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REVISTAFORUMUL JUDECÃTORILORRevistã semestrialã de atitudine ºi studii juridice

Nr. 1/2018

2 Revista Forumul Judecãtorilor – Nr. 1/2018

Tehnoredactare: Ameluþa ViºanCoperta: Ionuþ Militaru

Angelica Mãlãescu

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ISSN 2065-8745

DOI: (Digital Object Identifier): 10.5682/20658745

Revista Forumul Judecãtorilor – Nr. 1/2018 3

REVISTA FORUMUL JUDECÃTORILOR

Director:jud. Dragoº Cãlin,

Curtea de Apel Bucureºti

Redactor-ºef:jud. Ionuþ Militaru,

Curtea de Apel Bucureºti

Redactor-ºef adjunct:jud. Roxana Cãlin,

Tribunalul Bucureºti

Colegiul de redacþie:jud. Ana-Maria Lucia Zaharia,

Curtea de Apel Bucureºtijud. Florin Mihãiþã,

Judecãtoria Sect. 4, Bucureºtijud. dr. Gabriel Caian,

Ministerul Afacerilor Externejud. Carla Anghelescu,

Tribunalul Bucureºtijud. Victor Constantinescu,

Judecãtoria Sect. 6, Bucureºtijud. Claudiu Drãguºin, Judecãtoria Sect.

4, Bucureºtijud. Cristinel Ghigheci, Curtea de Apel

Braºovjud. Ioana-Maria Cîmpean, Judecãtoria

Timiºoara

Colegiul ºtiinþific:prof. univ. dr. Mihai ªandru,

Academia Românãjur. Mihai Banu,

Revista Românã de Drept EuropeanRuben Murdanaigum,

solicitor, Rubens Solicitors, Notariesand Estate Agents Lochgilphead,Marea Britanie

lector univ. dr. Anamaria Groza,judecãtor, Tribunalul Olt

prof. univ. dr. Jaime Octávio CardonaFerreira, Universitatea Lusíada dinLisabona, Fost Preºedinte al CurþiiSupreme de Justiþie din Portugalia,Preºedinte al Consiliului Jude-cãtorilor de Pace din Portugalia

Colaboratori principali:Judge Alex Kozinski,

United States Court of Appeals forthe Nine Circuit

jud. Mihaela Amoos Piguet,Tribunal du canton de Vaud,Lausanne, Elveþia

Avv. Monica Adriana Marinescu,Ordine degli Avvocati di Roma, Italia

jud. Simona Kovács, Tribunalul CovasnaIon Guzun, coordonator de programe,

Centrul de Resurse Juridice dinMoldova

jud. Ivan Georgiev,Tribunalul Regional Sofia, Bulgaria

jud. Veronica Gavriº Todinca, JudecãtoriaSighetu Marmaþiei


Lista principalelor abrevieri

C. Ap. Curtea de ApelC.E. Comunitãþile EuropeneCEDO Curtea Europeanã a Drepturilor OmuluiCJCE Curtea de Justiþie a Comunitãþilor EuropeneCJUE Curtea de Justiþie a Uniunii EuropeneConvenþia Convenþia Europeanã a Drepturilor OmuluiC.S.M. Consiliul Superior al MagistraturiiDalloz Recueil le DallozDec. civ., pen. Decizia civilã, penalãD.N.A. Direcþia Naþionalã AnticorupþieD.I.I.C.O.T. Direcþia de Investigare a Infracþiunilor de

Criminalitate Organizatã ºi TerorismI.N.M. Institutul Naþional al Magistraturiiînch. încheiereaÎ.C.C.J. Înalta Curte de Casaþie ºi JustiþieJ.O.U.E. Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii EuropeneJud. JudecãtoriaM.J.L.C. Ministerul Justiþiei ºi Libertãþilor CetãþeneºtiM. Of. Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea In.a./ n.n. nota autorului / nota noastrã (urmatã de

iniþialele autorului)n.t. nota traducãtoruluiO.N.U. Organizaþia Naþiunilor UniteS. civ., pen., com., cont. adm. Secþia civilã, penalã, comercialã, de

contencios administrativsent. civ., pen. Sentinþa civilã, penalãsubl. ns. Sublinierea noastrã (a autorului)TFP Tribunalul Funcþiei Publice al Uniuniunii

EuropeneTPI Tribunalul de Primã Instanþã al Comunitãþilor

EuropeneTrib. TribunalulTUE Tratatul privind Uniunea EuropeanãTCE Tratatul instituind Comunitatea EuropeanãUE Uniunea Europeanã


Cuprins

1. Dialogul jurisdicþional dintre instanþeleromâne ºi Curtea de Justiþie a UniuniiEuropene. Raport privind anul 2017(prezentare de Daniel-Mihail ªandru) ..... 197

2. Noþiunea de „consumator” în dreptulUniunii Europene ºi aportul hotãrârii Curþiide Justiþie a Uniunii Europene pronunþatãîn cauza Schrems împotriva FacebookIreland Limited (cauza C-498/16, hotãrâreadin 25 ianuarie 2018) .............................. 205

3. Interzicerea discriminãrii pe motiv dereligie sau convingeri, în domeniulîncadrãrii în muncã ºi ocupãrii forþei demuncã. Activitãþi profesionale ale bisericilorsau ale altor organizaþii a cãror eticã estebazatã pe religie sau convingeri. Impunereacerinþelor legate de religie sau convingeri,la încadrarea în muncã. Cerinþãprofesionalã esenþialã, legitimã ºi justificatãîn privinþa eticii organizaþiei. Criteriile deaplicare. Control jurisdicþional efectiv(Hotãrârea CJUE – Marea Camerã din 17aprilie 2018, în cauza Egenberger). ........ 213

4. Valenþe ale dreptului la liberã circulaþieºi ºedere: dreptul la o viaþã de familienormalã (hotãrârea Coman) ºi protecþiasporitã împotriva expulzãrii (hotãrârea B ºiSecretary of State for the HomeDepartment) (selecþii ºi comentarii deAnamaria Groza) ..................................... 217

Din jurisprudenþa recentã în materiaorganizãrii judecãtoreºti ºi a statutuluimagistraþilor ............................................ 230

1. Hotãrârea Plenului CSM prin care s-apropus eliberarea din funcþie a contesta-toarei judecãtor pentru incapacitateprofesionalã nu putea fi emisã în mod legalanterior definitivãrii hotãrârii aceleiaºiautoritãþi privind aprobarea cursurilor ce sefinalizeazã cu susþinerea examenului acãrui nepromovare atrage eliberarea dinfuncþie pentru incapacitate profesionalã . 230

2. Concursul de promovare al judecãtorilorîn funcþii de execuþie. Comisia desoluþionare a contestaþiilor are un drept de

ÎN LOC DE EDITORIAL

Rezoluþia magistraþilor români pentruapãrarea statului de drept, Bucureºti,Palatul de Justiþie, 19 mai 2018 .............. 11

