analiza stratfor-interesele rusiei in rep. moldova

8/3/2019 ANALIZA STRATFOR-Interesele Rusiei in Rep. Moldova

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ANALIZA STRATFOR: Interesele Rusiei in

Republica Moldova sunt mai mari decat

capacitatea Romaniei de a le contracara

Un nou studiu al agentiei americane

private de informatii Stratfor se axeaza pe Renasterea Rusiei a Rusiei sovieto-imperiale.

Prezentam mai jos analiza care priveste Basarabia, in traducerea Agentiei Karadeniz Presscat si versiunea in original de la Stratfor.com. De remarcat ca studiul specialistilor americani

in geopolitica da peste cap toate sondajele mincinoase din gama Fundatiei Soros, aparute

pana acum, privind procentajele rusilor si a nativilor limbii ruse, demonstrand fara tagada caromanii sunt majoritari atat in Basarabia centrala (Republica Moldova) cat si in

Transnistria.Paralizia Moldovei politic, teritorial si geopolitic va dura pna cnd oputere externa va putea rivaliza cu Rusia in regiune, ceea ce este improbabil pe termen scurt

si mediu, este concluzia dura a Agentiei Stratfor.

Interesele Rusiei in Republica Moldova sunt mai mari decat capacitatea Romaniei de a le

contracara

de Razvan Iorga

Agentia americana de analiza Stratforopineaza ca desi interesele Bucurestilor sunt mari in privintaRepublicii Moldova, Romania nu este suficient de puternica pentru a tine piept Rusiei, stat care esteinteresat de mentinerea haosului politic de la Chisinau. Fostele state sovietice din Europa de Est caUcraina, Belarus sau R. Moldova sunt importante pentru Rusia din diverse motive, inclusiv pentrulocalizarea geografica sau relatiile economice. In general, toate aceste state coopereaza cuMoscova, dar in grade diferite. R. Moldova este o tara divizata intre puterile occidentale siMoscova si cel mai probabil va ramne paralizata din punct de vedere politic pe termen scurt sauchiar mediu, sustine agentia americana. Localizarea geografica a R. Moldova o face importanta

pentru Rusia, fiind o ruta traditionala de invazie dinspre sud-vest si statele balcanice. Aceasta estesituata in apropiere de portul strategic Odessa si Peninsula Crimeea, unde Rusia isi stationeaza flota

la Marea Neagra, si face parte din reteaua de tranzit de energie care leaga Rusia de Europa siTurcia. Din punct de vedere politic, prghia Moscovei o reprezinta fostul presedinte moldoveanVladimir Voronin si Partidul Comunistilor din R. Moldova (PCRM). Rusia are relatii strnse si cu

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liderii Aliantei pentru Integrare Europeana, inclusiv cu premierul Vlad Filat si cu presedinteleinterimar Marian Lupu. Cel mai important insa este faptul ca Moscova subventioneaza conducerearegiunii separatiste Transnistria. In R. Moldova, 6 la suta din populatie este de etnie rusa si circa 11la suta din populatie vorbeste rusa ca limba nativa. In Transnistria procentul rusilor este de 30 lasuta (alti 30 la suta sunt ucraineni, ceea ce ridica procentul romanilor la 40 la suta). In plus,Moscova are aproximativ 1.100 de militari in Transnistria, iar R.Moldova depinde in proportie de

100 la suta de Rusia in privinta gazelor, in timp ce 20 la suta din exporturile sale merg pe piatarusa. Dependenta economica a Transnistriei fata de Rusia este si mai mare, aceasta beneficiind, in

plus fata de R.Moldova, de asistenta financiara si subventii rusesti.

Moscova actioneaza si prin Partidul comunistilor si prin Alianta occidentalistilor

Scopurile Rusiei pentru 2012 sunt sa isi imbunatateasca pozitia in R. Moldova prin consolidareaPCRM si dezvoltarea unei relatii independente cu liderii si membrii AIE. Daca Rusia nu poate ajutacomunistii sa recapete puterea, ea poate cel putin sa se asigure ca R.Moldova ramne divizata si caAIE ramne incapabila sa aleaga un presedinte cu orientare prooccidentala. Moscova isi poateatinge aceste obiective prin complicarea procesului politic si impiedicarea negocierilor dintre

Chisinau si Tiraspol, sustine STRATFOR. Rusia vrea, de asemenea, sa isi mentina prezentamilitara si influenta politica in Transnistria si a inceput sa puna bazele unei posibile includeri aR.Moldova in Uniunea Eurasiatica. Ca si Ucraina, R. Moldova este slaba si divizata dar, spredeosebire de aceasta, ea nu are legaturi traditionale sau etnice cu Rusia, ci mai degraba cuRomnia. Acest lucru, alaturi de dimensiunile reduse si pozitia sa strategica, reprezinta un factor

principal al slabiciunii statului si al abilitatii sale de a balansa intre puterile externe. R. Moldovaeste divizata att din punct de vedere teritorial, ct si politic. Guvernul moldovean nu aresuveranitate teritoriala asupra Transnistriei, iar din punct de vedere politic, tara este divizata intredoua mari grupuri si anume comunistii orientati catre Rusia si AIE.

