dumitru a - thrace, thracians and antigonids - 2011

8/10/2019 DUMITRU a - Thrace, Thracians and Antigonids - 2011

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BIBLIOTHQUE MTROPOLITAINE DE BUCAREST

ACTES DU SYMPOSIUM

INTERNATIONAL

LE LIVRE. LA ROUMANIE.

LEUROPE.

4medition

20 23 Septembre 2011

TOME IIITroisime section LATINIT ORIENTALE

Textes runis et prsents par

Martin Hauser

Ioana Feodorov

Nicholas V. SekundaAdrian George Dumitru

Editura BIBLIOTECA BUCURETILOR

BUCAREST 2012


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Comit ditorial :

Florin Rotaru, Dr., Directeur gnral, Bibliothque Mtropolitaine de Bucarest

Section 1 :Frdric Barbier, Directeur de recherche au CNRS (IHMC/ENS Ulm),Directeur dtudes,Histoire et civilisation du livre, cole Pratique des Hautestudes, Sorbonne,Rdacteur en chef de Histoire et civilisation du livre. Revue internationale(Genve, Librairie Droz)

Section 2 :Rjean Savard, Dr. Prsident de lASTED et de lAIFBD, Professeur debibliothconomie, Universit de MontralChantal Stanescu Directrice adjointe, Bibliothque Publique Centrale pour laRgion de Bruxelles-CapitaleHermina Anghelescu Professeur Associ, School of Library & InformationScience, Wayne State University, Michigan, USACristina Ion Conservateur, Chef du service Sciences sociales, dpartementPhilosophie, histoire, sciences de lhomme de la Bibliothque nationale deFrance, Paris, France

Section 3 A :Martin Hauser, Prof. Dr., Dpartement-Chaire UNESCO dtude des changesInterculturele et Interreligieux, Universit de Bucarest, Roumanie

Section 3 B :

Ioana Feodorov, Conf. Dr., Institut dtudes Sud-est Europennes delAcadmie Roumaine, Bucarest

Section 3 C :

Nicholas Viktor Sekunda, Prof. Dr., Chef du dpartement dArchologieMditerranenne, Institute of Archaeology, Gdansk UniversityAdrian George Dumitru, Dr., Universit de Bucarest Paris IV Sorbonne,

Assistant de recherche, Bibliothque Mtropolitaine de Bucarest

Rdaction: Dr. Marian NencescuSecrtariat de rdaction : Cornelia RaduFormat lectronique du livre :Anca IvanPages couvertures :Mircia Dumitrescu

ISSN 2068 - 9756


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Some Remarks about Thrace,

Thracians and Antigonids

in between the wars, allegations and propagandas,

from Kynoskephalai to Pydna*

ADRIAN GEORGE DUMITRU

Weakened by the defeat at Kynoskephalai, the kingdom of Macedoniahad to give up any project of expansion towards continental Greece andtherefore turned its attention towards the North and the East of the BalkanPeninsula. I shall try here to make a brief analysis of the period comprised

between the battles of Kynoskephalai and Pydna (197-167 B.C.) in respectto the Thracian politics and policies of the Macedonian kings, Philip V and

Perseus, towards the Thracian tribes and the Greek cities of Thrace, in orderto try to underline some of its aspects. The true goals of this new policy(which was not an innovation, at the end of the day, because the Macedoniankings had to face the Thracian and Illyrian tribes, a long time before Philip II)is always an subject of debate of the modern scholars on the account of the

passages of Polybius and of Tite Live which have survived and should notconcern us here. These passages go as far as to show Philip V spending hislast years engineering fantastic plans, such as the invasion of Italy throughthe Northern Balkans1 but our main concern would be to try to find outwhat is the true meaning of the concept of Thrace in this context.

