exclusiviste.

The EU currently laks a strategic vision and a coherent foreign policy approach towards Russia and the result is Moscows increased assertioness for controling its direct neighborhood which is also EUs eastern neighborhood.

In order to have stable, democratic neighbors which could be easily integrated in the enlarged Europe, EUshould eventua

SUMMARY

{erban F. Cioculescu is a PhD in political science at the University of Bucharest and a scientific researcherin international security studies within the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History.

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Elements of the Security Sector Reform The end of the period characterized by the

bipolarity of the global balance of power consti-tuted a major event in the field of internationalrelations, signalling the appearance of a new andcontinuously changing security context. Thisnew context, containing a new and completely different assembly of threats to the internationalsecurity, offered the opportunities for constitut-ing and consolidating the new security architec-ture in Europe and beyond.

The ensuring of Romanias national security consists in a continuous and complex process,extended over a large number of areas, relationsand interdependencies, with the purpose of pro-moting the interests and the security objectivesof the state, society and citizens.

The security sector reform presupposes theintegrated approach of various processes andinstitutions featuring various methods of devel-opment and systems of interaction that envisionthe planning of forces with the purpose of cre-ating a component of dissuading and of responseto a wide range of risks and threats, the devel-

opment of the diplomatic component and im-age policies, the political sector, seen as theinteraction among authority, legitimacy andgoverning procedures, the economic sector,including trade, production and financial sys-tems, the society, seen as a form of collectiveidentity, the environment, as a relation betweenthe human activity and the environment.

The start of the security sector reform tookplace under the conditions of a double dynam-ics at an internal level, being connected with

both the political democratization and the tran-sition to market economy.

Parliamentary control and the efficient allo-cation of resources led to more transparency inthe security sector reform and to the fruition of important objectives on each segment, from re-structuring and modernizing the security forcesto the implementation of the rule of law, publicadministration reform, fight against corruption,illegal migration or diminishing of undesiredtrends such as marginalization and social gaps. The restructuring of institutions in the security sector took place under the constraints of thetransition to market economy, which determinedthe need for developing an efficient management system of financial resources for a coherent andcontinuous support of the reform, achievedthrough the optimization of the Planning, Pro-gramming, Budgeting and Evaluation System(PPBES)1. Consequently, the conceptual enlarge-ment of this field corresponds to new internaldemands, which are meant to smooth the adap-tation of the security sector to the new strategiccontext. This includes the public sector reform

and the defining of the missions and objectivesof each institution and correlating them in a uni-tary and flexible system, interoperable with simi-lar structures from NATO and EU member states. Also, improving the quality of education and thecreation of a security community within the civilsociety represent important objectives of thegeneral process of shaping a new relation amongstate, society and citizens with a fundamentalrelevance for defending and promoting the na-tional interests of Romania.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES REFORM(1990-2008)Lieutenant-Colonel Lauren]iu-Cristian Dumitru

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The security sector reform started in theabsence of formal security guarantees, but it did benefit from an internal continuity and ex-ternal assistance, especially from the NATO andEU member states. The development of the glo-bal society, the impact of communications andof information sharing in what concerns the in-ternational policies, but especially the definingof new evolution parameters and of new typesof international actors simultaneously represent both opportunities and risks to the national se-curity of Romania. In a world of global interde-pendencies and of increased actions of non-stateactors on the international stage, the security of one country should not be exclusively definedin national parameters, as it fundamentally de-pends on the ensuring of stability at a regionaland global level.

Romanias security as a European state can-not be defined and promoted otherwise than inthe framework of NATO and EU and in relation with the specific policies of the two organiza-tions, this premise being applied well beforebecoming a full fledged member of the two. Also,Romanias role on the global stage is strongly connected to its NATO and EU membership,

as well as to its various commitments and poli-tics established through partnerships with otherstates that define common action plans to pro-mote mutually shared security interests. At last but not the least, the development of sub-re-gional forms of cooperation in the political, dip-lomatic, military or economic areas, as well asthe development of trans-border projects, allthese contribute to the advancing of the nationalpolicies in a larger framework. Therefore, thenational security of Romania takes shape at theintersection of supra-nationality, multi-national-ity and regional position, in the same measurein which it represents the sum of the aspectsand processes within the Romanian state andsociety.

All these elements are not the expressionof a mere conjunctural process, but they rathercome from the need to adapt to a set of demands, values and necessities, both national and inter-national.

The security sector reform envisage themodernization and adaptation of the mecha-

nisms and of the systems of inter-state relationsto the new internal, continental and global re-alities, according to its acquired democraticexperience.

In this respect, the reform of Romanian Armed Forces leads to the defining of a new range of missions and capabilities, fitted on itsmembership in both NATO and the EU. They allow the enlargement of the range of objectivesand processes that include the preparation of the forces for the collective defense, the im-provement of the capacities for the entire rangeof crisis management and multinational mis-sions for combating terrorism2.

The foreign policy has been marked by thedevelopment of partnerships and regional pro-cesses in the context of asserting its active roleon the international stage, substantiated by as-suming the OSCE presidency and the role of leading nation in NATOs South-East Europeaninitiatives. The introduction of theacquis communautaire , the relations with the Roma-nians living abroad or the demarches of improv-ing the image of Romania abroad have all ben-efited from the creation of specialized institu-tions that directly support the dynamics of Ro-

manian foreign policy 3

. The internal institutions of security havegone through a period of profound transforma-tions in order to prevent and counter the inter-nal vulnerabilities, in the context of an increasein the transnational risks to Romanias security.In the policy of securing the borders, which now represent the Eastern border of the EU, themost important objectives consist of combatingorganized crime and trafficking of human be-ings, drugs, weapons and other sensitive mate-rials. On this trend, the process of demilitariza-tion of the police force and the border policealso took place. From this point of view, theimportance of the activities of the intelligenceservices and of their cooperation with similarstructures from NATO and EU member statesalso increased. The creation of the NationalSystem of Preventing and Combating Terrorismrepresents a first step in integrating the man-agement of unconventional threats to the secu-rity of transit regions such as South-EasternEurope and Black Sea area4.

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The start of real reforms in the judicial,health, environment protection, infrastructure,economic and financial areas responds to theobjective of ensuring the individual prosperity and security, on one hand, and to the objectiveof maximizing the resources and capacities of the state to promote its own values and inter-ests, on the other hand.

The adapting of the security sector to theglobal revolution in communications will leadto the appearance of a new organizational cul-ture, such as the defining of new capabilitiesfor the security forces in the context of evermore complex risks and threats in the interna-tional security environment 5.

