foucault k - scufi - paper

8/20/2019 Foucault K - SCuFI - Paper

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SCFI 2012 FoucaultShackelford/Gannon/Stevenson ___ of ___

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Foucault KFoucault K ...................................................................................................................................................................... 1 1NC—Shell (1/3) ............................................................................................................................................................ 3 1NC—Shell (3/3) ............................................................................................................................................................ 4 1NC—Shell (3/3) ............................................................................................................................................................ 5 Link—War ...................................................................................................................................................................... 6

Link—Hegemony ........................................................................................................................................................... 7 Link—Realism ................................................................................................................................................................ 8 Link—Circulation ............................................................................................................................................................ 9 Link—Circulation .......................................................................................................................................................... 10 Link—Transportation Infrastructure .............................................................................................................................. 11 Link—Public Transportation ......................................................................................................................................... 12 Link—Traffic Safety ...................................................................................................................................................... 13 Link—Highways ........................................................................................................................................................... 14 Link—Terrain ............................................................................................................................................................... 15 Link—Arctic Territory.................................................................................................................................................... 16 Link—Arctic Territory.................................................................................................................................................... 17 Link—Arctic War .......................................................................................................................................................... 18

Link—Terrorism ........................................................................................................................................................... 19 Link—Terrorism ........................................................................................................................................................... 20 Link—Environmental Managerialism ............................................................................................................................ 21 Link—Environmental Managerialism ............................................................................................................................ 22 Link—Environmental Managerialism ............................................................................................................................ 23 Link—Environmental Crises ......................................................................................................................................... 24 Link—Environmental Globalism/THE STATE .............................................................................................................. 25 Link—Transportation Investment ................................................................................................................................. 26 Link—Gas Tax ............................................................................................................................................................. 27 Link—Economy ............................................................................................................................................................ 28 Impact—Capitalism ...................................................................................................................................................... 29

Impact—Security .......................................................................................................................................................... 30

Impact—Governmentality ............................................................................................................................................. 31 Impact—Normalization ................................................................................................................................................. 32 Impact—Normalization ................................................................................................................................................. 33 Impact—Freedom ........................................................................................................................................................ 34 Eco Impact—Environmental Destruction ..................................................................................................................... 35 Alt—Micropolitics.......................................................................................................................................................... 36 Alt—Micropolitics.......................................................................................................................................................... 37 Alt—Micropolitics.......................................................................................................................................................... 38 Alt—Resistance ........................................................................................................................................................... 39 Alt—Care of the Self .................................................................................................................................................... 40 Alt—Refuse Distinctions ............................................................................................................................................... 41

Alt—Refuse Distinctions ............................................................................................................................................... 42

Alt—Territory ................................................................................................................................................................ 43 Alt—Environment ......................................................................................................................................................... 44 Alt—Environment ......................................................................................................................................................... 45 Alt—Public Ecology ...................................................................................................................................................... 46 AT: Perm ...................................................................................................................................................................... 47 AT: Perm ...................................................................................................................................................................... 48

AT: Perm—Environment specific ................................................................................................................................. 49 AT: Action/Reform Good .............................................................................................................................................. 50


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AT: Action/Reform Good .............................................................................................................................................. 51 AT: Realism/Security Inevitable ................................................................................................................................... 52 AT: Threats Real .......................................................................................................................................................... 53 AT: Managerialism Good ............................................................................................................................................. 54 AT: Managerialism Good ............................................................................................................................................. 55 AT: Environmental Securitization Activism ............................................................................................................. 56

AT: Pragmatism—Environment specific ....................................................................................................................... 57

FW—Discourse ............................................................................................................................................................ 58 FW—Discourse ............................................................................................................................................................ 59 FW—Discourse—Environment specific ....................................................................................................................... 60 FW—Territory .............................................................................................................................................................. 61 FW—Territory—Arctic spec. ........................................................................................................................................ 62 FW—Spatiality—Terrorism spec. ................................................................................................................................. 63 AT: Policymaking Good................................................................................................................................................ 64 AFF—Predictions Good ............................................................................................................................................... 65 AFF—Generic Perm..................................................................................................................................................... 66 AFF—Reform Good ..................................................................................................................................................... 67 AFF—Alt Doesn’t Solve ............................................................................................................................................... 68

AFF—Alt Doesn’t Solve ............................................................................................................................................... 69 AFF—Alt Doesn’t Solve—Foucault specific ................................................................................................................. 70

AFF—Cede the Political DA ......................................................................................................................................... 71 AFF—Violence UQ....................................................................................................................................................... 72 AFF—No Impact .......................................................................................................................................................... 73 AFF—AT: Structural Violence ...................................................................................................................................... 74 AFF—AT: Root Cause ................................................................................................................................................. 75 AFF—AT: Discourse FW.............................................................................................................................................. 76 AFF—AT: Epistemology FW ........................................................................................................................................ 77 AFF—AT: Epistemology ............................................................................................................................................... 78 AFF—AT: Ontology FW ............................................................................................................................................... 79 AFF—AT: Value to Life ................................................................................................................................................ 80

AFF—Biopower Good .................................................................................................................................................. 81 AFF—Threats Are Real ................................................................................................................................................ 83

AFF—Apocalyptic Discourse Good .............................................................................................................................. 84 AFF—Environment Alt Co-option ............................................................................................................................ 85 AFF—Environment Managerialism Good..................................................................................................................... 86 AFF—Climate Science Good ....................................................................................................................................... 87 AFF—Climate Science Good ....................................................................................................................................... 88 AFF—Science Good .................................................................................................................................................... 89 AFF—Eco-Pragmatism Good ...................................................................................................................................... 90

This file combines a couple different arguments related to Michel Foucault:

- The mobility link included in the 1NC applies to most affs on the topic with a little spin, particularly mass transitand high speed rail.- The generic section includes links to non-topic-specific things. This is where the broadest impacts, alts, and

framework arguments are.- The territory links include several 1NC-quality cards about the icebreakers and STRAHNET affs.- The environment arguments are most descriptive of the mass transit and gas tax affs.


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Mobility is a disciplinary technique designed to normalize and re-code bodies to maximizetheir integration in productive economies. The aff makes bodies docile within discursive

regimes of biopolitics.Reid ‘8 Julian Reid, “Life Struggles: War, Discipline, and Biopolitics in the Thought of Michel Foucault,” Foucault onPolitics, Security and War, ed. Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal, Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2008, p. 68-70The chapter of Discipline and Punish titled ‘Docile Bodies’ carefully records the emergence of these techniques with attention to their specifically militar y remit. It was through the

technique of enclosure that men came to be assembled under one roof in the form of the barracks. This technique of enclosure allowed for new forms of controland security: the prevention of theft and violence; the dissipation of fears of local populations at the incursions of marauding bandsof troops; the prevention of conflict with civil authorities; the stopping of mass desertion, and the management of expenditure (1991b:p. 142). Through the technique of partitioning, militarised groups of men were individualised. Knowing where and how tolocate individuals, to control communication between individuals, to supervise the conduct not only of the mass bodybut the life of bodies individually, comprised an essential technique in the development of modern militaryorganisation. The innovation of new systems of rank represented a further technique by which bodies were not only individualised but cast within a network of relations ofexchange, allowing for their better distribution and circulation. The organisation of serial spaces providing fixed positions for individuals butpermitting their circulation and interchange allowed for new forms of tactical arrangements in the composition ofmilitary forces. Foucault demonstrates with ample reference to the work of the French military tactician, Comte de Guibert, how the modern military science of tacticsencapsulated this newfound understanding of the potentialities of techniques of ranking and partitioning in the production of recombinan t forms of order. ‘Blinded by the immensity,