The sources and some of their particularities

The sources for this period are those that the historian of the Hellenisticage is mostly accustomed to namely Polybius and what one might call

* This article is meant as a part of a broader research on the political history of the

Hellenistic Byzantium which is supposed to find its final shape in an essay which is still

postponed for a later time.1 T.L. XXXIX, 35, 4


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446 ADRIAN GEORGE DUMITRU

his synoptic followers (Diodorus, Livy and Appian), to which one shouldadd some inscriptions2. The tricky thing about this corpus of sources isthat PolybiusHistorieshas not made its way towards us in its integrality,starting with his VIthBook, and thus we have become dependent (if notaddicted) to the work of those who are supposed to have copied himmore or less ad litteram(e.g. Livy, who relied on the Megalopolitan formore serious information concerning the Hellenistic East, mistrusting theroman annalists3). Thus, our perception is a bit distorted, for we try to findPolybius words hidden within the layers of Livys narrative or Diodorusand Appians fragments and sometimes, while searching for his words, we

lose sight of the facts themselves.Why is Polybius so important? Because Polybius4is not only our mostreliable and trustworthy source, but also it is important to bear in mind thathe was an Achaean and a man who lived in Rome (in the famous Scipioniccircle) and thus he didnt particularly hold the Antigonid kings in muchfavor throughout hisHistories. He had a certain admiration for Philip V, afact that he does not hide in his work. He criticizes him a lot, but still, heacknowledges that the king possessed many qualities as a general and astatesman (especially when he followed the advice of Aratus the Achaean

but that is another matter, which should not concern us, here). For instance,he praises him for his behavior after the battle of Kynoskephalai, for Philip

did not forget to send someone to destroy the royal archives in Larissa,which were to fall into the hands of the Romans, an act worthy of a kingto retain, even in the midst of disaster, a recollection of a necessary duty.For he knew well enough that, if these papers came into the possessionof the Romans, they would give many handles to the enemy both againsthimself and his friends5,not to mention that he has nothing to hold againstPhilip for losing this battle in the first place. Yet, he needs to accuse Philipof being the one who designed a grand planfor a war against the Romans.

2 One of the most notable being the famous inscription from Delphi bringing tous the charges against Perseus: S.I.G3II (1917), 643 = R.D.G.E. no. 40b (for some other

stones from Delphi in this context, see some quite recent views expressed by JACQUEMIN& LAROCHE 1982; JACQUEMIN, LAROCHE & LEFVRE 1995).3 See WALSH 1961; BRISCOE 20084 Among the huge literature on Polybius, see WALBANK 1972; WALBANK

1974; ECKSTEIN 1995; WALBANK 1974.5 POL. XVIII, 33, 3: '

' , ,engl. transl. by SHUCKBURGH 1889


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Some Remarks about Thrace, Thracians and Antigonids... 447

Philips plans for a future war against Rome6 fit perfectly within thepolybian system of distinguishing between causes/pretext/outbreak of anyphenomenon (and especially a war), but they also explain the policy of aking which Polybius several times believed he was inspired by Madness.

Lets listen to the Megalopolitan when he says, expressis verbis,that the war Perseus fought against the Romans was not Perseus war, butPhilips war:

Just as we say that Philip, the son of Amyntas, contemplated and

determined upon accomplishing the war with Persia, while Alexander

put into execution what he had projected, so in the present instance

we say that Philip son of Demetrius first projected the last war against

Rome, and had all his preparations ready for the execution of his design,

but that after his death Perseus became the agent in carrying out the

undertaking itself.7

One can easily see how much of Polybius was deeply embedded intothe layers of Livys composition by simply taking a look at the following

passage:The war with King Perseus and the Macedonians which was threatening

did not arise from the causes which most people assign to it, nor from

Perseus himself: the beginnings had been made by Philip ; and Philip

himself, had he lived longer, would have waged that war.8

Thus, in the view of the Ancient historians, Philip had had the visionof the future war, he had designed it and desired it, he had taken all thenecessary measures and he had engineered this war which was to be foughtnobody knows when. As was already stated, the most of the information wehave about the Antigonids (and it is important for us to hold in our minds

