1

RAPORTUL STIINTIFIC SI TEHNIC (în extenso)

RESPONSABILITATEA SOCIALA CORPORATIVA. STIMULAREA FIRMELOR ROMANESTI PENTRU CRESTEREA PERFORMANTELOR

DE MEDIU IN CONTEXTUL INTEGRARII ROMANIEI IN UNIUNEA EUROPEANA

Director proiect: prof. univ. dr. Ion STANCU

Contract 92120/01.10.2008

Membrii echipei de cercetare:

Prof. univ. dr. Ion STANCU

Lect. univ. dr. Robert SOVA

Prof. univ. dr. Irina PUGNA

Conf. univ. dr. Laurentiu FRATILA

CS III Anamaria SOVA

Conf. Univ. dr. Radu DESPA

Ec. Costica MANDRICELU

Ec. Violeta CIMPOERU

2

Cuprins

A. Obiectivele generale

B. Obiectivele etapei

C. Rezumatul etapei

D. Descrierea stiintifica si tehnica, cu punerea in evidenta a rezultatelor etapei

si gradul de realizare a obiectivelor; (se vor indica rezultatele)

E. Concluzii

F. Bibliografie

3

A. Obiectivele generale

Obiectivul general al acestui proiect de cercetare, desfasurat pe parcursul a

trei ani, este ca bazandu-se pe integrarea conceptelor dezvoltate in teoria

organizationala si neo-institutionala, sa se initieze unui nou cadru pentru

promovarea atat a Responsabilitati Sociale Corporative - aspectele referitoare la

protectia mediu denumita in cadrul raportului Responsabilitate Corporativa de

Mediu (RCM) cat si a Performantei Corporative de Mediu (PCM).

Indeplinirea obiectivului general se va realize prin atingerea urmatoarelor

obiective:

evaluarea comportamentului de mediu a firmelor in conditiile specifice

ale integrarii in UE, pentru a intelege mecanismele institutionale care

influenteaza semnificativ procesul de luare a deciziilor

dezvoltarea unui model conceptual a presiunii institutionale moderate

de caracteristicile firmelor pentru promovarea responsabilitatii de

mediu si a performantei de mediu.

un model econometric de analiza a factorilor care au cel mai mare

potential pentru incurajarea responsabilitatii corporative de mediu; un

instrument al modelului operational

un model econometric de analiza a factorilor cheie care motiveaza

firmele sa adopte masuri care sa aibe un impact relevant asupra

performantelor de mediu; un instrument al modelului operational

folosirea cunostintelor dobandite in proiectul de cercetare, pentru a

genera noi initiative de motivare care pot fi incorporate in politicii de

mediu

Proiectul se focalizeaza pe identificarea, analiza si initiere diferitelor politici

si motivari in domeniul protectiei mediului, si asupra rolului tuturor persoanelor

interesate autoritatilor publice, partenerii sociali, NGO, institutiile de mediu,

4

intreprinderile, institutele de cercetare, in initiative avand ca scop promovarea

responsabilitatii corporative de mediu, performanta de mediu si rolul acestora in

dezvoltarea durabila.

5

B. Obiectivele etapei 3 de executie;

Obiectivul etapei 3 de execuţie este de a analiza comportamentului corporativ

de mediu in România din perspectiva abordării Coaseiene si de a formula ipotezele

privind factorii care influenţează procesul decizional in domeniul protecţiei

mediului in vederea elaborarii cadrului conceptual de analiza.

6

C. Rezumatul etapei (maxim 2 pagini)

Adoptării responsabilităţii sociale presupune asumarea in mod voluntar de

angajamente care depăşesc cerinţele comune convenţionale şi de reglementare, pe

care ar trebui să le respecte în orice caz. In aceste conditii, companiile depun

eforturi pentru a ridica standardele de dezvoltare socială, protecţia mediului şi

respectarea drepturilor fundamentale şi sa adopte o guvernanta corporativa

deschisa, care presupune reconcilierea intereselor diverselor părţi interesate într-o

abordare globală de calitate şi durabila. Deşi se recunoaşte importanţa tuturor

aspectelor legate de responsabilitatea sociala corporativa, această cercetare se

concentrează în principal pe responsabilităţile companiilor in domeniul

protecţiei mediului

În cadrul companiei, practicile responsabile legate de mediu se referă în

principal la gestionarea resurselor naturale utilizate în producţie si la procesele

tehnologice generatoare de reziduri.

Problema referitoare la factorii care determina organizaţiile să adopte seturi

specifice ale practicilor de management este o tema centrală a teoriei

organizaţionale. Perspectiva instituţională sugerează că firmele obţin legitimitatea

prin conformarea cu practicile dominante în cadrul domeniul lor instituţional

(DiMaggio şi Powell, 1983; Scott, 1992).

Atunci când este integrata cu caracteristici cheie ale organizaţiei, teoria

instituţională poate genera noi perspective pentru a înţelege diferenţele dintre

strategiile firmelor.

Lucrările lui Coase (1937,1960) au fost punctul de plecare în elaborarea

teoriei neo-instituţională, bazată pe analiza a costurilor de tranzacţie, drepturile

de proprietate, contracte, şi organizaţii. În abordarea neo-instituţională în

domeniul protecţiei mediului se porneşte de la premisa că guvernele acţionează ca

agenţi publici, în reglementarea poluării, utilizand diferitele instrumente de care

7

dispun. Cu toate acestea, atunci când mecanismele de “reglementare formale” sunt

absente sau ineficiente, comunităţile vor căuta alte mijloacele de a-şi impune

propriile exigenţe. Lucrări ştiinţifice recente au indicat existenţa pe scară largă a

unor astfel de "reglementari informale", comunităţile fiind adesea în măsură să

negocieze sau să impună presiune asupra poluatorilor în scopul de a-şi imbunătăţii

performanţele de mediu.

In aceste conditii analiza empirica dezvoltata in cadrul acestei etape a

proiectului a avut menirea de a verifica pentru Romania, intr-o abordare holistica,

“care sunt factorii cheie care determina companii să-şi asume responsabilitatea lor

socială?” si “Care sunt aşteptările generate de un astfel de angajament?”

Pentru aceasta am realizat pentru prima data o analiza empirica pornind de la

un model de analiza calitativa.

S-au realizat 5 studii, toate bazadu-se pe date individuale la nivel de firma

furnizate de Institutul National de Statistica referitoare la investiile si cheltuielile

legate de protectia mediului.

Rezultatele sustin caracterul stimulativ al subventiilor Pigouviene asupra

comportamentului intreprinzatorului in sensul determinarii luarii deciziei de a

realiza investitii in protejarea mediului, dar releva faptul ca sistemul de taxe

Pigouviene nu are o influenta stabila asupra comportamentului responsabil fata de

mediu. Acest fapt implica realizarea unei analize calitative asupra acestui sistem

pentru a identifica punctele sale slabe, activitate ce se va desfasura in etapele

viitoare ale proiectului. De asemenea rezultatele releva faptul ca reglementarile

informale, cu exceptia presiunilor institutionale venite din piata, nu au o influenta

semnificativa asupra comportamentului responsabil fata de mediu. Referitor la

efectele asumarii responsabilitatii sociale corporative, de catre firmele romanesti,

studiul a reliefat ca ipoteza win-win nu se confirma in cazul Romaniei.

8

D. Descrierea stiintifica si tehnica, cu punerea in evidenta a rezultatelor etapei si gradul de realizare a obiectivelor; (se vor indica rezultatele)

1. Responsabilitatea corporativa sociala, o abordare holistică

Astăzi un număr tot mai mare de companii europene isi promovează

strategiile lor de responsabilitate socială corporative ca un răspuns la varietatea de

presiuni legate de aspectele sociale, de mediu şi economice. Scopul lor este de a da

un semnal de preocupare diferitele părţile interesate cu care interactionează:

angajaţi, acţionari, investitori, consumatori, autorităţile publice şi organizaţiile

non-guvernamentale (ONG-uri). Procedând astfel, companiile investesc în viitorul

lor şi se aşteaptă ca angajamentele voluntare pe care le adoptă vor contribui la

creşterea profitabilităţii lor.

Încă din 1993, s-a lansat apelul către mediul de afaceri european de a se

implica in lupta împotriva excluziunii sociale. Mai târziu, in martie 2000, Consiliul

European de la Lisabona a făcut un nou apel către mediul de afaceri european de a

promova simţul responsabilităţii sociale în ceea ce priveşte cele mai bune practici

pentru învăţarea pe tot parcursul vieţii, organizarea muncii, egalitatea de şanse,

incluziunea socială şi dezvoltarea durabilă.

Prin declararea de către mediul de afaceri a adoptării responsabilităţii sociale

care presupune asumarea in mod voluntar de angajamente care depăşesc cerinţele

comune convenţionale şi de reglementare, pe care ar trebui să le respecte în orice

caz, companiile depun eforturi pentru a ridica standardele de dezvoltare socială,

protecţia mediului şi respectarea drepturilor fundamentale şi sa adopte o

guvernanta corporativa deschisa, care presupune reconcilierea intereselor

diverselor părţi interesate într-o abordare globală de calitate şi durabila. Deşi se

recunoaşte importanţa tuturor acestor aspecte, această cercetare se concentrează în

principal pe responsabilităţile companiilor in domeniul protecţiei mediului.

9

Conceptul de responsabilitate socială corporativă este adoptat în principal de

marile companii, chiar dacă practicile responsabilitatii corporative sociale există în

toate tipurile de întreprinderi, publice şi private, inclusiv întreprinderile mici şi

mijlocii (IMM-uri) şi cooperative.

La nivelul Uniunii Europeane se acorda o atentie sporita responsabilitatii

sociale corporative, deoarece se considera ca aceasta poate aduce o contribuţie

semnificativa la atingerea obiectivului strategic de la Lisabona si anume: "Europa

să devină economia cea mai competitivă şi dinamică bazată pe cunoaştere din

lume, capabilă de o creştere economică durabilă, cu locuri de muncă mai multe şi

mai bune şi o mai mare coeziune socială".

Mai mulţi factori au determinat dezvoltarea conceptului de responsabilitate

socială a întreprinderilor:

noile preocupări şi aşteptările ale cetăţenilor, consumatorilor,

autorităţilor publice şi investitorilor, în contextul globalizării

criteriile sociale si de mediu influenţează din ce în ce mai mult deciziile

de investiţii ale indivizilor şi instituţiilor, atât în calitate de consumatori

şi în calitate de investitori;

preocuparea din ce in ce mai crescuta cu privire la daunele cauzate de

activitatea economică asupra calitatii mediului;

transparenţa activităţilor de afaceri datorate mass-mediei şi

tehnologiilor moderne informaţionale şi de comunicare.

Pe măsură ce companiile se confruntă cu noi provocări datorate unui mediu în

continua schimbare, în contextul globalizării şi, în special pe piaţa internă

europeana, acestea sunt din ce în ce mai conştiente de faptul că responsabilitatea

socială corporativă poate aduce valoare economică directă.

Deşi prima responsabilitate a unei companii este generarea de profituri,

companiile pot si trebuie ca în acelaşi timp sa contribuie activ la realizarea

10

obiectivele sociale şi de mediu ale societăţii in general, prin integrarea

responsabilităţii sociale în strategia lor de afaceri, in instrumentele lor de

management si in operaţiunile desfăşurate.

În cazul în care responsabilitatea socială corporatistă este un proces prin care

companiile administrează relaţiile lor cu o varietate de părţi interesate care pot avea

o influenţă reală asupra funcţionarii acestora, aceasta ar trebui să fie tratată ca o

investiţie, nu ca un cost, la fel ca managementul calităţii. Astfel ele pot avea o

abordare inclusivă a aspectelor financiare, comerciale, de mediu şi sociale,

conducând la o strategie pe termen lung, care sa duca la reducerea riscurilor legate

de incertitudine.

Totuşi, responsabilitatea socială corporatistă nu ar trebui să fie văzută ca un

substitut la reglementările sau legislaţia referitoare la drepturile sociale sau

standardele de mediu.

În cadrul companiei, practicile responsabile social implică în primul rând

angajaţi şi se referă la aspecte cum ar fi investiţiile în capitalul uman, sănătate şi

siguranţă, şi gestionarea schimbării, în timp ce practicile responsabile legate de

mediu se referă în principal la gestionarea resurselor naturale utilizate în producţie

si la procesele tehnologice generatoare de reziduri. Aceste practici au deschis o

noua cale de a gestiona schimbările şi de a reconcilia dezvoltarea sociala cu

îmbunătăţirea competitivităţii.

CSR – dimensiunea intrenă

În general, reducerea consumului de resurse sau reducerea emisiilor poluante

şi a deşeurilor poate reduce impactul asupra mediului. Acesta poate fi, de

asemenea, utile afacerilor prin reducerea facturilor de energie şi de eliminare a

deşeurilor şi scăderea de costurilor de intrare (consum mai mic de resurse naturale)

şi de-poluare. Companiile au constatat că utilizarea tehnologiilor verzi conduce la

11

un consum mai mic de resurse care are efecte pozitive asupra creşterii rentabilităţii

şi a competitivităţii.

În domeniul mediului, aceste investiţii de mediu sunt în mod normal asociate

oportunităţilor de tip "win-win" - bune pentru afaceri şi bune pentru mediul

înconjurător. Acest principiu a fost enunţat de Porter in anii 90 fiind recunoscut si

în cel mai recent program de acţiune de mediu al Comisiei Europene. Acesta

explică modul în care Uniunea Europeană şi guvernele statelor membre îşi pot

îndeplini rolul lor de a ajuta mediul de afaceri pentru a identifica oportunităţile de

piaţă şi să întreprindă investiţii "win-win". Acesta a stabilit o serie de alte măsuri

care vizează mediul de afaceri: stabilirea unui program de asistenţă pentru

conformitate pentru a ajuta companiile să înţeleagă cerinţele comunitare de mediu;

dezvoltare armonizata la nivel naţional a unui sistem de recompensa a performanţei

de mediu corporative care să identifice şi să recompenseze companiile cu

performante in protecţia mediului şi care sa încurajeze angajamentele şi acordurile

voluntare.

La nivel european, un bun exemplu de o abordare care permite autorităţilor

publice să conlucreze cu mediul de afaceri este „Integrated Product Policy” (IPP).

IPP se bazează pe luarea în considerare a impactului produselor pe parcursul

ciclului lor de viaţă, şi implică companiile şi alte părţi interesate în dialogul să

găsească abordarea cea mai rentabilă. În domeniul mediului, aceasta poate fi, prin

urmare, văzută ca un cadru puternic pentru promovarea responsabilităţii sociale

corporative. O altă abordare care facilitează responsabilitatea socială corporatistă

este schema Comunităţii referitoare la Eco-Management si Audit (EMAS) si

sitemul de certificare ISO 19000. Acest lucru încurajează companiile să înfiinţeze

voluntar la nivelul companiei a unui sistem de management şi audit de mediu care

să promoveze îmbunătăţirea continuă a performanţelor de mediu. Declaraţia de

mediu este publica şi este validată de către verificatori de mediu atestaţi.

12

CSR – dimensiunea externa

Responsabilitatea socială corporativă se extinde dincolo de porţile companiei

în comunitatea locală şi implică în plus faţă de angajaţi şi acţionari, o gamă largă

de părţi interesate: partenerii de afaceri si furnizori, clienţi, autorităţi publice şi

ONG-urile care reprezintă comunităţile locale, precum şi cele care militeaza pentru

protecţia mediului. Într-o lume a investiţiilor multinaţionale şi a lanţurile globale

de aprovizionare, responsabilitatea socială a întreprinderilor trebuie să se extindă,

de asemenea, dincolo de frontierele statelor. Globalizarea rapidă a încurajat

dezbaterile cu privire la rolul şi dezvoltarea guvernantei globale: dezvoltarea

practicilor de RSC poate fi privită ca o contribuţie la acest deziderat.

Comunităţile locale

Responsabilitatea socială corporatistă, influenţează de asemenea, integrarea

companiilor în comunitatea locala. Pe de o parte companiile ajuta comunităţile

locale, prin oferirea de locuri de muncă, salarii şi beneficii, şi venituri fiscale. Pe

de altă parte, companiile depind de sănătate, stabilitatea şi prosperitatea

comunităţilor în care îşi desfăşoară activitatea. Acestea recrutează majoritatea

angajaţilor lor de pe pieţele forţei de muncă locale, şi prin urmare, au un interes

direct în disponibilitatea locală a competenţelor de care au nevoie. În plus, IMM-

urile adesea, au clienti stabiliti în zona in care sunt instalate. Astfel, reputaţia unei

întreprinderi în regiunea sa, imaginea sa ca angajator şi producător, cu siguranţă

influenţează competitivitatea.