On medium and long term, the most impor-tant resource for ensuring the security and pros-perity of Romania is the human one. The Na-tional Security Strategy of Romania gives abso-lute priority to the defining and substantiatingof the citizen-civil society-state partnership. Thispartnership acquires a special importance dur-ing the period of transition (economic and/orpolitical) because it determines the harmoniza-tion of various perspectives on the security andoffers alternatives of development and of sup-

porting the objectives of the Romanian society and state. This vision is based on developing the capac-

ity of Romania to consolidate its democratic po-litical regime and the market economy, from aninternal point of view, and to act at a regional andglobal level for promoting its own interests andthose of its allies, from an external point of view.

Romania has gone through a series of steps with major implications in the field of the secu-rity system reform. The main objective was toimplement the rule of law and to join both NATO

and the EU. In this context, the emphasis wasplaced upon the reform of the Armed Forcesand the reconstruction of the intelligence services and of the structures dealing with the pub-lic order, as well as to the instituting of the demo-cratic and civilian control over them.

At present, under the new security environ-ment, a new, more profound and systemic ap-proach takes shape. Every institution, be it the Armed Forces, public order forces, intelligence,counter-intelligence and security services, acts

in a regime of democratic coordination, whichis both efficient and professional. Therefore, thesecurity sector reform demands the profoundtransformation of the institutions, the improve-ment of the leadership, a better national coor-dination and the ensuring of their functionalintegration in the security systems that Roma-nia is part of. The finality of the efforts is toconsolidate and raise the professional standardsof the civil control over the forces that have cer-tain responsibilities in the field of national se-curity and to focus on the structures, norms,relations, missions, training and resources of the system while respecting the principles of democracy, transparency and efficiency 6.

Taking into account the special complexity of these efforts, the specific actions concentrateon the transformation in the field of foreignpolicy, defense, intelligence, counter-intelli-gence and security and on the mechanisms of preventing, managing and solving the crises.

Transformation Process Characteristicsof the Romanian Armed Forces

The transformations from within the secu-rity sector, which have been initiated after the

end of the Cold War, have influenced the ArmedForces all over the world. The Armed Forceshave received new tasks and have been requiredto carry out the old missions in a new manner;the national nowadays Armed Forces usually have the following functions: to protect the na-tional independence, the sovereignty and integ-rity of the country and its citizens; internationalpeacekeeping or peacemaking missions; sup-port and assistance for civil emergencies; in-ternal security tasks (providing assistance forthe police forces and maintaining public order

in the exceptional situations) and contributingto nation-building (social function)7. The level through which the Armed Forces

are fulfilling those tasks varies from one coun-try to another, depending on the national legis-lative framework and the perception regardingsecurity. At the same time, the fulfillment of those tasks also depends on the capabilities that each country has.

The security sector reform generated thebuilding and development of new capabilities,

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adapted to accomplish these new tasks, in asecurity environment characterized by new se-curity risks and threats non-military, non-conventional and multidimensional ones; those new threats and risks could no longer be challenged with the traditional means of the Armed Forces.

The classic wars in which a great numberof personnel and military equipment were usedand directly engaged into battle have beenreplaced by asymmetrical wars, in which non-conventional fighting techniques are requiredand used as well.

The new threats, such as transnational ter-rorism, the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction, unsolved conflicts, authoritarianregimes, failed states, uncontrolled migration,organized crime etc, as well as ethnic conflicts,guerilla wars or other types of low-intensity conflicts, have determined changes in organiz-ing forces structures, action types, techniquesand means of combat.

As a result, the states are constantly adapt-ing and modernizing the military power, arerevising the security strategies and military doctrines and are constantly developing new technologies. In this context, the new military

technologies and equipments represent a key-factor in maintaining and consolidating a cred-ible military power capable of countering thenew security threats.

At the same time, a special attention is paidto cooperation and interoperability in counter-ing security threats. No state in the world, nomatter its economic and military power, canlonger face on its own the transnational threatsand their consequences.

Taking into consideration these facts, theRomanian military power had to be adapted from

the doctrinal, structural and operational point of view, regarding the military technique spe-cific for modern Armed Forces, in order to ful-fill the responsibility of our country, accordingto international treaties and commitments that Romania has taken upon.

The Armed Forces have evolved as a func-tional subsystem of the Romanian society, main-taining its main goals - those of granting statesovereignty and independence, territorial integ-rity, and constitutional democracy 8.

The military reform has as its main goal tobuild modern Armed Forces, mobile and flex-ible, expeditionary, with high combat capacity,interoperable with the other NATO forces andable to deter or counter an armed aggressionagainst Romania and its allies9.

The transformation process of the military sector requires modifications from the doctri-nal point of view, as well as in the field of orga-nizing and structuring forces, capabilities, train-ing and education, human resources manage-ment, acquisitions system and budgetary plan-ning10.

An important pattern of this transformationis the establishment of the military institution, which has the task to create a balanced, flex-ible and well trained structure, compatible andinteroperable on NATO standards. Related tothis objective, one fact should be mentioned:starting January 1st 2007, the Armed Forcesreplaced the conscription system with the vol-untary one, in which professional military are joining the armed forces after a rigorous selec-tion. In this respect, there were issued two laws, which support that process11.

The resources sustaining the Romanian

military power are financial, human, material,informational etc. The military budget is part of the state budget approved by the Parliament,and its volume is decided according to financialneed assessed by the Armed Forces, accordingto NATO standards.

Regarding the human resources, one couldadd the fact that a special attention is paid to arigorous selection process, based on profession-alism and efficiency. In this respect, Romaniahas to develop combat forces with a high oper-ability level; this will generate an increasingly

important role of specialized training depend-ing on the tasks imposed by the missions, andthe education will have a crucial role in boththeoretical and practical using of the new mili-tary concepts and technologies. In addition,training these forces has to take into account the principle of complementarities betweenNATO and EU.

For the fulfillment of every mission, on na-tional territory or in different operation the-atres, the Armed Forces have to be well equip-

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ped with high tech weaponry and technology. Technology is and will remain a key-element formultiplying the military power. The success of the missions depends on the tactics and doc-trines, as well as on the troops morale, motiva-tion and military equipment. Thus, the processof technological modernization and force gen-eration and regeneration process is going to decorrelated with increasing the efficiency in us-ing the assigned resources for defense.

Our country participation with forces andmilitary equipment in NATO missions is animportant commitment taken upon by Romaniaand successfully accomplished even before join-

ing the Alliance. NATO missions require expe-ditionary, interoperable and rapidly deployableforces, capable of carrying out the full spectrumof operations and adapting to the new combat conditions in a complex security environment.

According to legislation, the missions in which the Romanian Armed Forces may takepart are the following: collective defense, peacesupport operations, humanitarian assistance,coalition-type missions, common military ex-ercises and ceremonial12.