6 WALBANK 1940, 231 sqq.; GRUEN 19747 POL. XXII 18, 10-11:

,

' () ,

, ' , engl.transl. by SHUCKBURGH 1889. It has been already pointed out that the parallel with

Philip II and his son Alexander is rather suspect and it meets another polybian parallel,

with the Hannibalic war being designed by Hamilcar and carried out by his son, Hannibal:

POL. III, 10-12. See, most recently, ECKSTEIN 2010, 239 (and n. 63).8 T.L. XXXIX, 23, 5: Cum Perseo rege et Macedonibus bellum quod imminebat,

non unde plerique opinantur, nec ab ipso Perseo causas cepit : inchoata initia a Philippo

sunt ; et is ipse, si diutius vixisset, id bellum gessisset., engl. tr. E.T. SAGE, in Livy in

thirteen volumes, vol. XI, London & Cambridge MS., 1936


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this simple truth) is especially brought in together with charges againsteither Philip, either Perseus in such a manner that one has the impression(and I most certainly did so) of reading not a history book but a collectionof the speeches of an attorney or a barrister taking the floor to defend oraccuse a client9. It is for this particular reason that the modern vulgatahasmore or less shared this debate on the Macedonian Wars. There is one goodsynopsis of this Modern vulgataby Leo Raditsa10, starting with Mommsen(if not even Gibbon) and expressing a very welcome criticism against theusual views concerning the causes of the IIIrdMacedonian War. As for me,I shall propose the following table where I have analyzed the passages ofPolybius dealing with the period from the conclusion of the peace after theIIndMacedonian and the outbreak of the IIIrdMacedonian war.

Table I

An analysis of the passages in Polybius concerning the inter-war period

Passage SynopsisExposition

of facts

Accusations

or defenses

against

accusations

XXII, 6

Embassy of Eumenes denouncing Philips abuses

in Thrace; Embassy of Philip retorting; the Senate

decides to appoint a commission to investigate the

facts

X X

XXII, 13-14

Ambassadors in Rome send news to Philip that he

is to evacuate Ainos and Maroneia; the massacre

at Maroneia; Philip answers in front of the Roman

commission;

X X

XXII, 14

The commission asks that the perpetrators of the

massacred to be sent to Rome; Philip sends only

Cassandros but not Onomastos; Philip decides

the revanche against the Romans; Philip decides

to send Demetrius to Rome in order to cover his

intentions; Philip promises help to Byzantium

X X

XXII, 18

Analysis of the causes of the third Macedonian

in comparison to the war of Alexander the Great

against Persia

X

9 Of course, this impression holds out especially for Polybius, as this part of his

work has survived in theExcerptae (one being theExcerpta de Legatibus) of Constantinus

Porphirogenitus. Of course, a collection of the passages dealing with the embassies sent

by the Roman Senate or those received by the Roman Senate would be filled especially

with accusations and defenses reflecting a certain amount of rhetoric appropriate to a

diplomatic confrontation.10 RADITSA 1972 unfortunately getting older, since new articles and essays

dedicated to this subject have piled up in the last 40 years.


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XXIII, 1-3

Several Greek embassies in Rome; the prince

Demetrius defends his father against the

accusations of those embassies; the Senate

agrees to a more favorable settlement because of

Demetius activity

X X

XXIII, 7Demetrius returns from Rome; Perseus is jealous

of his brothers successX

XXIII, 8Philip withdraws from Thrace having heart

feelings against the RomansX

XXIII, 9

Ambassadors from Eumenes and Philip come to

Rome; Quintus Marcius presents his report as to

theRes Graeciae et Macedoniae;

X X

XXIII, 10

Philip gets angrier against the Romans; decides the

war and takes preparatory actions (colonization

of Thracians and displacement of the notables of

Macedonian cities in various cities); plots of the

Macedonian princes against each other

X

XXIII, 11

Reprise of the quote used by Philip when killing

not only his enemies, but their sons as well, and

the beginning of the quarrel between his sons

X

XXV, 1

Perseus becomes king; he initiates politics of

winning Greeces support; Perseus character;