Aderarea Moldovei la Uniunea Europeana este improbabila in viitorul apropiat iar SUA siUE nu pot concura Rusia

La rndul ei, alianta este divizata intre elemente care sustin legaturi mai strnse cu Romnia siNATO si altele mai flexibile in privinta loialitatii. In general insa, toate partidele din cadrul AIEsustin integrarea R. Moldova in Uniunea Europeana. In plus, din 2009, nicio formatiune politica nua reusit sa obtina suficiente voturi pentru alegerea sefului statului, asa ca tara este paralizata siincapabila sa formuleze o politica externa de aproape trei ani. Aceste diviziuni inseamna caviziunea si strategia R. Moldova nu sunt unitare. Orice lider al tarii trebuie sa depaseasca acestediviziuni pentru a consolida tara. Si alte puteri externe in afara de Rusia au interese in R. Moldova,iar printre acestea se numara in principal Romnia. Bucurestiul nu este insa suficient de puternic

pentru a provoca Rusia din punct de vedere militar, iar faptul ca R. Moldova este cea mai saracatara din Europa si este limitata substantial de prezenta si influenta Rusiei, aderarea la UE in viitorulapropiat este improbabila.

Paralizia Moldovei din punct de vedere politic, teritorial si geopolitic va dura pna cnd o

putere externa va putea rivaliza cu Rusia in regiune, ceea ce este improbabil pe termen scurt

si mediu.

Karadeniz Press

Versiunea originala a studiului Stratfor Renasterea Rusiei, care analizeaza si Ucraina si

Belarus-ul, plus legatura catre statele Baltice:

The Next Stage of Russias Resurgence: Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova

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The Eastern European former Soviet states of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova are important toRussia for various reasons, including geographic location and economic relations. Generally, thesestates all cooperate with Moscow, but the degrees of cooperation vary. Ukraine understands thenecessity of strong ties to Russia but works to play Russia and the West off of each other to gain asmany concessions as possible. Belarus, largely isolated from the West for political reasons, dependsgreatly on Russia and is already a member of Moscows customs union with Kazakhstan, so it will

be the least resistant to integration into the Eurasian Union. Moldova is a country divided againstitself, drawn in part to Western powers and in part to Moscow, and is likely to remain politically

paralyzed for the short to medium term.

Ukraine

Several factors make Ukraine crucial to Russia. Its location on the North European Plain and alongthe Black Sea has made Ukraine a traditional invasion route from the west. Ukraine is also thesecond-largest country in the former Soviet Union in terms of population. Furthermore, Ukrainehas the third-largest economy in the former Soviet Union, and its industrial, agricultural and energysectors are integrated with Russias.

Russias Levers

Political: Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich and his Party of Regions enjoy asupportive relationship with Moscow. Russia also has ties to Ukrainian opposition leaderssuch as former Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko and prominent political figure ArsenyYatsenyuk. Furthermore, Ukrainian oligarchs like Dmitri Firtash and Rinat Akhmetov havemaintained business relationships with Russia.

Social: Ethnic Russians make up 17 percent of Ukraines population, and 30 percent ofUkrainians speak Russian as a native language. Furthermore, Ukrainians come from thesame East Slavic ethnic and language group as Russians (and Belarusians). Most of thecountry is Orthodox Christian, and more than 10 percent of Ukraines population is underthe Moscow patriarch.

Security: Russia maintains a military presence in Ukraine by stationing its Black Sea Fleetin Crimea. Russias Federal Security Service and its Ukrainian counterpart cooperate onintelligence and training. Although Ukraine is not a member of the Russian-led CollectiveSecurity Treaty Organization (CSTO), it is also not a NATO member.