In the defense sector, the decisions regard-ing the transformation are aimed towards thefollowing: the revision of the force structure;continuation of the modernization process of themilitary equipment; the fulfilment of the com-mitments which Romania has taken upon in theintegration process in NATO and EU structures;the consolidation of the multiannual resourcesplanning process; the optimization of the com-bat capabilities of the Armed Forces; improv-ing human resources management; the devel-opment of civil-military relations and the im-provement of the civil control mechanisms; thedevelopment and optimization of bi- and multi-

lateral military cooperation. These commit-ments have been included into the national an-nual training plan for NATO joining, known asthe Membership Action Plan (MAP)13.

Granting the defense of the Romanian terri-tory is a continuous and complex process, ex-tended over a wide spectrum of fields, relationsand interdependencies, targeted to promote thesecurity objectives of the state, society and citi-zens. It is defined and promoted in correlation with the specific policies of NATO and EU.

The character of the national constitutionalresponsabilities, as well as the NATO standards,impose that the Romanian Armed Forces woulddevelop capabilities which may allow to developoperations into national territory, in NATO areaof responsability, as well as, within an enlargedstrategic environment which is permanently influences by changing factors.

According to NATO outlook, military trans-formation represents a continuous process of developing new concepts, strategies, doctrinesand capabilities, in order to improve the effi-ciency, the interoperability level of the ArmedForces and the adaptation to the new security

context. All those elements emphasize the needto re-assess the military component as the mainsource of reliability.

Within this context, the transformation pro-cess of the Romanian Armed Forces representsa natural necessity that is generated by the new strategic and transformational patterns of the Alliance. Those new patterns allow the widen-ing of the objectives range, which include thetraining of the Armed Forces for participation within the common defense and improvement of the capabilities that are required for multina-tional crisis management operations and com-bating terrorism operations14.

The Strategy of the Romanian Armed For-ces Transformation is based on the principlesstated in the Strategy of National Security, theRomanian Military Strategy, the White Charterof Defense, and it states as the main goal of the Armed Forces transformation the creation of the new capabilities by which Romania will ap-proach the present and future challenges in theinternational security environment 15. Thesecapabilities will grant the fulfillment of the spe-cific standards required by the Constitution, of

Romania commitments toward NATO, EU andthe regional initiatives and international coali-tions. The transformation process of the Roma-nian Armed Forces has as its main goal to cre-ate a modern structure, fully professional, withhigh mobility capabilities, efficient, flexible,deployable, sustainable, a structure that can beengaged in a very wide spectrum of missions.

Putting into practice the general objectiveof the transformation process will be sustainedby the future projects, such as: the fulfillment

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of the commitments towards NATO; the fulfill-ment of the commitments towards EU in thesecurity and defense field; the remodeling of the command control and force structures; theremodeling of the logistical support structures;the improvement of the systemic and structuralassessment process and the efficient connec-tion to the transformation process the Roma-nian Armed Forces; the creation of the C4I2SR and IT systems for the Armed Forces; the re-modeling of the military intelligence system; themodernization of the human resources manage-ment; the improvement of the life quality levelfor the military personnel; the remodeling of the military education system; the coordinatedmodernization of military equipment; the re-modeling of the medical system of the ArmedForces; the improvement of the Defense Re-sources Management System; the improvement of the scientific research in the military field;the modernization and improvement of the finan-cial system; the improvement of the management system of the real-estate properties of the Ro-manian Armed Forces; the structural and func-tional remodeling of the PR activities system.

The modernization efforts and the intero-

perability contain three stages determined by force structure restructuring and the require-ments of the integration process within NATOand EU: the stage of final basic transformationprocess (2005-2007); the stage of full opera-tional integration within NATO and EU (2008-2015) and the stage of fully technical integra-tion within NATO and EU (2016-2025)16.

The financial resources nedeed for thetrasformation process will be allocated from thedefense budget, with a constant growth untillthe level of full interoperability with NATO

member states is reached. The main domains of the transformationprocess refer to: defense resources manage-ment, military intelligence, operations, com-mand, systemic and structural assessment, com-munications and IT, endowment, doctrines andtraining, logistics, scientific research, infrastruc-ture and PR activities system.

The Romanian Armed Forces have to be ableto simultaneous ensure the defense of the na-tional territory by means of a military response

to any aggression and to support the civil au-thorities in case of emergencies, natural disas-ters, NRBC events etc.

The performing of the duties towards NATO,EU, regional organizations and internationalcoalitions is accomplished by means of theimplementation of the Capabilities Package,according to the obligations assumed at thePrague Summit (NATOs Prague CapabilitiesCommitment), including taking part in NATOResponse Force NRF, in the EUs BattleGroups, participation in multinational opera-tions and to the achievement of Headline Goals2010.

The Romanian Armed Forces will have aunique force package. It will be established by the forces transformation and aim the organi-zation, endowment, training and sustainability. The transformation process will provide withan optimal balance between combat units andlogistic support units; the projection of a modu-lar, interchangeable, compatible deployment andsustainable force; basis for the forces rotation;setting up of the appropriate forces for specialmissions; setting up of the appropriate capabili-ties for the force expansion mobilization, train-

ing, equipments etc. The training process will assure the institu-tionalization of a modern training system andthe development of the readiness level assess-ment system. Taking into account these objec-tives, the Romanian Armed Forces personnelsummarize 90.000 troops, from which 75.000represent military and 15.000 civilian person-nel17.

The creation of the Special Forces and light Infantry units is generated by the modern asym-metrical conflicts and fits the NATO require-

ments. Raising the combat capability of a Moun-tain large unit is a question of national tradi-tion, but also responds to NATO standards forsuch kind of forces, specialized for carrying out the military actions in the mountains. The cre-ation of the attack helicopter units also meanscreating an intervention force with high re-sponse capability and superior firepower.

From 1990 until now, the Land Forces havebeen subject to a large transformation process,determined by the objective of joining NATO,

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as well as the subject of major acquisitions pro-grams and participations in peace support op-erations in different theaters18.

The Air Forces will be a force with a highlevel of interoperability, with radically trans-formed capabilities, able to accomplish a multi-functional package of forces that would be ableto respond to a wide range of objectives, accord-ing to the elements needed in conflict and cri-sis situations19.

Mainly, the Navy will be available forthe full range of NATO and EU missions. Themaximal contribution of the naval forces for high-intensity operations comprises one type 22modernized frigate, starting in 2009, and onetype 22 modernized frigate, starting in 201120.

The main result of the Romanian ArmedForces transformation will be represented by the forces structure, consisting of deployableforces assigned for all range of missions andgeneration/regeneration forces. The forces as-signed for all range of missions are determinedthrough the Defense Planning Questionnaireand they are subject to the interoperability pro-cess as requested by the standards of the Alli-ance. The generation and regeneration forces

are unemployable ones, and assure the comple-tion of the deployable forces assigned for allrange of missions. The resulting force structure will create the needed balance between the com-mand structures and the forces and will providethe national defense within the common defenseand military intervention in case of civil emer-gencies, as well as, for fully covering of the com-mitments towards NATO and EU.