Philips character

X

XXV, 6

Embassy of the Rhodians and the Dardanians in

Rome; the latter warns about an invasion of the

Bastarnae and accuses Perseus to be in league

with them, requesting Romes aid; a commission

under Caius Postumius is sent to enquire on those

affairs

X X

XXVII, 4Circular letter of Perseus for the Greek cities;

discussion of this letter in RhodesX

XXVII, 5Embassy of the Macedonian king winning the

support of the BeotiansX

XXVII, 6

Roman ambassadors return from Asia and Rhodes;

ambassadors of Perseus are invited to assist at the

proceedings of the Senate and they try to defend

the king against Eumenes accusation concerning

the alleged attempt of assassination against him;

ambassadors are to leave Italy and war is declared

X X

The table shows us that out of 15 polybian passages where the inter-war period is being dealt with, 7 are being connected with accusationsagainst Philip or Perseus or their defenses against those accusations. Insome cases, Polybius rhetoric embeds the speeches into the narrative ofthe facts (e.g. the situation after the massacre at Maroneia, where thenarrative simply metamorphoses into the speech of Philip in front of theRoman commissioners, with no warning given to the lector).


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One important caution should thus be expressed: when readingPolybius, one should always remember that it is not the exposition of thefacts that we deal with, but the facts themselves are presented in the contextof a diplomatic polemics. The surviving Historiesof Polybius do not giveus the history of the Macedonian involvement in Thrace as such, but therecordings of the accusations and defenses regarding the Macedonianinvolvement in Thrace. And last, but not least, most of those accusationscome from a source: the court of Pergamon, which had its own quarrel withthe Antigonids, especially after the conclusion of the peace at Apamea,which established them as a new emerging European power after beinggranted what was left of the Seleucid satrapy of Thrace.

Therefore, we should stand warned in front of these distortions: first,the sources are distorted because the most important one is missing andwe have to look for it in the fragments copied by other historians, second,

because most of what we have are fragments accounting for accusationsand defenses, and third, because those accusations are connected especiallywith the Pergamenian claims over Thrace and the Thracian cities that one

belonged (briefly) to Antiochus III.

Philips treaty, Philips war, Philips plans

Having established this, I would try to illustrate with one example the

volatility of our information concerning the situation after Kynoskephalai,which springs out straight from the text of the treaty between Rome andPhilip V. I shall confine myself only with the text of Polybius (since allthe other synoptic authors give more or less abridged copies of Polybius,except for Livy):

All other Greeks, whether in Asia or Europe, to be free and enjoy their

own laws; but that Philip should hand over to the Romans those at present

under his authority, and all towns in which he had a garrison, before the

Isthmian games; and restore Eurmus, Pedasa, Bargylia, Iasus, Abydos,

Thasus, Myrina, and Perinthus to freedom, and remove his garrisons

from them. That Flamininus should write to Prusias commanding him

to liberate Cius, in accordance with the decree of the Senate. ThatPhilip should restore to the Romans within the same period all captives

and deserters; and likewise all decked ships, except three and his one

sixteen-banked vessel; and should pay a thousand talents, half at once,

and half by installments spread over ten years.11

11 POL. XVIII, 44, 1-7 : ,

, ,


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First of all, I have to point out that this is not the text of the treatyitself: it is a copy of the senatus consultumof the Roman senate to regulatethe situation in Greece. It probably didnt differ much from the final actthat was agreed and signed by Philip, Flamininus and the Ten Romancommissioners, which must have comprised the first text of the treaty,which was already sworn and ratified and slightly modified by the edictof the Senate). The text of the treaty itself must have been centered on theconditions imposed by Flamininus to Philip when a truce was concludedwhile the treaty was signed and sworn later on12. Flamininus words wereas follows:

Therefore the terms which the king asked were granted: namely, that heshould have four months suspension of hostilities, paying Flamininus

at once the two hundred talents; delivering his son Demetrius and some

others of his friends as hostages; and sending to Rome to submit the

decision on the whole pacification to the Senate. Flamininus and Philip

then separated, after interchanging mutual pledges of fidelity, on the

understanding that, if the treaty were not confirmed, Flamininus was to

restore to Philip the two hundred talents and the hostages. All the parties

then sent ambassadors to Rome, some to support and others to oppose

the settlement []13

, , , ,

, ,

'

,

,

, ' . , engl. transl. by SHUCKBURGH1889. For a comprehensive historical commentary, see WALBANK 1967, 609-612. To

this text, one should add T.L. XXXIII, 30, : captiuos transfugasque reddere Philippum

Romanis et naues omnes tectas tradere praeter quinque et regiam unam inhabilis prope

magnitudinis, quam sedecim uersus remorum agebant; ne plus quinque milia armatorum

haberet neue elephantum ullum; bellum extra Macedoniae fines ne iniussu senatus gereret;mille talentum daret populo Romano, dimidium praesens, dimidium pensionibus decem

annorum. . This text is intercalated, as we can see, between some of the clauses who are

given by Polybius, as well but the absence of those two clauses from the polybian text

and their presence in the livian version can be explained by Livy combining Polybius with

some analists (probably Claudius, who has also added that Philip was forbidden to wage

war against Eumenes of Pergamum, T.L. XXXIII, 30).12 POL. XVIII, 42, 2.

13 POL. XVIII, 39, 5-6: , ,


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What is striking about these two texts is that they only give somegeneral principles that are to regulate the future peace between Rome andPhilip. So, we find out that Philip is to leave free all the Greek cities in Asiaand Europe, that he is to pay 1000 talents, that he is to give up his fleet, thathe would send hostages to Rome in order to enforce the treaty and thatsalmost all. With a few given exceptions (Eurmus, Pedasa, Bargylia, Iasus,Abydos, Thasus, Myrina, and Perinthus), the treaty does not specify whichcities should have been abandoned by the kings and which should not.One would have expected very rigid articles to deal on the situation on thefield to clarify the precise borders of what was left of the kings sphere ofinfluence and what was to become the Roman one. Nothing in particularis said about the cities of Thrace, its cities and, most of all, its peoples.We would have expected a more serious regulation on the situation of the

borders of the Macedonian kingdom, and especially on its northern parts.But this is, as we can see, out of question.

Why is it so? Why is this very important treaty so vague? There areseveral explanations for this.

One would be to look for a future that no one could contemplate atthat moment, but rather wildly guessed: a war with Antiochus III wascoming and Philip could be a precious ally14. It is possible, but highlyunlikely considering that the senatus consultum came in the moment ofthe Proclamation of Corynth, when the Antiochic War was far from being

unavoidable.One could also imagine that there was a more precise text of the treaty,

which clarified and enlarged the dispositions of the senatus consultumandthat this treaty is now lost (but we could hope that it could be recoveredafter a lucky strike of an archaeological excavation). While very tempting,this hypothesis does not hold when we think at the shape of the treaties ofthe Greek cities with Rome that are preserved on stone, complying with avery strict and rigid standard.

One could also imagine that the treaty was deliberately left so impreciseand vague, so that it would allow future Roman interventions in the Balkan

,

.

, ' ,

,

, , '

, for a brief commentary, see WALBANK 1967, 601.14 This is what HAMMOND & WALBANK 1988, 604 tends to believe, among

other scholars.


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peninsula. It is a view supported in a way by William Harris analysis onthe Roman elites and their attitude towards war, characterized by the desireto acquire glory and spoils of war, not to mention to climb up the socialand political scale15. But still, we would still need to assume that Romanpoliticians were able to gamble with the future.