ATITUDINI

William Baude – Originalitatea ca oconstrângere pentru judecãtori [articol în lb.englezã] .................................................. 15

Alec Webley – Judecãtorii sunt politicieni(sau nu?): Williams-Yulee v. Baroul dinFlorida ºi Legea constituþionalã carereconfigureazã districtele pentru alegerilejudiciare [articol în lb. englezã] ............... 28

STUDII JURIDICE

Ioana Marinescu – Sunt judecãtoriisensibili la condiþiile economice? Mãrturiidin tribunalele de dreptul muncii din RegatulUnit [articol în lb. englezã] ...................... 73

Wojciech Sadurski – Cum este înfrântãdemocraþia (în Polonia): Studiu de caz cuprivire la regresul populist anti-constituþional[articol în lb. englezã] .............................. 104

Voicu Puºcaºu - Câteva consideraþii criticereferitoare la Legea privind mãsurilealternative de executare a pedepselorprivative de libertate ................................ 179

JURISPRUDENÞÃ

Din jurisprudenþa recentã a Curþii Europenea Drepturilor Omului ................................ 192

Cauza Baydar c. Olandei. Limitele obligaþieiinstanþei de a-ºi motiva refuzul de a efectuao trimitere preliminarã la Curtea de Justiþiea Uniunii Europene. Neîncãlcarea art. 6 par.1 din Convenþie (prezentare de DragoºCãlin) ....................................................... 192

Din jurisprudenþa recentã a Curþii de Justiþiea Uniunii Europene ................................. 197


apreciere discreþionar în domeniul sau pedisciplina sa de specialitate, astfel încâtinstanþa de control judiciar nu poateinterveni în activitatea sa, pentru a stabilirãspunsul corect, dispoziþiile Regula-mentului conferind aceastã prerogativãexclusiv comisiei/comisiilor de soluþionarea contestaþiilor la baremele de evaluare ºinotare ...................................................... 240

3. Suspendarea soluþionãrii cererii deacordare a pensiei de serviciu opereazã încazul punerii în miºcare a acþiunii penalepentru una dintre infracþiunile menþionatela alin. 1 al art. 832 alin. 2 din Legea nr.303/2004. Dacã în situaþia sãvârºirii uneiinfracþiuni suspendarea soluþionãrii cereriimagistratului de acordare a pensiei deserviciu se produce doar în ipoteza puneriiîn miºcare a acþiunii penale, nu existã nicioraþiune pentru care o simplã sesizare cuprivire la sãvârºirea unei abateri disciplinaresã aibã în mod automat acelaºi efectsuspensiv ................................................ 242

4. Regulamentul privind evaluarea activitãþiiprofesionale a judecãtorilor ºi procurorilor.Experienþa profesionalã superioarã amembrilor comisiei de evaluare de laparchetul ierarhic superior ºi principiulsubordonãrii ierarhice nu au relevanþã, atâttimp cât voinþa legiuitorului a fost ca, încomponenþa comisiei de evaluare, sã seregãseascã ºi conducãtorul parchetului încare funcþioneazã persoana evaluatã,acesta fiind în mãsurã sã cunoascã cel maibine eficienþa ºi calitatea activitãþii acesteia. 250

5. Înregistrãrile în baza de date a InspecþieiJudiciare au doar un caracter provizoriu,

fiind consemnate abaterile de la Coduldeontologic al judecãtorilor ºi procurorilorla momentul constatãrii acestora prinhotãrârea secþiei corespunzãtoare aConsiliului Superior al Magistraturiiadoptatã potrivit art. 36 indice 2 alin.(4) dinRegulamentul de organizare ºi funcþionarea Consiliului Superior al Magistraturii. .... 255

6. Atitudinea amuzantã, precum ºisusþinerea unui dialog judecãtor - avocat -pãrþi civile, fãrã relevanþã juridicã, ci doarcu intenþia de a ºicana ºi de a evidenþiaeventualele greºeli de drept material sauprocesual ale acestora, fãcând aprecierinepotrivite cu privire la calitatea ºi conþinutulmemoriilor depuse la acel termen de pãrþi,sunt de naturã sã atragã rãspundereadisciplinarã a unui judecãtor pentru faptaprevãzutã de dispoziþiile art. 99 lit. c) dinLegea nr. 303/2004. (selecþii de DragoºCãlin) ....................................................... 266

PREZENTÃRI

Asociaþia Forumul Judecãtorilor dinRomânia - White Paper – Modificãrileaduse „Legilor justiþiei” din România –Potenþial colaps al magistraturii române[articol în lb. englezã] .............................. 273

GREFA VESELÃ

Curtea de Apel a Circuitului al ªaptelea dinStatele Unite ale Americii - CHARLENEEIKE ºi alþii vs. ALLERGAN, INC. ºi alþii –Acþiunea împotriva a ºase companiifarmaceutice din cauza faptului cã picãturilepentru ochi pe care le produc sunt inutil demari ......................................................... 281


Contents

INSTEAD OF AN EDITORIAL

The Resolution of Romanian Judges andProsecutors for Upholding the Rule of Law,Bucharest, Palace of Justice, 19th May2018 ........................................................ 11

ATTITUDES

William Baude – Originalism as aConstraint on Judges [article in English] . 15

Alec Webley – Judges are (not?)Politicians: Williams-Yulee v. The FloridaBar and the Constitutional Law ofRedistricting of Judicial Election Districts[article in English] .................................... 28

LEGAL STUDIES

Ioana Marinescu – Are Judges Sensitiveto Economic Conditions? Evidence from UKEmployment Tribunals [article in English] 73

Wojciech Sadurski – How DemocracyDies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist Backsliding [articlein English] ............................................... 104

Voicu Puºcaºu - Some criticalconsiderations related to the Law onalternative measures of execution ofsentence in detention .............................. 179

JURISPRUDENCE

Recent case-law of the European Court ofHuman Rights ......................................... 192

Case Baydar c. Netherlands. Limits of thecourt obligation to give arguments forrefusing to make a reference to theEuropean Union Court of Justice. Non-infringement of art. 6 par. 1 of theConvention (presentation by Dragoº Cãlin) 192

Recent case-law of the Court of Justice ofthe European Union ................................ 197

1. Jurisdictional dialogue betweenRomanian Courts and the European UnionCourt of Justice. Report on 2017(presentation by Daniel-Mihail ªandru) .. 107

2. The notion of “consumer” in EuropeanUnion law and the contribution of theEuropean Union Court decision in CaseSchrems against Facebook Ireland Limited(case C-498/16, Decision, January 25,2018) ....................................................... 205

3. Prohibition of discrimination on groundsof religion or belief in the field ofemployment and labour force. Professionalactivities of churches or other entitieswhose ethos is based on religion or belief.Imposing requirements of religion or belieffor being employed. Occupationalrequirement, legitimate and justified on theorganization’s ethos. Application criteria.Effective judicial review (EUCJ Decision –Grand Chamber, April 17, 2018, caseEgenberger). ........................................... 213