dazed by the multitude ... the innumerable combinations that result from the multiplic ity of objects’ Guibert mused at the end of the eighteenth century (1991b: p. 148). The adventof these new disciplinary techniques in the military sciences was, as Discipline and Punish shows, much concerned with the re-ordering of relations between bodies and space . Yet they were also as interested in the disciplining of relationsbetween time and bodily activity, or what Foucault called ‘the temporal elaboration of the act’ (p. 151). He documents how modern military organisation waspredicated upon the creation of meticulously detailed ‘programmes’ according to which the ‘correct use of t he body’ would be specified in order to allow for ‘a correct use of time’ (p.152). For example, between the mid-seventeenth and mid-eighteenth century, ordinances developed to refine the movements across space and time of marching soldiers. While in theseventeenth century marching was only vaguely regulated to assure conformity, by the eighteenth century ordinances specified distinctions between four different sorts of marching

step; the short step, the ordinary step, the double step and the marching step, each differentiated according to duration, extension and comportment (p. 151). As disciplinarypower was concerned with the correct use of time so it was also concerned with what Foucault called ‘theinstrumental coding of the body’ through the creation of a ‘body-machine complex’ (p. 153). Foucault considered that traditionalforms of subjection involved only the extraction of the product of labour , the exploitation of bodies for their surpluses. Disciplinary

power , on the other hand, is about more than that. Its aim is to assure and regulate the correct procedure by which the bodycarries out its labour as an end in itself . In this vein, Foucault focused again on innovations occurring in the domain of military organisation – centrally on thespecifications made in the same late eighteenth-century military ordinances as to how to fire a weapon, which were meticulous in their detailing of how body and weapon interact (p.

153). All of these new innovations, reflecting what Foucault identified as a new ‘positive economy’ of time through which modern societiesattempted to intensify their use of time with increased speeds and increased efficiencies, resulted he argued from changes that were occurring in the domain ofwar . The mid-eighteenth century successes of Prussia enabled by the military systems of Frederick II were the harbinger of most of these developments (p. 154). Through thedevelopment of these techniques with which to organise for and conduct war emerged a new object for theorganisation of power relations. That new object was as Foucault described, ‘the natural body, the bearer of forces and theseat of duration; it is the body susceptible to specified operations, which have their order, their stages, their internalconditions, their constituent elements’ (p. 155).


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The dark side of power over life is the ability to put entire populations to death in the nameof ‘the greater good’

Foucault ’78 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley, 1978, p.136-137Since the classical age the West has undergone a very pro found transformation of these mechanisms of power. "Deduction" has tended to be nolonger the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor,optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces , making them grow, and ordering them,rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least atendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-administering power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is

now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as theyhave been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on theirown populations. But this formidable power of death -and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has sogreatly expanded its limits -now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, thatendeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in thename of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire

populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have

become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to

wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars hascaused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one thatterminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the endpoint of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee anindividual's continued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of battle that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living-has becomethe principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; atstake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of arecent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and thelarge-scale phenomena of population.

The alternative is to vote negative.

This performatively destabilizes the discourses the 1AC subscribes to and opens up newavenues of discussion which move past status quo limits of knowledge.Julia H. Chryssostalis, lecturer at the Westminster school of law, “The Critical Instance ‘After’ The Critique of theSubject,” Law and Critique 16, 2005, pg. 16-21So far, we have looked at some of the ways in which the question of the question is being re-situated in a philosophical terrain that has been radically _re- marked’ by the criticaldiscourses associated with the deconstruction of subjectivity in French contemporary thought. However, the critical instance involves not only questioning but also judgment as one ofits basic tropes. How? To begin with, judgment is found intimately implicated in the semantic economy of the critical: critique, criticism, criterion, critic; they all derive from krisis, theGreek word for judgment; yet, in addition, and more importantly, the very operation of the critical instance seems dominated by judgmental figures, grammars and logics.78 After all, is

not the figure of the Tribunal of Reason at the centre of Kant’s critical project?79 And is not the role of critique therein precisely _that of defining theconditions under which the use of reason is legitimate in order to determine what can be known [connaıˆtre],what must bedone, and what may be hoped’?80 Moreover, from the Enlightenment onwards, is not the critical practised _in the search for formalstructures with universal value’81 that would firmly ground our knowledge, action, and aspirations, and provide thecriteria for the evaluation of all claims to authority?82 And does not the critical instance, in this respect, necessarily turnaround a _quaestio juris, the juridical question, [which asks] with what right one possesses this concept and uses it’?83 Finally,does not the critical moment itself – whether found operating in terms of fault-finding (epi-krisis),84 of drawing distinctions (dia-krisis),85 or of drawing comparisons (syn-krisis) –

seem always to rely on the basic _logic’ of judgement: namely, the operation through which the particular issubsumed (and thus also thought and known) under the rule of an already constituted category?86


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1NC—Shell (3/3)What is interesting to note about these judgemental grammars and logics organising the operation of the critical instance,87 is that the subjective forms they deploy involve two well-

known _types’ of the figure of the judge. On the one hand, there is the _judge’ as a sovereign figure whose capacity to pass judgements on our receivedwisdom, draw distinctions in the field of our knowledge, and set the limits of what can be known, means the capacityto invest the world with a meaning drawn from a more profound knowledge . On the other hand, there is the _judge’ as a normalising, technocratic figure,a mere functionary of the criteria, which regulate and organise the conceptual gestures of our thought and knowledge. These t wo _types’ can be easily seen as antithetical. On the one hand, the figure of the critic inall its dignity, autonomy and sovereignty; on the other, the figure of the critic in, what Adorno calls, the _thing like form of the object’.88 However, wha t should not be missed is how much both rely on thephilosophemes that organise the _classical’ configuration of the subject: rationality, mastery, self-presence, identity, consciousness, intentionality, autonomy, the radical difference between subject and object. Fordoes not critical judgement involve in this instance an operation of thinking, where an already given subject takes the initiative of applying an already established category to, say, an object, a text, an event? Is notthis _initiative’ marked not only by the distance between the _judge’ and the _judged’, but also by the instrumentality of a masterful, rational and rationalising subject? Moreover, is not the submission of thefunctionary compensated by the mastery s/he has over the material under his/her authority? And does not the very form of subsumption, with its reliance on already established categories, involve a technique, which

assimilates and neutralises the singularity of the particular and forecloses the possibility of thinking something new?89 To return to our initial question, if the critical instance is ruled by judgemental grammars and logics, which in turn rely on _classical’ configurations of subjectivity, what happens to thecritical when reinscribed and re-situated in a philosophical terrain which has been _re-marked’ by the critique ordeconstruction of subjectivity, a philosophical terrain without transcendental guarantees? Following what was said earlier in connection with the question of thequestion, the critical is also being re-thought and re-worked. Three gestures mark this re-thinking: first, an abandonment of judgemental grammars andlogics; second, a re-casting of the critical in terms of the question of the limit; and third, the emergence of an ethic ofencounter (with the limit). Let us briefly consider what is involved in the last two gestures. One of the clearest statements of what is at stake in the re-casting of the critical in termsof the question of the limit, the limit as a question, is to be found in Foucault’s two essays, _What Is Critique?’ 90 and _W hat is Enlightenment?’91 Without going into the detail of the