Companiile de asemenea, interacţioneaza la nivel local cu mediul

inconjurator. Unele se bazează in activitatea lor pe un mediu curat necesar

proceselor de producţie – aer curat, apă curată etc. De asemenea, poate exista o

relaţie între calitatea mediul incojurator şi capacitatea companiilor de a atrage

13

lucrătorilor la regiunea în care se află instalate. Pe de altă parte insa, companiile

pot fi responsabile pentru o serie de activităţi poluante: zgomot, lumina, poluarea

apei, emisiile în aer, contaminarea solului, precum şi problemele de mediu asociate

cu transportul şi eliminarea deşeurilor.

Multe companii se implica în problemele comunitatii in care dezvolta

afacerile. Dezvoltarea de relaţii pozitive cu comunitatea locală şi astfel, acumularea

de capital social este mult mai relevanta in cazul companiilor străine. Companiile

multinaţionale utilizează tot mai mult aceste relaţii pentru a sprijini integrarea

filialelor lor în diferite pieţe în care acestea sunt prezente.

Partenerii de afaceri, furnizori şi consumatori

Prin colaborarea strânsa cu partenerii de afaceri, companiile pot reduce

complexitatea activitatilor şi a costurilor şi pot asigura creşterea calităţii. Selecţia

furnizorilor nu este întotdeauna bazata exclusiv pe oferte competitive financiar. Pe

termen lung, cimentarea unor relaţii de parteneriat poate avea ca rezultat preţuri

echitabile, termenii şi aşteptări legate de calitate, împreună cu

şi termene de livrare fiabile. În adoptarea practicilor responsabile social şi faţă de

mediu, companiile trebuie să respecte si normele relevante ale UE şi ale legislaţiei

naţionale legate de concurenţă.

Marile companii sunt in acelaşi timp partenerii companiilor mai mici, in

calitate de clienţi, furnizori, subcontractori sau competitori. Companiile ar trebui să

fie conştiente de faptul că performanţele lor sociale pot fi afectate de practicile

partenerilor şi furnizorilor lor de-a lungul întregului lanţ de aprovizionare. Efectul

activităţilor de responsabilitate sociala corporativa nu va rămâne limitat la

compania în sine, dar va influenta, de asemenea, partenerii lor de afaceri. Acest

lucru apare în special în cazul companiilor mari, care au externalizat o parte a

producţie sau servicii lor şi, prin urmare, poate dobândi responsabilităţii sociale

corporative suplimentare, legate de acesti furnizorii şi personalul lor, ţinând cont

14

de faptul că, uneori, bunăstarea economică a acestor furnizori depinde în principal

sau totalitate de o singură companie mare.

De asemenea companiile mari demonstrează responsabilitate socială

corporativă, si prin promovarea iniţiativelor antreprenoriale în regiunea in care

activeaza. Exemple de astfel de practici includ sisteme de mentorat oferite de

companiile mari start-up-urilor şi IMM-urilor locale, sau de asistenţă pentru

firmele mai mici privind raportarea şi comunicarea activităţilor lor de

responsabilitate socială corporativa.

O alta maniera de manifestare a responsabilitatii sociale corporative se refera

la faptul ca firmele mari pot facilita dezvoltarea de noi întreprinderi inovatoare.

Astfel aceste companii pot achizitiona un pachet minoritar de acţiuni dintr-un start-

up promiţător şi sa sprijine dezvoltarea sa. Aceasta oferă avantaje diferite ambilor

parteneri, incluzând o mai bună implicare in dezvoltarea inovatoare pentru

companiile mari şi acces mai uşor la resurse financiare şi pe piaţa pentru firmele

mici.

Ca parte a responsabilităţii lor sociale, companiile sunt de aşteptat să

furnizeze produse şi servicii de care consumatorii au nevoie şi pe care le doresc,

într-un mod eficient, etic şi ecologic. Companiile, care construiesc relaţii de durată

cu clienţii prin focalizarea asupra înţelegerii a ceea ce clienţii au nevoie şi doresc.

Astfel companiile pot răspunde acestor cerinţe prin oferirea de produse si servicii

de o calitate superioara, mult mai sigure si fiabile ceea ce implica o creştere a

profitabilităţii. De asemenea companiile trebuie sa dezvolte produse si servicii care

sa fie utilizabile de cat mai multe persoane posibil, inclusiv consumatorii cu

handicap, aceasta fiind un alt exemplu important de responsabilitate socială.

Probleme globale de mediu

Prin efectul transfrontalier al problemelor de mediu legate de afaceri si de

consumul resurselor naturale, companiile sunt de asemenea actori implicati în

15

problematica globala legata de mediul. Astfel ele pot încuraja o mai bună

performanţă de mediu la nivel global prin intermediul lanţului de aprovizionare.

Dezbaterea cu privire la rolul mediului de afaceri în realizarea dezvoltării durabile

a devenit tot mai intensa si mai importantă pe scena mondială. Secretarul General

ONU a lansat o iniţiativă denumita "Global Compact", care urmăreşte să facă din

mediul de afaceri un partener în realizarea îmbunătăţirii performantelor sociale şi

de mediu la nivel global. Linii directoare pentru întreprinderile multinaţionale

lansat de OCDE, contribuie de asemenea la promovarea dezvoltării durabile.

O abordare holistica privind promovarea CSR

În timp ce companiile constientizeaza din ce în ce mai mult responsabilitatea

lor socială, multe dintre ele nu au adoptat practici de management care se reflecta

aceasta. Deaorece acestea trebuie să integreze aceste practici în managementul

operational implicand totodata si lanţul lor de aprovizionare, angajaţii companiilor

şi managerii acestora au nevoie de instruire în scopul de a dobândi aptitudinile şi

competenţa necesare. Unele companii au ales ca solutie pentru integrarea

practicilor social responsabile, diseminarea de bune practici.

În timp ce decizia de a implementa responsabilitatea socială corporativă

apartine doar companiilor însele, părţile interesate, în special angajaţii,

consumatorii şi investitorii, pot juca un rol decisiv, în interes propriu sau în numele

altor părţi interesate în domenii cum ar fi condiţiile de muncă, mediul sau alte

drepturi, în determinarea companiilor să adopte practici responsabile social. Astfel

ei pot solicita si chiar impune prin diverse mecanisme nevoie de transparenţă

efectivă cu privire la performanţa sociala şi de mediu a companiilor.

Management integrat privind Responsabilitatea socială

Modul in care companiile abordeaza responsabilităţile acestora şi relaţiile cu

părţile interesate variază în funcţie de diferenţele sectoriale şi culturale. La

începutul companiile tind să adopte o declaraţie de misiune, cod de conduită, sau

16

Credo-ul prin care isi exprima scopul lor, valorile de bază, şi responsabilităţile faţă

de părţile interesate. Aceste valori trebuie apoi să fie traduse în acţiuni în cadrul

organizaţiei, de la strategii la deciziile de zi cu zi. Acest lucru implică practici, cum

ar fi adăugarea unei dimensiuni social sau de mediu în planurile şi bugetele

elaborate şi evaluarea performanţelor corporative în aceste domenii, crearea de

"comitete consultative ale comunitatii", care efectuează audituri sociale sau de

mediu şi înfiinţarea de programe de educatie continua

Atat timp cat problemele legate de responsabilitate socială corporativă au

devenit o parte integrantă a planificării strategice corporative şi a performanţelor

operaţionale, managerii şi angajaţii au obligaţia de a lua decizii legate de afaceri

bazate pe criterii suplimentare faţă de cele care au fost instruiţi în mod tradiţional.

Modelele tradiţionale de comportament organizational, management strategic şi

chiar etica în afaceri nu dau întotdeauna suficientă pregătire pentru gestionarea

companiilor în acest nou mediu.

Raportarea şi de auditarea Responsabilitatii sociale

Multe companii multinaţionale elaboreaza si publica rapoarte referitoare la

responsabilitate socială a companiei. Însa se constata ca abordările companiilor

referitoare la raportarea peformantelor sociale si de mediu sunt la fel de variate ca

abordările lor referitoare la responsabilitatea corporativa socială. Pentru ca aceste

rapoarte să fie utile, trebuie realizat un consens global referitor la tipul de

informaţii care urmează să fie publicate, la formatul de raportare şi la fiabilitatea

procedurii de evaluare şi de audit. Puţini dintre ei oferă detalii suficiente cu privire

la politicile lor şi performanţele legate de managementul resurselor umane şi

managementul mediului, cum ar fi recunoaşterea şi negociere, consultare şi

formarea personalului etc.

Astazi se constata din ce în ce mai multe iniţiative publice pentru sprijinirea

dezvoltării de raportare socială şi de mediu.

17

In acest sens, mai multe organizaţii au elaborat standarde pentru

contabilitatea, raportarea şi auditarea sociala si de mediu. Aceste standarde

urmăresc abordări variate de la standarde de procese pana la cele de performanţă,

de la standarde voluntare pana la cele obligatorii, de la o singură ediţie la standarde

pana la mai multe ediţii, şi doar un număr restrâns acoperă întregul spectru de

probleme de responsabilitate socială corporativă.

Iniţiativele majore internaţionale s-au axate pe globalizarea standardelor

sociale, transparenta publică a informaţiilor şi dezvoltarea de rapoarte sociale si de

mediu. In acest sens putem aminti Global Reporting Initiative. In ciuda acestor

iniţiative trebuie precizat ca având in vedere complexitatea creării unor standarde

globale aplicabile oricărei culturi şi ţari a creat o mulţime de controverse.

Referitor la componenta de mediu, Global Reporting Initiative este în prezent

văzută ca cele mai bune practici. Orientările prevăzute in Global Reporting

Initiative referitoarea la raportarea rezultatelor legate de dezvoltarea durabila a

companiilor permit astăzi o inter-comparabilitate. Global Reporting Initiative

include, de asemenea, orientări ambiţioasă de raportare socială.

Comunicarea Comisiei privind strategia de dezvoltare durabilă a recomandat

ca "Toate societăţile public-cotate cu cel puţin 500 de angajaţi sunt invitate să

publice în rapoartele lor anuale catre acţionari performanţele lor pe baza celor trei

criterii respectiv economice, sociale şi de mediu".

În plus, apare necesitatea de a oferi companiilor, şi în special IMM-urile,

orientări şi instrumente care să le permită să raporteze politicile, procesele şi

performanţa cu privire la responsabilitate socială corporativă în mod eficient. In

acest sens companiile mari trebuie sa ofere suportul necesar IMM-urilor, aceasta

atitutdine fiind una de tip castigator-castigator deoarece IMM-urile pot imbunatatii

performantele lor in domeniul responsabilitatii sociale, iar in calitatea lor de

18

participanti la lantul de aprovizionare a marilor companii contribuie la cresterea

performantelor acestora in acest domeniu.

Un alt aspect care trebuie mentionat se refera la credibilitatea informatiilor

publicate in raportarile companiilor legate de responsabilitatea corporativa sociala.

In acest sens verificarea de către terţe părţi independente a informaţiilor publicate

în rapoartele de responsabilitate socială este necesara pentru a evita criticile care

afirma că de fapt rapoartele sunt sisteme de relaţii publice fără substanţă. Într-

adevăr, astfel de servicii încep deja să fie oferite de o varietate de companii, care

desfasoara misiuni de certificare pe baza de standarde agreeate. Implicarea părţilor

interesate, inclusiv sindicate şi ONG-urile, ar putea îmbunătăţi calitatea de

verificare.

Etichetele eco si sociale

Sondaje au demonstrat că, consumatorii nu doresc numai produse de calitate

şi sigure, ci sunt interesati si daca acestea au fost produse într-o manieră social

responsabilă. Pentru majoritatea consumatorilor europeni angajamentul companiei

de a fi responsabililă social este important atunci când cumpără un produs sau

serviciu. Acest lucru creează oportunităţi interesante de piaţă, pentru ca un număr

semnificativ de consumatori spun ca ar fi foarte dispusi sa plateasca mai mult

pentru astfel de produse, deşi în prezent doar o minoritate procedeaza in aceasta

maniera.

Etichetele eco si sociale implică o garanţie că produsul sau serviciului a fost

aplicandus-e practicile specifice responsabilitatii sociale corporative. Spre

deosebire de etichetele referitoare la conţinutul si siguranta produselor, respectarea

practicilor responsabile social nu pot fi verificate prin testarea produsului în sine.

Pentru a fi credibile, aplicarea etichetelor sociale şi ecologice, presupune verificare

permanentă a locului de muncă si a proceselor de productie care se face pe baza

unor standarde convenite. O buna practica o constituie eticheta ecologică

19

europeană, care atesta performanţa de mediu pentru anumite produse. Numărul de

companii cu produse cu etichetă ecologică este în creştere rapidă.

Însa, numărul tot mai mare de sisteme de etichete sociale în Europa poate fi

dăunătoare pentru eficacitatea lor deoarece pot apărea confuzii în rândul

consumatorilor, datorate diversitatea de criteriile utilizate, care uneori intra chiar in

conflict, şi lipsa de claritate de sens a diferitelor etichete.

Investiţii Responsabile social si ecologic

În ultimii ani, investiţiile responsabile social au înregistrat o creştere puternică

în popularitate în rândul investitorilor. Politicile responsabile social şi ecologic

oferă investitorilor un bun indicator al bunei gestiuni interne şi externe. Ele

contribuie la minimizarea riscurilor, prin anticiparea şi prevenirea crizelor care pot

afecta reputaţia şi cauza diminuari dramatice ale preţurilor acţiunilor. Avand in

vedere cresterea tot mai accentuata de fonduri pentru investitii responsabile social

venita din partea companiilor, firmele de investiţii răspund prin alocarea de resurse

financiare in aceste companii.

Fondurile de investitii responsabile social investesc în companii care respectă

criteriile specifice sociale şi de mediu. Aceste companii trebuie sa manifeste o

atitidine proactiva privind aspectele sociale si de mediu. O altă opţiune importantă

pentru investitori este să se angajeze în mod activ in calitate de acţionari pentru a

induce in managementul companiei adoptarea de practici responsabile social.

Activismul acţionarilor este de aşteptat să crească odata cu importanţa problemelor

de guvernare corporativă cu care se confrunta companiile.

Investiţiile responsabile social constituie o piata emergenta cu multe agenţii

de monitorizare specializate (analişti nefinanciare), utilizând diferite instrumente si

metrici. Ca o consecinţă, companiile devin supraîncărcate cu cererile excesivă şi

divergente de informaţii. Datorita acestei situatii, o extindere viitoare a investiţiilor

responsabile social poate întâlni o aversiune tot mai mare şi lipsa de cooperare din

20

parte companiilor. O soluţie a acestei probleme poate veni din partea agenţiilor de

monitorizare importante care împreuna depun eforturi in direcţia standardizării

preliminare a raportării sociale. Există, totuşi, o nevoie de mai multă convergenţă

între indicatorii dezvoltaţi de către companii şi criteriile utilizate de analişti pentru

a evalua performanţa sociala şi de mediu unei companii. In plus, lipsa de

transparenţă în metodele de evaluare folosite de agenţiile de monitorizare poate de

asemenea împiedica, mari investitori sa realizeze investiţii social responsabile

semnificativ. Există, prin urmare, o nevoie suplimentară de standardizare,

armonizarea şi transparenţa în instrumentele şi metricile de monitorizare folosite

de agenţiile de monitorizare.

In cadrul proiectului autorităţile publice de la toate nivelurile, IMM-uri

precum si întreprinderile multinaţionale, parteneri sociali, ONG-urile si alte parti

interesate sunt invitate să-şi exprime opiniile cu privire la modul in care se poate

construi un parteneriat pentru dezvoltarea unei nou cadru de lucru pentru

promovarea responsabilităţii sociale a întreprinderilor, ţinând cont atât de

interesele mediului de afaceri cat şi a părţilor interesate. Întreprinderile trebuie să

lucreze împreună cu autorităţile publice pentru a găsi modalităţi inovatoare de

dezvoltare a responsabilităţii sociale corporative. Un astfel de parteneriat ar putea

avea o contribuţie semnificativă la realizarea obiectivului de a promova un model

de responsabilitate socială corporativă bazat pe valorile europene.