4. Facets of the right to free movement andresidence, the right to a family life (ComanDecision) and enhanced protection againstexpulsion (case B ºi Secretary of State forthe Home Department). Selections andcomments by Anamaria Groza ............... 217

Recent case law on judicial organizationand status of magistrates ........................ 230

1. SCM Plenum Decision which proposedthe dismissal of a judge for professionalincapacity could not legally be issued priorto finalizing the same authority decisionapproving courses that end with passingan exam whose failure draws dismissal forprofessional incapacity. ........................... 230

2. Contest for judges’ promotion inexecution office. Commission for examiningthe candidate’s objections has an absoluteright to assess them in its field or in specialarea of competence, so the court for judicialreview cannot interfere in its work to


establish the correct answer, the provisionsof the Regulation conferring this powerexclusively to the committee/committeesthat are competent to solve the objectionsto the scales of assessment and scoring. 240

3. Suspension of settlement of theapplication for the pension service operatesin the case of formal criminal action for oneof the offences mentioned in paragraph 1of art. 832 of law No. 303/2004. If in case ofcommitting an offence suspension of theapplication for granting the service pensionoccurs only in the hypothesis of the formalcriminal action, there is no reason for whicha simple referral with respect to committinga disciplinary act to have automatically thesame suspensive effect .......................... 242

4. The regulation on the evaluation ofprofessional activity of judges andprosecutors. Superior professionalexpertise of the members of the EvaluationCommittee from the hierarchically superiorprosecutor Office and hierarchicalsubordination principle are irrelevant, solong as the will of the legislature was thatin the Evaluation Commission to be theChief prosecutor of the prosecutor’s officewhere the person assessed is working,which is in a position to know best theefficiency and quality of his/her activity ... 250

5. The recordings in the database of theJudicial Inspection are only temporary andthey state about the deviations from the

Code of Ethics for judges and prosecutorsat the time of their establishment by thejudgment of the Superior Council ofMagistracy adopted according to art. 36index 2 para. (4) of the Regulation oforganization and functioning of the SuperiorCouncil of Magistracy .............................. 255

6. A funny attitude, as well as supporting adialogue lawyer-judge -civil parties withoutlegal relevance, but only with the intentionof teasing and highlighting any errors ofsubstantive or procedural law, makinginappropriate observations on the qualityand content of the petitions submitted bythe parties to that term, are likely to attractdisciplinary liability of a judge for the deedprovided by the article. 99 lit. c) of law no.303/2004. (selections by Dragoº Cãlin) .. 266

PRESENTATIONS

Romanian Judges’ Forum Association- White Paper – Changes to the Romanian„Justice Legislation” – Potential collapse ofRomanian Magistracy [article in English] 273

HAPPY REGISTRY

United States Court of Appeals for theSeventh Circuit - CHARLENE EIKE andothers vs. ALLERGAN, INC., and others -The claim against six pharmaceuticalcompanies because the size of an eyedrops they produce is unnecessarily large 281


Sommaire

AU LIEU DE L‘EDITORIAL

La Résolution des magistrats roumainspour la défense de l’état de droit, Bucarest,Palais de justice, 19 mai 2018 ................ 11

ATTITUDES

William Baude - L’originalité commecontrainte sur les juges [article en Anglais] 15

Alec Webley - Les juges (ne) sont (pas?)des politiciens: Williams-Yulee v. LeBarreau de la Floride et la Loiconstitutionnelle de reconfiguration descirconscriptions électorales des districtsjudiciaires [article en Anglais] ................. 28

ETUDES JURIDIQUES

Ioana Marinescu - Les juges sont-ilssensibles aux conditions économiques?Témoignages provenant des tribunaux dutravail britanniques [article en Anglais] ... 73

Wojciech Sadurski - Vers le décès de ladémocratie (en Pologne): étude de cas dela régression populiste anti-constitu-tionnelle [article en Anglais] .................... 104

Voicu Puºcaºu - Quelques considérationscritiques concernant la Loi sur les mesuresde substitution à l’exécution des peinesprivatives de liberté ................................. 179

JURISPRUDENCE

La jurisprudence récente de la CourEuropéenne des Droits de l’Homme: ...... 192

L’affaire Baydar c. Pays-Bas. Les limitesde l’obligation des tribunaux de motiver lerefus de saisir la Cour de Justice de l’UnionEuropéenne pour prononcer une décisionpréjudicielle. Aucune violation de l’art. 6 par.1 de la Convention (présentation parDragoº Cãlin) .......................................... 192

La jurisprudence récente de la Cour deJustice de l’Union Européenne: .............. 197

1. Le dialogue judiciaire entre les juridictionsroumaines et la Cour de Justice de l’UnionEuropéenne. Rapport sur 2017(présentation par Daniel-Mihail ªandru) . 197

2. La notion de „consommateur” dans ledroit de l’Union Européenne et lacontribution de l’arrêt de la Cour de Justicede l’Union Européenne dans l’affaireSchrems c. Facebook Ireland Limited (no.C-498/16, arrêt du 25 janvier 2018) ........ 205

3. Interdiction de la discrimination fondéesur la religion ou les convictions dans ledomaine de l’emploi et de la profession.Activités professionnelles d’églises oud’autres organisations dont l’éthique estfondée sur la religion ou des convictions.Imposition dans l’emploi d’exigencesreligieuses ou des convictions. Exigenceprofessionnelle essentielle, légitime etjustifiée pour l’éthique de l’organisation.Critères d’application. Contrôlejuridictionnel effectif (CJUE - GrandeChambre, 17 avril 2018, affaireEgenberger). ........................................... 213

4. Valences du droit à la libre circulation età la résidence: droit à une vie familialenormale (arrêt Coman) et protection accruecontre l’expulsion (arrêt B. et Secrétaired’État au Ministère de l’Intérieur)(sélections et commentaires par AnamariaGroza) ..................................................... 217

La jurisprudence récente en matièred’organisation judiciaire et le statut desjuges: ...................................................... 230

1. La décision du Plénum du CSM quiproposait la révocation du juge pourincapacité professionnelle ne pouvait êtrelégalement prononcée avant la décision dela même autorité approuvant les cours quise finissent avec l’examen sur la capacitéprofessionnelle ........................................ 230

2. Concours pour la promotion des jugesdans les postes d’exécution. LaCommission de règlement des différendssur le barème jouit d’un pouvoir


discrétionnaire dans son domaine ou danssa discipline spécialisée, de sorte que letribunal de contrôle judiciaire ne peut pasintervenir dans ses travaux pour établir laréponse correcte, car les dispositions duRèglement confèrent cette prérogativeuniquement aux commissions de règlementdes contestations aux échelles d’évaluationet de notation .......................................... 240