Economic: Ukraine gets more than 60 percent of its natural gas from Russia, which can

manipulate the Ukrainian pipeline infrastructure by cutting off supplies. Russia owns manyassets in Ukraines metals industry and supplies the industry with energy (besidesmaintaining business relationships with the industrys oligarchs). Russia also gives Ukrainefinancial assistance and loans via Sberbank and other financial institutions

Russias Successes, Obstacles and Ambitions

etween 2010 and 2012, Russia achieved many of its goals in Ukraine. Moscow extended the BlackSea Fleets lease of Sevastopol to 2042. Ukrainian legislation making NATO membership illegallimited Kievs ties to the bloc, and the pro-Western faction in the Ukrainian government led byformer President Viktor Yushchenko and his Our Ukraine-Peoples Self-Defense party has been

marginalized. A major threat to Russias plans, fast-tracked negotiations between Kiev and theEuropean Union, were not completed in 2011 as planned, leaving Ukraine without association andfree trade agreements with the union and without explicit prospects for EU membership.

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In 2012, Moscow hopes to gain some degree of control over Ukraines energy pipeline and storagesystem by maintaining high natural gas prices and forcing Ukraine to trade energy assets forcheaper natural gas. Russia also wants to keep Ukraine from growing closer to the European Union

by creating and manipulating domestic challenges that will keep Yanukovich preoccupied andmake Ukraine seem less desirable to the Europeans. Moreover, Moscow plans to keep specific EUmembers, particularly Sweden and Poland and their Eastern Partnership initiative, from focusing on

Ukraine by keeping those countries divided and focused on other matters.

Still, this does not mean Moscow can do whatever it likes inside Ukraine. The largest challenge toRussias ambitions in Ukraine has come from the Ukrainian government, despite the governmentsclose ties to Moscow. It is not in Yanukovichs interest, or in the interest of the oligarchs who makeup his power base, to give Russia control of the countrys natural gas transit system, which is notonly a vital economic asset but also a symbol of Ukraines sovereignty. This is why Ukraine hascontinued to resist selling the system to Russia and joining Russian-led institutions like the customsunion, which would further undermine Kievs economic sovereignty.

Beyond 2012, Moscow wants to prepare Ukraine for closer integration via membership in the

Eurasian Union as it evolves from the customs union and Common Economic Space.

Ukraines Position and Strategy

Because it historically has been ruled by many external powers Russia, Poland, Austria-Hungaryand the Ottoman Empire among them the territory that makes up modern Ukraine encompasses

people from different cultures and with different worldviews. The broadest division in Ukraine isbetween the countrys east, which is economically and culturally more integrated with Russia, andthe countrys west, which is more nationalist, closer to the West and more supportive of Ukrainianmembership in Western institutions such as the European Union. The chief imperative for anyUkrainian state is to prevent the country from splitting apart and balance between external powersto maintain sovereignty.

Thus, Yanukovich, despite hailing from eastern Ukraine and campaigning on a much more Russia-friendly platform than his predecessor, has not been merely an unquestioning ally of Moscowduring his presidency. Although he made numerous favorable gestures to Russia early in his term,such as passing legislation legally barring NATO membership and signing the Black Sea Fleet-for-natural gas deal, Yanukovich then sought to balance this by fast-tracking Ukraines negotiationswith the European Union on signing association and free trade agreements (which Kiev hopedwould include a provision for eventual EU membership).

However, the failure of Ukraines negotiations with the European Union due to the imprisonmentof Timoshenko weakened Ukraines counterbalance against Russia and forced Kiev into a difficultposition. Ukraine can only afford to pay Russia more than $400 per thousand cubic meters fornatural gas for so long before the high prices create a financial crisis, so it is really a question ofwhen not whether Ukraine will have to give Russia at least some control over, or access to,its energy system in exchange for lower prices. This will diminish Kievs ability to maneuveragainst Moscow even further and will ensure that, whether it wants to or not, Ukraine will have totake Russias interests into account eventually.

Belarus

Geography plays a large role in Belarus importance to Russia. The country is located on the NorthEuropean Plain, a traditional invasion route from the west, and there are no meaningful geographic

barriers to invaders because of the countrys flat terrain. Belarus serves as a territorial buffer for

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Russias core. Belarus also has one of the largest economies in the former Soviet Union, and itsindustry, energy and security mechanisms are integrated with Russias.

Russias Levers

Political: Belarus and Russia are partners in the Union State, and Belarusian President

Aleksandr Lukashenko receives support from Moscow. Russia has ties to Belarusiansecurity leaders and Belarus economic elite have business relationships with Russia.

Social: Ethnic Russians make up 11 percent of the Belarusian population. The majority ofthe Belarusian population speaks Russian as a native language, and Russian and Belarusianare both official languages in the country. Most of the country is Orthodox Christian, withroughly 60 percent of the population under the Moscow patriarch. Belarusians and Russianshave roots in the same East Slavic ethnic and language group and thus have culturalsimilarities.