Propunerile referitoare la dezvoltarea noului cadru de lucru trebuie să se

bazeze pe caracterul voluntar al responsabilitatii sociale corporative şi să identifice

modul în care aceasta poate contribui la realizarea dezvoltării durabile şi la un mod

mai eficient de guvernare. Nivelul şi conţinutul unui astfel de cadru va fi clarificat

prin discuţii în timpul perioadei de consultare in activitatile viitoare ale proiectului.

Agenda discutiilor se va concentra pe urmatoarele directii:

21

Care sunt factorii cheie care determina companii să-şi asume responsabilitatea

lor socială?

Care sunt aşteptările generate de un astfel de angajament?

Pe care zone trebuie sa se focalizeze aceste angajamente?

Care este beneficiul pentru companii?

22

2. Teoria externalitătilor in abordarea Coasiana

În cartea sa “The Economics of Welfare” A. Pigou a dezvoltat conceptul de

externalitate, definit prin costurile impuse sau avantajele conferite altor agenţi

care nu au fost luaţi în considerare de către persoana care efectează acţiunea.

Tradiţia Pigouviană, criticată de Coase, este una în care există o parte

identificabilă, care generează un efect extern, si o altă parte identificabilă care este

afectată de efectul extern, oferind raţiunea pentru o intervenţie publică ca răspuns

la această externalitate negativa. In fapt, exista multe situaţii în care preţurile nu

ţine cont de efectele dăunătoare asupra mediului şi astfel preţul nu reflectă pe

deplin costurile de producţie a societăţii. Pentru a corecta această situaţie este în

mod evident necesar să se internalizeze externalităţile negative. Contribuţia lui

Pigou constă în faptul că el a propus internalizarea acestor efecte printr-o

intervenţie de natura economica, cum ar fi impunerea unei taxe de poluare a cărei

rata (în mod ideal) este egală cu costul marginal extern al poluării. O taxa

Pigouviana este o taxa perceputa pentru a corecta externalităţile negative ale unei

activităţi din piaţă si pentru a egala . Pornind de la aceasta abordare, politica de

mediu comunitară a introdus principiul "poluatorul plăteşte", care este menţionat

în Article174, alineatul 2, din Tratatul UE, şi care presupune ca toate costurile

pentru combaterea poluării şi a factorilor nocivi, în primul rând, să cadă în sarcina

poluatorului, respectiv, industriei poluante.

Mai mult decât atât, tradiţia Pigouviană se bazează pe presupunerea, oarecum

problematică, că regulatorul este capabil să discearnă forma şi nivelul de taxare

corect care are ca rol doar compensarea externalităţilor negative. Dacă autoritatea

de reglementare se înşeală cu privire la structura sau la nivelul costurilor sociale,

atunci ajustarea pieţei prin taxele Pigouviene este compromisă inducând ineficienţa

acestora. În ultimii ani, datorită problemelor din ce în ce mai grave generate de

23

poluare şi încălzirea globală, s-a constatat o revigorare a interesului pentru taxele

Pigouviene

Abordarea Pigouviană a fost unanim acceptată până în 1960, când Ronald

Coase a demonstrat că taxele şi subvenţiile nu sunt necesare în cazul în care

persoanele afectate de externalităţi şi persoanele care le generează pot cu uşurinţă

comunica şi negocia. Cu toate acestea, cei mai mulţi economişti încă pledează

pentru taxele Pigouviene ca fiind mult mai eficiente pentru reducerea poluării decât

standardele impuse de guvern.

În contrast fată de abordarea Pigouviană, cea Coasiană presupune că :

externalitatea este reciprocă, adică, atât poluatorul şi cât şi poluatul sunt

cauza aparitiei externalittilor;

normele juridice şi instituţiile ar trebui să se schimbe pentru a eficientiza

internalizarea externalităţilor;

factorii de decizie politică ar trebui să se concentreze asupra dinamicii

problemei de eliminare a externalităţiilor.

Prin încorporarea acestor aspecte în analiză, abordarea Coasiană poate ajunge

la politica optimală.

In ţările dezvoltate, ne aşteptăm ca presiunea politică şi socială cu privire la

reducerea poluării sa fie comunicată prin intermediul instituţiilor formale ale

statului şi a agenţiilor de reglementare. Însă, în ţările în curs de dezvoltare

reglementarea directă este destul de slabă, iar în aceste condiţii eforturile de

reducere a poluării în acestea ar putea avea elemente Coasiane semnificative

(reglementarea informală).

Lucrările lui Coase (1937,1960), au fost punctul de plecare în elaborarea

teoriei neo-instituţională, bazată pe analiza a costurilor de tranzacţie, drepturile

de proprietate, contracte, şi organizaţii. În abordarea neo-instituţională în

domeniul protecţiei mediului se porneşte de la premisa că guvernele acţionează ca

24

agenţi publici, în reglementarea poluării, utilizand diferitele instrumente de care

dispun. Cu toate acestea, atunci când mecanismele de reglementare formale sunt

absente sau ineficiente, comunităţile vor căuta alte mijloacele de a-şi impune

propriile exigenţe. Lucrări ştiinţifice recente au indicat existenţa pe scară largă a

unor astfel de "reglementari informale", comunităţile fiind adesea în măsură să

negocieze sau să impună presiune asupra poluatorilor în scopul de a-şi imbunătăţii

performanţele de mediu.

Mecanismele formale de reglementare includ cele două categorii de

instrumente şi anume : instrumentele de control şi comandă şi instrumentele de

piaţă. Reglementarea informală poate de asemenea, să ia mai multe forme,

respectiv cererile de despăgubire emise de către grupuri membre ale comunităţii;

manifestări de stradă; boicotarea firmei şi a produselor etc.

Există în mod clar o relaţie între conceptul de reglementare informala si

abordarea Coasiana a economiei de mediu. Ambele iau în considerare procesul

prin care externalităţilor sunt internalizate în absenţa agenţilor de reglementare şi

recunosc că externalitate poate fi reciproca atât poluatorul cat şi poluatul genereaza

externalitatea.

Cu toate acestea, soluţia tradiţională Coasian rămâne dependentă de un mediu

legal şi instituţional bine definit, chiar si atunci când agenţii de reglementare sunt

absenti. Rezultatele eficiente necesită existenta unui set de conditii cum ar fi

informaţii corecte despre problemele de poluare, delimitarea clară a drepturilor

de proprietate legate de mediu, şi instanţe care sunt capabile şi dispuse să pună în

aplicare acordurile legale.

Nu se pune la îndoială relevanţa acestor condiţii, în multe cazuri, dar punctul

nostru de vedere referitor la regulamentarea informala extinde interpretarea

Coasian în două moduri. În primul rând, presiunea comunităţii afectează în mod

clar comportamentul poluatorilor, chiar şi în cazul în care există puţine informaţii

25

corecte, nu exista niciun acord explicit cu privire la drepturile de proprietate de

mediu, şi nu exista niciun sistem judiciar capabil să se pronunţe pe aceste

probleme.

În al doilea rând, cercetarea noastră şi alte studii au sugerat că distincţia

conceptuală dintre aranjamentele Coasiene şi reglementarea tradiţională este

adesea neclară în practică. Autorităţile de reglementare trebuie să se confrunte cu

comportamentul strategic de poluatorilor şi sa renegocieze frecvent graficiele de

conformare şi sancţiunile. Presiune comunitatii poate afecta în mod semnificativ

aceste interacţiuni, creand de facto regulementari informale chiar şi în ţările în care

informaţiile sunt suficiente, reglementările oficiale sunt clar definite, şi sistemul

judiciar functioneaza eficient.

În cazul în care costul de negociere şi de obtinere a unei solutii reciproc

avantajoase este scăzut, teoria este aplicabila, controale instituţionale nefiind

necesare (Coase, 1960; Stigler, 1989). Cei care au dorinţa de a proteja mediul pot

negocia direct cu cei care il pun in pericol.

În cazul în care costul de negociere şi de obtinere a unei solutii reciproc

avantajoase este ridicat, solutia poate fi crearea unei singure structuri (firma) care

ar putea să preia controlul atât a resurselor cat şi a poluatorului potenţial pentru a

facilita un rezultat mai bun (Coase, 1937; 1960).

Când nici negocierea si nici firma de control ne sunt fezabile, atunci

guvernele pot oferi soluţii de reglementare la problemele de mediu. Cu toate

acestea, pentru multe dintre problemele de mediu, guvernele nu dispun de voinţa

sau autoritatea de a elabora o soluţie de reglementare. Poluare este un fenomen

care nu se opreşte la graniţele in care a autoritate de reglementare are jurisdicţie, o

mare parte a planetei noastre se află în afara apelor teritoriale ale oricărui popor, şi

atmosfera pământului este un bun comun tuturor. In ciuda faptului ca astăzi ne

confruntam cu o multitudine de problemele de mediu, trans-frontaliere şi globale,

26

existenta unor convenţii internaţionale care sa impună reguli stricte sunt mai

degrabă excepţia decât regula.

27

3. Abordarea Pigouviana vs. abordarea Coaesiana

Elaborarea politicilor de mediu este fundamentata pe doua teorii si anume

teoria Pigouviana si cea Coasiana.

Abordarea Pigouviana plaseaza responsabilitatea pentru externalitati exclusiv

pe generator (poluatorul) si ii impune acestuia o taxa in conformitate cu

prevederile legale. Determinarea nivelului optim al acesteia se bazeaza pe un set de

presupuneri de natura neoclasica. Cel mai important, lucru de retinut in abordarea

Pigouviana este ca aceasta nu considera externalitatile de natura reciproca si nici

nu analizeaza comportamentul de reducere a poluarii induse de fiscalitatea

Pigouviana

În contrast, abordare Coasiana presupune că externalitatea este reciproca

adica, atât poluatorul şi poluatul genereaza externalitatea, că normele juridice şi

instituţiile ar trebui să se schimba pentru a eficientiza internalizarea externalitatilor

si ca factorii de decizie politică ar trebui să se concentreze asupra dinamicii

problemei de eliminare a externalitatilor. Prin încorporarea acestor aspecte in

analiză, abordarea Coasiana poate ajunge la politica optima.

Avand in vedere faptul ca in tarile in dezvoltare, cazul Romaniei,

reglementarea directa este destul de slaba, atat din punct de vedere legal cat si

institutional, este de asteptat ca pentru elaborarea politicilor de mediu sa apeleze la

abordarea Coasiana care presupune aplicarea teoriei neo-instituţionala.

28

4. Formularea ipotezelor referitoare la factorii care determina companiile sa adopte un comportament responsabil fata de mediu

Adoptării responsabilităţii sociale presupune asumarea in mod voluntar de

angajamente care depăşesc cerinţele comune convenţionale şi de reglementare, pe

care ar trebui să le respecte în orice caz. In aceste conditii, companiile depun

eforturi pentru a ridica standardele de dezvoltare socială, protecţia mediului şi

respectarea drepturilor fundamentale şi sa adopte o guvernanta corporativa

deschisa, care presupune reconcilierea intereselor diverselor părţi interesate într-o

abordare globală de calitate şi durabila. Deşi se recunoaşte importanţa tuturor

aspectelor legate de responsabilitatea sociala corporativa, această cercetare se

concentrează în principal pe responsabilităţile companiilor in domeniul

protecţiei mediului

În cadrul companiei, practicile responsabile legate de mediu se referă în

principal la gestionarea resurselor naturale utilizate în producţie si la procesele

tehnologice generatoare de reziduri.

Problema referitoare la factorii care determina organizaţiile să adopte seturi

specifice ale practicilor de management este o tema centrală a teoriei

organizaţionale. Perspectiva instituţională sugerează că firmele obţin

legitimitatea prin conformarea cu practicile dominante în cadrul domeniul lor

instituţional (DiMaggio şi Powell, 1983; Scott, 1992). Cu toate acestea, perspectiva

instituţională, abia a început să abordeze un aspect fundamental în cercetarea din

domeniul managementului: de ce organizaţiile care actioneaza in cadrul aceluiaşi

domeniu instituţional şi astfel, se confruntă cu aceleaşi presiuni instituţionale

izomorfe, adopta diferite practici de management?

Unii cercetători au subliniat faptul că, chiar si organizaţiile care împărtăşesc

domenii comune instituţionale sunt adesea supuse la niveluri diferite de presiuni

29

instituţionale. Aceasta situaţie se poate datora pe de o parte faptului ca instituţiile

creaza presiuni diferite pe organizaţii, in funcţie de anumite criterii sau

organizaţiile resimt diferit aceeaşi presiune datorita propriilor lor caracteristici

Atunci când este integrata cu caracteristici cheie ale organizaţiei, teoria

instituţională poate genera noi perspective pentru a înţelege diferenţele dintre

strategiile firmelor. Având in vedere aceasta abordare, modelul de analiza pe care

il vom dezvolta se bazează pe ipoteza ca deşi organizaţiile care actioneaza in

cadrul aceluiaşi domeniu instituţional şi astfel, se confruntă cu aceleaşi presiuni

instituţionale izomorfe, interpretează diferit aceste presiuni datorita caracteristicilor

interne proprii legate de organizarea funcţionala si structura.

Procesele economice de bază sunt producţia şi de consumul; firmele

transforma resurselor naturale, prin intermediul procesului de producţie, în produse

de bază cerute de consumatori. Din punct de vedere fizic, această conversie nu este

niciodată perfect eficienta ceea ce presupune obtinerea de reziduri. Când rezidurile

nu au nici o valoare economică, atunci acestea pot fi considerate desuri, care pot

duce la poluare. Astfel, firmele impun un cost societatii iar aceste costuri nu sunt

complet compensate. Acesta este cazul tipic al unei externalităţii negative respectiv

costurile sunt "externe" pe piaţei. In aceste situaţii preţurile nu ţinut cont de

efectele daunatoare, ceea ce înseamnă că preţul nu a reuşit să compenseze

utilizarea mediului care este un bun al intregii societati. Pentru a corecta aceasta

formă de eşec a pieţei este în mod necesar sa se internalizeze externalitatile

negative, fapt care insa va genera o crestere a costurilor de productie. Se presupune

insa ca poluatorul ca agent economic urmareste maximizarea profitului ceea ce va

genera un comportament care sa urmareasca minimizarea costurilor de producţie.

Deoarece firmele au lipsa de motivare in internalizarea externalitatilor negative,

acestea sunt supuse unor factori mimetici, coercitivi si normativi care le afecteaza

deciziile (DiMagio and Powell 2004).

30

Izomorfismul coercitiv derivă din influenţa politică, autoritate şi probleme

de legitimitate. Acesta este rezultatul unor presiuni formale şi informale pentru a se

conforma, care sunt impuse organizaţiei de către alte organizaţii şi de cadrul

cultural (Powell & DiMaggio, 1983). Presiunea oficială includ statutul

guvernamentale, regulile şi regulamentarile, precum şi standarde ale agenţiilor de

acreditare, care sunt în general efectuate de către organizaţiile şi persoanele cu un

anumit nivel relevant de autoritatea.

Comportamentul mimetic apare în special în condiţii de incertitudine şi

ambiguitate. "Organizaţia model" poate ignora faptul că alţii o copiază iar imitarea

poate apărea în mod intenţionat sau neintenţionat. Acest comportament poate, de

exemplu, să fie rezultatul neaşteptat de transferul de personal de la o organizaţie la

alta, sau apare din cauza faptului ca personalul adopta intenţionat practicilor

descrise în literatura de specialitate sau ţine seama de sfaturile unui consultant.

Datorită dorinţei organizaţiilor de a fi perceput ca legitime în condiţii de

incertitudine, acestea au tendinţa de a se modela după modelul altor organizaţii

care sunt percepute a fi de succes şi mai legitime (Powell & DiMaggio, 1983).

Procesele normative se referă la procesele prin care o profesie urmăreşte să

menţină jurisdicţia asupra muncii, domeniilor de cunoaştere, şi a reproducerii de

acest fel. Trei aspecte ale acestor procese sunt esenţiale pentru schimbarea

izomorfa. În primul rând partajarea în comun a bazei de cunoştinţe a unei profesii.

In al doilea rând este crearea de reţele între profesionişti, care intersectează

organizaţiile şi este susţinută de către asociaţiile profesionale prin conferinţe,

buletine de ştiri şi publicaţii. În al treilea rând, este traseul carierei liderilor în

cadrul unei profesii. Traseul carierelor, tinde să fie oarecum omogenizat in cadrul

organizaţiilor şi în cadrul profesiilor.