3. La suspension du règlement de lademande d’octroi de la pension de serviceest effectuée en cas d’ouverture de l’actionpénale pour l’une des infractions visées auparagraphe 1 de l’art. 832 de la Loi n° 303/2004. Si, en cas de délit, la suspension dela demande du magistrat pour l’indemnitéde service intervient uniquement lorsquel’action pénale est engagée, il n’ya aucuneraison pour qu’une simple saisine d’uneinfraction disciplinaire ait automatiquementle même effet suspensif .......................... 242

4. Le Règlement sur l’évaluation de l’activitéprofessionnelle des juges et desprocureurs. L’expérience professionnellesupérieure des membres de la commissiond’évaluation du parquet supérieurhiérarchique et le principe de subordinationhiérarchique sont sans importance, tant quel’intention du législateur était que, dans lacomposition de la commission d’évaluationse trouve le chef du parquet dans lequelfonctionne la personne évaluée, qui estcapable de mieux connaître l’efficacité etla qualité de son travail ........................... 250

5. Les enregistrements dans la base dedonnées de l’inspection judiciaire ne sontque provisoires et ne sont consignées que

les violations du Code de déontologie desjuges et des procureurs au moment de leurconstatation par la décision de la sectioncorrespondante du Conseil Supérieur de laMagistrature adoptée conformément à l’art.362 par. (4) du Règlement sur l’organisationet le fonctionnement du Conseil Supérieurde la Magistrature ................................... 255

6. L’attitude drôle et le soutien d’un dialoguejudiciaire - avocat - parties civiles, sanspertinence juridique, mais uniquement dansle but de stigmatiser et de mettre enévidence leur fautes de droit matériel ouprocédural, en faisant des jugementsinappropriés sur la qualité et le contenu desactes de procédure déposés à ce momentpar les parties est de nature à engager laresponsabilité disciplinaire d’un juge pourla violation des dispositions de l’art. 99 lit.c) de la Loi no. 303/2004 (sélections parDragoº Cãlin) .......................................... 266

PRÉSENTATIONS

L‘Association le Forum des Juges deRoumanie - Livre blanc - La modificationde la législation roumaine - Potentieleffondrement de la magistrature roumaine 273

LE GREFFE JOYEUX

La Cour d’Appel des États-Unis pour leSeptième Circuit - CHARLENE EIKE et al.vs. ALLERGAN, INC., et al. - L’action enjustice contre six sociétés pharmaceutiquesparce que la taille d’une goutte pour lesyeux qu’elles produisent est inutilementlarge ........................................................ 281


Subsemnaþii, judecãtori ºi procurori,magistraþi asistenþi ºi auditori de justiþie,având în vedere:

- evoluþiile publice recente cu privirela modificarea „legilor justiþiei”, care punîn grav pericol independenþa justiþiei ºiparcursul Statului Român în cadrul UniuniiEuropene ºi al Consiliului Europei, aºacum au constatat Comisia Europeanã ºiGRECO;

- faptul cã majoritatea covârºitoare ajudecãtorilor ºi a procurorilor români nu aacceptat proiectele de lege vizândactivitatea sistemului judiciar, voinþamagistraþilor nefiind luatã în considerare,evitându-se orice dialog cu aceºtia încadrul unui veritabil „experiment judiciar”,în lipsa oricãror studii de impact ºiprognoze;

- declaraþiile Ministrului Justiþiei ºi alereprezentanþilor puterii legislative princare, contrar art. 11 din Constituþie, seminimalizeazã Raportul GRECO, princare s-a cerut ca România sã se abþinãde la adoptarea unor amendamente lalegislaþia penalã care sã contravinãangajamentelor sale internaþionale ºi sã-isubmineze capacitãþile interne în materialuptei împotriva corupþiei ºi se neso-coteºte necesitatea sesizãrii Comisiei dela Veneþia (preºedintele Comisiei speciale

comune pentru modificarea legilor justiþieia afirmat cã nici Curtea Constituþionalãnu va aºtepta avizul Comisiei de laVeneþia, aceasta fixând deja un termenpentru soluþionarea obiecþiilor deneconstituþionalitate la 30 mai 2018; încalitatea sa de membru al Comisiei de laVeneþia, Ministrul Justiþiei trebuia sãsolicite public luarea în considerare aavizului Comisiei de la Veneþia, iar nusubminarea activitãþii sale);

- propunerile legislative aflate îndezbatere publicã reprezintã o involuþieîn crearea unui sistem de justiþie penalãmodern ºi adaptat noilor realitãþi sociale,precum ºi o denaturare a scopuluiprocesului penal ºi a politicii penale astatului, fiind evidentã schimbarea deparadigmã de la o justiþie penalã careprotejeazã victimele infracþiunii la un nouconcept care plaseazã inculpatul într-opoziþie privilegiatã;

- desfãºurarea procesului de legiferareîn materia Codului penal, a Codului deprocedurã penalã ºi a Codului de proce-durã civilã, cu o procedurã netranspa-rentã ºi neprevizibilã, fãrã a putea apreciaîn ce modalitate vor fi folosite observaþiileformulate de sistemul judiciar, a cãruiprezenþã pare doar a fi necesarã pentrulegitimarea modificãrilor propuse,mimându-se un dialog;

ÎN LOC DE EDITORIAL

Rezoluþia magistraþilorromâni pentru apãrarea

statului de drept, Bucureºti,Palatul de Justiþie,

19 mai 2018


- nesocotirea principiilor statului dedrept, statutului magistratului ºi regulilorde transparenþã ce trebuie sã caracte-rizeze procesul de consultare publicã ºiîncercarea de a intimida judecãtorii ºiprocurorii din România, prin transfor-marea unor abateri disciplinare cu gradde pericol social redus în infracþiuni cupedepse având limite apropiate de celeprevãzute pentru infracþiunea de omor(spre exemplu, infracþiunile prevãzute laart.2801 - Reaua credinþã ºi art.2802 -Grava neglijenþã);

- ura visceralã împotriva autoritãþiijudecãtoreºti prin plasarea judecãtorilorºi a procurorilor români în companiaclanurilor infracþionale, pe acelaºi nivel cuproxeneþii ºi traficanþii de carne vie, cucãmãtarii ºi contrabandiºtii, fiind ima-ginate infracþiuni pentru „contracarareaclanurilor, precum ºi a procurorilor ºijudecãtorilor, în comiterea infracþiunilorspecifice” ;

- escaladarea fenomenului corupþiei,care reprezintã o ameninþare serioasãpentru dezvoltare ºi stabilitate, cuconsecinþe negative la toate nivelurile deguvernare, ºi încercãrile repetate, pemultiple planuri, de anulare a eforturilormagistraþilor români de combatere ainfracþiunilor de corupþie;

- acþiunile de manipulare a opinieipublice ºi atacurile fãrã precedent laadresa a numeroºi judecãtori ºi procuroricare instrumenteazã inclusiv cauze demare corupþie, dar ºi a celor maiimportante instituþii ale statului, cu rol deapãrare ºi siguranþã publicã, inclusivDirecþia Naþionalã Anticorupþie, ori aautoritãþilor statului menite sã-l reprezinteîn faþa partenerilor din UniuneaEuropeanã (a se vedea schimbareaarbitrarã a Agentului pentru CJUE pentrurefuzul de a aviza proiectele de actenormative în dispreþul dreptului UniuniiEuropene);