One could also think that after teaching Philip a lesson, Rome was readyto abandon the newly liberated Greece to its faith and leaving Macedoniaas the natural guardian of its northern frontier. This is, more or less, theorthodox view and it is very likely that things were this way.

The result of this was that Thrace was left basically untouched by thetreaty of peace and no one could tell which cities or which peoples werein fact Rome allies and therefore untouchable for Philip. Thus, the wayfor the events that followed was left open while participating at the waragainst Antiochus III, vividly, as an ally of Rome16, Philip was allowed tooccupy those cities which were held by Antiochus III or the Aetolians thathe was able to capture17. Hence, he occupied some cities in the ContinentalGreece and in Thrace ( in 187/6, Philippe V takes Ainos et Maronea18). Weknow of this again out of the accusations brought later on by Eumenesagainst Philip and this is how we know that Philip was said to have actedagainst the treaty. From those accusations of Eumenes and from Philipsresponses, we find out that Philip did not occupy the cities directly from

Antiochus III

19

and that he felt he was in his right to posses those cities15 HARRIS 1979 challenged more recently by ECKSTEIN 198716 At least, this is what one would be tempted to imply seeing the collaboration

between the Roman and Macedonian force and knowing that Philip offered his help, troops,

grain and money (T.L. XXXVI, 4) that a formalfoedusdid exist, either comprised in the

text of the (lost?) peace treaty, either established at the beginning of the Antiochic War.

For a different opinion, see GRUEN 197317 After three long campaigns, Antiochus III was able to recreate a Seleucid satrapy

of Thrace with garrisons in Lysimacheia, Ainos, Maroneia and establishing friendly

relations with Byzantium and a treaty of alliance with Perinthus, GRAINGER 2002, 67-

71, 81-3.18 HATZOPOULOS 1983; HAMMOND & WALBANK 1988, 611-2 (where

the situation of those cities plus Abdera is discussed after the outcome of the 3rd

Macedonian War. See also HANSEN 1971, 107; ECKSTEIN 2010, 239, n.64 for the same

point of view).19 According to the Roman commissioners: T.L. XXXIX, 29, 2: si Philippus bello

cepisset eas, praemium uictoriae iure belli habiturum; si neutrum eorum foret, cognitionem

placere senatui reseruari et, ut omnia in integro manerent, praesidia, quae in iis urbibus

sint, deduci. = if Philip had captured them in war, he should hold them as the prize of

victory under the law of war ; if neither of these was true, it was their pleasure that the

decision should be reserved for the senate and, in order that everything might remain in its


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(without defining what was the nature of his right)20. But Livy informs usthat immediately after the defeat of Antiochus III at Magnesia, the Romanssent a (very) small squadron of 3 vessels, under the nominal command ofQ. Labeo, to obtain the surrender of the seleucid garrisons in Thrace, thusfreeing Ainos and Maroneia21. If those cities were set free by Labeo, thenwasnt Philips gesture of occupying them an act of hostility against Romethat he should have rather avoided?

At the end of the day, we have to admit that we dont know how didPhilip acquire those cities: did the Romans give them to him? Did he occupythem by force from the Seleucids? Did the Romans allow him at a certainmoment to occupy the cities? Or and this is a very tempting hypothesis Philip was there with this army in 188, helping Labeos not very imposingsquadron of 3 ships to obtain the surrender of the Seleucid garrisons ofAinos and Maroneia and taking possession of the cities after the seleucidtroops left. If this was the case, then the rather complicated legal aspect ofthe cities would be easier to explain: from Eumenes point of view, Ainosand Maroneia were cities which belonged to Antiochus III and were freed

by the Romans while to Philip V the cities were occupied by his troops withthe assistance of the Roman fleet. That this might have been the case, wehear from the ambassadors of Maroneia, present at the same meeting wherethe faith of their city was decided. They said:

And as to the boundary rights, they [sc. the ambassadors of Maroneia]had little new to say : only that Quintus Fabius Labeo, when he had been

in that region, had fixed as the boundary for Philip the ancient royal road

which leads to Paroreia in Thrace, nowhere approaching the sea : Philip

had later laid out a new road which encompassed the cities and lands of

the Maroneans.22

So, Philip came in the possession of these cities in the context of themission of the Q. Labeo, either with his quiet acknowledgement, either by

original state, that the garrisons which w^ere in these cities should be withdrawn., engl.

tr. E.T. SAGE, in Livy in thirteen volumes, vol. XI, London & Cambridge MS., 193620

POL. XXII, 6 and especially T.L. XXXIX, 2821 T.L. XXXVII, 60, 7: a Creta Ephesum Fabius redit; inde tribus nauibus in

Thraciae oram missis ab Aeno et Maronia praesidia Antiochi deduci iussit, ut in libertate

eae ciuitates essent. 22 T.L. XXXIX, 27, 10: de iure etiam finium pauca adiecerunt: Q. Fabium

Labeonem, cum in regione ea fuisset, derexisse finem Philippo ueterem uiam regiam, quae

ad Thraciae Paroreian subeat, nusquam ad mare declinantem: Philippum nouam postea

deflexisse uiam, qua Maronitarum urbes agrosque

amplectatur.


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creating a fait accompli in redirecting the road that was supposed to be hisborder.

But his maritime Thracian dominion will not last for long, for in183 Philip is forced to withdraw from Ainos and Maronea, and in thiscircumstances, a horrible crime is committed, as Philips Thracian troopsslaughtered the citizens of those two poleis, thus creating tht opportunityfor new accusations and new responses23.

The context of these diplomatic quarrels is quite simple to understand,since the treaty of Apameia put Eumenes in possession of all the cities thatwere once subject to the Antiochus III (but this must not have been thecase for the cities of Ainos and Maroneia, which were simply occupied by

seleucid garrisons) thus creating a new European power: the Attalids ofPergamum, the new rulers of the remains of the Seleucid satrapy of Thrace.Thrace was just a playground between two powerful dynasties, soon to

become an object of their territorial claims, as it was very well expressedby the ambassadors of Eumenes:

They [sc. the ambassadors of Pergamum] said that Eumenes had in

addition the preliminary opinion of the ten commissioners [sc. who

were in charge with the treaty of Apamea] on the matter, who, since

they had given him the Chersonesus and Lysimachia, surely gave him

Maronea and Aenus too, which, from their nearness to his country, were

mere appendages to the larger gift.24

This connects, one way or another, with the situation of the cityof Byzantium, because this polis is promised help by Philip V in 18425and Polybius tells us exactly that promised this help in order to makean impression over the Thracian tribes who were order now threateningByzantium while Livy goes even further, informing us that Philip helpedthe city and defeated and captured the (Thracian) king Amadocos, and thisis how we are also told of his fantastic plan to invade Italy with the help ofthe barbarians from the Northern Balkans:

Meanwhile, setting out under the pretence of bringing aid to the

Byzantines, but in reality in order to inspire the chiefs of the Thracians

with fear, having defeated them in one battle and captured their leader

23 POL. XXII, 13, 1 ; T.L. XXXIX 53, 1024 T.L. XXXIX, 27, 5: habere eum praeterea decem legatorum in eam rem

praeiudicium, qui cum Chersonesum Lysimachiamque dederint, Maroneam quoque

atque Aenum profecto dedisse, quae ipsa propinquitate regionis uelut appendices maioris

muneris essent. , engl. tr. E.T. SAGE, in Livy in thirteen volumes, vol. XI, London &

Cambridge MS., 193625 POL. XXII, 14


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Amadocus, he returned to Macedonia, sending agents to stir up the

barbarians living along the Hister river, to the end that they might invade

Italy. 26

The politics of Philip were carried on also by his successor, becausewe know that Perseus gave aid to the Byzantines, the Aetolians, and theBoetians, not against [the Romans], but against others. Of these things [theMacedonian] ambassadors advised you long ago, and [the Romans] didnot object until Eumenes uttered his slander against [Macedonia]27(as itcan be deduced from the game of accusations and defenses that lead to theoubreak of the IIIrdMacedonian War28).