Pentru a corecta eşecul piaţei, se impune intervenţia statului, în cadrul

acţiunilor private a firmelor. Statul, format din trei ramuri legislativ, judiciar,

31

precum şi autorităţile de reglementare, încearca să induca poluatorului să ia măsuri

sociale, care aparent nu sunt în interesul poluatorul, folosind două tipuri majore de

reglementare a mediului: “stimulente economice” şi “comandă şi control”. Insa

statul prin institutiile sale, în realitate, este supus presiunilor din ambele, atat a

cetăţenilor cat şi a poluatorilor. Astfel, reglementarea in domeniul mediului este

deosebit de sensibila la influenţa grupurilor de interese.

Determinarea nivelului "corect" de poluare, implică determinarea "daunelor

poluarii". In economia se obişnuieste să condenseze varietatea efectelor negative

ale poluarii într-o măsură unică, - disponibilitatea de a plăti pentru reducerea

poluării. În acest caz, oamenii isi manifesta dorinţa de a da ceva din resursele lor

pentru eliminarea poluării. Problema care apare se refera la cât de mult este

consumatorul dispus să plătească pentru pentru protectia mediului. Astfel,

veniturile şi standardele de viaţă devin o caracteristica importanta in aceasta

ecuatia determinarii nivelului de poluare.

De asemenea firmele, fac obiectul unor reglementari informale. Acestea pot fi

directe (presiunea directa asupra firmelor) sau indirecte (presiunea asupra

autorităţilor). În cazul în care regulamentarea formala este slaba sau percepută a fi

insuficienta de catre comunitate, acestea pot reglementa în mod informal firmele

indirect sau direct prin negociere, petiţionare şi activităţi de lobby.

Presiunea pietei poate proveni de la clienti, investitori şi firmele concurente.

Astfel acestia pot induce costuri suplimentare, de exemplu in cazul boicotului

consumatorilor, dar de asemenea, pot induce beneficii prin acceptarea in cadrul

unor retele comerciale ceea ce poate induce reducerea costurilor operaţionale, etc.

Strategiile firmei se bazeaza pe resursele şi capacităţile lor. Astfel,

caracteristicile fiecarei firme pot să influenţeze calitatea strategiilor de mediu alese.

Pornind de la analiza calitativa prezentata anterior se pot emite urmatoarele

ipoteze:

32

Ipoteza 1 – Statul prin cele trei ramuri legislativ, judiciar şi autorităţile

de reglementare influenteaza managementul companiilor in scopul

promovarii atat a Responsabilitati Sociale Corporative - aspectele referitoare

la protectia mediu denumita in cadrul raportului Responsabilitate

Corporativa de Mediu (RCM) cat si a Performantei Corporative de Mediu

(PCM).

Ipoteza 2 – Sistemul legislativ poate afecta activitatea autoritatilor de

reglementare in sensul diminuarii intensitatii presiunii institutionale, daca

raspund la activitatea de lobby desfasurata de managementul companiilor.

Ipoteza 3 - Sistemul legislativ poate afecta activitatea autoritatilor de

reglementare in sensul diminuarii/intensificarii presiunii institutionale ca

urmare a presiunilor venite din partea cetetenilor in calitatea lor de alegatori.

Ipoteza 4 – Managementul companiilor poate fi influentat cu privire la

promovarea/nepromovarea RCM si PCM de catre natura actionarilor

(straini/locali/privati/stat)

Ipoteza 5 - Managementul companiilor poate fi influentat cu privire la

promovarea/nepromovarea RCM si PCM de catre bunastarea consumatorilor

Ipoteza 6 - Managementul companiilor poate fi influentat cu privire la

promovarea/nepromovarea RCM si PCM de catre competitori

Ipoteza 7 - Managementul companiilor poate influenta comportamentul

proactiv fata de mediu al angajatilor proprii

Ipoteza 8 – Transpunerea acestor presiuni institutional in activitatea

economica depinde de caracteristicile functionale si structurale ale

organizatiilor

Ipoteza 9 – Autoritatile de reglementare pot influenta activitatea

economica a unei companii prin sistemul de amenzi pentru neconformitate

33

Ipoteza 10 - Autoritatile de reglementare pot influenta activitatea

economica a unei companii prin sistemul de taxe Pigouviene

Ipoteza 11 – Cetatenii prin boicot pot influenta pozitiv costurile de

neconformitate

Ipoteza 12 – Competitorii pot influenta pozitiv costurile de

neconformitate

Ipoteza 13 – Performanta economica este indirect proportional afectata

de costurile de neconformitate

Ipoteza 14 – Performantele de mediu scazute induc costuri variabile

mari, datorita utilizarii de tehnologii care consuma materii prime si produc si

reziduri mai multe, rata de conversie fiind mai mica

Ipoteza 15 – Performanta economica determina performanta de mediu

– ipoteza win-win

Ipoteza 16 – Performanta de mediu scade costurile de neconformitate

Ipoteza 17 – Performanta de mediu scad costurile variabile

Ipoteza 18 – Performanta de mediu scade poluarea

Ipoteza 19 – Performanta de mediu creste consumul produselor

fabricate

Pornind de la aceasta imagine de ansamblu putem concretiza relatiile

institutionale si efectele acestora in domeniul politicilor de mediu in figura

urmatoare.

34

Astăzi există o diversitate de soluţii ce pot fi aplicate pentru a asigura

implementarea politicilor de mediu. Astfel enumeram :

1. Reglementarea directa, prin stabilirea unor cerinţe legale sau prin

emiterea de licenţe, urmată de inspecţie şi măsuri coercitive;

2. Reglementarea indirectă, prin promovarea conformităţii prin intermediul

altor mijloace decat inspecţiiile şi măsurile coercitive, (de exemplu, prin difuzarea

de informaţii tehnice, prin publicarea sancţiunilor de neconformitate, oferirea de

stimulente economice şi de programe de educaţie, etc).

3. Auto-reglementarea, de corectare a comportamentului de către

comunitatea reglementată în sine, pentru că aceasta şi-a impus ca strategie acest

lucru.

Efectele politicilor de mediu sunt direct influentate de instrumentele de

implementare a acestora. Instrumentele de implementare a politicilor de mediu se

pot grupa astfel:

35

Commanda si control : Licenţele / permise; standardele de emisie;

standarde de proces; standarde de produs;

Instrumente Economice : Taxe; Impozite; permisele de emisii negociabile;

Subvenţiile de mediu; bonificatii pentru performanţă; Amenzi pentru

neconformare; preţurile resurselor

Răspunderea, Daune de compensare: norme stricte privind răspunderea;

fondurile de compensare; asigurare obligatorie pentru riscul de poluare;

responsabilitatea extinsa a producătorilor

Abordarea voluntara : Angajamente unilaterale; programe publice de

voluntariat; acorduri negociate

Educatia si informarea : Campanii de educaţie pentru publicul larg;

Difuzarea de informaţii tehnice; Publicitatea sancţiunilor aplicate pentru

nerespectarea normelor; Eticheta ecologica

Management si planificare : Sisteme de management de mediu ISO si

EMAS;

36

5. Studii empirice care abordeaza diverse aspecte al Reponsabilitatii Sociale Corporative

5.1 The pollution abatement decision in Romanian industrial sector (articol prezentat la conferinta internationala ECOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE IN A COMPETITVE ECONOMY 11-12 november 2010 si publicat in revista Quality-access to success, cotata CNCSIS B+, indexata in SCOPUS si EBSCO, ISSN 1582-2559)

THE POLLUTION ABATEMENT DECISION IN ROMANIAN INDUSTRIAL SECTOR

Prof. univ. dr. Ion STANCU

Academia de Studii Economice din Bucuresti E-mail: finstancu@yahoo.com;

Lect. univ. dr. Robert Şova, Academia de Studii Economice din Bucuresti

E-mail: robertsova@yahoo.com Ec. dr. Anamaria Şova

Economic&Business Research Center E-mail: anamariasova@yahoo.fr Conf. univ. dr. Laurentiu Fratila

Academia de Studii Economice din Bucuresti E-mail: laurentiu_f@yahoo.com;

Ec. drd. Violeta Cimpoieru Economic&Business Research Center E-mail: violetacimpoeru@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT Using a panel dataset, containing information from Romanian industrial sector, this paper analyse the determinants of the pollution abatement expenditure, in the context of transition economy. We consider information related to the pollution abatement expenditure at plant level, plant – specific characteristics, state and local regulatory stringency, market incentives and community characteristics. KEY WORDS: Pollution Abatement Expenditure, Manufacturing, Environmental Regulation, Market incentives, Community characteristics ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: This paper would not have been possible without the funding support from C.N.M.P. under contract no. 92-120

INTRODUCTION The basic economic processes are production and consumption; the firms transform natural resources, through the production process , into commodities demanded by the consumers. In physical terms, this conversion is never perfectly efficient: by-products (residuals) are produced.

37

When residual has no economic value then it can be thought of as waste which may lead to pollution. Thus, the firms impose a cost on other agent in society and these cost are not full compensated. This is the typical case of negative externality i.e. the cost are outside or “external” to the market. These were situations where prices did not take account of damaging effects, means that the price failed to regulate the use of the environment. The price does not reflect full production costs to society. To correct this from of market failure is necessarily to internalize the externality. Assume that the polluter is a profit-maximizing firm this behavior minimize the firm’s production cost. Thus, the firm in a unregulated system, will lack incentive to compensate the other agent in society because his welfare was affected. Thus, is a discrepancy between the private cost to the firm of dumping which approximates to zero, and the social cost to society which is positive and potentially large. Societal welfare is increased if this discrepancy is addressed by making the firm pay in same way for whatever pollution damage it is causing. To correct this market failure, involves the state intervention, in private actions of the firms. The state, consisting of three branches the legislature, the judiciary, and the regulators, try to induce a polluter to take socially desirable actions, which ostensibly are not in the best interest of the polluter, using the two major types of environmental regulation: economic incentives and command-and-control. Thus, the state intervention is necessarily to achieve the “right” level of pollution for society. But the states, in reality, receive pressures from both, citizens and polluters. Thus, environmental regulation is particularly susceptible to interest group influence. Determining the “right” amount of pollution also involve determining “damages from pollution”. Economics is accustomed to condensing the variety of the damage’s effects into a single measure – the willingness to pay to reduce pollution. If pollution is bad, people are willingness to give something oh their resources to eliminating pollution. The all environmental problems really involve a trade-off between using resources (money) for conventional goods and services and using those same resources for environmental protection i.e. how much is the consumer willing to pay for particular levels of an environmental good. Thus, income and living standard were important, not only because rich people to consume more and thus generate more pollution, but also because the environment is often take a backseat to other more pressing needs related to survival. Most generally the community characteristics can affect local environmental outcomes. The firms also perceive informal regulation. The informal regulation may be direct (directly pressure to the firms) or indirect (pressure to the authorities). Where formal regulation is weak or perceived to be insufficient the communities may informally regulate firms indirectly or directly through bargaining, petitioning and lobbying. Market pressure emanate from customer, investors and competing firms can induce costs e.g. consumers boycott but also benefits which might arise from green consumers choosing environmentally friendly products, reduced operational costs etc. The strategies of the firm are droved by their resources and capabilities. Thus, key plant-characteristics are also expected to influence the quality of environmental strategies choosing by the firms. By integrating theories of institutional and organizational dynamics we develop and test a model to explain the determinants of the Pollution Abatement Expenditure.

38

1. ECONOMETRIC INVESTIGATION Traditionally the business manager has held the goal of profit optimization foremost. This goal required him to make investment decisions concerning alternatives which were expected to have a positive cash inflow for his firm. Thus, his decision process was concerned with achieving an optimal trade-off between the cost of the investment and the cash or other tangible benefits of that investment among a group of investment alternatives. A serious omission in the decision process can now be seen. Social pressures and external regulations now require the manager to consider various investment alternatives which may not have a positive cash inflow and which may not optimize profit in the short run. One of these decisions, the pollution abatement decision, is the focus of inquiry for this paper. Romania, like other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, has made efforts of approximating its environmental legislation with the European Union. Thus it is probable that substantial and even fundamental changes will be required at the plant level as a result of this process. The compliance cost require that firms make efforts to adjust themselves to the norms and rules set in the regulation and so goes toward improving the environmental performance. These efforts are concretized in a two directions a capital expenditure and operating costs both associated with pollution abatement efforts. While the plants have a lack incentive to internalize the negative externality, these are subject of extern normative, coercive and mimetic factors that affect firms decisions (DiMagio and Powell 1983). This pressure can be moderate by plant-level characteristics and organizational structure as well as industry effects. While each has provided a piece of puzzle, is desirable to examine the external and internal pressure that drive plants to regulatory compliance and so, to improve their environment performance. The pollution abatement expenditure can be modeled by a parametric form, using a model of qualitative choice. The data used concern a one year period 2004, and cover a sample of 4661 plants located into the all regions of Romanian. In the framework of this article we develop an empirical model for the analysis of the determinants of the dependent variable, the plant decision to make pollution abatement expenditure. We estimate the decision by a variable proxy, the existence of the pollution abatement expenditure. In this case this variable can take two values. Therefore, the variable takes value 1 if the amount of pollution abatement expenditure is positive and it takes value 0 otherwise. The simplest statistical model to describe a binary variable is there the distribution of Bernoulli with P [y = 1] = p and P [y = 0] = 1 - p. Nevertheless it is possible that the chances of success differ between the individuals, and we are interested of modeling, in the spirit of the regression, the possible causes of these differences. Our approach will be to analyze each one within a framework general of the models of probability

39

parameters effects,relevant YProb occurs event Prob Fjj respectively

βxFxY , 1Prob

βxFxY , 1 0Prob The nonnegative discrete nature of the variable observed generates not linearity which makes the inappropriate usual linear models, because some basic assumptions like the normality and the homoscedasticity of the residuals or the adjustment linear of the data are not filled any more. The use of the linear regression with the nonnegative and discrete dependent variable will give inefficient, inconsistent and biased estimates (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). For the regression linear:

,xβxF , it results that

,ix iii yExy 1P x,

iβ measure the probability that an individual with characteristics xi will make the choice yi=1. The marginal effect of the explanatory variable j is equal to:

k ...., 3, 2,j , 1P jiji xy The binary response models can be derived from an underlying latent variable model that satisfies the classical linear model assumptions. Let y* be an unobserved, or latent variable, determined by

iji uy ,ijx0

*

Therefore, y is one if y* > 0, and y is zero if y* <= 0. We assume that ui is independent of xij and has the standard normal distribution. In either case, ui is symmetrically distributed about zero. Economists tend to favor the normality assumption for ui, which is why the Probit model is more popular than Logit in econometrics The Probit models are non-linaires and the parameters can be estimated by maximum of probability (maximum likelihood). Our binary qualitative model shows that plant decision to make the Pollution Abatement Expenditure is influenced by three variables categories formal regulation, plant-level characteristics and community characteristics. The Probit model permit to take the decision-making process into account and to examine the contribution of the various determinants to this

40

process. We found convenient to use 9 explanatory variables that characterize better the decision to make the Polution Abatement Expenditure :

Imob – plant capital size defined as amount of long-term assets, Solv – solvability is the ability of an entity to pay its debts with available cash. CA – plant activity size defined as turnover Emp – unemployement proxy for the population welfare Iso – ISO 14000 certification, proving environmental management adoption Mark – listing on Bucharest Stock Exchange proxy for the firm’s visibility Sect – dummy variable which take value 1 for the pollution sectors and 0 otherwise;

proxy for the regulatory pressure to adopt an environmental behavior Urb – percent of population in the urban area; proxy for population reactivity Tx – environmental taxes proxy for the economic incentives to adopt an environmental

behavior

The econometric specification used is the following: Deci=β0+β1*Imobi+β2*Solvi+β3*CAi+β4*Empi+β5*Isoi+β6*Marki+β7*Secti+β8*Urbi+β9*Txi+ui where: Deci represents plant decision to make the Pollution Abatement Expenditure and ui is the residual term. We first determine the qualitative influence of the explanatory variables (table 1, column 1) and then calculate the marginal effects (table 1, column 2). The numerical value of the estimated parameters reported in table 1, column 1 is not directly interpretable. The only really useful information is the sign of parameters that indicates whether the associated variable influences positively or negatively the dependent variable. To highlight the quantitative influence we carry out another estimate when the coefficients of the variables will show the level of influence of the decisions to make the Pollution Abatement Expenditure. It is important in practice to have an idea of the sensitivity of the probability of the event {y = 1} and {y = 0} compared to variations in the explanatory variables. This sensitivity is generally provided by calculation of the marginal effect. This is why we analyze the results of table 1, column 2 which reflect the marginal effect of the variables.

Table 1 Appendix

The results of the estimation indicate that all the variable coefficients have the expected signs but some variables are not statistically significant. The both community characteristics unemployment Emp and urban population Urb, and environmental taxes does not matter in the decision to make the Pollution Abatement Expenditure.