- lipsa unor proiecte concrete deefectuare a unei hãrþi judiciare ºi a asigu-

rãrii unei infrastructuri corespunzãtoarenecesitãþilor actuale de desfãºurare aactivitãþii instanþelor ºi parchetelor, lipsastabilirii volumului optim de activitate almagistraþilor români pe criterii obiective,lucrându-se constant intelectual 10-12 orezilnic, lipsa oricãror preocupãri a auto-ritãþilor pentru funcþionarea cât mai efici-entã a Institutului Naþional al Magistraturiiºi a ªcolii Naþionale de Grefieri;

- concentrarea modificãrilor legislativeasupra bulversãrii sistemului de acces ºipromovare în profesie, fãrã studii deimpact, încurajarea sau determinareaieºirii definitive sau temporare din sistema unor magistraþi, reprimirea în profesiefãrã niciun fel de testare a foºtilor magis-traþi cu 10 ani vechime, introducerea unuisistem de atragere a rãspunderii materialecare ar târî magistraþii în mod automat înprocese pentru a dovedi cã nu este vorbadespre o eroare judiciarã (de cele maimulte ori, legislaþie deficitarã, necon-formitatea legislaþiei naþionale cu dreptuleuropean etc.), aspecte care nu par aavea ca scop creºterea calitãþii actului dejustiþie, evoluþia sistemului judiciar, ci„falimentarea” acestuia;

- multe dintre modificãrile preconizatenu au nicio legãturã cu scopul enunþat delegiuitor ºi se îndepãrteazã de la obiec-tivele avute în vedere, întrucât expunerilede motive ºi intervenþiile legislativepropuse conþin soluþii inadecvate reali-tãþilor juridice din România ºi standardelorde protecþie a unor valori fundamentalede la nivel european ºi internaþional, denaturã sã compromitã înfãptuirea actuluide justiþie;

- faptul cã Ministrul Justiþiei îºi permitesã atace public pe toþi procurorii din cadrulDirecþiei Naþionale Anticorupþie,speculând faptul cã aceºtia administreazãprobe cu încãlcarea legii, apreciindasupra întrunirii elementelor constitutiveale unor infracþiuni, stabilirii vinovãþiei saunevinovãþiei unor persoane, solicitândliste cu soluþiile de achitare pronunþate de


instanþele judecãtoreºti (numai înUzbekistan numãrul de achitãri estezero,1 în statele democratice achitareareprezentând expresia unui sistemjudiciar sãnãtos);

- faptul cã Rapoartele MCV subliniazãconstant cã ar trebui sã se întreprindãmãsuri suplimentare pentru a furniza unsprijin adecvat magistraþilor împotrivacãrora sunt îndreptate critici ce sub-mineazã independenþa justiþiei, aspecteignorate cu obstinaþie de Statul român;

- prin faptul cã are calitatea de membrual Uniunii Europene, Statului român îirevine obligaþia de a aplica Mecanismulde cooperare ºi verificare ºi a da cursrecomandãrilor stabilite în acest cadru, înconformitate cu dispoziþiile art.148 alin.(4)din Constituþie;

- faptul cã, atunci când democraþia ºilibertãþile fundamentale sunt în pericol,obligaþia de rezervã a judecãtorului devinesubsidiarã obligaþiei de indignare,2

ADOPTÃM URMÃTOAREAREZOLUÞIE:

1. Solicitãm insistent factorilorpolitici încetarea imediatã a atacurilorla adresa statului de drept ºi a jude-cãtorilor ºi procurorilor din România.România este ºi trebuie sã rãmânã statmembru al Uniunii Europene ºi alConsiliului Europei, iar nu un teritoriual corupþiei ºi fãrãdelegii. Jos mâinilede pe justiþie!

2. Solicitãm PreºedinteluiRomâniei, Preºedintelui Senatului ºiPreºedintelui Camerei Deputaþilorconsultarea urgentã a ComisieiEuropene pentru Democraþie prinDrept a Consiliului Europei (Comisiade la Veneþia) asupra unor aspecte

curente vizând modificarea în Româniaa Codului penal, Codului de procedurãpenalã ºi Codului de procedurã civilã,precum ºi unele aspecte conexe, fiindnecesarã suspendarea imediatã adezbaterilor Comisiei speciale comunepânã la data primirii Avizului Comisieide la Veneþia.

3. Solicitãm amânarea luãriioricãror decizii, din partea tuturorautoritãþilor competente, în privinþa„legilor justiþiei”, pânã la data primiriiAvizului Comisiei de la Veneþia ºi pânãla punerea de acord a textelor de legecu solicitãrile Comisiei Europene ºi aleGRECO. Puterea judecãtoreascãtrebuie sã fie independentã, ceea ceimplicã existenþa unor anumite garanþiifaþã de celelalte puteri ale statului,pentru a consolida independenþa ºiimparþialitatea magistratului.

4. Solicitãm consultarea realã acorpului magistraþilor cu privire lapachetele legislative care vizeazãactivitatea lor, prin Adunãrile Generaledin cadrul instanþelor ºi parchetelor.Consiliul Superior al Magistraturii nureprezintã magistratura dacã ignorãpunctul de vedere al miilor de magis-traþi români. Propunerile legislative aleConsiliului Superior al Magistraturii nupot fi promovate netransparent ºi nupot reprezenta voinþa a 5-6 membri.Solicitãm consultarea realã a societãþiicivile, ale cãrei reacþii trebuie sã fieavute în vedere în cadrul dezbaterilorlegislative.

5. Solicitãm condiþii demne demuncã. Realizarea unui act de justiþiede calitate presupune alocarea tim-pului minim necesar studierii cauzelor,analizãrii problemelor de drept ºi alegislaþiei în continuã modificare, iar

1 A se vedea pagina web https://www.rferl.org/a/guilty-no-matter-what/29206669.html [consultatãultima datã la 19 mai 2018].

2 A se vedea Declaraþia privind etica judiciarã,

adoptatã de Adunarea Generalã a ReþeleiEuropene a Consiliilor Judiciare, desfãºuratã laLondra în perioada 2-4 iunie 2010.


nu pronunþarea unor soluþii ce pot fiafectate de inadecvarea condiþiilor delucru, de lipsa de timp ºi supra-încãrcare.

6. Solicitãm Ministrului Justiþiei sãse abþinã de la acþiunile care intimi-deazã procurorii ºi afecteazã statul dedrept ºi independenþa justiþiei.