In 2015, depending on the allocated re-sources, the Romanian Armed Forces will have90.000 troops. The distribution of the troops

will aim to achieve a balance between the com-mand structures and the combat forces, in or-der to obtain optimal conditions for fulfilling themissions objectives. The command structures will represent up to 4.5 per cent, and the com-bat forces will represent 95.5 per cent of thetotal number of troops21.

The fulfilling of the transformation process will led to the generation of the flexible, rapidresponsive and interoperable military capabili-ties, which will be able to provide the decision-

makers improved opportunities of accomplish-ing the objectives, according to national inter-est.

The transformation process of the Romanian Armed Forces is not a scope itself, but it repre-sents the adequate response to the internationalsecurity environment evolutions, NATO trans-formation and the international commitmentsthat Romania has taken upon.

1

George Cristian Maior, Mihaela Matei,Defense Policy Developments: Old and New Missions for the Armed Forces , in Occasional Papers, No. 1(I)/2002, Institute forPolitical Studies of Defense and Military History, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, pp. 9-11.

2 Ibidem, pp. 13-18.3 George Cristian Maior,Transformarea politicii de

aprare a Romniei (Romanias Defense Policy Transfor- mation) , in Occasional Papers, No. 5(III)/2004, Institutefor Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Mili-tary Publishing House, Bucharest, pp. 15-31.

4 Ibidem, pp. 47-64.5 Marian Zulean,Militarul i societatea. Relaiile civil-

militare la nceputul mileniului al III-lea (Military and So- ciety. Civilian-Military Relations at the Beginning of the Third Millennium) , Military Publishing House, Bucharest,2008, pp. 194-198.

6 Ibidem, pp. 199-202.7 Wolfgang Wagner,Parliamentary Control of Military

Missions: Accounting for Pluralism, in Occasional Papers,No. 12 /2006, DCAF, Geneva, pp. 5-13, www.dcaf.ch/pub-lications

8 Constituia Romniei (Romanias Constitution) ,art. 118, al. 1, Monitorul Oficial Publishing House, Bucha-rest, 2003.

9 Carta Alb a Aprrii (White Charter of Defense),Romanian Ministry of Defense website, www.mapn.ro

10

Eugen Bdlan,De la reforma Armatei Romniei latransformarea acesteia prin implementarea cerinelor obiectivelor forei (From the Romanian Armed Forces Reforme to Its Transformation by the Implementation of Force Objectifs Requirement) , in Provocri la adresasecuritii i strategiei la nceputul secolului XXI (Chal- lenges to the Security and Strategy at the Beginning of the 21st Century) , National Defense University Carol IPublishing House, Bucharest, 2005, p. 16.

11 Legea nr. 395/2005, privind suspendarea pe timp de pace a serviciului militar obligatoriu i trecerea laserviciul militar pe baz de voluntariat (Law No. 395/2005,

NOTES

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regarding the suspension of the conscription military service and the transition to the voluntary military service during peacetime), Monitorul Oficial Publishing House,Bucharest, 2005; Legea nr. 384/2006, privind statutul soldailor i gradailor voluntari (Law No. 384/2006, regarding the status of the soldiers and enlisted ranks) ,Monitorul Oficial Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006.

12 Legea nr. 42/15 martie 2004, privind participareaforelor armate la misiuni n afara statului romn (Law No. 42/March 15, 2004, regarding the Romanian Armed Forces participation in the missions outside the Roma- nian state) , http://dlaj.mapn.ro

13 Mihail E. Ionescu,Romanias Westernization and NATO Membership , in Occasional Papers, No. 3(I)/2002,IPSDMH, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, pp. 71-75.

14

Radu Popa, Ap rarea i securi tatea na ional .Coordonate ale integrrii europene (National Defense and Security. Coordinates of European Integration) , inGndirea Militar Romneasc (Romanian Military Think- ing) , No. 5/2006, pp. 68-69.

15 See the text of these documents to the RomanianMinistry of Defense website, www.mapn.ro

16 Strategia de Transformare a Armatei Romniei (Strategy of the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation) ,Romanian Ministry of Defense website, www.mapn.ro

17 Marian Zulean,Professionalisation of Romanian Armed Forces , in The Challenge of Military Reform inPost-Communist Europe , Palgrave, New York, 2002, p. 121.

18 Teodor Frunzeti, Accelerarea transformri i i modernizrii Forelor Terestre ale Armatei Romniei.Imperativul major al momentului (Transformation and Modernization Speeding Up of the Land Forces of the Romanian Armed Forces. Major Requirement of the Mo- ment) , in Gndirea Militar Romneasc (Romanian Mili- tary Thinking) , No. 1/2007, p. 12.

19

Strategia de Transformare a Armatei Romniei (Strategy of the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation) ,Romanian Ministry of Defense website, www.mapn.ro.

20 Ibidem.21 Ibidem.

SUMMARY

LTC Lauren]iu-Cristian Dumitruis an Army officer, researcher and head of the DefenseStrategies sector within the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History. He iscurently a Ph.D. candidate in History, and also holds an M.A. in International Relations and a B.A.in History, all of them with the University of Bucharest. The defense studies, military alliancestopics, Geopolitics and Geostrategy, post-conflict military actions and the transformation processof the military institution are among his areas of interest.

The security sector reform started in the absence of formal security guarantees, but it didbenefit from an internal continuity and external assistance, from NATO and EU. The processgenerated the creation and development of new capabilities, adapted to accomplish these newtasks, in a security environment characterized by new security risks and threats. The militaryreform has as its main goal to build modern Armed Forces, mobile and flexible, expeditionary,with high combat capacity, NATO interoperable and capable to deter and counter an armedaggression against Romania and its allies. The main result of the Romanian Armed Forcestransformation will be represented by the simultaneous ensure the defense of the national territoryby means of a military response to any aggression and to support the civil authorities in case of emergencies, natural disasters, NRBC events etc.

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CONSIDERA}II CU PRIVIRELA CON}INUTUL {I EVOLU}IA

CONCEPTULUI DE PLANIFICARE A AP|R|RII {I IMPACTUL INTRODUCERIISISTEMULUI PLANIFICARE-PROGRAMARE

BUGETARE-EVALUARE Mirel }ariuc

Planificarea aprrii, atribut i component esenial a politicii de aprare,reprezint un complex de activiti i msuri care vizeaz promovarea intereselor naionale, definirea i ndeplinirea obiectivelor securitii naionale a Romniei ndomeniul aprrii .1 Aceasta este definiia conceptului de planificare a aprrii ,stipulat de Legea planificrii aprrii. O definiie remarcabil, care stabilete clasadin care face parte, descrie sumar ceea ce cuprinde, precizeaz scopul urmrit depunerea n oper a conceptului. Pe de alt parte, cititorului comun (dar i celui avizat,din pcate) definiia i induce o mulime de noi ntrebri, obligndu-l la rememorrii raionamente contradictorii, la consultarea iterativ a dicionarelor lingvistice ide specialitate. Cum adic atribut al politicii? Care ar fi celelalte atribute? De ce component esenial? Cum se promoveaz interesele naionale? Ce diferene exist ntre securitate i aprare naional? Am enunat o parte a ntrebrilor pe care, cubun credin, ni le-am pus reflectnd asupra definiiei citate i nu ne ndoim c pot exista i altele.