41

CONCLUSION Economic transition is a process of gradual adjustment from a non-market equilibrium to a market equilibrium. During the transition process, many variables such provision of public goods, willingness to pay, technology and capital markets and many other are in disequilibrium. The adjustment process creates both constraints and opportunities that may be unavailable to more “settled” economies. Ignoring them may lead to the misallocation of scarce resources in the provision of public goods, in pollution abatement, and in the financing of private environmental investments, or to a choice of inappropriate instruments for environmental management. Our results stress that the population’s potential for collective action in the environmental area is not significant. Also, there is not evidence that the economic incentives to adopt an environmental behavior raises the level of plant Pollution Abatement Expenditure. The most consistent results, were the indication that demands from regulators and plant characteristics are the most influential determinants in the adoption of the decision to raises the level of plant Pollution Abatement Expenditure.

REFERENCES Arora, Seema and Timothy N. Cason. “Do Community Characteristics Influence Environmental Outcomes? Evidence from the Toxic Release Inventory,” Southern Economic Journal, 65(4), 691- 716, April 1999. Becker, Randy A. “Air Pollution Abatement Costs under the Clean Air Act: Evidence from the PACE Survey,” Center for Economic Studies Discussion Paper, 01-12, November 2001. Becker, Randy A. and J. Vernon Henderson. “Effects of Air Quality Regulations on Polluting Industries,” Journal of Political Economy, 108(2), 379-421, April 2000. Cameron A. C., Trivedi P. K., „Regression Analysis of count data”, Cambridge University Press, 1998 DiMaggio PJ, Powell WW. „The iron cage revisited: institutioal isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields” American Sociological Review, no. 48, pp 147-160, 1983 Gray, Wayne B. and Ronald J. Shadbegian. “‘Optimal’ Pollution Abatement – Whose Kahn, Matthew E. “Particulate Pollution Trends in the United States,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 27(1), 87-107, February 1997. StataCorp. Stata Statistical Software: Release 7.0. College Station, TX: Stata Corporation, 2001. Wooldrige, J.H., “Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 3rd Edition”, Thomson South-Western, ISBN 0-324-28978-2.2005

42

APPENDIX

Tabelul 1. Rezultatele estimarii (1) (2) Dec Dec Imob 0.000 0.001 (4.26)** (4.23)** Solv 0.556 0.521 (6.95)** (6.35)** CA 0.000 0.001 (2.96)** (2.66)** ISO 0.625 0.620 (4.88)** (4.56)** Mark 0.766 0.764 (13.55)** (12.95)** Sect 0.186 0.167 (3.61)** (3.41)** Tx 0.000 0.000 (0.73) (0.73) Emp -0.012 -0.011 (1.15) (1.12) Urb 0.073 0.073 (0.58) (0.57) Constant -2.441 -2.235 (13.02)** (12.85)** Observations 4661 4661 Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses

* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level

43

5.2 Pigovian vs. Coasian Externality Theory - Framework for understanding Corporate social responsibility in Romania (articol acceptat spre publicarea in revista Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting, cotata ISI cu factor de impact, ISSN 1582-6163)

Pigovian vs. Coasian Externality Theory - Framework for Understanding Corporate social responsibility in Romania

Lect. univ. dr. Robert SOVA1, Prof. univ. dr. Ion STANCU2, Ec. drd. Anamaria SOVA3,

Christophe Rault44

Abstract

The aim of the present study is to shed some light on the framework for Understanding Environmental Policy in Romania, in contrast to the existing literature which mostly focuses on developed economies. Specifically, we use the Pigovian and Coasian Externality Theory. For the empirical analysis we use a survey data of the Romanian National Institute of Statistics and estimate Multilevel Regression Model (MRM) to investigate the determinants of environmental behaviour at plant level. Our results reveal some important differences vis-à-vis the developed countries, such as a less significant role for collective action and environmental taxes, which suggests some possible policy changes to achieve better environmental outcomes.

Keywords: Pollution Abatement Expenditure, Manufacturing, Environmental Regulation, Market incentives, Community characteristics

JEL Classification: Q52, C23 Aknowledgement: This paper was produced as part of the research project entitled “Corporate social responsibility; New incentives for improving Romanian Corporate Environmental Performance in EU context”, contract 92-120, funded by CNMP

1. Introduction

The basic economic processes are production and consumption; the firms transform natural resources, through the production process, into commodities demanded by the 1 Academy of Economic Studies of Bucharest 2 Academy of Economic Studies of Bucharest 3 Economic&Business Research Center 4 Economic&Business Research Center & LEO, University of Orléans

44

consumers. In physical terms, this conversion is never perfectly efficient: by-products (residuals) are produced. When residual has no economic value then it can be thought of as waste which may lead to pollution. Thus, the firms impose a cost on other agent in society and these cost are not full compensated. This is the typical case of negative externality i.e. the cost are outside or “external” to the market. These were situations where prices did not take account of damaging effects, means that the price failed to regulate the use of the environment. The price does not reflect full production costs to society. To correct this from of market failure is necessarily to internalize the externality. Assume that the polluter is a profit-maximizing firm this behavior minimize the firm’s production cost. Thus, the firm in a unregulated system, will lack incentive to compensate the other agent in society because his welfare was affected. Thus, is a discrepancy between the private cost to the firm of dumping which approximates to zero, and the social cost to society which is positive and potentially large. Societal welfare is increased if this discrepancy is addressed by making the firm pay in same way for whatever pollution damage it is causing.

To correct this market failure, involves the state intervention, in private actions of the firms. The state, consisting of three branches the legislature, the judiciary, and the regulators, try to induce a polluter to take socially desirable actions, which ostensibly are not in the best interest of the polluter, using the two major types of environmental regulation: economic incentives and command-and-control. Thus, the state intervention is necessarily to achieve the “right” level of pollution for society. But the states, in reality, receive pressures from both, citizens and polluters. Thus, environmental regulation is particularly susceptible to interest group influence.

While the plants have a lack incentive to internalize the negative externality, these are subject of extern normative, coercive and mimetic factors that affect firms decisions (DiMagio and Powell 1983). This pressure can be moderate by plant-level characteristics and organizational structure as well as industry effects. While each has provided a piece of puzzle, is desirable to examine the external and internal pressure that drive plants to regulatory compliance and so, to improve their environment performance.

Environment policy making is based on two theories, namely the Pigouvian and the Coaseian theory.

Pigouvian approach places responsibility for externalities solely on generator (the polluter) and impose a tax in accordance with legal provisions. This approach later became known as the "polluter pays ", and is mentioned in Article174, paragraph 2, of the EU Treaty enshrines in current policies, as operational, pigouvian paradigm. Determining the optimal level of taxes is based on a set of assumptions of neoclassical nature. Most importantly, the Pigouvian approach does not address the reciprocal nature of externalities.

In contrast, Coaseian approach implies that externalities is reciprocal, which mean that both polluter and pollutee generates externalities; that legal rules and institutions should change in order to better internalize externalities; and that policy decision-makers should focus on the dynamics of the problem of disposing the externality. By incorporating these aspects into the analysis, the Coaseian approach can reach the optimal policy

2. The formal regulation

The benefits of pollution control are usually widespread over the whole society. High transaction costs of assigning and securing property rights over most goods and environmental services make those suffering from harmful effects of pollution unable to seek full compensation

45

against emitters. This is the typical case of a negative externality, i.e. third party damages that market is not properly pricing.

If the benefits of pollution control, that is, the damages avoided, are lower than the respective private control costs, emitters will lack incentives to undertake it. So pollution control is a typical case of governmental intervention to correct a market failure. The classic paradigm for environmental policies is then based on the regulator (a principal) controlling private agents through regulation. Non-compliance with norms and rules dictated by the regulators is liable to sanctions.

The seminal work of Becker (1968) on general legal compliance stated that profit maximization would make agents equalize non-compliance and compliance costs at the margin. Compliance costs require that firms incur in expenditures to adjust themselves to the norms and rules set in the regulation. Firms also perceive compliance benefits when environmental performance is affected by market incentives, such as, reduced operational costs, increasing competitiveness in green-oriented markets or facilitated access to subsidies.

The public policy implications in the increase of firm’s environmental performance can be summarised in three-fold: Firstly, use policy instruments which increase incentives for firms to identify and act upon

environmental-commercial synergies. This includes economic instruments, but also performance-based standards. In addition to the short-run benefits, this can have long-run benefits since firms will adjust their responses (organisation structures, management systems, etc…) to regulatory pressures differently depending upon the nature of the instrument used. This may lead to better decision-making more generally.

Secondly, information-based tools can have an important role to play on both the demand-side and the supply-side. There are barriers to information for both firms and households, and such tools can help to amplify incentives for improved environmental performance, and foreshorten the responses of households and firms.

Thirdly, public authorities may have a role to play in explicitly influencing decision-making structures within the firm. This includes incentives for self-audits, environmental reporting, accounting procedures, etc. However, it is important to note that governments are not well-placed to dictate management systems within firms, and the implications of such policies should be examined closely.

It is clear that the policy framework must not only provide the right “external” incentives for the firm, but it also has a role to play in encouraging firms to recognise and act upon on environmental-commercial opportunities in a timely manner. The shift toward “softer” policy measures has been driven in large part by a desire to change decision-making processes within the firm with respect to environmental matters.

There are three broad sets of policy recommendations which emerge from our study. Firstly, and least controversially, regulators need to introduce policies which have the

effect of attaching value to the generation and use of environmental information within the firm. This has more to do with the nature of the instrument applied, than the stringency of the regulation per se. The concern, therefore is not with the magnitude of the external incentive itself, but rather with the effect that alternative (nominally equivalent) instruments have on the internal decision-making process within the firm.

Arguably, traditional environmental policy has done the opposite – attaching a low price to such information. For instance, technology-based standards give firms no incentive to “uncover” environmental-commercial synergies. Moreover, they may have also had the effect of

46

encouraging firms to have separate environmental health and safety departments which were concerned with compliance and with only weak links to the rest of the firm.

In one sense this is another argument in favour of market-based instruments – along with their benefits in terms of an efficient allocation of environmental effort across firms, and dynamic technological benefits. However, it is important to note that other instruments will also generate such effects. Indeed, any measure which gives firms flexibility in how it meets its environmental targets will do so. Thus, a performance-based standard will do so as well. This aspect of environmental policy design (its effects on the allocation of resources within a firm) has been largely ignored.

The effect that regulations have on decision-making procedures may, however, be the most important of the three criteria by which the efficiency of an instrument can be evaluated. While responsibility for abatement strategies had previously rested largely with environmental health and safety departments, in many cases this was transferred to financial vice presidents and other senior management figures once the tradable permit programme was introduced since the permit holdings were now financial assets and since the implications of the strategy adopted now extended well beyond mere compliance. Table 1: The incentive effects of alternative policy instruments

Improved Resource Allocation Within Firms

Improved Resource Allocation Across Firms

Improved Dynamic Technological Effects

Technology-Based Standard Negative Negative Negative Performance-Based Standard Positive Negative Somewhat Positive Market-Based Instrument Positive Positive Positive

Secondly, information-based tools have an important role to play in helping firms to realise commercial-environmental opportunities. For instance, many mandatory emission inventory schemes can help firms to differentiate themselves on environmental grounds in a credible manner. However, this is dependent upon the public availability of the data generated. In addition, some “voluntary” environmental programmes advertise membership in the programme on behalf of firms. Alternatively, public recognition for firms with environmental management systems can be considered. This may allow firms to differentiate their performance in a more credible manner. However, the potential for strategic behaviour must be assessed. Public authorities can also support information-sharing concerning environmental management practices amongst firms through networks and other related schemes. Gathering and disseminating information on "best practice" may overcome information cost barriers. This is thought to be particularly important for small and medium-sized enterprises where access to information is often most restricted. On the demand side, eco-labelling and other related schemes can also help firms to realise commercial-environmental opportunities at the level of the product. More generally, as efforts to differentiate products on environmental grounds become more widespread, advertising law may have to be changed

Thirdly, and most controversially, public authorities can try to affect internal decision-making procedures within the firm more directly. As noted above, this is a very hazardous exercise and governments must enter into this area with some caution. However, it is clear that the basket of policy measures used by governments is increasing rapidly and, arguably, most of the new measures are concerned with internal decision-making processes within the firm. Examples include the following:

47

Environmental management systems – by providing support (or incentives) for the development of environmental management systems, the government are seeking to improve environmental decision-making. This is the case in the EU, with the introduction of the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme.

Self-audit policies - the government use financial incentives, by lowering fines for non-compliance discovered through self-audits

Corporate Environmental Reporting –corporate environmental reporting is usually voluntary. In addition the Bucharest stock exchanges require corporate environmetal reports. However, it is widely felt that in order to be useful there is much room for improvement in this area, particularly with respect to the reform of corporate disclosure laws.

Personnel Incentives and Training – giving individuals within the firm the appropriate incentives to recognise and act upon environmental-commercial synergies is very important, but governments have little role in this area. However, by allowing for the possibility that individuals may be held responsible for environmental harms generated by companies, the government can influence personal incentives.

Accounting procedures – by encouraging firms to use accounting procedures which allow for the better integration of environmental costs and benefits with other aspects of the firms operations, it is hoped that firms will be better placed to recognise environmental-commercial synergies. This is not usually mandated by law, but is rather encouraged by various means such as disemmination of “best practice” guidelines. For instance, the EU has supported the Environmental Management Accounting Network. (See Welford 1999.)

Organisational structure – by seeking to affect the locus of responsibility for environmental matters within the firm the government are directly affecting organisational structure.

All of these programmes are efforts on the part of the policymaker to affect the workings of the firm. However, governments are cognisant of the fact that they are not best placed to dictate management strategies to firms. As such, this is usually done in a non-prescriptive and voluntary manner. Nonetheless, since these policies often entail the use of public financial resources and can (and should) have important consequences for firm behaviour they should be assessed and evaluated, as with any public policy.

3. The informal regulation Determining the “right” amount of pollution also involve determining “damages from

pollution”. Economics is accustomed to condensing the variety of the damage’s effects into a single measure – the willingness to pay to reduce pollution. If pollution is bad, people are willingness to give something of their resources to eliminating pollution. The all environmental problems really involve a trade-off between using resources (money) for conventional goods and services and using those same resources for environmental protection i.e. how much is the consumer willing to pay for particular levels of an environmental good. Thus, income and living standard were important, not only because rich people to consume more and thus generate more pollution, but also because the environment is often take a backseat to other more pressing needs related to survival. Most generally the community characteristics can affect local environmental outcomes.

The informal regulation may be direct (directly pressure to the firms) or indirect (pressure to the authorities). Where formal regulation is weak or perceived to be insufficient the

48

communities may informally regulate firms indirectly or directly through bargaining, petitioning and lobbying.

Market pressure emanate from customer, investors and competing firms can induce costs e.g. consumers boycott but also benefits which might arise from green consumers choosing environmentally friendly products, reduced operational costs etc.

The strategies of the firm are droved by their resources and capabilities. Thus, key plant-characteristics are also expected to influence the quality of environmental strategies choosing by the firms.

By integrating theories of institutional and organizational dynamics we develop and test a model to explain the determinants of environmental behaviour at plant level.

4. Conceptual framework Based on the foregoing discussion, we can materialize Institutional Relations

and their effects on environmental policy in the following figure

Figure 1. Conceptual framework

5. ECONOMETRIC INVESTIGATION

In the framework of this article we develop an empirical model for the analysis of the determinants of environmental behaviour at plant level using multilevel model.

49

In the statistics literature MRM is alternatively referred to as multilevel analysis, hierarchical models, random coefficients models, and variance components analysis. The common element of all of these methods is that the dependent variable is analysed as a function of predictors measured at the lowest level and of those measured at one or more higher levels.The rationale for using the multilevel model is based on the assumption that the variation in the dependent variable is a function of both lower-level and higher-level factors. This variation is not only a function of individual-level attributes, but also extra-individual factors. Besides, the relationship between lower-level and higher-level factors and the dependent variable is not assumed to be fixed or constant across space or time. Therefore, the regression coefficients in micro-level models are not fixed, and they can vary across these factors.