7. Solicitãm Ratificarea Protocoluluinr.16 la Convenþia pentru apãrareadrepturilor omului ºi a libertãþilorfundamentale, al cãrui text a fostadoptat de Comitetul Miniºtrilor la datade 10 iulie 2013 ºi care a fost deschisspre semnare la 2 octombrie 2013, laStrasbourg. Protocolul nr. 16 prevedeposibilitatea pentru cele mai înaltejurisdicþii ale pãrþilor contractante dea solicita un aviz consultativ CurþiiEuropene a Drepturilor Omului, atuncicând apreciazã cã o anumitã cauzãaflatã pe rolul lor ridicã o problemãgravã privind interpretarea sau apli-carea Convenþiei sau a protocoalelorsale.

8. Solicitãm membrilor ConsiliuluiSuperior al Magistraturii sã condamneimediat ºi cu fermitate atacurile laadresa statului de drept ºi a jude-cãtorilor ºi procurorilor din România.

Implementarea unor criterii interactivede evaluare anualã, de cãtre corpulmagistraþilor, a activitãþii curentedesfãºurate de membrii CSM, precumºi revizuirea procedurii de revocare aacestora sunt imediat necesare.

9. Solicitãm puterii legislative ºiConsiliului Superior al Magistraturii sãadopte mãsuri imediate pentru afurniza un sprijin adecvat magistraþilorîmpotriva cãrora sunt îndreptate criticicare submineazã independenþajustiþiei.

10. Adresãm un îndemn cãtre toateadunãrile generale ale instanþelor ºiparchetelor sã se întruneascã imediatºi sã hotãrascã formele de protest pecare le considerã necesare.

11. Invitãm pe toþi cetãþeniiRomâniei sã se alãture acesteiRezoluþii, în calitatea lor de purtãtoriai unor speranþe ºi aspiraþii deînsãnãtoºire moralã a þãrii ºi demenþinere a ei pe coordonateleEuropei civilizate.

Rezoluþia a fost semnatã de 1911magistraþi, lista completã fiindpublicatã pe site-ul Revistei ForumulJudecãtorilor.3

3 A se vedea pagina web http://www.forumuljudecatorilor.ro/index.php/archives/3240 [consultatã ultima datã la 16 iunie 2018].


Abstract: One of Justice Antonin Scalia’s greatestlegacies was his promotion of constitutional originalism.One important feature of Scalia’s particular arguments fororiginalism was constraint – the idea that originalism wascentrally a way, the best way, to constrain judicialdecision-making, whereas nonoriginalist theories wouldessentially license judges to make up constitutional lawas they went along.

In this short essay, I honor Justice Scalia with twoobservations about originalism and constraint. The first isthat originalist scholars today are much more equivocalabout the importance and nature of constraining judges.This is a point that may be obvious to those steeped in thelatest originalist theory, but apparently cannot be statedoften enough or clearly enough to those who are not.

The second observation, which relates to the first, is that the concept of constraintis ambiguous in several respects and that originalism may be better at some kinds ofconstraint than others. In particular, I emphasize the difference between externalconstraints, which help others to judge the interpreter, and internal constraints, whichfocus on allowing the interpreter to constrain him- or herself. As reflected and refinedin modern scholarship, originalism may not be terribly good at the former, but it maybe much better at the latter. In other words, originalism can still have constrainingpower, but mostly for those who seek to be bound.

Rezumat: Una dintre cele mai importante moºteniri lãsate de Antonin Scalia,judecãtor din cadrul Curþii Supreme a Statelor Unite ale Americii, a fost promovareaoriginalismului constituþional. O importantã trãsãturã a argumentelor sale specificepentru originalism a fost limitarea – ideea cã originalismul era, în esenþã, o cale, ceamai bunã cale, pentru a limita luarea deciziilor judiciare, în timp ce teoriilenonoriginaliste, în esenþã, ar legitima judecãtorii sã creeze legi constituþionale.

ATITUDINI

Originalism as a Constrainton Judges

William Baude*

* Neubauer Family Assistant Professor of Law,The University of Chicago Law School. I appreciatehelpful and timely comments from Samuel Bray,Jud Campbell, Jonathan Mitchell, Richard Primus,Richard Re, Stephen Sachs, Lawrence Solum, and

the editors of The University of Chicago LawReview, as well as research support from the SNRDenton Fund and the Alumni Faculty Fund. E-mailprofesional: [email protected].


One of Justice Antonin Scalia’sgreatest legacies is his promotion

of constitutional originalism. He employedthe interpretive philosophy on the benchand argued for it in print4 and in speechesaround the country. (Indeed, one ofScalia’s speeches about originalism at theUniversity of Chicago in 20035 wasformative in provoking my own thinkingon the subject.)

One important feature of Scalia’sparticular arguments for originalism wasconstraint – the idea that originalism wascentrally a way, the best way, to constrainjudicial decision-making, whereasnonoriginalist theories would essentiallylicense judges to make up constitutionallaw as they went along. This motifappeared in various passages of hiswriting. For instance, he de-scribed asone of the chief virtues of originalism thatit was “more compatible with the natureand purpose of a Constitution in ademocratic system,” because:

The purpose of constitutionalguarantees – and in particular thoseconstitutional guarantees of individualrights that are at the center of thiscontroversy – is precisely to prevent thelaw from reflecting certain changes inoriginal values that the society adoptingthe Constitution thinks fundamentally

undesirable. Or, more precisely, to requirethe society to de-vote to the subject thelong and hard consideration required fora constitutional amendment before thoseparticular values can be cast aside.6

On the other hand, he argued, “thecentral practical defect of nonoriginalismis fundamental and irreparable: theimpossibility of achieving any consensuson what, precisely, is to replace originalmeaning, once that is abandoned.”7 Heelaborated:

If the law is to make any attempt atconsistency and predictability, surelythere must be general agreement not onlythat judges reject one exegeticalapproach (originalism), but that they adoptanother. And it is hard to discern anyemerging consensus among thenonoriginalists as to what this might be.8

The central theme here is thatoriginalism constrains judges from simplyfollowing popular pressures and,conversely, that nonoriginalists will not beable to produce a consistent andpredictable system. Originalism may notbe perfect on this score, but it is, Scaliasaid, the lesser evil.

In later work with Professor BryanGarner, Scalia more explicitlyemphasized the constraint of his methodsof interpretation. “[S]ound interpretive

În acest scurt eseu, onorez judecãtorul Scalia cu douã observaþii despre originalismºi limitare. Prima este aceea cã doctrinarii originaliºti contemporani sunt mult maiechivoci cu privire la importanþa ºi natura limitãrii judecãtorilor. Aceastã chestiunepoate fi evidentã celor iniþiaþi în cea mai nouã teorie originalistã, dar, în fapt, nu poatefi exprimatã de suficient ori sau suficient de clar celor care nu sunt.

Keywords: constraint, restraint, originalism, original meaning, judges, Scalia,Justice, constitution, constitutional law, wayward, willful, puzzled

4 See generally, for example, Antonin Scalia,Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U Cin L Rev 849(1989); Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner,Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts(Thomson/West 2012); Antonin Scalia, A Matterof Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law(Princeton 1997) (Amy Gutmann, ed).