argument developed there, I want to focus at a point in the Enlightenment essay, which I think is crucial. This is a point where, to begin with, Foucault affirms that _[c]riticism

indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits’, thus seemingly locating himself within the basic parameters of the Kantian formulation of thecritical. Then, though, he continues: But if the Kantian question was that of knowing [savoir] what limits knowledge [connaissance] must renounce exceeding , it seems to methat the critical question today must be turned back into a positive one: In what is given to us as universal, necessary,obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints? Thepoint in brief is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique thattakes the form of a possible crossing over [franchissment].92 In other words, Foucault’s re-working of the critical involves anotion of the limit not as necessary limitation, as in the Kantian critical project, but as a point of _a possible crossingover ’. For posing the question of the limits of our knowledge , or _showing the limits of the constitution of objectivity’,93 involves also adimension of opening up, of transformation and becoming. As such the type of _work done at the limits of ourselves must’, according to Foucault, _onthe one hand, open up a realm of historical inquiry, and on the other, put itself to the test of reality, of contemporary reality,both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this changeshould take.’94 In other words, the critical instance rethought in terms of the limit as question does not merely involve a negative mo ment of transgression. For at the

point of this work on the limits (of ourselves), the ethico-political promise/possibility of transformation opens up – which is also why, at this point, the critical instance, for Foucault, becomes intimately linked with virtue .95 Let us now turn tothe last gesture involved in the re-thinking of the critical: namely, the displacement of judgemental logics and the emergence of an ethics of encounter – that is to say, an encounter with

the question of the limit. Let us move with caution, though. To begin with, it is important to understand that one does not drive to the limits for athrill experience, or because limits are dangerous and sexy, or because it brings us into tintillating proximity with evil. One asks about the limitsof knowing because one has already run up against a crisis within the epistemological field in which one lives. Thecategories by which social life is ordered produce a certain incoherence or entire realm of unspeakability. And it isfrom this condition, the tear in the fabric of our epistemological field, that the practice of critique emerges, with theawareness that no discourse is adequate here or that our reigning discourses have produced an impasse.96 Which is to saythat the critical instance, as the exposure of the _limits of t he constitution of objectivity’, also involves the experience of the dislocation of our sedimented positivities, in other wor ds, the

experience of crisis. Such a recognition is important here because it reinscribes crisis, which is actually another meaning of the Greek word krisis, intothe critical, which is thus re-connected with the notion of negativity – negativity in the ontological sense. This negativity, as Stavrakakis notes,has both a disruptive dimension that _refers to the horizon of impossibility and unrepresentability, which punctuates the life of

linguistic creatures’,97 and at the same time a productive one: _[b]y inscribing a lack in our dislocated positivities, itfuels the desire for new social and political constructions.’98 As such, this negativity is _neither an object nor itsnegation: it is the condition of possibility/ impossibility of objects’,99 of objectivity more generally, indeed of alltransformative action.100 And it is precisely here that an ethics of the encounter with the limit is located in that such an encounter is a moment, which ought to beacknowledged rather than covered over by quickly _patching the cracks’ of our universe. It is a moment which should not be fo reclosed or assimilated: For at stake in thisencounter with the limit, _is a matter of showing how the space of the possible is larger than the one we are assigned

– that something else is possible, but not that everything is possible.’101 And it is precisely here, at the moment when the site of the pre -theticand the pre-judicative is glimpsed, that the thrust and the promise of a _re-marked’ critical instance is t o be found.


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Link—War

Threats of nuclear war are used to justify militarizationGrondin 2004 ((Re)Writing the “National Security State”: How and Why Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War DavidGrondin Occasional Paper Paper presented at the annual International Studies Association Convention, March 17-20, 2004, Montreal) Much of the Cold War state apparatus and military infrastructure remained in place to meet the challenges andthreats of the post-Cold War era. If the attack on Pearl Harbor was the driving force of the postwar national security state apparatus (Stuart, 2003:303), the 9/11 events have been used as a motive for resurrecting the national security discourse as a justificationagainst a new ‘infamy’, global terrorism.19 Although in this study I am calling into question the political practices that legitimized the very idea of anational security state during the Cold War era, I find even more problematic the reproduction of a similar logic in the post-9/11 era

– a rather different historical and socio-political context. As Simon Dalby highlights, Coupling fears of Soviet ambitions, of arepeat of Pearl Harbor, and of nuclear war, these institutions formed the heart of a semipermanent militarymobilization to support the policies of containment militarism. If this context is no longer applicable, the case that the national securitystate is not an appropriate mode for social organization in the future is in many ways compelling. If security is premised on violence, as security-dilemma and national-security literatures suggest (albeit often reluctantly), perhaps the necessity of rethinking globalpolitics requires abandoning the term and the conceptual strictures that go with it (Dalby, 1997: 21).

Invocations of a dangerous other threatening the stability of the West place discursivecontrol in the hands of a national security complex fixated on continual warGrondin 2004 ((Re)Writing the “National Security State”: How and Why Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War DavidGrondin Occasional Paper Paper presented at the annual International Studies Association Convention, March 17-20, 2004, Montreal)The Cold War national security culture represented in realist discourses was constitutive of the American nationalsecurity state. There was certainly a conflation of theory and policy in the Cold War military-intellectual complex, which “were observers of, and activeparticipants in, defining the meaning of the Cold War. They contributed to portray the enemy that both reflected and fueledpredominant ideological strains within the American body politic. As scholarly partners in the national security state, they wereinstrumental in defining and disseminating a Cold War culture” (Rubin, 2001: 15). This national security culture was “a complex spacewhere various representations and representatives of the national security state compete to draw the boundaries anddominate the murkier margins of international relations” (Der Derian, 1992: 41). The same Cold War security culture hasbeen maintained by political practice (on the part of realist analysts and political leaders) through realist discourses inthe post-9/11 era and once again reproduces the idea of a national security state. This (implicit) state identification is neitheraccidental nor inconsequential. From a poststructuralist vantage point, the identification process of the state and the nation is always anegative process for it is achieved by exclusion, violence, and marginalization. Thus, a deconstruction of practices that constituteand consolidate state identity is necessary: the writing of the state must be revealed through the analysis of the discourses that constitute it. The state andthe discourses that (re)constitute it thus frame its very identity and impose a fictitious “national unity” on society; it isfrom this fictive and arbitrary creation of the modernist dichotomous discourses of inside/outside that the discourses(re)constructing the state emerge. It is in the creation of a Self and an Other in which the state uses it monopolisticpower of legitimate violence – a power socially constructed, following Max Weber’s work on the ethic of responsibility

– to construct a threatening Other differentiated from the “unified” Self, the national society (the nation).16 It is through thisvery practice of normative statecraft,17 which produces threatening Others, that the international sphere comes into being. David Campbell adds that it is by

constantly articulating danger through foreign policy that the state’s very conditions of existence are generated18.