The econometric specification used is the following:

itit

itttititit

ititititit

uIsoEnvGuardEnvNGOUnEmpLogEnvSubEnvTxPollSect

MarkTurnoverDebtoductNCPM

1110

98765

43210

)log()log()()log()log()log()log()log()log(Pr)log(

where: NCPMit = pollution abatement expenditure incurred by plant i in year t proxi for environmental behaviour at plant level Productit = plant productivity of plant i in year t Debtit = debt ratio of plant i in year t Turnoverit = turnover of plant i in year t Markit = listing on Bucharest Stock Exchange of plant i in year t Isoit = dummy variable with value=1 if plant i is certified ISO 14001 and 0 in other case UnEmpit = unemployment rate of county i in year t EnvNGOit = number of environmental non-governmental organizations of county i in year t PollSectit = dummy variable which takes value 1 if plant i becomes active in year t in pollution sectors and 0 otherwise EnvTxit = environmental taxes of plant i in year t EnvSubit = environmental subsidies of plant i in year t EnvGuardit = environmental penalties in county i in the year t uit – error term

The analysis has been carried out for Romania in the period 2002 – 2005. The data are taken from the yearly survey of plant pollution abatement effort conducted by the Romanian National Institute of Statistic which inquires about capital expenditures and operating cost associated with pollution abatement efforts.

The data consist of a panel of environmental and financial information at establishment-level and the community characteristics and regulation intensity data at the counties level for the period 2002-2005.

The econometric results from the model are reported in Table 1.

50

Table 1. Estimation results

It can be seen that the signs of statistically significant variables are in general as expected. Theses results indicate that capital availability and, the large and successful firms a more

likely to adopt an environmental behavior and thus, to invest in environmental protection. The environmental incentives to adopt an environmental behavior respectively,

environmental taxes and subsidies, appears both empirically important and positively correlated with environmental behaviour but only environmental subsidies have a significant positive impact on the participation decision.

The influence of community groups, proxied by unemployment and number of environmental non-governmental organizations, has no statistically significant impact neither on plant decision to adopt an environmental behaviour. In general in the transition economies the concern for the environment is not a top priority of the community which is confronted with economical and financial problems.

The public authorities which are concerned with regulatory enforcement and monitoring are critical factor in positive influencing plant decision to undertake an environmental behavior and an increase of the environmental investments. Thus, environmental penalties have a statistically significant positive impact.

Market pressure emanated from consumer, investors and competing firms, estimated by the adoption of ISO 14001 and by the listing on Bucharest Stock Exchange has a significant positive influence.

6. CONCLUSION

This paper has tested some hypotheses formulated in the environmental literature about plant environmental behaviour patterns at plant level. Its original contribution is to examine them using survey data in the case of a country such as Romania, which has undergone a process of

51

economic and political transition and has been a EU member since 2007; also, we apply an appropriate econometric method, namely MRM.

Our results are generally consistent with the literature suggesting that plant characteristics, formal pressure through substantial regulatory actions and informal pressure through market incentives and community aspects may be important drivers of the level of plant environmental behaviour. However, unlike in the case of developed countries, we find that in Romania the population’s potential for collective action in the environmental area is not significant.

Whether the influence of these stakeholders on plant environmental behaviour will strengthen as Romania completes its development process remains to be seen. Also, there is no evidence that environmental taxes work as incentives to adopt an environmental behaviour at plant level. As expected, the actions of regulators (command and control and liability instruments), market pressure and plant characteristics are the most important determinants of the level of environmental behaviour.

These findings enable us to gain a better understanding of the factors increasing the plant environmental behaviour in the case of transition economies in general and Romania in particular.

They point to the need to redesign environmental taxes in order to achieve better outcomes. References Chan E S W, Wong S C K (2006) Motivations for ISO 14001 in the hotel industry. Tourism Management 27(3):481-492 Delmas M (2003) In search of ISO: an Institutional Perspective on the Adoption of International Management Standard. Standford Graduate School of Business Working Paper 1784 DiMaggio P J, Powell, W W (1983) The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review 48 (2):147-160. Ferraz C, Seroa da Motta R (2002) Regulação Mercado ou Pressão Social? Os Determinantes do Investimento Ambiental na Industria. Proceedings ANPEC- XXIX Encontro Nacional de Economia Salvador Greene WH (2002) Econometric Analysis. Prentice Hall New Jersey Guler I, Guillen M F, MacPherson J M (2002) Global competition institutions and the diffusion of organizational practices: the international spread of the ISO 9000 quality certificates. Administrative Science Quarterly 47(2):207-232 Neumayer E, Perkins R (2004) What explains the uneven take-up of ISO 14001 at the global level? A panel-data analysis. Environment and Planning 36(5): 823-839 OECD (2001) The firm The environment and Public Policy Working Party on National Environmental Policy. ENV/EPOC/WPNET 31/FINAL Panayotou T, Schatzki T, Limvorapitak Q (1997) Differential industry response to formal and informal environmental regulations in newly industrializing economies: The case of Thailand Mimeo Harvard Institute for International Development Rivera J (2004) Institutional pressures and voluntary environmental behavior in developing countries: Evidence from the Costa Rican hotel industry. Society and Natural

52

Resources 17(9):779-797 Rivera J, de Leon P (2004) Is greener whiter? Voluntary Environmental Performance of Western Ski Areas. Policy Studies Journal 32 (3): 417-437 Rivera J, de Leon P, Koerber C (2006) Is greener whiter yet? The sustainable slopes program after five years. Policy Studies Journal 34(2): 195-221 Sova R., Sova A.(2007) „Modeling international trade flows between CEEC and OECD countries” Applied Economics Letter, indexata in ISI - Thomson ISI Journal Citation Reports 2007, Volum 15 /2008, ISSN: 1350-4851 Seroa da Motta R (2006) Analyzing the environmental performance of the Brazilian industrial sector. Ecological Economics 57(2):269-281 Shin S (2005) The Role of the Government in Voluntary Environmental Protection Schemes: The Case of ISO 14001 in China. Issues & Studies 41(4): 141-173 Viadiu M F, Casadesús F M, Saizarbitoria M H (2006) ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 standards: An international diffusion model. International Journal of Operations and Production Management 26(1-2):141-165

53

5.3 Corporate social responsibility and its Macroeconomic Implications (articol acceptat spre publicare in revista Review of International Comparative Management, cotata CNCSIS B+ si indexata in baza de date RePec, ISSN 1582-3458)

Corporate social responsibility and its Macroeconomic Implications

Lect. univ. dr. Robert SOVA5 Prof. univ. dr. Ion STANCU1,

Conf. univ. dr. Laurentiu FRATILA1, CS III. dr. Anamaria SOVA2

Abstract.

One of main concern of policy makers is pollution and hence the improvement of the environmental quality. The implementation of environment policies aims at improving life and product quality in order to replace those obtained by high polluting processes by less polluting ones. Countries having more strict environmental regulations are likely to suffer from a significant increase of their production costs. As a consequence these countries become less competitive on the international market and may lose their market share. In this context, an increasing attention was granted to the impact of environment policies on foreign trade. Our purpose in this paper is to investigate whether Corporate social responsibility introduced into Eastern European countries have led or not to a decline of exports towards the European Union (EU), and if so how much? This question is important since it is related to the preoccupation of EU new members to increase their exports and the quality of their products. Our econometric methodology based on recent developments of panel data techniques allow us to control for unobservable heterogeneity and hence to get robust empirical robust. Our results highlight a moderated impact of environmental regulations on foreign trade. Keywords: environmental regulations, trade policy, gravity equation, competitiveness JEL Classification : C23, F13, F15, Q28 Aknowledgement: This paper was produced as part of the research project entitled “Corporate social responsibility; New incentives for improving Romanian Corporate Environmental Performance in EU context”, contract 92-120, funded by CNMP

5. Academy of Economic Studies of Bucharest 2. Economic&Business Research Center

54

1. Introduction Corporate social responsibility is essentially a concept whereby companies decide to integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis. Being socially responsible means not only fulfilling legislation concerning social rights or environmental standards, but also going beyond compliance and investing ‘more’ into human capital, the environment and the relations with stakeholders. Even if the prime responsibility of a company is generating profits these should nevertheless integrate corporate social responsibility as a strategic investment into their core business strategy, their management instruments and their operations. Moreover the business practices transparency due to the internet, the news media and the information revolution, means that for many companies, CSR, is no longer a luxury but a requirement. One of the factors that are driving this move towards corporate social responsibility is the increased concern from citizens, consumers, public authorities and investors in the context of globalization about the damage caused by economic activity to the environment. Even if in traditionally view, environmental protection has been considered to be “in the public interest” and external to private life, today the private sector becoming an active partner in environmental protection. An earlier emphasis on strict governmental regulations has ceded ground to corporate self-regulation and voluntary initiatives. As a result the environmental aspect of CSR is defined as the duty to cover the environmental implications of the company’s operations, products and facilities. Many governments and businesses are now realizing that implement and manage corporate environmental responsibility can increase competitiveness. In this paper we examine corporate social responsibility and investigate whether relatively strict environmental regulations introduced into Eastern European countries have led or not to a decline of competitiveness proxy by exports towards the European Union (EU), in the specifics conditions of Romanian economy as UE member country. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the main features of analyses of the environmental regulation impact on bilateral trade flows. Section 3 briefly recalls the theoretical foundations of the gravity model and the panel data methodology. Section 4 reports the empirical investigation as well as the econometric results. Section 5 finally concludes.

2. Theoretical background

The debate on the relationships between environmental regulation and competitiveness has a interesting topic of debate for long time. On the one hand, according to the classical assumption, if regulatory regimes are not able to design stringent and at same time efficient environmental regulation (e.g. historically strong emphasis on command-and-control regulation in many countries), it expected that the proportion of environmental costs to the production cost increase, and so the environmental regulations may have hardly effect on comparative advantage patterns and thus on commercial competitiveness. On the other hand the “soft” version of the “Porter hypothesis” argues that environmental progress, due the strict but efficient environmental regulations, can achieved without sacrificing competitiveness (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995).

55

Furthermore, the “hard” version of this hypothesis emphasize that countries with forward-leaning environmental policies and programs, that suppose strict but efficient environmental regulations, actually will enhance their commercial competitiveness creating win-win situations. According to this hypothesis, strict environmental regulation (under the condition that it is efficient) triggers the discovery and introduction of cleaner technologies and environmental improvements, the innovation effect, making production processes and products more efficient. The cost savings that can be achieved are sufficient to overcompensate for both the compliance costs directly attributed to new regulations and the innovation costs. The pivotal issue at stake is whether domestic environmental regulation impairs the competitiveness of domestic industries, especially the pollution-intensive industries. The general conclusion emerging from the literature on this topic seems to be rather uniform. Initially, in their early comprehensive account of the empirical literature, Jaffe et al. (1995, p. 157) conclude that “… overall, there is relatively little evidence to support the hypothesis that environmental regulation has a large adverse effect on competitiveness..” Evidence from recent studies suggests this conclusion should be taken with care. Recent studies do occasionally find a negative correlation between trade and environmental stringency, although the findings do not seem to be particularly robust. Recent reviews therefore continue to be cautious: “… the costs imposed by tighter pollution regulation may not be a major determinant of trade patterns” (Copeland and Taylor, 2003, p. 220; see also Mulatu, Florax and Withagen 2003).

3. Econometric approach In the framework of this article we develop an empirical model for the analysis of the impact of formal and informal pressure on comparative advantage patterns and thus on foreign trade. We estimate this pressure by a proxy variable, the existence of important environmental pressure. In this case this variable can take two values. Therefore, the variable takes value 1 if the pressure is significant for the industry sector and it takes value 0 otherwise. It is commonly belief that the pollution-intensive industries of Romania it was the most concerned with the stringent environmental regulation. The empirical specification is inspired by the gravity framework, previously used in cross-country studies of trade in pollution-intensive activities. An advantage of the gravity model over the earlier standard factor endowment-based studies (e.g. Tobey (1990), is that it exploits the large amount of information contained in bilateral trade flows. It was first applied by van Beers and van den Bergh (1997) on a cross section of OECD countries. This initial approach has been extended in a number of directions, including the panel dimension (Harris et al (2001)), developing countries (Cagatay and Mihci (2003) and Grether and de Melo (2004)) the role of product differentiation (Jug and Mirza (2005)) or of regional free trade agreements (Kahn and Yoshino (2004)), while the endogeneity of environmental policy has been examined in Mantovani and Vancauteren (2005).

3. 1 The gravity model (overview)

56

Inspired initially by the law of physics (Newton), the gravity model has become an essential tool in the simulations of international trade flows. The first applications were rather intuitive without substantial theoretical claims. These applications were the object of criticisms concerning the lack of robust theoretical foundations. Among the first studies which have used the gravity model in economic analysis we can note those by Beckerman (1956), Tinbergen (1962), Poyhonen (1963), and Linnemann (1966). Linnemann explains trade flows between countries i and j and then defines it as a combination of three basic factors: the offer of the exporter country i, the demand of the importer country j and the resistance of trade between countries i and j. The potential offer of the exporter is a positive function of the income level of the exporter country which can be interpreted as a proxy of available good varieties. The potential demand of the importer country also depends positively on the income level of the importer country. The resistance of trade was approximated by geographical distance between countries i and j (proxy for the transaction costs). Gravity models have received theoretical foundations due to the development of new international trade theories with imperfect competition. Helpman and Krugman (1985) propose a formalization of the gravity equation in which the intra-trade and inter-trade approaches are reconciled.

Bergstrand (1989) model represents an extension of Helpman and Krugman model, taking into account the offer and the demand functions in explaining trade flows. The model also includes a variable of income per capita representing the capital intensity of the exporter country and of the importer country, reflecting a relative factor endowment in terms of GDP per capita. For author, this variable is an indicator of demand sophistication. Thus, Bergstrand proposes the most complete version of the gravity model using for instance, variables like GDP, GDP per capita, distance, and monetary variables.

3.2. Econometric methodology Most studies estimating a gravity model were carried out on cross-section data6. Recently several papers have argued that standard cross-section methods lead to biased results because they do not control heterogeneous trading relationships. For instance, the impacts of historical, cultural and linguistic links in trade flows are difficult to observe and to quantify, the presence of minorities, or past memberships in a common trade area can also lead to biased estimates. Panel data regressions allow to correct such effects. The use of panel data is preferred in our analysis because it allows to control specific effects. The source of potential endogeneity bias in gravity model estimations is the unobserved individual heterogeneity. Matyas (1997) argues that the cross-section approach is affected by a problem of misspecification and consider that a correct econometric specification of gravity model is a “three – way” model with exporter, importer and time effects.

6 See Baldwin (1994), Gros and Gonciarz (1996), Wei and Frankel (1998), Sapir (2001)

57

Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) indicate that the omission of specific effects per country pair can bias the estimated coefficients. Thus, they propose “two-way” gravity model specification with time and country pairs effect when the countries are alternately importer or exporter i.e.αij ≠ αji. To control specific effects a solution is to use an estimator like in a fixed effect model (FEM) or in a random effect model (REM). However, fixed effect models (FEM) allow for unobserved or misspecified factors that simultaneously explain the trade volume between two countries and lead to unbiased and efficient results7. The choice of the method (FEM or REM) depends on two important things, its economic and econometric relevance. From an economic point of view there are unobservable time invariant random variables, difficult to be quantified, which may simultaneously influence some explanatory variables and trade volume. From an econometric point of view, in the gravity model explaining trade flows, the inclusion of fixed effects is preferable to random effects because the rejection of the null assumption of uncorrelation of the unobservable characteristics with some explanatory variables is less plausible (see Baier and Bergstrand 2005). Recently Plümper and Troeger (2004) have proposed a more efficient method called “the fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD)” to accommodate time-invariant variables. Using Monte Carlo simulations they compared the performances of the FEVD method to some other existing techniques, such as the fixed effects, or random effects, or Hausman-Taylor method. Their results indicate that the most reliable technique is the FEVD if time-invariant variables and the other variables are correlated with specific effects, which is likely to be the case in our study. We now briefly present the panel data econometric methods used in our paper to estimate the possible various specifications of our models: within estimator (FEM), random effect estimator (REM), and fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD). 3.2.1. Within estimator and random estimator (FEM and REM) In the presence of correlation of the unobserved characteristics with some explanatory variables the random effect estimator leads to biased and inconsistent estimates of the parameters. To eliminate this correlation it is possible to use a traditional method called “within estimator or fixed effect estimator” which consists in transforming the data into deviations from individual means. In this case, even if a correlation between unobserved characteristics and some explanatory variables exists, the within estimator may provide unbiased and consistent results. The fixed effect model can be written as

iti

K

kitkkit uxy

1

, t = 1, 2,…,T, k=1, 2,,K regressors, i=1, 2,,N individuals (2)

, where ái denotes individual effects fixed over time and uit is the disturbance terms.