Trebuie menionat faptul c noi considerm c introducerea sistemului deplanificare, programare, bugetare i evaluare n procesul de planificare a aprrii aconstituit un pas important n modernizarea armatei naionale, dup cum suntemconvini c armata a fost primul model de succes al occidentalizrii Romniei, unmotor important al accederii sale n structurile europene i euroatlantice. Mai mult,Romnia asist alte state n domeniul planificrii aprrii2, fapt ce constituie orecunoatere direct a nivelului calitativ pe care experii romni l au n acest domeniu.

Ca urmare, considerm c o nou analiz a coninutului conceptului planificarea aprrii i a conceptelor nrudite este binevenit, iar concluziile vor putea clarificadimensiunile reale, locul i importana planificrii n domeniul aprrii. De asemenea,trecerea n revist a evoluiei conceptului n Romnia post-decembrist poate con-duce la explicaii pertinente ale eventualelor confuzii provocate de utilizarea diferita conceptelor, de ctre diveri autori. Aceste clarificri constituie scopul prezenteilucrri, demersul fiind determinat de propriile nelmuriri i de dificultile pe careatt noi, ct i colegii pe care i-am chestionat, le-am ntmpinat n activitatea cotidian.Sperm c opiniile prezentate vor permite celor interesai o nelegere mai exact aaspectelor legate de coninutul i evoluia conceptului de planificare a aprrii.

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PLANIFICAREA CA ATRIBUT AL CONDUCERII

Este discutabil dac pisicile au vreun plande aciune atunci cnd vneaz vrbii sau cndchinuie cu sadism oriceii, dar muli dintre ceicare au avut ocazia s urmreasc aa ceva sunt convini c planul exist. Vrem s spunem aicic planificarea nu a fost inventat de cineva, cieste o necesitate impus de apariia raiunii.Contient sau nu, orice fiin care vrea s facceva, este obligat s se gndeasc cum ajungela rezultat, deci planific. Poate fac asta i uneleanimale, dar este sigur c i oamenii preistorici

i cei de azi, i organizaiile, i statele sau uniu-nile de state planific ori de cte ori au o int.n aceeai ordine de idei, subliniem c nc dinantichitatea timpurie a fost apreciat calitateade strateg a diverilor conductori. Or, chiardac nu putem pune semnul egalitii ntre celedou concepte3, ni se pare evident c strategiai planul au o mulime de elemente comune.

Meritul pentru definirea planificrii ca atri-but (funcie) al conducerii (managementului)aparine lui Henri Fayol4, un venerabil inginerminier francez, care a reuit s descrie mana-gementul ntr-un mod ce a rezistat anilor, nciuda multiplelor revoluii i coli din domeniulconducerii. Care a fost ns aceast definiiermas aceeai, timp de aproape un secol, ntr-un domeniu n care teoriile au speran de viade aproximativ dou decenii? Dup specialitiienglezi5, esena contribuiei lui Henri Fayol este definirea managementului ca un tot care cuprinde cinci elemente:

1. Prevedere i planificare (n limba francez prvoyance): Examinarea viitorului i ntocmirea planului de aciune.

2. Organizare: Crearea structurii mate-

riale i umane a ntreprinderii.3. Comand: Meninerea activitii nrndul personalului.

4. Coordonare: Corelarea, unificarea i armonizarea tuturor activitilor i eforturilor.

5. Control: Supraveghere, astfel nct totul s se desfoare n conformitate cu regulile stabilite i ordinele transmise.

Numite de uniifunciile conducerii , de aliiatributele managementului sau folosindu-sesintagme echivalente, cele cinci elemente pre-

cizate de inginerul francez au oferit un sistemde concepte, cu ajutorul crora managerii i pot clarifica modul de a gndi n legtur cu ceea ce au de ndeplinit 6. Remarcm, desigur, c primuldintre elementele lui Fayol constituie subiectulstudiului nostru. Subliniem c acest atribut estespecific n primul rnd managerilor de la vrfulorganizaiei i este deosebit de important ntr-osocietate ce dorete s se dezvolte ntr-un mediuconcurenial. Pentru a demonstra generalitateaacestui element al managementului nc din vremea aceea, menionm c Fayol a argumen-tat, n 1916, necesitatea unui plan naionalpentru Frana, elaborat la nivel guvernamental7.

n viziunea experimentatului manager8,management nseamn s priveti nainte, ceeace face ca procesul de previziune i planificare s fie o activitate central. Managementul pre- supuneevaluarea viitorului i iniierea msurilornecesare. Ca s funcioneze adecvat, o ntre- prindere are nevoie de un plan cu caracteristicile de unitate, continuitate, flexibilitate i precizie.Pentru a rezolva problemele legate de planificare, conducerea trebuie: s asigure mbinareacorespunztoare a obiectivelor specifice fiecrui departament al organizaiei (unitate); s com- bine planificarea pe termen scurt cu cea pe termen lung (continuitate); s fie capabil s adapteze planul la schimbrile aprute (flexibilitate); s ncerce s prognozeze corect direciile de aciune (precizie) 9 .

Conchidem c planificarea aprrii poate fidefinit ca un atribut al conducerii sistemuluide aprare, atta timp ct aceast conducere,conform regulilor statului democratic, estestabilit de politica de aprare. Aadar, planifi-carea aprrii constituie, la nivelul su de vrf,o component esenial a politicii de aprare,component esenial, la rndul ei a politicii de

securitate naional.

SISTEMUL DE PLANIFICARE,PROGRAMARE, BUGETARE

Dup ce am stabilit calitatea sa de compo-nent a politicii de aprare, trebuie s subliniemc planificarea aprrii, ca orice sistem deplanificare de altfel, este un ansamblu de activi-ti cu caracter tehnic, un instrument destinat asigurrii eficacitii i eficienei aciunilor ce

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sunt ntreprinse. Acesta este motivul pentrucare vom descrie evoluia conceptului din mo-mentul n care stabilirea diverselor componentea fost formalizat i pus n practic intro-ducerea Sistemului de Planificare, Programarei Bugetare n cadrul Departamentului Aprrii(SPPB) al SUA de ctre Robert McNamara10. Acest sistem se datoreaz n mare parte luiCharles Hitch11, numrul doi n Departa-mentul Aprrii al SUA, care a introdus metode-le cercetrii operaionale (n mare ascensiuneatunci) n domeniul politicii de vrf.