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Link—Hegemony

US hegemony establishes a global liberal order engaged in constant war —the world istranslated into a universal domestic realm in which continual American intervention is

necessitatedLouiza Odysseos, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sussex, “Liberalism’s War,Liberalism’s Order: Rethinking the Global Liberal Order as a ‘Global Civil War’” paper prepared for LiberalInternationalism, 17 March 2008, San FranciscoThis echoes official voices of the ‘new normalcy’ or the ‘new normal’, pronounced by Vice President Cheney the daybefore the USA PATRIOT Act passed into law in October 2001 : ‘Many of the steps we have now been forced to take will become permanent inAmerican life. They represent an understanding of the world as it is, and dangers we must guard against perhaps for decades t o come. I think of it as the new normalcy’ (Cheney

2001).9 The new normalcy, encompassing as it does the ‘biopolitical operations’ of the state of exception, and whichinvolves the defence of logistical societies (Reid 2006), points to a disruption of the relationship posited by Schmittbetween the rule and the exception, allowing Agamben to speak of its becoming the ‘dominant paradigm ofgovernment in contemporary politics’ (Agamben 2005: 2). When the state of exception becomes the (political) rule, we discern it more clearly as ‘a space devoid of law’, in which the law is replaced by ‘civil war and revolutionary violence, that is human action that has shed [deposto] every relation to l aw’ (ibid.: 59). 10 Since the state of exception

has ‘today reached its maximum worldwide deployment’, we are faced with the advent of a global civil war in which the normative aspect

of the law can thus be obliterated and contradicted with impunity by a governmental violence that – while ignoringinternational law externally and producing a permanent state of exception internally – nevertheless still claims to beapplying the law (ibid.: 87) The emphasis placed on the fictitious (or willed) state of exception and on the analogy to Nazism, alongside the exposition of Benjamin’s call tobring about a real state of exception with which to fight Fascism (1999: 248), might suggest that we are faced with a ‘post-modern’ totalitarianism, whichnormalises the state of exception and leads us to a ‘global civil war ’. Yet this term refers, for Agamben, not so much to actual fighting or a specificinstance of conflict but, importantly, to a form of world ordering, pursued by (or which is) the global liberal order. The global liberal order, then, maybe bepreliminarily ‘formally indicated’ as a ‘war -order’. As he explains in an article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: By the rapid reduction of global politics tothe antitheses of “state/terrorism”, what once seemed a paradoxical and peripheral term has today become real and effective. By strategically linking the twoparadigms of the state of emergency and the civil war, the new American world order defines itself as a situation inwhich the state of emergency [exception] can no longer be distinguished from the norm, and in which evendifferentiating between war and peace - and between external and civil war - is impossible (Agamben 2003; brackets added).


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Link—Realism

Realist discourse keeps the US operating on Cold War logic, securitizes against “the other”and prevents any alternative forms of thought from achieving legitimacy.

Grondin 2004 ((Re)Writing the “National Security State”: How and Why Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War DavidGrondin Occasional Paper Paper presented at the annual International Studies Association Convention, March 17-20, 2004, Montreal)As American historian of U.S. foreign relations Michael Hogan observes in his study on the rise of the national security state during the Truman administration,

“the national security ideology framed the Cold War discourse in a system of symbolic representation that definedAmerica’s national identity by reference to the un-American ‘other ,’ usually the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or some o ther totalitarianpower” The very notion of state security as it is used in this literature is concerned with the “relationship between stateand society where the state provides insurance against the impact of ‘external’ contingencies” (Mabee, 2003: 143). However,as Bryan Mabee rightfully notes, this research area “overlaps with the idea of the ‘national security state’, as conceptualized in the literature on the history of USsecurity policy, with particular reference to the early Cold War years, and the founding of the National Security Act in 1947” (Mabee, 2003: 148, note 15). In

addition, a feminist literature on national security studies has emphasized how states, and not only the American state, actas security states. For example, for Iris Marion Young, security states designate Hobbes’ Leviathan; they are authoritarian governmentsacting as protector states asking total obedience from their society. The state grounds its patriarchal role of the

masculine protector “in fear of threat and in the apparent desire for protection such fear generates” (Young, 2003: 2). In lightof these different literatures, when using the concept of national security state, it is necessary to specify the context and the meaning with which it is associated.Such a binary system made it difficult for any domestic dissent from U.S. policy to emerge – it would have “amountedto an act of disloyalty” (Hogan, 1998: 18).15 While Hogan distinguishes advocates from critics of the American national security state, his view takes forgranted that there is a given and fixed American political culture that differs from the “new” national security ideology. It posits an “American way”, produced by itscultural, political, and historical experience. Although he stresses that differences between the two sides of the discourse are superficial, pertaining solely to the

means, rather than the ends of the national security state, Hogan sees the national security state as a finished and legitimate state:an American state suited to the Cold War context of permanent war, while stopping short of a garrison state: Althoughgovernment would grow larger, taxes would go up, and budget deficits would become a matter of routine, none o f these and other transformations would add upto the crushing regime symbolized in the metaphor of the garrison state. The outcome instead would be an American national security state that was shaped asmuch by the country’s democratic political culture as it was by the perceived military imperatives of the Cold War (Hogan, 1998: 22). I disagree with this

essentialist view of the state identity of the United States. The United States does not need to be a national security state. If it wasand is still constructed as such by many realist discourses, it is because these discourses serve some politicalpurpose. Moreover, in keeping with my poststructuralist inclinations, I maintain that identity need not be, and indeed never is, fixed. In a scheme in which “to

say is to do”, that is, from a perspective that accepts the performativity of language, culture becomes a relational site whe re identity politics happens rather thanbeing a substantive phenomenon. In this sense, culture is not simply a social context framing foreign policy decision-making. Culture is “a signifying part of theconditions of possibility for social being, […] the way in which culturalist arguments themselves secure the identity of subjects in whose name they speak”(Campbell, 1998: 221).


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Link—Circulation

Mobility infrastructure paradoxically imposes freedom of movement on the populace tosupport security apparatuses

Didier Bigo, Professor of International Relations at Sciences-Po, Paris, “Security: A Field Left Fallow,” trans. J.E.Dillon, Foucault on Politics, Security and War, ed. Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal, Palgrave Macmillan: NewYork, 2008, p. 107-108As we have seen, a major argument for Foucault is that a dispositif of security cannot exist without a regime of liberties, and inparticular without freedom of circulation. Security pre-supposes that one analyses mobilities, networks and margins insteadof the frontier and the isolation that goes with demarcation. Security is thus a dispositif of circulation within a lifeenvironment and not a dispositif of disciplining bodies. A security dispositif does not isolate, it is built as a network. It does notclose off the social area but interweaves its aspects. It does not operate so as to watch and maintain surveillance, it lets things happen (as aform of laissez-faire). Specialists on European institutions have to question themselves about this dimension where freedom of circulation produces a normality, asecurity which destabilises disciplinary closures and sovereign log ics, and thus creates unease about the lack of certainty (Apap, 2001; Gangster et al., 1997;Huysmans, 2004a; Kelstrup and Williams, 2000). They are o ften unaware of the Foucaultian approach and its idea of centrifugal dynamic, and see thephenomenon through the lenses of a spillover, but much research concerning the frontiers of Europe can profit from Foucault’s lectures. What is often not

accepted is the effect this line of thought has on freedom. The proposition overturns the conventional schema of the balancebetween two different principles: security and freedom (Bigo et al., 2006a). Security is not the opposite of liberty. It is not an equivalentprinciple. It is not even the delineation of the limits of liberty or a form of necessity. It is the result of liberties. Security works in a given areaand favours the double movement of extending the area and freeing circulation. In fact, within the interplay of opposing forces,security is extended by displacing frontiers, pushing back controls on others, externalising discipline so as to maintain securitisation only in the name of the libertyof the majority (Bigo and Guild, 2005; Valluy, 2005).