)()(1

iitikitk

K

kkiit uuxxyy

(3)

7 See for instance Matyas 1997, Festoc 1997, Egger 2002, Peridy 2006, Cheng and Wall 2005, Baier and Bergstrand

(2005), Ghosh-Yamarick (2004), Carrère C. (2006), Rose (2000), Glick and Rose 2001.

58

In the fixed effect transformation, the unobserved effect, ái, disappears and may lead to unbiased and consistent results. The random model has the same form as before,

Yit = â0 + â1xit1 + â2xit2 …………….. +âkxitk + ái + uit (4) , where an intercept is included so that the unobserved effect, ái, has a zero mean. Equation becomes a random effect model when we assume that the unobserved effect ái is uncorrelated with each explanatory variable:

Cov(xitk, ái) = 0, t = 1,2,…, T; j =1,2,…, k. (5) The hypothesis mentioned above is actually less plausible and the GLS estimator may lead to biased results. The Hausman (chi2) test consists in testing the null hypothesis of no correlation between unobserved characteristics and some explanatory variables and allows us to make a choice between random estimator and within estimator. The within estimator has however two important limits:

- it may not estimate the time invariant variables that are eliminated by data transformation;

- the fixed effect estimator ignores variations across individuals. The individual’s specificities can be correlated or not with the explanatory variable. In traditional methods these correlated variables are replaced with instrumental variables uncorrelated to unobservable characteristics.

3.2.2. Fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD)

Plümper and. Troeger (2004) suggests an alternative to the estimation of time-invariant individual variables in the presence of unit effects. The alternative is a developed model discussed in Hsiao (2003: 52). It is known that unit fixed effects are a vector of the mean effect of omitted variables, including the effect of time-invariant variables. So, the unit effects of the FEM contain the vector of time-invariant variables. It is therefore possible to regress the unit effects on the time-invariant variables to obtain approximate estimates for invariant variables. Plümper uses a three stage estimator, where the second stage only aims at the identification of the unobserved parts of the unit effects, and then uses the unexplained part to obtain unbiased POLS estimates of the time-varying and time-invariant variables only at third stage. The unit effect vector is broken into two parts; a part explained by time-invariant variables and an error-term. The model proposed by Plümper and Troeger leads to unbiased and consistent estimates of the effect of time-varying variable and unbiased for time-invariant variables if the unexplained part of unit effects is uncorrelated with time-invariant variables. The estimates of time-invariant variables are consistent only if N is large. With N being small, the evaluation of stage 2 is inconsistent. This model adopts the robustness of fixed effect model and allows for the correlation between the time-variant explanatory variables with variables and unobserved

59

individual effects. In brief, the technique fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD) proposed by Plümper and Troeger can be summarized by the three following steps: estimation of the unit fixed effects by the FEM excluding the time – invariant

explanatory variables; regression of the fixed effect vector on the time-invariant variables of the original model

(by OLS); estimation of a pooled OLS (POLS) model by including all time-variant explanatory

variables, time-invariant variables and the unexplained part of the fixed effect vector. This stage is required to control the multicolinearity and to adjust the degrees of freedom. At least in theory this method has three obvious advantages (Plümper and Troeger, 2004):

a) the fixed effect vector decomposition does not require prior knowledge of the correlation between time-variant explanatory variables and unit specific effects,

b) the estimator relies on the robustness of the within-transformation and does not need to meet the orthogonality assumptions (for time-variant variables) of random effects,

c) FEVD estimator maintains the efficiency of OLS. The FEVD is not a perfect estimator, but one of the best available. It produces unbiased estimates of time-varying variables regardless whether they are correlated with unit effects or not and unbiased estimates of time-invariant variables that are not correlated. The estimated coefficients of the time-invariable variables correlated with unit effects, however, suffer from omitted variable bias. To summarize, the FEVD produces less biased and more efficient coefficients. The main advantages of the FEVD come from its lack of bias in estimating the coefficients of time-variant variables that are correlated with unit-effects. 4. Model specification We carry out several panel data estimations in order to compare the results across specifications and to identify the most robust one. We first make a test for individual effects and if this confirms their presence, then to control the individual effects we carry out an REM and FEM estimate. To eliminate the unobservable heterogeneity due to bilateral specific effects and avoid the potential bias of the estimators taking the invariant time variables into account it is advisable to use FEVD estimator. Hausman test indicates by the value of chi2 whether the specific effects are correlated or not with the explanatory variables. The specification retained here to characterize the trade between Romania and EU-15 countries can be written as follows:

ijtijis eeeTchrDistGDPGDPeX uPolaaijt

aij

ajt

ait

aijst

543210 (12)

where : Xijst denotes the export of country i (Romania) from industry sector s to country j at time t

with i # j (CHELEM – CEPII French data base); GDPit, GDPjt represents the Gross Domestic Product of country i and country j

(CHELEM CEPII – data base) Distij represents the distance between two countries, (CEPII data base); Tchrijt is the real exchange rate which indicates the competitiveness of price;

60

jt

itijtijt P

PTcnTchr (14)

where: Tcnijt is the real exchange rate (CHELEM CEPII data base) Pi(j) is consumer price index (WORLD BANK – World Tables) Polis is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the industry sector is pollutant and so it was a

stringent environmental regulation as a consequence of Corporate social responsibility adoption and 0 otherwise;

ao is the intercept; uij individual effect; εijt is the error term.

After log linearization equation (14) becomes: Ln(Xijst) = a0 +a1ln(GDPit) +a2ln(GDPjt) +a3ln(Distij) +a4ln(Tchrijt) +a5Polis +uij+ εijt (15)

The expected signs for the estimators associated with the variables are based on traditional arguments. Theoretically, we expect a positive effect of the variables like the country size, and a negative impact of the geographical distance and of the real exchange rate and environmental regulation. The more the real exchange rate index drops the more there is a depreciation of the exporter currency with respect to the currency of his partner and export competitiveness is improved. Geographical distance has always theoretically a negative impact being a proxy of transactional cost.

Our estimates are organized in a panel with Romania as exporter, EU-15 countries8 as importers and 19 sectors (NC – combined nomenclature) and cover a 7 year period (from 1998 to 2004). The results of FEM, REM, FEVD estimations are reported in table n0.1 that summarizes the results of our estimations for the whole sample.

THE ESTIMATION RESULTS Table no : 1

FEM REM FEVD (1) (2) (3)

VARIABLES

Xij Xij xij 2.490 1.545 2.490 GDPjt

(3.98)** (11.16)** (92.38)*** 3.507 3.569 3.507 GDPit

(8.06)** (12.31)** (12.64)*** -1.190 -0.016 -1.190 TCHRijt

(3.34)** (0.10) (33.20)*** 0.000 -1.969 -1.643 DISTij

(0.00)** (5.52)** (27.58)*** 0.000 -0.109 -0.153 POLis

(0.00)** (0.90) (-7.60)*** Constant -28.284 -17.304 -22.945 8 Belgium and Luxembourg are treated together.

61

(11.78)** (8.91)** (-15.82)*** - - 1.000 Residuals - - (91.99)***

R-squared 0.15 0.34 0.91 Observations9 1728 1728 1728 Test for presence fixed effect Prob>F

33.25 (0.00)

- -

Hausman - 17.33 (0.00)

-

Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level The FEM estimator indicates the presence of individual effects. It is an unbiased estimator but it is not appropriated for our analyse because the interest variable POL is time invariant variable and so it was excluded from the estimation. On the other hand REM estimator is biased due of the correlation between the individual effect and the explanatory variables (Hausman test reject the null hypothesis Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic). In this case the FEVD is the most appropriated estimator for our analyses.

5. CONCLUSIONS This paper studied the possible impact of environmental policy as a consequence of Corporate social responsibility adoption on Romanian international competitiveness and thus on the export flows. The stringency of environmental regulations was approximated by a dummy variable which take value 1 if the pressure is significant for the industry sector and it takes value 0 otherwise. It is commonly belief that the pollution-intensive industries of Romania it was the most concerned with the stringent environmental regulation. The use of panel econometric method in empirical analysis of trade flows is convenient because it permits for controlling the individual heterogeneity to avoid biased results. As it is known, the time-series and cross-section, not controlling for heterogeneity, run the risk of obtaining biased results10. Furthermore, the fixed effects vector decomposition (FEVD) estimator allows us to obtain the unbiased, consistent and efficient results. The results suggest that traditional variables of the gravity model confirm the expected results. Thus, we obtain a positive significant effect of the country size variables (attraction factors), and a negative significant impact of the geographical distance and of the real exchange rate (resistance factors). With regard to the environmental costs due the stringent environmental regulation we obtain a negative significant impact on the Romanian comparative advantage patterns and so on the export flows. The negative sign for the environmental regulation variable indicate that the Porter hypothesis is not confirmed in Romanian case. That can be explained by the relatively short period of the

9 Only 1728 observations are available from 1862 (19 sectors x 14 countries x 7 years) 10 Badi H. Baltagi (2001)

62

analyses only seven years and also by the fact that the analyses period coincide with massive industries reorganization due the economic transition period.

References

[1] Baier, L.S., Bergstrand, J.H, “Do Free Trade Agreements Actually increase Members' International Trade?”, FRB of Atlanta Working Paper No. 2005-3., 2005 [2] Baltagi B.H., “Econometric Analysis of Panel Data”, John Wiley & Sons Ltd,New York, 2nd edition.,2001 [3] Beers, C. v., and Bergh, J. van den (1997). An empirical multi-country analysis of the impact of environmental regulation on foreign trade flows. Kyklos, 50, 29–46. [4] Çagatay, S., and H. Mihçi,. “Industrial Pollution, Environmental Suffering and Policy Measures: An Index of Environmental Sensitivity Performance (IESP)”, International Journal of Environmental Assessment Policy and Management, Vol. 5 (2). 2003 [5] Carrere C.,“Revisiting the Effects of Regional Trading Agreements on Trade Flows with Proper Specification of Gravity Model”, European Economic Review vol. 50, 223-247, 2006 [6] Cheng I.-H.,Wall, H. Controlling for heterogeneity in gravity models of trade and integration, Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis Review 87, 49-63., 2005 [7] Copeland, B., and Taylor, S. (2003). International Trade and the Environment: Theory and Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [8] DiMagio and Powwell “Environmental Management Accounting: Informational and Institutional Developments”, Springer Netherlands,2004 [9] Egger P., “A note on the Proper Econometric Specification of the Gravity Equation”, Economics Letters, Vol. 66, pp.25-31,2000 [10] Egger, P., and Pfaffermayr, M., “Structural Funds, EU Enlargement, and the Redistribution of FDI in Europe “,WIFO Working Papers, Nr. 195, 2003. [11] Festoc F., “Le potentiel de croissance du commerce des pays d’Europe Centrale et Orientale avec la France et ses principaux partenaires”, Economie et Prévision.,n°218,1997 [12] Ghosh S., Yamarik S., “Are Regional Trading Arrangements Trade Creating?: An Aplication of Extreme Bounds Analysis.”, Journal of International Economics 63, no.2: 369-395., July 2004 [13] Greene, W. (2000). Econometric Analysis (fourth ed.). Upper Saddle River NJ: Prentice Hall International. [14] Grether, J.-M. et J. de Melo, "Globalization and Dirty Industries: Do Pollution Havens Matter?", in R. Baldwin and A. Winters eds,2004 [15] Harris, M., Kònyà, L., and Màtyàs, L. (2002). Modeling the impact of environmental regulation on bilateral trade flows: OECD, 1990–1996. The World Economy, 25,387–405. [16] Helpman, E. and Krugman, P., “Market Structure and Foreign Trade. Increasing Returns, Imperfect Competition, and the International Economy”, Cambridge MA/ London: MIT Pres. 1985. [17] Jug J. and Daniel Mirza : " Environmental Regulations and Trade in Europe: the Role of Differentiation" ", World Economy, Volume 28 (11) ,2005 [18] Kahn, M. and Yoshino, Y. (2004). Testing for pollution havens inside and outside of regional trading blocs. Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy, 4, no. 2, Article 4. http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/vol4/iss2/art4

63

[19] Linnemann, H., “An Econometric Study of International Trade Flows”, North Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1966.

[20] Mantovani A. & M. Vancauteren, “The Harmonization of Technical Barriers to Trade, Innovation and Export Behavior: Theory with an application to EU Environmental”, Data Working Paper, 480, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna,2005

[21] Matyas, L., “Proper Econometric Specification of the Gravity Model”, The World Economie, 20 (3), 363-368, 1997 [22] Mulatu, A., Florax, R., and Withagen, C. (2003). Environmental regulation and competitiveness: an exploratory meta-analysis. In C. Boehringer and A. Loeschel (eds.), Empirical Modeling of the Economy and the Environment (ZEW Economic Studies). Heidelberg: Physica Verlag (20, 23–54). [23] Péridy. N., « La nouvelle politique de voisinage de l’Union européenne,ne estimation des potentiels de commerce’,Revue économique ,4 (Vol. 57)| ISSN 0035-2764 | ISSN numérique : en cours | ISBN : 2-7246-3037-8 | page 727 à 746, 2006 [24] Plumper, T. and V. Troeger (2004), “The Estimation of Time-Invariant Variables in Panel Analysis with Unit Fixed Effects,” Konstanz University, mimeo [25] Porter, M.E. and C. van der Linde (1995), “Towards a New Conception of the Environment- Competitiveness Relationship”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 97-118. [26] Rault C., Şova A., Şova R., „The Role of Association Agreements within European Union Enlargement to Central and Eastern European Countries” IZA Discussion Papers , Bonn, Germania, Nr. 2769/2007 [27] Rose, Andrew K. “One Money One Market,” Economic Policy 15-30, 7-46, 2000. [28] Tinbergen, J. (1962), Shaping the World Economy: Suggestions for an International Economic Policy, The Twentieth Century Fund, New York. [29] Tobey, J. (1990), “The Effects of Domestic Environmental Policies and Patterns of World Trade: An Empirical Test”, Kyklos, 43, 191-209. [30] William H. Greene, “Econometric Analysis” Fifth Edition, Pearson Education, 2002 [31] Sova A., Sova, R., “Le commerce international dans les conditions de l’intégration européenne », Romanian Statistical Review, No 12. p.79-86, 2006 [32] Tobey, J. (1990). The impact of domestic environmental policy on international trade: an empirical test. Kyklos, 43, 191–209. [33] Wooldrige, J.H., “Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data 2rd Edition”: Books: The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England, 2002.

64

5.4 Determinants of Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditure in Romania: A Multilevel Analysis (articol publicat on-line in CeSifo Working Papers, urmeaza sa fie publicat in format hartie in Working Papers Series, indexate RePEC ISSN 1617-9595)

Determinants of Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditure in Romania: A Multilevel Analysis

Guglielmo Maria Caporale Christophe Rault

Robert Sova Anamaria Sova

CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3255 CATEGORY 9: RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENT

ECONOMICS NOVEMBER 2010

An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded • from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com

• from the RePEc website: www.RePEc.org • from the CESifo website: www.CESifo-group.org/wp

65

CESifo Working Paper No. 3255

Determinants of Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditure in Romania: A Multilevel Analysis

Abstract

The transition process in Central and Eastern Europe was associated with growing environmental awareness. This paper analyses the determinants of Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditure (PACE) at plant level in the case of Romania using survey data and a Multilevel Regression Model (MRM). Our findings suggest that, although Romania has improved its environmental performance, formal and informal regulation are still only partially developed due to the difficulties of economic transition, and heterogeneity across regions remains considerable.

JEL-Code: Q52, C29, C40.

Keywords: Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditure, transition economy, Multilevel Regression Model (MRM).

Guglielmo Maria Caporale Centre for Empirical Finance

Brunel University London UK – West London UB8 3PH

United Kingdom Guglielmo-Maria.Caporale@brunel.ac.uk

Christophe Rault LEO / CNRS UMR 6221

University of Orleans Rue de Blois-B.P.6739

France – 45067 Orléans Cedex 2 chrault@hotmail.com

Robert Sova

Academy of Economic Studies and Center of Economics Studies Paris 1

Sorbonne University 106-112 bd. de L’Hôpital

France – 75647 Paris Cedex 13 robertsova@yahoo.com

Anamaria Sova Economic&Business Research Center Center of Economics Studies Paris 1

Sorbonne University 106-112 bd. de L’Hôpital

France – 75647 Paris Cedex 13 anamariasova@yahoo.fr

This paper has been realised within the project 92-120 (CNMP). The authors are in alphabetic order.

66

1. Introduction

Global environmental issues have acquired crucial importance in recent years.