Security: Belarus military-industrial complex is integrated with Russias, and the countries

have a unified air defense system. Belarus is a member of the Russian-led CSTO and hostsRussian military installations, such as S-300 air defense systems. Also, the Belarusian andRussian intelligence bodies have a cooperative relationship including training.

Economy: Russia supplies 99 percent of Belarus natural gas and most of its oil. Russia alsoowns a 100 percent stake in Beltransgaz, giving it full ownership of the countrys pipelineinfrastructure. Trade between the two countries is important for the Belarusian economy, ashalf of Belarus exports go to Russia. Furthermore, Russia provides Belarus with financialassistance, including a $3 billion loan through the Eurasian Economic Community and a $1

billion Sberbank loan.


Russias influence in Belarus did not go unchallenged over the past two years. In early 2010,Lukashenko lashed out at Moscow over high energy prices and began considering alternativesuppliers (Venezuela and Azerbaijan, in particular) as a way to pressure Russia into lowering

prices. But Russia kept prices high and cut off natural gas to Belarus until Minsk agreed to cedecomplete control of its pipeline system and Beltransgaz to Moscow.

Russia carried out several strategies to increase its influence in Belarus. Beginning in 2010, Russiaand Belarus integrated economically as Belarus joined the Russian-led customs union, a body that

became the Common Economic Space in 2012. Russia was able to limit Belarus ties to the Westand Polish-led EU overtures to Minsk ahead of Belarusian elections. After the elections, the Westchose to isolate Belarus, giving Russia a chance to increase its economic and political support ofLukashenko. Moscow also enhanced its security integration with Minsk when Belarus joined theCSTO rapid reaction force and hosted deployments of S-300s.

In 2012, Russia wants to continue its integration efforts in Belarus. The Common Economic Spacewill serve Russias interests economically, but Moscow wants access to more of Belarus strategiceconomic assets, such as refineries and potash firm Belaruskali. Politically, Moscow wants Minskto remain isolated from the European Union and the West. Militarily, Russia wants to use weaponssales and CSTO participation to draw Belarus closer. Beyond 2012, Russia wants Belarus

complete strategic integration via the Eurasian Union.

Belarus Position and Strategy

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Unlike Russia or Ukraine, Belarus has a relatively homogenous society, both culturally andpolitically. This has facilitated the centralization of power under Lukashenko, who has dominatedBelarus politically since 1994. Also unlike Russia or Ukraine, Belarus never developed a powerfulclass of oligarchs; rather, Lukashenko has maintained a social and economic model much like theold Soviet system since the early years of Belarus independence. He rules the country with a close-knit group of elites, many of whom have ties to the security and intelligence apparatus.

While this dynamic has made consolidation of power easier, it complicates another imperative: thebalancing of external powers to maintain economic, military and political sovereignty. Belarus hasnever strayed far from Russia in terms of security or economics, given the democratic andeconomic reform requirements needed to be considered for NATO or EU membership. However,Belarus political relations with Russia have not been as steady; the two countries formed theUnion State in 1997, but this closeness has not prevented spats over economic issues that have ledLukashenko to periodically look to the West for cooperation in order to gain leverage over Russia.Given the integration of Belarus infrastructure with Russia and the political connotations ofeconomic relationships, this is easier said than done. Testing Moscow on matters such as energy

prices has usually backfired for Minsk, as Gazproms recent acquisition of Beltransgaz has shown.

Countries like Poland and Lithuania have geopolitical interests in courting Belarus, such as thedesire to establish the same kind of territorial buffer to the east that Russia desires from the west.But these countries cannot match Russias influence over Belarus, so they have resorted to soft

power maneuvers such as establishing ties to Belarusian opposition groups and spearheading EUsanctions against the Lukashenko government. The success of the first strategy has been limited,since opposition groups face numerous constraints. The second strategy is a more serious threat tothe Belarusian government, since Lukashenkos rule depends on a populist economic model andsuch models weaken in poor economic and financial environments. However, this economicisolation has given Russia the opportunity to provide financial assistance and serve as Belaruseconomic lifeline, a role Moscow will continue to play as long as Lukashenko stays in line.

Moving forward, Belarus will have no choice but to go along with Russias strategy and broaderresurgence, given Minsks limited options for gaining support from other powers. Therefore,Russia will continue integrating Belarus as it moves toward the creation of the Eurasian Union in2015.

Moldova

Moldovas location makes it important to Russia. It is situated in the Bessarabian Gap between theCarpathians and the Black Sea, a traditional invasion route from the southwest and the Balkan

states. It is near the strategic port of Odessa and the Crimean Peninsula, where Russia stations itsBlack Sea Fleet, and it serves as part of the energy transit network linking Russia with Europe andTurkey.