Secretarul aprrii din epoc (1961-1968),Robert Strange McNamara, avea un backgroundadecvat pentru implementarea unui asemeneasistem: studii de statistic, implicare n utilizareacalculului operaional n timpul celui de-al DoileaRzboi Mondial, fiind i director general laFord ,unde introdusese metode noi de management.Preocuparea de principiu a lui McNamara (duspn la obsesie n unele situaii) a fost cea detranslatare a prioritilor politice n politici publi-ce (n cazul SPPB, politica de aprare, iar ulte-rior, pe durata lungului su mandat de pree-dinte al Bncii Mondiale, ntre 1968 i 1981, dedezvoltare economic a Lumii a Treia). Aceastpreocupare s-a tradus prin constituirea uneiarhitecturi complexe de planificare a politicilor,servit de un sistem de planificare bugetar(inclusiv n cadrul Bncii Mondiale, unde afolosit tot planuri cincinale, ca i la Pentagon).

Revoluia declanat de implementarea sis-temului este dovedit, printre altele, i de faptulc, n anul 1965, preedintele Johnson a dispusgeneralizarea sa la nivelul ntregii administraii.Din pcate, aceast msur a fost pripit, ignorn-du-se faptul c att SPPB, ct i analiza sistemicfuseser proiectate strict pentru uzul Departa-

mentului Aprrii, se bazau pe cercetri efectuatepe durata unei decade de ctre o corporaieprivat i beneficiau de existena unui solid corpprofesional specializat. Aplicarea sa la altedepartamente care nu ntruneau niciuna dintrecondiiile enunate mai sus a generat o mareconfuzie i compromiterea metodelor de manage-ment pe care SPPB le promova.

Ceea ce ni se pare esenial n aceast abor-dare a domeniului este aezarea pe paliere dis-

tincte a celor trei componente inseparabile planificarea, programarea, bugetarea , pornin-du-se de la dou principii clare: palierele serefer la activiti cu orizonturi diferite, iar deter-minarea reciproc are loc n ambele sensuri. Astfel, planificarea n sens de politic de aprare(termen lung) determin aezarea activitilorn ordinea lor logic (programare planificarean sens de plan de aciune termen mediu),care determin estimarea costurilor necesareatingerii intelor (bugetare planificare n sensde alocare a resurselor financiare termenscurt). Invers, constrngerile imediate de naturfinanciar (bugetarea) determin ajustareaplanului de aciuni (programarea), care poatedetermina reevaluarea politicii (planificarea).

n ceea ce privete Romnia, implementareaSistemului de Planificare, Programare, Bugetarei Evaluare (SPPBE) n Ministerul AprriiNaionale a nceput n anul 1998, cu sprijinulexperilor americani din cadrul Institutuluipentru Analize n domeniul Aprrii. Procesulde implementare a durat pn n anul 2002, cndsistemul a devenit complet operaional. Cadrullegislativ a evoluat pe baza experienei acumu-late i consultrilor derulate n cadrul procesuluide aderare la NATO (Membership Action Plan).Primul act normativ a fost elaborat n anul 1998,Ordonana Guvernului nr. 52 privind planificareaaprrii naionale, aprobat cu modificri prinLegea 63/2000. Actualmente este n vigoareLegea 473/2004 privind planificarea aprrii.

Principalul obiectiv al SPPBE const nintegrarea eforturilor structurilor Ministerului Aprrii Naionale pentru utilizarea resurselordisponibile ntr-un mod eficient n vederea reali-zrii capabilitilor militare planificate. SPPBEasigur att nevoile de management intern, ct

i elaborarea documentelor de planificare solici-tate de NATO.

SECURITATE NAIONAL VERSUS APRARE

Suntem siguri c, pentru a nelege unitaraceste lucruri, este necesar s ncercm slmurim, att ct se poate, dou concepte funda-mentale: securitate i aprare. Necesitatea este

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dat de folosirea lor n diverse documente demare importan pentru domeniul studiat, cumsunt Constituia, Legea aprrii sau Legeaplanificrii aprrii.

Legea planificrii aprrii, de exemplu, serefer la aprare ca la un capitol distinct alsecuritii naionale, n spiritul celor mai claredefiniii n domeniu. Astfel, Samuel Huntington12consider c securitatea naional este un con-cept mult mai larg dect securitatea militar,fiind compus din securitatea militar, securi-tatea intern i securitatea situaional. naceast abordare, dac securitatea intern se refer la msurile de combatere a subversiunii interne, anume eforturile de a slbi i distruge statul din interior,iar securitatea situaional are n vedere msurile de adaptare permanent la schimbrile sociale, economice, demografice i politice, interne i internaionale, care pot avea drept consecin slbirea puterii statului,putem spune c securitatea militar constituieun concept foarte apropiat de ceea ce numeteLegea 473/2004 aprare. Conform aceluiaiautor, securitatea militar este responsabilitatea profesional a militarilor, n timp ce

securitatea naional este responsabilitatea politic a politicienilor 13 . Prin aceste afirmaii,Huntington indic implicit cele dou paliere lacare se stabilesc i se exercit prghiile deputere ale statului de drept, n domeniul apr-rii. Dac securitatea militar este parte a securi-tii naionale, este evident c anumite com-ponente ale sale se afl sub controlul puteriipolitice care este responsabil de ntreg, n timpce nfptuirea securitii militare (a aprrii, nsensul descris) este atributul structurilormilitare.

S precizm n continuare c acest nelesal termenilor, care face oarecare ordine n fluxulraionamentelor din domeniu, este contrazis deo analiz atent a Legii aprrii naionale14, careextinde conceptul de aprare ctre cel desecuritate naional. Astfel, potrivit acestui docu-ment legislativ, aprarea naional cuprinde ansamblul de msuri i activiti adoptate i desfurate de statul romn n scopul de a garan- ta suveranitatea naional, independena i

unitatea statului, integritatea teritorial a rii i democraia constituional (art.1.), iar prin-cipalele fore destinate aprrii sunt forelearmate care cuprind armata, mari uniti i uniti din subordinea Ministerului de Interne,cele ale serviciilor de informaii ale statului i alte formaiuni de aprare armat organizate conform legii . Legea fundamental15 pare a daacelai neles extins conceptului de aprare,stabilind c se organizeaz edine comunepentru aprobarea strategiei naionale de aprare a rii . Parc pentru a complica i mai mult lucrurile, Legea 473/2004 descrie coninutul

strategiei de aprare ca pe o strategie de securi-tate:Strategia naional de aprare a Romniei cuprinde: definirea intereselor i obiectivelor naionale de securitate, evaluarea mediului internaional de securitate, identificarea poten- ialelor riscuri, ameninri i vulnerabiliti,direciile de aciune i principalele modaliti pentru asigurarea securi ti i naionale aRomniei n cadrul Alianei(Art.5, alin. 3).

n concluzie, am gsit necesar aceastanaliz neprtinitoare pentru c suntem convini c ne aflm ntr-un moment foarte potrivit

pentru lmurirea unor concepte i corectareaunor texte, astfel nct s fie uor de neles iaplicat. Credem c specialitii din Ministerul Aprrii Naionale i pot aduce o contribuieimportant la clarificarea unor concepte funda-mentale ca aprare, securitate, armat, plani-ficare i ei ar putea desigur s contribuie larevizuirea legislaiei existente, fr a fi obliga-torie introducerea vreunor modificri majore nlogica respectivelor norme.