5 See Andrew Moesel, Justice Scalia Speaksat Law School (Chicago Maroon, May 9, 2003),archived at http://perma.cc/WQ3K-SZYP.

6 Scalia, 57 U Cin L Rev at 862 (cited in note1) (emphasis omitted).

7 Id at 862–63.8 Id at 855.


conventions,” they wrote, “will narrow therange of acceptable judicialdecision-making and acceptableargumentation” and “will curb – evenreverse – the tendency of judges to imbueauthoritative texts with their own policypreferences.”9

But time comes for both men andtheoretical arguments. In this short essay,I honor Justice Scalia with twoobservations about originalism andconstraint. The first is that originalistscholars today are much more equivocalabout the importance and nature ofconstraining judges. This is a point thatmay be obvious to those steeped in thelatest originalist theory, but apparentlycannot be stated often enough or clearlyenough to those who are not.

The second observation, which relatesto the first, is that the concept of constraintis ambiguous in several respects and thatoriginalism may be better at some kindsof constraint than others. In particular, Iemphasize the difference betweenexternal constraints, which help others tojudge the interpreter, and internalconstraints, which focus on allowing theinterpreter to constrain him- or herself. Asreflected and refined in modernscholarship, originalism may not beterribly good at the former, but it may bemuch better at the latter. In other words,originalism can still have constrainingpower, but mostly for those who seek tobe bound.

I. The death of constraint?Critics of originalism have leveled

sustained, and sometimes persuasive,arguments against the justification oforiginalism as a constraint on judges. Forinstance, in a book-length treatment andcritique of originalism, The Failed Promiseof Originalism, Professor Frank Crossattempts to empirically study “[a] keyargument for originalism,” namely, “itsability to restrain willful judging.”10 Heconcludes that “reliance on originalistsources is not [ ] particularly constraining,so justices exercise their ideologicalpreferences in cases using originalism asmuch as in other decisions.”11

But the target of these critiques is mostreadily found in the work of olderoriginalists, like Professor Raoul Berger,Judge Robert Bork, and Justice Scalia.12

With Scalia’s passing, these versions ofthe constraint argument no longer have aclear champion.13

9 Scalia and Garner, Reading Law at xxviii(cited in note 1).

10 Frank B. Cross, The Failed Promise ofOriginalism 170 (Stanford Law 2013).

11 Id at 189.12 See id at 11–12, 15–16, 19–20. See also,

for example, Peter J. Smith, The Marshall Courtand the Originalist’s Dilemma, 90 Minn L Rev 612,621 (2006) (discussing works by Scalia, Berger’sbook Federalism: The Founders’ Design, Bork’sbook The Tempting of America: The PoliticalSeduction of the Law and Professor John Hart Ely’sbook Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of JudicialReview).

13 See Gary Lawson, Reflections of anEmpirical Reader (or: Could Fleming Be Right ThisTime?), 96 BU L Rev 1457, 1472 (2016) (“Oldoriginalists, such as Raoul Ber-ger and Robert Bork(at least before 1990), did not talk as I do. Theydid not discuss epistemology, concepts,communication, and the philosophy of language.They discussed such things as judges, democracy,constraint, and authority.”) (citation omitted). Notethat, in light of the importance of this temporalchange, my citations in this piece largely focus onoriginalist work published in the last decade or so.

If a method of interpretationprovided very little constraint inany sense, we might worry thatwas a clue that our method ofinterpretation was not a very

accurate picture of the meaningit was trying to capture.


By contrast, many modern originalistshave tended to de-emphasize theimportance of constraining judges, relyinginstead on other arguments – thatoriginalism is normatively desirable forother reasons,14 that it is an account ofthe true meaning of the constitutionaltext,15 or that it is required by our law.16

For instance, originalist ProfessorsJohn McGinnis and Michael Rappaportwrite that while “the argument thatoriginalism offers clearer rules toconstrain judges than other interpretiveapproaches contains some truth”, it “maynot be enough to sustain the case fororiginalism.”17 Rather, “if constraint is theoverriding objective, non-originalistdoctrine may sometimes provide moreconstrained rules than the originalmeaning.”18

Professor Gary Lawson, also anoriginalist, writes more skeptically: “Ifconstraint and certainty are the goals,originalism is a relatively poor way toachieve it compared to numerous othermethodologies.”19 Professor JohnHarrison, an originalist, concurs that heis “deeply skeptical of the capacity of anymethodology,” originalism included, “toconstrain any interpreter,” but adds that

he “do[es] not think it is very important”whether originalism constrains or not.20

Another originalist, ProfessorChristopher Green, rejects the importanceof constraint even more profoundly,arguing that originalism is not underminedeven if the original meaning is “difficult tounearth,” “enigmatic,”21 and fails “toproduce unique and indisputable answersto legal questions.”22 As Green puts it:“The purpose of my originalism, at anyrate, is simply to get the constitutionaltruthmaker right, whatever dispute thatmight engender.”23 Similarly, originalistProfessor Randy Barnett states that “thenew originalism that is widely acceptedby most originalists today is not anenterprise in constraining judges, but anenterprise in determining what the writingreally means.”24

Thus, it may seem as if the argumentthat originalism is justified because it willeliminate judicial discretion has beenrefuted by originalism’s critics andabandoned by its defenders. The mostexplicit recognition of this shift comes fromProfessor Thomas Colby, who writes thatwhile “[j]udicial constraint” was once the“heart and soul” of originalism, the theoryhas since “sold its soul to gain respect

14 See, for example, John O. McGinnis andMichael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the GoodConstitution 19–21 (Harvard 2013); Lawrence B.Solum, The Constraint Principle: Original Meaningand Constitutional Practice *58–83 (unpublishedmanuscript, Mar 24, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/KN5Y-NDC8.

15 Lawson, 96 BU L Rev at 1458–64 (cited innote 10).

16 See generally, for example, William Baude,Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 Colum L Rev 2349(2015); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theoryof Legal Change, 38 Harv J L & Pub Pol 817(2015); William Baude and Stephen E. Sachs, TheLaw of Interpretation, 130 Harv L Rev 1079 (2017);Jeffrey A. Pojanowski and Kevin C. Walsh,Enduring Originalism, 105 Georgetown L J 97(2016).

17 John O. McGinnis and Michael B.Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Original-ism,101 Nw U L Rev 383, 383 (2007).

18 Id at 384.19 Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No

Legitimacy ... No Problem: Original-ism and theLimits of Legal Theory, 64 Fla L Rev 1551, 1554(2012).

20 John Harrison, On the Hypotheses That Lieat the Foundations of Originalism, 31 Harv J L &Pub Pol 473, 473–74 (2008).

21 Christopher R. Green, ConstitutionalTruthmakers *17 (unpublished manuscript, 2017),archived at http://perma.cc/HXQ6-ST4N.

22 Id at *18, quoting Andrew Koppelman,Originalism, Abortion, and the ThirteenthAmendment, 112 Colum L Rev 1917, 1919 (2012).