As for the chronology, obviously, this event must have occurred quiteearly in the reign of Perseus (around 176, probably earlier, because hisreign starts in 179 and the war starts in 172. Appians long time agowould thus indicate a date around 177-17629).

Those were the Antigonid actions in the civilized faade of Thrace,the one which was close to the Greek cities and also the one which wasdangerously close to the newly acquired attalid satrapy in the HellespontineThrace. They were accompanied by other actions, more to the North, ofwhich our sources tell us less (if they dont give us too much, as in the caseof Philips alleged plan of invading Italy).

Conclusion: What Thrace?

The main corps of the information we have about the actions of the

26 T.L. XXXIX, 35, 4: interim per speciem auxilii Byzantiis ferendi, re ipsa ad

terrorem regulis Thracum iniciendum profectus, perculsis iis uno proelio et Amadoco

duce capto in Macedoniam rediit, missis ad accolas Histri fluminis barbaros, ut in Italiam

irrumperent , engl. tr. E.T. SAGE, in Livy in thirteen volumes, vol. XI, London &

Cambridge MS., 1936. We know already that he promised help to the city from POL.

XXII, 14 (but what we have left of Polybius does not tell us if and how this help was

eventually given. One should not exclude the possibility that Livy mixes up passages from

Polybius with passages from the analists, especially on that part with the alleged plan to

invade Italy). See also HAMMOND & WALBANK 1988, 468; ECKSTEIN 2010, 240..27

APP., Mak., 11, 6-7, ' , ' . ,

,

. engl. transl. by WHITE H., dans Appian.Roman

History. Vol. II, Cambridge MS & Londres, 200528 T.L. XLII, 12, 10 and again APP., Mak. 11, 729 HATZOPOULOS 1983, 84, n. 32 considers more likely the date of 174, followed

by LOUKOPOULOU 1987, 63. But 174 would fall to close to the date of the outbreak of

the conflict, and thus would be in contradiction with Appians a long time ago.


15/18


Macedonian kings in the Balkans, except for two or three descriptionsof the expeditions (such was the one that Philip made with his army toclimb to highest peak of the Haemus mountains, where he could see, orsays Livy, the beautiful and magnificent sight of the Adriatic, the BlackSea and the Danube, all in the same time) are to be found either in thespeeches of Eumenes accusing Perseus, either in the speeches of Perseusdefending himself. I would like to point out again that those speeches ofEumenes were not delivered without a purpose, and a very material one:the faade of Thrace to the Aegean Sea (and especially the cities of Ainosand Maronea that he requested either to be given to himself either to be setfree), not to mention his interest in his newly acquired satrapy of Thraceafter the treaty of Apamea.

Here is the reason why I would like to propose to distinguish betweentwo ideal Thraces in the ancient sources: a) on the one hand, there is thatThrace that one gets accustomed to in the speeches of Eumenes, and thatis the Aeagean and the Hellespontine Thrace, a fringe of territory centeredaround and exceeding the hinterlands of the cities of Ainos, Maronea andAbdera, precisely because here is the area attracting Eumenes desiresand gaze (and also the eyes of the historians who followed in his steps) b)on the other hand, a more abstract and undefined Thrace to the North ubileones sunt, a Balkanic Thrace which is mysterious and dark, a Thrace that

no one else but the Antigonids knows what is going on up there, a Thracewhere everything is possible (and so are the big expeditions planned againstRome)

When talking about Thrace, Eumenes implies that second Thrace ofour hypothesis but in most cases he must mean the first one. And so doesPolybius, when he gives us the account of the accusations against Philip or

Perseus and their responses only to be followed by Diodorus, Livy andAppian.

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