NOTE1 *** Legea 473/2004 privind planificarea aprrii.2 Romnia a asistat Georgia, prin intermediul exper-

ilor din cadrul Departamentului pentru Politica de Aprarei Planificare (DPAP), n vederea implementrii sistemuluide planificare utilizat n cadrul NATO. De asemenea,Serbia a beneficiat de asisten n domeniu, prin inter-mediul DPAP.

3 Putem considera c, n sensul lor de politici, plani-ficarea i strategia pot fi declarate sinonime.

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fesional n combinatul minier i metalurgic Commentry-Fourchamboult-Decazeville, mai nti ca simplu inginer,iar apoi, dup vrsta de 30 ani, ca membru al conducerii.Din 1888 pn n 1918, el a deinut funcia de directorgeneral.

5 OUBS,Breviar Anex la cursul de Management Competitiv , Edit. CODECS, Bucureti, 1993.

6 Idem.7 Dac unora dintre noi o astfel de idee ne amintete

vremuri nu tocmai plcute, trebuie s precizm c nuplanificarea excesiv a fost motivul lipsei de eficien aeconomiei socialiste ci, din contr, aplicarea greit aplanificrii, n sensul ignorrii legilor obiective ale econo-miei. nlocuirea acestora cu legi ideologice a dus la viziuninerealiste i la un proces de risipire a resurselor pentru ase ncerca atingerea unor inte greit alese.

8 Fayol avea, n momentul apariiei lucrrii sale, vrstade 75 de ani.

9 OUBS,Breviar Anex la cursul de Management Competitiv , Edit. CODECS, Bucureti, 1993.

10 Aceste elemente legate de evoluia sistemului aufost preluate din lucrarea d-nei Elena Lungu,Bugetele

program instrumente ale previziunii pe termen mediu a eficienei cheltuielilor publice i a maximizrii buns- trii sociale.

11 Preocuparea lui Hitch a fost de dezvolta un sistemcare s permit trecerea dincolo de simpla execuie (aacum era la acel moment) i s coreleze cheltuielile cuperformana. Charles J. Hitch fusese autorul unei lucrricapitale, Price Theory and Business Behavior, aprutla Oxford n 1939 i care sfida teoria convenional, bazn-du-se pe date empirice colectate de la oameni de afaceri(evident, nici unul dintre acetia nu avea habar de venit marginal sau cost marginal). n 1948 a nfiinat diviziaeconomic a corporaiei RAND, unde a utilizatin extenso analiza sistemic.

12 Ionel Nicu Sava, Marian Zulean, Gheorghe Tibil, Armata i societatea, Edit. Info-Team, Bucureti, 1998,

p. 30.13 Ibidem.14 *** Legea nr.45/1994,Legea aprrii naionale a

Romniei , M.Of. nr.172/07.07.1994.15 ***Constituia Romniei,(art. 65, edinele

Camerelor, alin. 2, lit. f.).

The author believes that the Romanian legal framework of national security could be thesource of confusions and misinterpretations for defence and security concepts such as defenceplanning. Taking into account several layers considered, the planning is a process with different

connotations. It could be a political process, a tool for ordering the activities in a logical way or aresource allocation process. The implementation of Planning, Programming, Budgeting andEvaluation Process has been a leap forward in defence management due to this layout of planningon several levels as well as its irreversibility. Experts working within defence system could amendthe legislation incoherence of security framework. Despite some elements of incoherence at thetop of the system, the defence planning process goes forward. It should be highlighted the necessityand opportunity of keeping these stages in the defence planning process.

SUMMARY

Mirel }ariuc is a researcher in Security Studies within the IPSDMH. He holds a BA in aircraft engineering and another one in economic cybernetic. His area of expertise is organisationalmanagement being Associate Tutor of Open University School, Milton Case, UK. He is also a PhDcandidate in Military Science and Intelligence at Romanian National Defence University.

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PM Vladimir Putin must have a Plan to fur-ther the development of the Russian Federationas a sovereign democracy1 and an indepen-

dent world great power this seems to be theunanimous conclusion of much of the interna-tional press and analysists. The inherent com-plicity drawn from the nature of the power trans-fer process between Vladimir Putin and DmitriMedvedev, alongside the virulent foreign policy discourse of the new Russian president are seenby most as evidence of the existence of thismaster Plan an idea that is more than everfed by the conspirative theses surrounding theunfolding of the August war between Georgiaand Russia. The majority of theorists, struck by some sort of post-Cold War nostalgia or a doubt-

ful methodological corectness are hesitent andtend to consider the Russian Federation eitheras an emerging world power or a regional great power at the most. Others tend to see it as a world great power. Most of these justify theirchoice by invoking the spectaculous economicgrowth and recovery of the Russian Federationthroughout the last eight years although they also tend to agree that this upward trend inRussian GDP growth was largely caused by theaccelerated growth in the prices of raw materi-als and energy resources in particular (oil andnatural gas). However, there is also a consider-

ably smaller number of analysists that draw at-tention to the dangers lurking in the Russianeconomy, by emphasizing that an economy that is largely dependent upon the supply of raw materials (be they even the highly-necessary energy resources) cannot sustain a world great power. In August 1999, when Vladimir Putincame to power, Russia was in a nearly falimen-tary state economically and politically. In lessthan eight years not only did Putin manage todomestically stabilize Russia and take advantage

THE TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONSOF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL

COMPLEXS REFORM Simona Soare

of the rise in energy resource prices, but healso managed to get the Russian economy togrow by 5-7% annually. And the former Russian

president managed this performance without domestic sacrifices in terms of growing unem-ployment caused by the dismissal of workers of the huge Russian industrial complexes suchas those of the Russian industrial-defense com-plex, which remains highly influential in Rus-sian politics even nowadays.

Since 2005 Russia has been the worlds sec-ond largest weapons exporter, getting revenuesof over $7.2 billion solely from foreign weaponssales. The foreign contracts signed by the Rus-sian Federation in 2006-2007 reached a grandtotal of over $32 billion.2 On September 1, 2008,

the Department for International Technical-Military Cooperation announced that in 2008Russia will receive some $8.5 billion from thearms sales on the international market. Through-out 2009-2012, though, the annual growth rateof Russias arms sales is estimated to increaseby 8-10%.3 The problems of the Russian military-industrial complex are carefully hidden under apile of reports that emphasize facts and fig-ures regarding Russias annual arms exports.4 Yet, they exist and can very well be fitted into afew large categories discussed below.