23 Green, Constitutional Truthmakers at *18(cited in note 18).

24 Randy E. Barnett, The Golden Meanbetween Kurt & Dan: A Moderate Reading of theNinth Amendment, 56 Drake L Rev 897, 909(2008).


and adherents.”25 The new incarnation oforiginalism, Colby writes, has “left behindmore than just the theoretical flaws of itspredecessor. It has also effectivelysacrificed the Old Originalism’s promiseof judicial constraint. The very changesthat make the New Originalismtheoretically defensible also strip it of anypretense of a power to constrain judgesto a meaningful degree.”26 Scalia’sconstraint argument, it may seem, isdead.

But perhaps things are not so simple.One of the most important moderntheorists of originalism, ProfessorLawrence Solum, emphasizes the“Constraint Principle.”27 This is thenormative argument that original meaningought to constrain constitutional practice,for reasons derived from legitimacy andthe rule of law.28 Solum’s picture ofconstraint is nuanced, perhaps more sothan Scalia’s. He need not and does notassume that originalism eliminates alljudicial construction.29 But if originalismcould not constrain judges at all, thesenormative arguments would not work. Sothe question remains – does originalismimpose a meaningful constraint onjudges?30

II. It depends on what you mean byconstraint

It is not entirely clear what it means toask whether originalism, or anymethodology, “constrains” judicialdecision-making. It is therefore not clearwhether originalism accomplishes it, orwhether it would be a good thing if it did.So before interring the importance oforiginalism as a constraint, one shouldpause to see what that might mean.(Before going any further, though, it isworth one terminological clarification – Ifollow Professor Colby and others in using“judicial constraint” to refer to “promisingto narrow the discretion of judges” whilereserving “judicial restraint” to refer to“deference to legislative majorities.”)31

First of all, there is the questionwhether any methodology at all canconstrain decision-making, or whethermethodologies and constraint are simplyinapt, like asking whether grocery storeshelp one lose weight. There are at leasttwo reasons to think they might be soinapt. One is that methodologies are notself-applying or self-enforcing. So nomethodology is constraining in the sensethat it can leap out of the law reviews andforce judges to use it or even keep themfrom deviating from it once they havestarted.32

25 Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the NewOriginalism, 99 Georgetown L J 713, 714–15(2011). For a sample denial that originalism hassold its soul, see Stephen E. Sachs, SavingOriginalism’s Soul (Library of Law and Liberty, Dec17, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/RJ6E-CRU8(“The soul of originalism is a method, not acollection of results.”).

26 Colby, 99 Georgetown L J at 714 (cited innote 22). See also Jeremy K. Kessler and DavidE. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A LifeCycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U Chi L Rev1819, 1846–47 (2016).

27 See generally Solum, The ConstraintPrinciple (cited in note 11).

28 Id at *58–83.29 Id at *24–28. For Solum’s disagreement with

Scalia on this point, compare Scalia and Garner,Reading Law at 13–15 (cited in note 1), withLawrence B. Solum, Original-ism and

Constitutional Construction, 82 Fordham L Rev453, 483–88 (2013).

30 See Colby, 99 Georgetown L J at 751 (citedin note 22) (“New Originalists tend to argue that,although their theory does not completely eliminatejudicial subjectivity and the potential for judicialmischief, it is still meaningfully constraining, atleast in comparison to the alternatives.”).

31 Id. See also Solum, 82 Fordham L Rev at524–25 (cited in note 26); Randy J. Kozel, OriginalMeaning and the Precedent Fallback, 68 Vand LRev 105, 112 n 26 (2015).

32 See Anthony D’Amato, Can Any LegalTheory Constrain Any Judicial Decision?, 43 UMiami L Rev 513, 522–23 (1989) (“The reasontheories work is that we expect them to work. Butthe subtlety here is that we can at best expectthem to ‘work’ as theories; it is irrational for us toexpect them to work in the sense of constrainingpractice.”).


The other is that the performance ofan interpretive methodology might berelated to the materials it interprets. If theConstitution itself results in a lot of judicialdiscretion, then the methodology thattruthfully enforces the Constitution willresult in a lot of judicial discretion. But itis not clear whether that fault (if it is a fault)should be laid at the feet of themethodology or the Constitution.33

Methodologies don’t constrain, one mightsay; constitutions constrain.

But let us put these aside for amoment. Even so, there are furtherambiguities: There is a question of howforceful of a constraint a methodologyimposes. Does it impose a single rightanswer to the legal question at hand?Does it narrow down the range of rightanswers, but not necessarily to one?Does it pro-vide a process or set ofconsiderations for giving the right answer,even if different people applying themethod might legitimately come todifferent conclusions? And there is thequestion of the range of cases in whichthe constraint operates. In particular, doesit apply in all constitutional cases, or onlya subset of them?

These different axes suggest thatconstraint is not a single, scalar variable.One methodology might produce uniqueright answers in a range of cases and noguidance in another range of cases. Is itless constraining than a methodology thatproduces a limited range of right answers,but in every single case? We couldstipulate either type of constraint to begreater than the other, but ultimately thesepoints suggest that we must defineconstraint more precisely before joiningissue on how much a methodology doesit, or whether it is a good thing.

I mention all of these points as apreliminary matter to one more distinction,one that may be the most under-appreciated distinction between differenttypes of constraint: how the constraintoperates.

Consider two types of constraint:external and internal. An externalconstraint helps those who wish to judgethe judge. If the judge misapplies (orignores) the constraint, other people willbe able to tell. Perhaps they will shamehim, punish him, or even defy him. AsJudge Frank Easterbrook puts it (in thepreface to Scalia and Garner’s book):

Interpretation is a human enterprise,which cannot be carried outalgorithmically by an expert system on acomputer. But discretion can be hedgedin by rules, such as those that this bookcovers in detail, and misuse of these rulesby a crafty or willful judge then can beexposed as an abuse of power. A morelatitudinarian approach to interpretation,by contrast, makes it hard to see whenthe judge has succumbed to the Dark Sideof Tenure – which, like the Dark Side ofThe Force in Star Wars, is marked byself-indulgence.34

But that is not the only mechanism bywhich a constraint might operate. Aconstraint might also operate as aninternal constraint, one which helps thewilling judge. If the judge faithfully appliesthe constraint, it will help him to decidethe case by telling how to get to theanswer.

In principle, a constraint could operatein both respects, but some constraints willbe more effective internally thanexternally. If a legal methodology iscomplicated or turns on questions ofjudgment, it may be hard for others to

33 See Green, Constitutional Truthmakers at*17–20 (cited in note 19); Steven G. Calabresi andGary Lawson, The Rule of Law as a Law of Law,90 Notre Dame L Rev 483, 487, 504 (2014). To

be sure, others might respond that a Constitutiondoesn’t do anything until it is interpreted.

34 Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword, in Scaliaand Garner, Reading Law xxi, xxiii (cited in note 1).

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