Production of greater and more efficient population movement justified through thebackdrop of images of terror is a strategy of population managementDiken and Laustsen ‘3 Bülent Diken, lecturer in Sociology at Lancaster University, and Carsten Bagge Laustsen,Ph.D. student at the University of Copenhagen, “Zones of indistinction : security, terror and bare life,” Territories,Islands, camps and other states of utopia, 2003, p. 42-51, http://www.languageandcapitalism.info/wp-content/uploads/2006/08/wot.pdfModern sovereignty does not only work according to the disciplinary logic of exclusion. Disciplinary confinement, and thusexclusion and normalization constitute only one of the three spatial principles embodied in the camp. The camp is also a space of controlorganized according to a science of flows, manifesting a biopolitical paradigm à la Foucault. Control does not demand thedelimitation of movement but rather abstraction and speed. Significantly, the Nazi regime used the human instinct forsurvival to make the Jews carry out their own destruction. The Nazi sought to destroy the Jews step by step, makingthem opt for the “least evil” option each time, which paved the way for the greatest evil. In the camp, there was nospace for rest, reflection and comfort: work, finding something to eat and survival were parts of a daily battle, whichmeant that the prisoners were in permanent movement. What interrupted their controlled flow was terror . In contrast todiscipline and control, which operate, respectively, in terms of enclosure and flow, terror functions against the background of fear related touncertainty, insecurity and unsafety. The prisoner could be hit, at any time, by the guards’ anger, the greatest terrorbeing the “showers”. Terror immobilizes through fear. It is thus disciplinary without the spatial confinement ofdiscipline and the functional regularity of flows. Let us now investigate these three paradigms – discipline, control, and terror – focusing on howthe attempts at escaping from one form of power sediment other, more advanced forms of power.


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Link—Circulation

Mobile subjectivity requires discipline and regulation from the state in the form ofincreasingly effective transportation infrastructure to ensure that speed does not exceed

mechanisms of social controlJeremy Packer , Assistant Professor of Communications at Penn State-University Park, Foucault, Cultural Studies,and Governmentality, 2003, p. 139-140Paul Virilio’s thesis in Speed and Politics (1986) is that the power of the State is primarily that of the police: the management of the public ways. He follows thiswith a combative assertion on thinking about knowledge. Virilio states in his study, “the related logic of knowing-power, or power-knowledge, is eliminated to thebenefit of moving-power —in other words the study of tendencies, of flows” (p . 47). An examination of this statement will make it apparent that although Viriliodoes provide impetus to think about the importance of mobility and its control, his dismissal of the relationship between power and knowledge not only weakenshis claims but forces his hand regarding notions of power and freedom. Foucault, according to Virilio, is the thinker of confinement and disciplinarity.Power/knowledge according to Foucault describes the co-constitutive capacities of knowledge and power to produce apparatusses of control, regulation, and

production. The important insight that power/knowledge provides is that discourses such as science, medicine, or psychology, throughtheir monopoly on truth claims, exert the power to determine the relative face of “reality.” For instance, Foucault in Madness andCivilization (1965) explains how, through the creation of the descriptive category of madness, a whole series of material effects were carried out upon those

deemed mad by medicine and psychology Knowledge then is not simply descriptive, but productive. It produces, among other things,normative categories, prescriptions for proper conduct, and relations of power: for instance the relationship of doctor-patient or

highway patrolman-driver. Virilio, by dismissing the power/knowledge thesis, demonstrates that his understanding of power is in line with traditional Marxism inwhich power is wielded by the State and is exerted upon an unsuspecting proletariat, with negative effects.3 His discussion of freedom begins to reveal his notionof the negative effects that the power of speed has, namely the loss of freedom. Freedom for Virilio is something innate to individuals rather than the product andnecessity of certain forms of government. Furthermore, speed is a correlate of freedom within conceptions of mobility: more speed is said to equal greaterfreedom. In Foucault and Political Reason (1996), Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose critique this understanding of freedom and its relation to a

top-down conception of power. The following quote sums this up: Freedom is neither an ideological fiction of modern societies nor an existential feature ofexistence within them; it must be understood also and necessarily as a formula of rule. Foucault’s concern here might be characterized as anattempt to link the analysis of the constitution of freedom with that of the exercise of rule; that is, with the extent to which freedom has become, in our so-called “free societies,” a resource for , and not merely a hindrance to, government. (p. 8) If we are to take Foucault’s notion seriously we need notsimply look for instances in which something, in this instance speed, leads to a loss of freedom, but instead reveal the types of freedom producedby speed, the types of regulations placed on speed and its purposes, and the necessity of freedom as a constitutiveelement of the very notion of speed. Speed after all is always relative; it is measured against what is considered thenormative rate. Freedom and mobility, one of its material corollaries, must be understood then in their specificity and in theirnecessity to current forms of governing , State and otherwise. This demands a recognition that as the potential for mobility isincreased, the subject of governing must change in accordance. A “more free” or at least “more mobile” citizenbecomes necessary to partake actively in a differently striated space. Thus the goal of governing is not to simply guard againsttoo much freedom, but to produce the type of freedom that accords with the expansive demands of culture and economy.Governing at a distance across striated space takes the place of direct control. A proper deployment of power requires enabling and activating “men and things”(Foucault 1991, p. 93) in a manner that allows them to and in fact demands that they move outside of confined and continuously surveyed arenas. It also meansstriating space in such a fashion that rule can still be exercised. Depending upon what perspective drives one’s analysis, one could view the d irectly surveyedsubject as far less dangerous to the State than the mobile subject, and thus more free, in that once it is surveyed, its perceived ability to do harm to the state is

minimal and thus not taken as seriously. Mobile subjects, on the other hand, must be highly disciplined, because they are not undercontinual surveillance, are not always within the immediate scope of state interaction, and are depended upon toexecute the goals of State and non-State institutions when the State per se is not present to do so. Thus, to be mobileis to be free to govern oneself , across a vast territory, but it is always in accordance with governing in so far as it coincides with “convenient ends” (p. 93).


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Link—Transportation Infrastructure

Transportation infrastructure is designed to maximize the extraction of labor from thepopulace and identify and quarantine social deviants and unproductive workers

Elden ‘8 Stuart Elden, “Strategies for Waging Peace: Foucault as Collaborateur,” Foucault on Politics, Security andWar, ed. Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal, Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2008, p. 28-30In sum, over a million francs was projected for this work, worth about 773,000 euros today, 13 enough to support a fairly large team for a few years. 14 Various outputs came from thiswork, culminating in the book Les équipements du pouvoir which was originally published as a special issue of the journal Recherches in 1973, and then reissued in 1976. 15