1) The simultaneous rise in and diver-sification of both domestic and foreign pro-curement contracts

In comparison to the revenues resulted fromarms sales on the international market in 1999 when Russia barely received $3.5 billion present figures have more than doubled andthe foreign clients and orders are far more diverse. During the 90s, Russias largest clients were China and India (which together took upto 80% of Russian arms exports), whereas in

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2008 Russia sells arms to over 80 countries worldwide and though China and India are stillits largest clients, together they only take upaproximately 40% of Russian arms exports.5Only in 2003 did Russia begin to truly diversify its foreign clients by winning a series of ordersfrom Burma, Vietnam, Malaysia, Algeria, Ven-ezuela, etc. Among the Russian arms produc-ers, the MIG Corporation, whose market sharereached $390 million in 2006 and is steadily increasing (though it is still far from the pro- jected $1.1 billion), is the leader, followed by aloose margin by the Sukhoi ($280 million mar-ket share), Salyut ($50 million market share)and the Admirality Shipyards ($23 million mar-ket share).6

The total number of weapons delievered by the Russian Federation as a follow-up to the con-tracts signed with the new clients rose as welland delievery was relatively made upon agreeddeadlines, particularly in the field of military aircraft. Between 2000-2005, China and Indiatogether bought over 350 Russian fighters. Thus, in 2003-2004 MIG and Sukhoi were pro-ducing as many as 50 fighters annualy a pro-duction rate that equaled that of many Weasternmilitary aircraft producers.7 Between 2003-2007, the composition of Russian arms exports was largely similar to that of other Weasternexporters such as the US or France.8

The rise in the number of foreign orders isoften portrayed by Russian authorities and mass-media as evidence of the development of theRussian defense industry and the consolidationof the power and influence of the Russian mili-tary-industrial complex. However, this is a grossexaggeration. A large part of the Russian mili-tary-industrial complex is still functioning at theproduction rate and with the same technology used during the Soviet era. Between 2000-2004,

the annual production rate of the companies that make up the Russian military-industrial complexhas indeed grown by an estimated 1.5-2.1% andby over 5-8% since 2005.9 Still, the productionrates of different companies working in the samesector of the Russian military-industrial complex vary greatly this indeed could very well be aresult of political interference that works to fa- vor some of the domestic producers at theexpence of others. Moreover, the conflicts of the early 2000s, the accelerated economicgrowth of both China and India, as well as the

constantly rising prices of energy resourceshave all contributed to supporting this growthin Russian arms exports since 2000 onwards. The difference between the annual growth rateof productivity in the Russian military-industrialcomplex and the number of weapons actually delievered to the foreign clients by the RussianFederation between 2000-2008 can only be ex-plained by Moscows decision to exploit a largepart of the internal reserves of the Russian Army weapons, ammunition, spare parts and old/used military systems and equipments that werea part of the Russian Armys war reserves orthat had been used by former units dismantledduring the late 1990s and early 2000s.10

Since 2000, the Russian military-industrialcomplex has been implementing a sustainedinvestment campaign in equiping the productionlines with new, modern and more productivetechnologies, in re-opening the design and R&Dbureaus of the large corporations, in emphasiz-ing the need to employ highly qualified humanresources and in using the latest highly mod-ern technologies in building military systemsand equipments for both domestic and interna-tional markets. The funds invested during thisperiod have been largely private; most of them were in fact large parts of the revenues thesecompanies of the Russian military-industrialcomplex received for meeting foreign orders;others, were government-guaranteed loans froma variety of Russian investment banks. For in-stance, the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC)developed and is constantly implementing amanagement strategy that focuses on maxima-zing the annual productivity of the aircraft-build-ing sector particularly the civilian sector by means of procuring new and modern produc-tion lines and technologies for the affiliatedplants; the strategy involves the use of revenues

earned as a result of former and present for-eign orders and their investment in developingindustrial sectorial policies particularly by promoting the National Strategy for the Devel-opment of the Aeronautic Industry 2015 that ensures government investments of over $10billion for the development of the domesticaicraft production capacity.

As a consequence of the contracts ROEsigned with Syria for the delievery of 5 (second-hand, modernized) interceptor-fighters MIG-31E, the Sokol plant the main production fa-

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cility of the MIG Corporation, which has beena part of the UAC which own 100% of its stockssince 2007 invested 700 million roubles(aproximately $269 million at the 2008 averagecurrency exchange rate) to equip and modern-ize the production line; this amount was due torise to over 2.2 billion roubles (aproximately $846 million) since 2007. Similarly, the Ulan-Ude plant one of the main production facili-ties of the Sukhoi Company invested over 780million roubles (roughly $275 million) in themodernization of the production line after it wonthe contract for the delievery of 24 civilian out-fitted Mi-171 helicopters; in 2007 the amount of the investments was due to rise to over 2billion roubles (over $850 million) after the com-pany began delievery on the contracts with Ven-ezuela and Malaysia. Due to winning a domes-tic contract worth $2.5 billion for the delievery of an undisclosed number of fix radion stationsdestined for the consolidation of the nationalearly-warning system (a part of the Russian anti-ballistic missile system), the RTI Systems Cor-poration already engaged investments of over$1 billion meant to change the equipments andtechnologies used in the production facilities,in re-opening the design bureau and in purchas-ing modern digital technologies for productionand R&D activities. The Uralvagonzavod plant,that builds the T-90 tanks, which was quite closeto declaring bankrupcy in 2000 and had accu-mulated huge debts to the federal budget, wonin 2004-2005 a contract for the delievery of 185 T-90 tanks to Algeria. After having invested over890 million roubles (approximately $300 mil-lion) in replacing the old and used equipments,the plant increased its productivity by 21%,delievering in 2006 alone over 90 T-90s to its Algerian client. Similarly, after winning its first domestic order in 10 years for the delievery of

an undisclosed number of BMP-3 fighting infan-try vehicles, the Kurganmashzavod plant com-mitted over $40 million in the modernizationand development of the production capacity between 2008-2009. Last, but not least, theZvezdochka shipyard won in 2005 a contract forthe modernization of 8 diesel Russian subma-rines bought by India; in order to be able to meet the contract and the technological requirementsof the Indian client, the company invested over$480 million in replacing old technologies andequipments used in the production activities. 11

The examples quoted above are not the only relevant ones. Domestic orders have allowedRussian arms producers to develop their pro-duction capacity and invest in replacing the tech-nologies of their production lines and facilities with new, modern, mostly digital technologiesand equipments, in developing the R&D anddesign bureaus, etc. Of cour

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