rolul serviciilor secrete in politica europei unite

8/10/2019 Rolul Serviciilor Secrete in Politica Europei Unite

1/5

The European Union's Proposed Intelligence Service

Posted inEurope| 17-Jun-05 | Author:John Nomikos

Dr. John M. Nomikos is the Director of the Research Institute for European and American

Studies (RIEAS).

The Maastricht Treaty seized the opportunity in 1991 to catalyze the European Unionintelligence-sharing process when the Treaty laid the foundations for a Common Foreign andSecurity Policy (C.F.S.P.) including the eventual framing of a common defense. In addition, on

November 14, 1995, in Madrid, assessments were investigated and promises made to contribute

towards enhancing European security and intelligence arrangements with the conclusion that the

development of intelligence cooperation was important for operational capabilities.

Most important, at the British-French Summit at St. Malo in 1998, it was stated that intelligence

was fundamental to the success of the European Union, and that it must be given appropriatestructures and a capacity for the analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability

for relevant strategic planning without unnecessary duplication. This notion was also reinforced

in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 in order to create a policy of planning and an early warningunit.

Moreover, intelligence and security analysts in the European Union member states who promote

the idea of a European common intelligence policy argue that intelligence collaboration isalready taking place successfully around the world: in the E.U. Satellite Center in Spain; the

Situation Center at the United Nations in New York; and the informal gathering of the Club of

Berne in Switzerland. However, the toughest challenge for the European Union has been the

highly sensitive area of intelligence-sharing. The European Union has decided that from January1, 2008, any information available in one country should be available in all other 25 member

states.
http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/category/Europe/97http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/category/Europe/97http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/category/Europe/97http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/author_bio/john-nomikos-1http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/author_bio/john-nomikos-1http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/author_bio/john-nomikos-1http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/author_bio/john-nomikos-1http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/category/Europe/97


2/5

The Role of an Intelligence Service within the European Union Mechanism

Improving intelligence cooperation is a top priority but, in the long-term, the root causes of

conflicts must be understood and addressed. An emerging intelligence service in the EuropeanUnion should have as its most important task the analysis of overtly gathered information and

preparing it for use by policymakers. A first step towards improving intelligence sharing was the

establishment of the Joint Situation Center (SITCEN) for intelligence analysis within the Council

Secretariat. One of its goals is to bring together experts from both the intelligence and security

services.

How a European Union intelligence service might fit in the overall European Union mechanism

and what its shape and role might be is a prospective challenge for the member states in the

coming decades. Eventually, by establishing an intelligence service, Europe might be able to

foresee a situation which could be threatening to the European Union states such as a crisis in the

Balkans or prospective religious turmoil or biochemical attacks to terrorist acts; the Council of

Ministers should be involved as well by informing appropriately their national intelligence

services.

Since the Council of Ministers is the official decision-making body of the European Union, it

should receive reports and analyses from the European Union intelligence service. However, the

problem here is that a minister of foreign affairs might have difficulties and conflicts in dealing

with the foreign affairs of his own country and that of the European Union at the same time. Of

course, there are ways around this; for instance, the creation of a Committee on EuropeanIntelligence could refer directly to the European Union Commission.

On the other side, the European Parliament would be the one to approve the budget of the

European Union intelligence service. In the U.S., Congress is also responsible for the approval of

the budget of the Central Intelligence Agency. The European Parliament could in the future also

become the institution to provide oversight over the European Union's intelligence service

operations comparable to U.S. Congressional oversight over the intelligence community in the

United States.

Since the European Union member states address the possibilities of a future European Army,even if it remains simply a peacekeeping facility, it can be reasoned that they should also address

the creation of an intelligence policy. Reduced duplication and closed cooperation among the

member states offers an opportunity for efficient intelligence cooperation.

Analyzing the Reasons for a European Union Intelligence Service


3/5

The European Union as an entity has become an increasingly important factor on the Continent

since the revival of the European Community through the Single European Act (S.E.A.) signed

in 1986. S.E.A. is the official name for the 1992 program for the opening up of borders among its

members. The European Union, together with the United States and the United Nations, has also

become a force of some importance outside the European continent.

But the instability of the North African region, as well as in the former Soviet states, will affect

the enlarging European Union. Islamic fundamentalism is reemerging in the North African

states, alongside an increase in terrorism. Southern European Union member states such as

Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece are facing the effects of demographic trends (via illegal

immigration).

The European Union's interior and justice ministers were clearly reluctant to hand over any

major national intelligence function to a European government at a time when ad hoc

arrangements among the major national intelligence services in the European Union -- and withthe United States -- are currently in the forefront in the campaign against al-Qaeda and related

Islamic extremist groups.

Eventually, the European Union's interior and justice ministers did agree on closer cooperation

on certain security issues, and discussed the appointment of a new counter-terrorism coordinator.