Recherches was the house journal of CERFI, and although all the projects clearly influenced the work, this is very m uch based on Fourquet’s research project. 16 Theequipments of power analysed in this book are the three items in the subtitle: towns, territories and ‘collective equipments’ – équipementscollectifs. By these Fourquet and Murard mean something akin to public amenities or the infrastructure of society. These are tools or utensils that are utilisedcollectively – roads, transportation and communication networks, and the more static apparatus of towns. Circulation necessarily plays acrucial role, with the flux and flow of people, goods and capital as money (Fourquet and Murard, 1976: p. 35). For Fourquet and Murard,these elements of infrastructure are means of production, or perhaps more accurately the means by which production canbe achieved (Fourquet and Murard, 1976: p. 32). The town is in their terms a ‘collective equipment’, ‘and the network [réseau] oftowns distribute capital across the whole of the national territory’ (Fourquet and Murard, 1976: p. 35). Foucault himself takes place in two dialoguesin the book, after the outlining of various ideas by Fourquet and Murard. 17 In the English translation of the dialogues the order is reversed, and the accompanying material left aside.This makes for a peculiarly decontextualised discussion. Fourquet and Murard note that the three key terms that they are interested in thinking through are power, territory and

production, particularly in their interrelation (Fourquet and Murard, 1976: p. 7). The stress on power and territory within a broadly Marxist analysis allows for a ‘displacement’ rather thana revision or critique (Fourquet and Murard, 1976: p. 8). This context is supplemented by an interest in Deleuze and Guattari ’s work Anti-Oedipus, and earlier texts which the authorsreceived while working on this, and an interest in Foucault’s work on madness and the clinic (Fourquet and Murard, 1976: p. 10). The original title of the wo rk, Généalogie deséquipements collectives (Fourquet and Murard, 1976: p. 9) perhaps betrays this Foucaultian influence – a Foucault then engaging with Nietzsche’s ideas in detail. Indeed in theextended introduction, Fourquet and Murard acknowledge Deleuze and Foucault’s readings of Nietzsche, as well as the pioneerin g work of Bataille and Klossowski (Fourquet andMurard, 1976: p. 17). All sorts of Foucaultian themes are found in this work – the use of the panopticon, relations of power and knowledge, surveillance, control of population andnormalisation of individuals and so on. The dating of the material to the early 1970s shows that this relation was not solely a one- way influence. Murard and Fourquet utilise Foucault’sresearch on madness, medicine and other issues, but the bulk of the material predates Discipline and Punish, although there is some editing between the 1973 journal article and the1976 book. Some of Foucault’s ideas about the division of space in schools and the control of children’s bodies and medical plans for towns are discussed in this work (see Fourquetand Murard, 1976: pp. 197 –8, 210). A range of other contemporary thinkers are utilised, including those of a more obviously Marxist perspective such as Lefebvre (Fourquet andMurard, 1976: pp. 55 –6) and Castells. The ideas of normalisation are explicitly related to Canguilhem, just as Foucault does in his Les Anormaux lectures (Fourquet and Murard, 1976:p. 155, see 7). But the other key role is played by Fernand Braudel, who is mentioned in a number of places (Fourquet and Murard, 1976: pp. 7, 10). The book is organised on thefollowing plan: • La ville-ordinateur – the town-machine • La ville-métaphore – the town-metaphor • Les territoires – territories • Formation des équipements collectives – formation ofcollective equipments or facilities • Le discours du plan – the discourse of the plan • Économie politique sans famille – political economy without the family. In the second dialogue

Foucault takes the example of a road, and suggests that it plays three strategic functions: to produce production, toproduce demand, and to normalise. While the first two are unsurprising from a Marxist perspective, the third is perhaps most interesting. Productionrequires transport, the movement of goods and labour, and the levies or tithes of state power and tax collector . The

bandit is an ‘antithetical person’ in these relations . Demand requires ‘the market, merchandise, buyers and sellers’, it creates a wholesystem of coded places of business, regulates prices and goods sold. The inspector, controller or customs agent face-to-face with the smugglerof contraband, the peddler (Foucault, 1996: p. 106; Fourquet and Murard, 1976: pp. 215 –16). Both production and demand are the subject of theprocedure of normalisation, in the adjusting and regulation of these two domains. Foucault talks about the aménagement du territoire, the control and planning of theland or territory of the state that the road allows. The role of engineers is important both as a product of normalising power – their education and authentic knowledge – and as its

privileged agent. In opposition to them are those who do not fit the allowed circuits – the vagabond or the sedentary: ‘in bothcases, abnormal’ (Foucault, 1996: p. 216; Fourquet and Murard, 1976: p. 107). Foucault stresses that this is merely one example of the kind of collective equipment thatFourquet and Murard are analysing. He suggests that the chronology of the industrial and the disciplinary state – we should note that it is of the state, not society, that he is speaking – do not match up, although they are correlatives. ‘Education produces producer s, it produces those who demand and at the same time, it normalises, classes, divides, imposes rules and

indicates the limit of the pathological’ (Foucault, 1996: p. 107; Fourquet and Murard, 1976: pp. 217–18). Deleuze responds to this, suggesting that the threeaspects are rather investment, treating someone as a producer in potential or actuality; control, treating someone as aconsumer; the public service aspect, the citizen as a user . Utilising concepts that he and Guattari would develop in their collaborative work, Deleuzesuggests that ‘the highway today is channelled nomadism, a partitioning into a grid, while public service implies a general

nomadism’ (Foucault, 1996: p. 107; Fourquet and Murard, 1976: pp. 217 –18). Foucault’s point in response is that the state is tasked with thebalancing of production of production (i.e. supply) with the production of demand. The state’s role in other areas, such as the normalisationundertaken by the police, hospitals, treatment of the insane, is ambiguous: on the one hand the state’s role expands, but on the other private corporations are part of a process of de-

statisation. Foucault’s telling point is that the difference between socialist and capitalist utopias i s that the latter worked. But now, instead of private ventures of thiskind, there are ‘housing projects’ that the state must control, that ‘depend on the St ate apparatus. The deck has been reshuffled’ (Foucault, 1996: p. 108; Fourquet and Murard, 1976: pp. 218 –20). Murard and Fourquet give their own examples, of hospitals that act as means of production in terms of producing thehealthy workforce required by capital.


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Link—Public Transportation

Efficient public transportation fulfills the biopolitical necessity of increasing populationmovement and labor extraction while regulating movement and social interactions

Jeremy Packer , Assistant Professor of Communications at Penn State-University Park, Foucault, Cultural Studies,and Governmentality, 2003, p. 145-46The first technique of docility dealt with by Foucault is “the art of distributions,” mentioned earlier in the discussion of the naval hospital. It entails the distributionof individuals in space provided through the enclosure of populations, the partitioning of individuals within that space,the creation of specialized spaces in which only singular activities took place, and the rank of arrangements throughwhich individuals move. This last point is particularly important in that individuals are never given a fixed location, but rather theirpurposefulness is dependent upon the relative location that they occupy at any given moment. This allows formobility, yet only in a very predetermined fashion. For instance, there are very particular places in which one can operate motor vehicles: primarily the roadsystem, with some ever-decreasing number of off-road areas. The roads themselves only connect certain places, and the quickest routesgenerally only connect places of political and economic importance. Furthermore, only certain types of vehicles and modes of transportation areallowable in these spaces. The second technique is “the control of activi ty,” which primarily depends upon the allocation of time and the efficient connection of actor and tools, throughthe use of time-tables, the standardization of time allowed for actions, the partitioning of actions, and exhaustive use of time. The control of activities on the road can in a simple way be

understood as the rules of the road: one-way streets, stop signs, turn signal use, speed limits, and so forth. In the name of efficiency an entire traffic

engineering apparatus has been set up to minimize time spent on roads in order to command the most efficient useof resources. As drivers we merely serve as transporters of our own resources: time, money, and labor. This createsthe third technique of docility, capitalization of time. It entails the repetitive but gradual acceleration of proficiency. Thusthe Highway Commission is constantly under pressure to produce more proficient drivers through the use of traffic engineering. Whether automobiles or other forms of publictransportation are involved, the often divergent goals of personal mobility and population mobilization frequently derail any plans to satisfy both desires with one system as Bruno Latour