Russias Levers

Political: Former Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and his Communist Party are in apartnership with Russia. Moscow also has ties to leaders of the Alliance for EuropeanIntegration (AEI), including Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat and acting PresidentMarian Lupu. Most notably, Russia subsidizes the leadership in the breakaway region ofTransdniestria.

Social: Only about 6 percent of the Moldovan population is ethnically Russian, though inTransdniestria 30 percent of the population is Russian (and another 30 percent is

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Ukrainian). Roughly 11 percent of Moldovans speak Russian as a native language, and forapproximately 16 percent of the population Russian is a primary language. Most of thecountry is Orthodox Christian but split between Romanian Orthodox and Russian Orthodox.

Security: Russia maintains approximately 1,100 troops in Transdniestria (along with asmaller contingent of Ukrainian soldiers). Although Moldova is not part of the Russian-led

CSTO, it also is not a member of NATO.

Economic: Moldova depends on Russia for 100 percent of its natural gas and sends 20percent of its exports to Russia (especially important is wine, imports of which Russia cutoff for political reasons). Russia controls most of the economy in Transdniestria which,although a breakaway region, is Moldovas industrial heartland and provides financialassistance and subsidies to Transdniestria.


Russia rebuffed attempts to demilitarize Transdniestria or allow a Western presence in the territory.

However, Moscow has faced some setbacks in Moldova proper; the Communists have not been inpower since the Western-leaning AEI ousted them from power in 2009 following the TwitterRevolution. Despite its position, the AEI has not been strong enough to elect a president, soMoldova has been in political deadlock for nearly three years.

Russias goals for 2012 are to improve its position in Moldova proper by strengthening theCommunist Party and forming independent relationships with AEI leaders and members. If Russiacannot help the Communists regain power, it at least wants to make sure Moldova remains dividedand that the AEI remains incapable of electing a Western-oriented president. Moscow couldaccomplish this by complicating the political process and obstructing negotiations betweenMoldova and Transdniestria. Russia also wants to maintain its military presence and politicalinfluence in Transdniestria and begin laying the groundwork for Moldovas possible inclusion inthe Eurasian Union.

Moldovas Position and Strategy

Like Ukraine, Moldova is both weak and divided. Unlike Ukraine, Moldova does not havetraditional or ethnic ties to Russia; it is ethnically and linguistically Romanian. This, along withMoldovas small size and strategic location, is a main factor in the weakness of the state and itsability to balance between external powers.

Moldova is divided both territorially and politically. The Moldovan government does not holdterritorial sovereignty over Transdniestria, which is home to a Russian military base and is

populated largely by Russians and Ukrainians. The split within Moldova proper is a political onedominated by two large groups: the Russian-oriented Communists and the AEI, a collection of

parties that want Moldova to become Western-oriented. The AEI is divided further, with someelements pledging close ties to Romania and NATO while others are more flexible in theirloyalties, but in general all parties in the AEI support Moldovan integration with the EuropeanUnion. Since 2009, neither the Communist Party nor the AEI has been able to gain enough votes in

parliament (61 out of 101) to elect a president, so the country has been paralyzed and unable toform any decisive foreign policy for almost three years. These divisions mean that Moldovas viewand strategy is not unified. Any leader of Moldova must overcome these divisions in order to

consolidate the country; only then can the issue of Transdniestria and broader foreign policyquestions be addressed in Chisinau.

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External powers other than Russia have interests in Moldova; chief among them is Romania. Notonly do Moldova and Romania share ethnic and linguistic ties, but also the territory that makes upMoldova and Transdniestria (as well as western parts of Ukraine) belonged to Romanias Moldavia

province before Russia annexed the territory as a defensive bulwark. However, Romania is notstrong enough to challenge Russia militarily in the country, and given that Moldova is the poorestcountry in Europe and is substantially limited by Russias presence and influence, EU membership

prospects in the near- to midterm are very unlikely (though the distribution of Romanian passportsto Moldovan citizens that allows them to travel in the European Union is one example ofRomanias soft power in the country). Other individual EU states like Poland and Sweden want to

bring Moldova closer to the West via the Eastern Partnership program, but this is a long-termprocess with limited effects.

Moldovas paralysis political, territorial and geopolitical can be expected to remain until anexternal power is able to contest Russia in the region in terms of hard power rather than soft power.This is not likely to happen in the short to medium term.

Click here for The Next Stage of Russias Resurgence: Introduction

The Next Stage of Russias Resurgence: The Baltic States

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