An important point of agreement between the ministers at the meeting was to "create a

clearinghouse, where for the first time investigating judges, police, and intelligence services can

direct sensitive information which would become available in real time to all members."

The various forms of cooperation so far have been based on the secret services of the majorcountries. Owing to this fact, it is not surprising that small states deprived of their own effective

intelligence services, which would be capable of recognizing and neutralizing terrorist threats,

are insisting on the creation of a European intelligence organization. Those small states are also

unsatisfied with the present cooperation with the states bearing such services. On the other hand,

the countries with effective intelligence services, such as the so-called "Big Five" (Italy, U.K.,

Germany, France and Spain) which together with the Netherlands and Sweden participate in

SITCEN, are against revolutionary changes in the present system of intelligence cooperation in

the European Union.

Moreover, the Belgian and Austrian governments have suggested creating a European Union

intelligence service modeled on the Central Intelligence Agency in order to fight terrorism; the

interior ministers from the top five European countries were unwilling to agree on how to share

intelligence with all 25 members and other states. And the European Union's past unwillingness

to cooperate on counter-terrorism has caused strain, in particular with Washington, because of

U.S. demands to collect personal data on airline passengers.


4/5

The next step in the process of creating an intelligence service in Europe would be to distribute

tasks according to the operational and informational capacities of a given national service. For

instance, French intelligence has been traditionally interested in Africa, and Spain in South

America, while new members in the European Union are to some extent experienced with the

former U.S.S.R. countries as well as the Balkans and the Middle East. It would also be possible

to make of wider use by the European Union's analytical and intelligence units of the following:

information and non-governmental analyses as well as research centers, private, scientific and

related to economics, which rely upon open source intelligence.

Overcoming Obstacles to the Development of the European Union Intelligence Structure

European intelligence cooperation to date has been hampered by emphasizing national

sovereignty over shared intelligence. The cooperation that does exist has been largely confined to

imagery collection and analysis using the European Union Satellite Center. Imagery intelligenceis a necessary capability, but an effective European Union intelligence service will also require

cooperation in signals intelligence and human intelligence, and be able to integrate them in all-

source intelligence products.

The second obstacle to integration is the fear of spoiling privileged relationships. Many N.A.T.O.

countries have individual intelligence sharing agreements with the United States. The French,

determined to reduce their dependence on U.S. intelligence capabilities, are the driving force

behind the drive for European autonomy. France developed the Hellios system with Spain and

Italy, and has struggled to obtain German cooperation in the Hellios 2 program. Leading the

intelligence gathering assets are the Helios series satellites which are optical reconnaissancesatellites providing photographic images down to approximately one-meter resolution. The

Helios system is a joint French, Italian, and Spanish venture and provides data initially to the

three participant states.

Institutional obstacles also stand in the way of increased intelligence cooperation. Intelligence

organizations generally believe that no other organization's analysis is as reliable as their own,

which leads them to place more faith and confidence in their own work. These organizations also

tend to view international relations as a zero-sum game, and may not agree with a cooperative

approach to security and defense integration. Furthermore, the conservative nature of intelligence

agencies, coupled with the bureaucratic lethargy of the European Union, will also act to slow

European intelligence cooperation.

Conclusion

After the rejection of the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands, the concept of


5/5

considering a European intelligence service becomes more complicated. E.U. member states will

be more hesitant to share intelligence among other member states under a central intelligence

network in the European Union institution.

Nevertheless, a lack of knowledge about potential conflicts on the European continent could be

more costly than maintaining a viable European Union intelligence structure. The eastern and

southern peripheries of Europe are regions with considerable instability.

The Balkan and Persian Gulf crises have been sufficiently traumatic to convey the message that

if the European Union is serious about achieving the objective of a common foreign, security,

and defense policy, the requirement for a common European Union intelligence policy is critical.

The main tasks of this intelligence structure would be gathering information from the E.U. states'

intelligence services and analyzing it independently. This analysis would allow the intelligence

organization to advise the Commission and the Council on foreign relations and security issuesfor prospective conflicts.

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent organization that utilizes open

source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations.

PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral

judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the

written permission [email protected] comments should be directed to

[email protected].

http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Europe/john-nomikos-1/The-European-Unions-Proposed-Intelligence-Service
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Europe/john-nomikos-1/The-European-Unions-Proposed-Intelligence-Servicehttp://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Europe/john-nomikos-1/The-European-Unions-Proposed-Intelligence-Servicehttp://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Europe/john-nomikos-1/The-European-Unions-Proposed-Intelligence-Servicehttp://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Europe/john-nomikos-1/The-European-Unions-Proposed-Intelligence-Servicehttp://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Europe/john-nomikos-1/The-European-Unions-Proposed-Intelligence-Servicemailto:[email protected]:[email protected]

rolul serviciilor secrete in politica europei unite

Documents