(1996) notes. The last technique described by Foucault is “the composition of forces.” It entails the response to a new demand for socialefficiency, which is to “construct a machine whose effect will be maximized by the concerted articulation of theelementary parts of which it is composed” (Foucault, 1979, p. 164). Thus the techniques listed above are said to elevate the effectiveness of simple actions into acomprehensive activity~ In this instance it is paramount that the mobility produced must service other sectors of the social order , most notablythe economy and government. Put simply, these techniques of docility must enable individuals to get to work, transportgoods, go on vacation, get to shopping malls, and go to school in an efficient manner . Furthermore, the road system needsto operate to keep particular, often less docile, populations off the streets, away from middle-class suburbs, andwithout access to quick group mobilization .6


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Link—Traffic Safety

Purging transportation of its attendant dangers is a tool to solidify social control throughthe ordering of mobility

Jeremy Packer , Assistant Professor of Communications at Penn State-University Park, Foucault, Cultural Studies,and Governmentality, 2003, p. 135-136In his “Governmentality” lecture, Michel Foucault (1991) pinpoints Guillaume de La Perrier’s statement in Mirror Politique, one of the first anti-Machiavelliantreatises on government, “government is the right disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a convenient end” (Foucault, 1991, p. 93), as the demarcator ofthe shift from sovereignty to governmentality. According to de La Perrier, and Foucault by extension, ruling was no longer consumed by the task of simply

retaining sovereignty. Rather, it became the responsibility of rulers to employ tactics that would benefit the population as wellas the State. In place of the goal simply to maintain territory and loyalty, men and territory were seen as a means to an ends, assumingthey were properly disposed. According to Foucault, the metaphor often used to illustrate this point, in the governing manuals of the eighteenth century, was thegovernance of a ship (p. 93). This metaphor speaks to a concern with not only the men on the ship and the potential gain produced by successful shipping, but,importantly, the avoidance of catastrophes that could befall such an enterprise. It is the choice of this metaphor that I want to elucidate in this essay. It bears

further elaboration because it points out the importance of mobility in the formation of thought concerning governing. In an increasingly mobile world,governing mobility consumes greater and greater amounts of mental and physical resources. A vast literature explains thestructural organization, political and economic advantages, and general importance of transportation and communication systems that crisscross the globe. But

more specifically, the disposition of these resources takes place not only on a global or national scale. In contemporary America, personal mobility is

primarily achieved through the brute materiality of cars, trucks, buses, trains, motorcycles, and airplanes. This form of mobility plays a vital role in how individuals organize, rationalize, and inhabit their world. It is at this intersection ofgovernance and governed (increasingly self-governed) in the realm of the microphysics of power, that the following analysisof the politics of mobility is located. Quite literally, “individuals are the vehicles of power ” (Foucault 1980, p. 98). Personal mo-bility must therefore be seen as an act of power . An examination of the “net like-organisation” (p. 98) that binds individual aims and governmentalaims can illuminate the important ways that our individual mobile conduct is implicated in, guided by, and resistant to seemingly detached political, economic, andcultural trends. The relative importance ascribed to Foucault’s work is often based on his analysis of large -scale processes such as power, discourse, or, morerecently, government. The critical orientation that such generalities provide for current and friture intellectual enterprises is certainly important. However, it needsto remain clear that the specificity of Foucault’s research was often the microphysics of power and close discursive investigation of key texts that oriented thoughtat critical moments. Furthermore, thinking about mobility, like thinking about incarceration or madness, demands detours into discursive territory that is not

necessarily obvious at first. In the case of this essay the notion of safety has oriented my road map for investigating how personal mobility islinked to governing. As the ship metaphor makes explicit, an important part of governing in general and mobility specifically isthe avoidance of catastrophe. It is this avoidance—being safe—that comes to construct thought and ultimately self-reflection about mobility. As Foucault explains, in order for something to be governed, or imagined as governable, it needs to be problematized (1990b).This is to say that an activity to be governed needs to be thought of in terms of a problem to be overcome. In this regard,mobility, like communication (Mattelart, 1996, p. xvi), has historically been seen as an economic, cultural, and political good, but it has beenproblematized according to the dangers that it posed.’ The idea of safety serves then as the solution and provides anormative orientation for mobility. Once this orientation solidifies, as I will argue it has, it disperses into a vast array ofnormative contexts, thereby legitimating forms of governance and self-governance that have little relation to any specificproblematization.


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Link—Highways

Highway expansion fortifies class divisions within populations by stratifying socialprivileges through the criteria of automobility

Campbell ‘5 ,David ‘ The Biopolitics of Security: Oil, Empire, and the Sports Utility Vehicle’ American Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 3, Legal Borderlands: Law

and the Construction of American Borders (Sep., 2005), pp. 943- JSTOR BSH Although constructed as a means to achieve the unification of social life, the web of traffic routes that permeate urban space have in practicefurthered the fragmentation of the urban and its peri-urban and suburban spaces, creat-ing in the process newborderlands (which in turn require new capsules of security).The distanciation of life elements (home from work, family fromfriends, haves from have nots) that are part of this urban fissure in turn promotes further reliance on automobility as people seek toovercome, traverse, or bypass these divisions. Importantly, this partitioning of the urban world has been codified in and encouraged byplanning legislation. Embodying a functionalist view of the city as an organized machine, American urban plan-ners from the 1 920s on relied on a system of zoning controls that separated uses and imposed homogenous criteria on specified areas.Hostile to mixed usage or hybrid formations, these uniform zoning codes (known as Euclidean zoning after a 1 926 Supreme Court decision in favor of thevillage of Euclid) have produced urban sprawl and the elongation of travel routes.95 In the absence of public transport systems, theseurban forms have further increased reliance on the car. For residents of the border zones known as "edge cities," there is little choice but torely on private transpor t for mobility. Contemporary urban life is both sustained by oil in the form of the car and requires increasing oil

consumption through the use of the car urban life promotes. Citizens are thus coerced into a limited flexibility, creating a situation that is "a wonderfultestament


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Link—Terrain

Identifying zones of land as sites for sovereign struggle and competition converts land intomilitaristic terrain—this supports and extends the violence essential to modern statecraft

Stuart Elden, Durham University, “Land, terrain, territory,” Progress in Human Geography 34 (6), 2010, p. 799-817The conflict over land indicated by Anderson is significant. Property is important as an indicator, but conflict over land is twofold: both over its possession and conducted on its terrain.Land is both the site and stake of struggle. In this it differs from conflict over other resources. Strategic-military reasons thus become significant. As well asseeking to maximize the possession of land as a scarce resource, feudal lords and nascent states were also concerned with security, management and administration. Defensibleborders, homogeneity and the promotion of territorial cohesion offer a range of examples – examples that straddle thestrategic issues and link closely to the development of a range of techniques of state practice. France, for example, following theTreaty of the Pyrenees in 1659, began a process of mapping and surveying its land, employing technical specialists both to map and to reinforce its so- called ‘natural frontiers’. Arelated term to that of land is therefore ‘terrain’. This is land that has a strategic, political, military sense. The English ‘territory’, theFrench territoire and related terms in other languages derive from quite a specific sense of the Latin territorium. Territorium is an extremely rare term in classical Latin that becomescommon in the Middle Ages. The standard definition is the land belonging to a town or another entity such as a religious order. It is used, for instance, by Cicero (1858: volume IV, 522)for the agricultural lands of a colony, and in phrases such as that describing the birthplace of the Venerable Bede in his Ecclesiastical history. Bede (Colgrave and Mynors, 1969: v, 24)is described as being born ‘in territorio eiusdem monasterii’, ‘i n lands belonging to the monastery’. This monastery was Jarrow in nort heast England. In Alfred the Great’s Anglo -Saxontranslation, Bede was born ‘on sundorlonde of the monastery’, outlying lands, lands sundered from the estate itself, but under its possession, and thus it has been claimed that this isthe basis for the name of the town Sunderland, although it is not clear that it was this sundorlonde (Brown, 1855: 277, 280; Colgrave, 1969: xix). As a number of writers have discussed,the etymology of territorium is disputed, with the meaning of the place around a town supplemented by that of a place from which people are warned or frightened (see, for example,Connolly, 1995; Neocleous, 2003; Hindess, 2006). The Latin terrere is to frighten, deriving from the Greek trein meaning to flee from fear, to be afraid, and the Sanskrit, trasati, meaning

he trembles, is afraid. This means that the term territory has an association with fear and violence, an association that is more compelling in history than etymology. As arguedelsewhere, ‘creating a bounded space is already a violent act of exclusion and inclusion; maintaining it as such requiresconstant vigilance and the mobilization of threat; and challenging it necessarily entails a transgression’ (Elden, 2009: xxx).Terrain is of course a term used by physical geographers and geologists. Yet all too often the term terrain is used in a very vague sense. Evans (1998: 119), for instance, notes that ‘tosome of us, ‘‘terrain analysis’’ means, especially, quantitative analysis of terrain’, thus seeing a greater need to qualify the mode , rather than object, of analysis. Terrain is seen as landform, rather than process (Lane et al., 1998; see also Lawrence et al., 1993; Wilson and Gallant, 2000). It is also a term used by military strategists. Yet there is a relation as well as aseparation, with knowledge of battlefield terrain essential to military success. There are a number of important studies of different military campaigns and the question of terrain, but littleconceptual precision (see, for example, Parry, 1984; Winters, 1998; Rose and Nathanail, 2000; Doyle and Bennett, 2002a).10 Fo r Doyle and Bennett (2002b: 1), terrain ‘encompassesboth the physical aspects of earth’s surface, as well as the human interaction with them’. At times terrain seems to be l andscape devoid of life, as it is when targeting of cities isdiscussed without reference to those living within it, or it is reduced from a concrete material ity to a level of virtuality. Max Weber’s analysis of the historical development of the state,and Michael Mann’s study of the changing dynamics of power (Mann, 1986; 1993), where they do discuss territory, could be seen to be operating in a way that sees territory as terrain,a political-strategic relation. In his interview with the geographers of the H´ erodote journal, Foucault deflects their inquiry about his use of spatial categories, suggesting that they arenot primarily geographical, but instead shot through with power. As he declares, ‘territory i s no doubt a geographical notion, but it’s first of all a juridico -political one: the area controlledby a certain kind of power’ (Foucault, 2007: 176). As his interviewers respond, ‘certain spatial metaphors are equally geographical and strategic, which is only natural since geographygrew up in the shadow of the military’ (p. 177). They make the explicit li nkage between the region of geographers and the commanded region, fromregere; the conquered territory of a

province, from vincere; and the field as battlefield. Foucault then notes how ‘the politico-strategic term is an indication of how the military andadministration actually come to inscribe themselves both on a material soil and within forms of discourse’ (p. 177). Lefebvreoffers further concrete and compelling discussion of this relation (see also Lefebvre, 1974: 133; 1991: 122; 2009; Brenner and Elden, 2009): Sovereignty implies ‘space’,and what is more it implies a space against which violence, whether latent or overt, is directed – a space established and constituted byviolence . . . Every state is born of violence, and state power endures only by virtue of violence directed towards aspace . . . At the same time, too, violence enthroned a specific rationality, that of accumulation, that of the bureaucracy and the army – a unitary,logistical, operational and quantifying rationality which would make economic growth possible and draw strength from that growth for its own expansion to a point where it would take

possession of the entire planet. A founding violence, and continuous creation by violence (by fire and blood, in Bismarck’s phrase) – such are thehallmarks of the state. (Lefebvre, 1974: 322 –33; 1991: 280) What is central in Lefebvre’s reading is the relation between accumulation, violence and the ‘unitary, logistical, operationaland quantifying rationality’. For Lefebvre this highlights the limitations of a political-economic reading of territory as land: ‘Neither Marx and Engels nor Hegel clearly perceived theviolence at the core of the accumulation process . . . and thus its role in the production of a politico-economic space. This space was of course the birthplace and cradle of the modernstate (Lefebvre, 1974: 322; 1991: 279; see also pp. 413/358).


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Link—Arctic Territory

The primary issue underlying Arctic concerns is a question of territory and borders. Whatis at stake is a method of delineating an inside and outside to feed a desire for security

Klaus Dodds, Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London, “Flag planting and finger pointing:The Law of the Sea, the Arctic and the political geographies of the outer continental shelf,” Political Geography, Vol.29, Issue 2, February 2010, p. 63-73, ElsevierThe ongoing claims to OCS and maritime resources, alongside with debates about the trans-continental accessibilityof the Arctic, has attracted considerable popular and formal geopolitical speculation. According to some commentators, the Arcticis on the threshold of a political and environmental state-change (e.g. Berkman & Young, 2009). Sea ice thinning in particular is held to beprimarily responsible for stimulating renewed interest in the Arctic as a resource rich space awaiting furtherdevelopment and exploitation. Moreover, as a consequence of these potential shifts, it is claimed that we are witnessing theprospect of further schisms emerging over maritime claims to the Arctic Ocean. As Berkman and Young (2009: 339) warn, “TheArctic could slide into a new era featuring jurisdictional conflicts, increasingly severe clashes over the extraction of natural resources, and the emergence of a

new ‘great game’ among the global powers”. Claims to OCS are only one element, therefore, in a wider discursive reconfigurationof the Arctic. Repeated warnings concerning the thinning of Arctic sea ice have contributed to increasingly strategicdebate concerning the region's accessibility not only in the form of shipping lanes (e.g. the Northwest Passage and Northern SeaRoute) but also as an energy/resource frontier. What is at stake here, I believe, is a competing sense of territorial legibility, most notably over the maritime Arctic. The ongoing attempt of the coastal states to map and survey their continental shelves isone powerful manifestation of that desire, in the words of the US led Extended Continental Shelf Project, for ‘certainty’ and‘recognition’. Informing, and indeed enhancing, that desire for those aforementioned qualities is a whole series of‘bordering practices’ ranging from demarcating the outer continental shelf to speculating about new fears of illegaltrans-shipment and illicit flows through an ice-free Arctic. What, however, is clear is that those Arctic coastal states seeking ‘certainty’ and‘recognition’ will have to do so in a world much changed form the Cold War era when extra-territorial actors and indigenous communities were either marginal ormarginalised, respectively (cf. Osherenko & Young, 1989).


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Link—Arctic Territory

Exploring and opening the Arctic is intimately linked with the governmental practice ofbordering and identifying domestic spaces which must be protected from foreign threats, as

well as a colonial mythology of economic expansionKlaus Dodds, Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, Univer sity of London, “Flag planting and finger pointing:The Law of the Sea, the Arctic and the political geographies of the outer continental shelf,” Political Geography, Vol.29, Issue 2, February 2010, p. 63-73, ElsevierThe inscription of Arctic territory including remote areas o f the seabed by coastal states and international bodies such as the CLCS makes itboth more legible and accessible – although in this case accessibility is unusual in the sense that it is likely to only apply to scientists and theirlogistical sponsors including civilian and military agencies such as th

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