Pollution is responsible for decreased overall biodiversity, and the alteration of geographical

landscapes and climatic patterns, with a negative impact on the global economy. This

represents a significant challenge for policy-makers.

Romania, like other countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), has been making

several efforts to comply with the environmental legislation of the European Union (EU). Its

heavy mineral and petrochemical industries being highly polluting, a new environmental law

framework was adopted in 1995 in order to achieve the transition to an environmentally

sustainable market economy. The new laws introduced a number of policy instruments,

including environmental permits, charges, subsidies, legal liabilities and other economic

incentives. Compliance has required firms to implement substantial changes at plant level. In

particular, pollution abatement efforts have had an impact on both capital expenditure and

operating costs.

Early in the transition process, Romania and the other CEE countries experienced a

decline in industrial production and a consequent decrease in pollution levels. In subsequent

stages, higher economic growth may lead to higher pollution, unless concerted action is taken

to implement more effective environmental policies. Unfortunately, environmental efforts in

Romania face the twin obstacles of severe budgetary constraints and a legacy of poor practice

in investment and project management. In this context, innovative and effective financing

strategies for environmental protection need to be developed or strengthened, and steps must

be taken to ensure that scarce financial resources are allocated efficiently to address priority

issues.

The aim of the present study is to shed some light on the factors affecting Pollution

Abatement and Control Expenditure (PACE) in Romania. Its contribution is threefold: first, it

analyses the case of a transition economy, in contrast to the existing literature which mostly

focuses on developed economies; second, it uses a database at plant level; third, it adopts a

suitable econometric method, i.e. the Multilevel Regression Model (MRM), to investigate the

determinants of environmental behaviour at plant level.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the

relevant literature on environmental performance. Section 3 reviews the theory of

environmental regulation focusing on the Pigouvian and Coasian approaches. Section 4

outlines the econometric framework and presents the empirical findings. Section 5 offers

some concluding remarks.

67

2. Literature Review

The basic economic processes are production and consumption: firms transform natural

resources, through the production process, into commodities supplied to consumers. However,

this conversion is never perfectly efficient: by-products (residuals) are produced. When such

residuals have no economic value they can be thought of as waste, which may lead to

pollution.

Thus, firms impose costs on other agents in the economy. This is a typical case of a

negative externality. As prices do not take into account the negative effects on the

environment, they do not reflect full production costs for the economy; to correct this form of

market failure it is necessary to introduce environmental regulations, as otherwise there is no

incentive for a polluting profit-maximising firm to internalise the externality (DiMaggio and

Powell, 1983). When formal regulation is weak or perceived to be insufficient, communities

may informally regulate firms indirectly or directly through bargaining, petitioning and

lobbying. Clearly, determining the “right” amount of pollution requires evaluating its negative

effects - the willingness to pay to reduce pollution is an obvious measure. Environmental

issues invariably involve a trade-off between using resources for conventional goods and

services or for environmental protection instead - i.e. how much is a consumer willing to pay

for a particular level of an environmental good?

Since the Brundtland Report was published in 1987 as a result of the work of the

World Commission on Environment and Development, extensive research has been done by

economists on how to improve environmental performance through pollution abatement, in

some cases using capital expenditure as a proxy for environmental performance (Panayotou et

al., 1997; Ferraz and Seroa da Motta, 2002; OECD, 2001). Pollution abatement and control of

residuals from production processes can be achieved either using end-of-pipe technology

attached to a given production process, or by changing the process. Investment in the former

does not affect the production process itself, and the amount of pollution generated; instead, it

aims to treat pollution already generated. By contrast, investment in integrated technologies is

synonymous with reducing the amount of potential pollutants at source, reducing the

consumption of resources and energy, and recycling residues and used products.

Some research has analysed specific external factors that drive companies to improve

their environmental performance, such as regulatory regime or government support (Delmas,

2003; Chan and Wong, 2006; Rivera, 2004; Rivera and de Leon, 2004; Rivera et al., 2006;

Shin, 2005), pressure from local wealthy stakeholders, civil society, and foreign customers in

Europe and Japan (Neumayer and Perkins, 2004) and industry pressure (Guler et al., 2002;

68

Corbett and Kirsch, 2004; Viadiu et al., 2006). Other research has focused on the role of

internal organisational factors such as “organisational structure and culture.” Only a few

studies have begun integrating key organisational characteristics with institutional theory.

This approach can yield new insights into understanding differences between firms’

strategies. (Seroa da Motta, 2006; Gunningham, 1995; Hoffman, 2001).

Some other studies have analysed the implications of corruption and political

instability for firm investment in abatement technology. Their prediction is that greater

corruptibility increases the level of abatement technology investment. The strategic incentive

to under-invest in pollution control technology declines when policymakers become more

corruptible. Similarly, political instability is predicted to increase abatement technology

investment (Fredriksson et al., 2008). Fredriksson et al. (2005) analyse the relationship

between environmental lobbies and environmental policy in rich and developing countries,

and find that lobbying leads to more stringent environmental policies.

Chávez and Stranlund (2009) show that setting a uniform tax equal to the expected

marginal damage is not generally efficient under incomplete information about firms’

abatement costs and damages from pollution. The efficient emissions tax rates will vary

across firms if a regulator can use observable firm-level characteristics to gain some

information about how the firms’ marginal abatement costs vary.

A few more recent studies concerning the relationship between enforcement

mechanism and firm’s compliance behaviour highlight the fact that an increase in

enforcement efforts may provide better environmental results (Shimshack and Ward, 2008).

Even in an industry where compliance is generally high, an increase in enforcement through

fines can cause a significant reduction in discharges. Enforcement not only induces non-

compliant plants to become compliant, it also makes many typically over-compliant plants

reduce discharges even further below the permitted levels.

Almost all these empirical studies focus on the developed countries. Additional

challenges are faced by the developing economies, including the CEE countries such as

Romania, which underwent a transition process. Under central planning, the well-known bias

towards heavy industry combined with a lack of incentives to economise on inputs created

considerable waste and pollution. Thus, in the transition countries production technologies are

substantially less efficient than in the developed economies, and therefore emissions per unit

of output are higher. In addition to the environmental problems inherited from the period of

central planning, transition economies have experienced various other difficulties, including

69

financial and economic hardship. The adjustment to market equilibrium is a gradual process,

during which many variables such as provision of public goods, willingness to pay,

technology and capital markets etc. are in disequilibrium. This creates both constraints and

opportunities that may not be available to more “settled” economies.

From an econometric viewpoint, the Multilevel Regression Model (MRM) is the most

appropriate for our sample which contains hierarchical data structured in three levels (plant,

county and region). We choose this approach because it allows to combine these levels into a

single analytical framework. This is important as theory suggests that different levels are

interrelated.

3. Environmental regulation: the theoretical framework

The impact of environmental regulation on the economy should be examined both

theoretically and empirically. Economists thought of the problem of environmental

degradation as one in which the economic agents impose external costs on society as a whole

in the form of pollution. The obvious solution was seen as the introduction of a tax on the

polluting activity internalising social costs. Thus, the study of the degradation of the

environment introduces the concept of externality, which is one of the main arguments for

neoclassical interventionism. External effects have been analysed in the light of the divergent

views of Pigou and Coase respectively.

Pigou (1920) introduced the concept of external economy as a form of service or

disservice to others which is not paid or compensated, focusing on the divergence between

private and social marginal products. The presence of externalities legitimised the

intervention of the state, whose goal was to restore the equality between marginal products,

guaranteeing the maximisation of social income. The solution lies in taxing the activity

causing the disservice. Since the pioneering study of Pigou (1920) it has been recognised that

a regulatory authority can internalise external costs resulting from production (emissions) by

introducing an environmental tax based on the marginal damage resulting from the activity

(Pigouvian tax).

Coase (1960) called into question the assertion that the presence of externalities

legitimates corrective government intervention, in order to restore an optimal situation in

terms of allocation of resources. His criticism is based on demonstrating the existence of a

spontaneously negotiated solution. This argument is the heart of his well known “Coase

Theorem”. This shows that decentralised bargaining between sender and receiver of the

harmful effect for the amount of compensatory payment for the nuisance can produce a

70

situation corresponding to an optimal final allocation.

The Coasian criticism is fundamental to the neo-liberal offensive against neoclassical

interventionism. Essentially, Coase establishes the existence of a solution to pollution

problems by spontaneous negotiation between the concerned agents. This direct solution

breaks with the Pigouvian approach in two ways: the recognition of the reciprocal nature of

the harmful effects and the introduction into economic analysis of the legal concept of

property rights. However, as the hypothesis of zero transaction costs is unrealistic, the

Coasian solution has been marginalised in the field of environmental economics.

In brief, in the Pigouvian approach it is the polluter which is responsible for the

externality and the policy prescription consists in a pollution tax. By contrast, in the Coasian

approach the externality is assumed to be reciprocal (i.e., both polluter and polluted cause it),

and this implies that legal rules and institutions should change to internalise it.

Our aim is to establish whether formal (governmental) environmental regulation is

more effective than informal ones (negotiation, community pressure) in reducing pollution in

the case of Romania.

4. Econometric Analysis

4.1 Econometric method

In the statistics literature MRM is alternatively referred to as multilevel analysis,

hierarchical models, random coefficients models, and variance components analysis. The

common element of all these methods is that the dependent variable is analysed as a function

of predictors measured at the lowest level and of those measured at higher levels. The

rationale for using the multilevel model is based on the assumption that the variation in the

dependent variable is a function of both lower-level and higher-level factors - not only of

individual-level attributes, but also of extra-individual factors. Besides, the relationship

between lower- and higher-level factors and the dependent variable is not assumed to be fixed

or constant across space or time. Therefore, the regression coefficients in micro-level models

are not fixed, and they can vary across these factors.

Conceptually, the model is often viewed as a hierarchical system of regression

equations. The simplest multilevel model that can be formulated considers only two levels of

analysis5. The analysis focuses on level-1 (individuals), whilst level-2 (group) provides the

context for the level-1 units. For instance, in our case, level-1 units are the plants who are

nested in different counties (level-2 units). The dependent variable (note: in Yij , i refers to

71

p

5 For more details concerning MRM, see Greene (2002).

level-1 units and j refers to level-2 units) is measured for level-1 units, since this is the

primary level of analysis. The explanatory variables are Xij for level-1 and Zj for level-2. By

assumption, there are J groups and in each group there are Ni individuals.

Thus, there is a separate regression equation for each group.

where :

Yij = β 0 j + β1 j X ij + ε ij with (j = 1,2, …….J; i = 1,2,……N) (1)

β0 is the regression intercept;

β1 is the regression slope for the explanatory variable X;

εij is the residual term.

To model group variation (this time for the level-2 units) in regression parameters

additional equations are required, with the level-1 regression parameters as their dependent

variables. The regression includes at least a constant, one level-2 explanatory variable and a

disturbance.

Thus, a typical level-2 model consists of the following equations:

β 0 j

β ij

= µ00 + µ01 Z j + u0 j

= µ10 + µ11 Z j + u1 j

with (j = 1,2,….N) (2) with (j = 1,2,….N) (3)

After substituting equations (2) and (3) into equation (1), one obtains:

Yij = µ00 + µ01 Z j + µ10 X ij + µ11 X ij Z j + u1 j X ij + u0 j + ε ij

(4)

where: µ00 is the intercept; µ01 µ10 are the effect of the level-2 variable Zj on level-1 Xij ; µ11

is the cross-level interaction between the level-1 and level-2 variables. The last three terms in

equation [4] are the disturbance terms.

If there are P variables X at level-1 (lowest level) and Q variables Z at level-2 (highest

level) the equations (1→4) become:

Yij = β

P

j + ∑ β pj X ij

+ ε ij

0 (1a) p =1

72

q

q

β 0 j

Q

= µ00 + ∑ uoq Z j + u0 j

(2a)

q =1

β pj

= µ p

Q

0 + ∑ µ =

pq Z j

+ u pj

(3a)

q 1

73

P Q Q P P

Yij

= µ00 + ∑ µ p 0 X ij

+ ∑ µ0 q Z j

+ ∑∑ µ pq Z j X ij

+ ∑ u pj X ij

+ u j + ε ij

(4a)

where:

p =1

p

q =1

q

q =1 p =1

q p p 0

p =1

µ are the regression coefficients (fixed parts of the model – they do not change across

groups);

u are the residuals at the group level;

ε are the residuals at the individual level. The residuals u and ε are the random or stochastic

part of the model.

The multilevel model can be extended to more than two levels of analysis. The

parameters at the highest level are always assumed to be fixed. A multilevel model extended

to a greater number of levels produces structures that are even more complex and implies

more complex disturbance term. Recent advances in computational power and software

packages allows the analysis of at least three-level models, and even nine levels, but the

interpretation of complex multi-level models is very difficult. That is why more than two

levels should not be included unless one has a clear rationale for doing so and strong priors

about the nature of the effects.

The standard techniques for combining data of different levels often break down,

while multilevel methods allows to take into consideration their relationships and at the same

time avoid the pitfalls associated with the traditional methods of dummy variable models and

standard interactive approaches (see Jones and Steenbergen, 2002) for more details

concerning the multilevel methods).

4.2 Model specification

The econometric model used here considers four determinants of pollution

expenditure: plant characteristics, market incentives, communities’ characteristics and

regulation intensity. In our analysis we focus on the regulatory variables in order to explain

pollution abatement through the control expenditure at plant level. The dependent variable is

plant environmental pollution expenditure (PACE) defined as:

PACE = f (PLANT , MARKET , COMMUNITY , REGULATORY ) (5)

Plant - Plant characteristics,

Market – Market incentives,

Community - Community characteristics,

74

Regulatory - Regulatory intensity.

Plant characteristics included in the analysis are the competitiveness of the firm,

ownership, size, location, the technology used and external financing. Competitiveness and

profitability are important factors as they represent the willingness and ability of the firm to

abate pollution. Other relevant variables are solvency, liquidity and the debt ratio which are

indices of financial stability and can provide more information about the ability of plants to

invest in pollution abatement technology.

Regarding ownership, we consider three categories, namely enterprises with state

capital (state-owned enterprises), with private capital (privately owned enterprises) and with

mixed capital. We also distinguish between domestic and foreign enterprises.

Plant size is proxied by turnover and is a measure of the ability of the firm to invest in

order to abate pollution. The geographical location can be urban or rural. Eight regions are

considered. The technology used in the production process allows to distinguish between

intensive pollution sectors (dirty sectors) and the non-pollutant sectors (clean sectors).

It is also important to take into account other economic factors and market

characteristics of the environment where plants develop their activities. Thus, income per

capita at purchasing power parity at national and regional level are included as a measure of

the standard of living. People from regions with high income tend to be better educated, more

informed about environmental issues and more active in abating pollution.

Government’s pressure or formal regulation is included in the form of environmental

taxes and penalties, environmental subsidies and legislation on air and water pollution

abatement at regional level. As for community pressure or informal regulation, we consider

non-governmental organisations (NGO) at regional and county level which can exert

important pressure on plants to abate pollution and use cleaner technologies.

Table 1 provides a list of variable definitions and a summary of theoretical priors for their

effects on pollution abatement.

Table 1 Variable Definitions and Expected Signs

Variables Definitions Sign

Plant characteristic variables

75

Profitit Disposable profit of plant i in year t as a measure of

competitiveness and profitability;

+

Productit Plant productivity of plant i in year t as a measure of

economic performance;

+

Debtit Debt ratio of plant i in year t as a measure of a company's

financial leverage;

-

Turnoverit Turnover of plant i in year t as a measure of plant activity

size;

+

Svbit Solvency of plant i in year t as a measure of financial

performance;

+

Lqtit Liquidity of plant i in year t as a measure of financial

performance;

+

CSit Ownership of the plant i in year t. The dummy variable takes

value 1 if the plant is a state-owned enterprise and 0

otherwise;

+/-

CPit Ownership of the plant i in year t. The dummy variable takes

value 1 if the plant is a privately owned enterprise and 0

otherwise;

+/-

CMit Ownership of the plant i in year t. The dummy variable takes

value 1 if the plant has mixed capital and 0 otherwise;

+/-

Frgnit Foreign plants. The dummy variable takes value 1 for foreign

enterprises and 0 for domestic enterprises;

+/-

Locit Geographical location of the plant i in year t according to the

degree of urbanization. The dummy variable takes value 1 if

the plant is located in an urban area and 0 if is located in

rural area;

+/-

Efnit Foreign financing aid of plant i in year t. +/-

Market incentive variables

Isoit ISO 14001 certification, indicating environmental

management adoption by the plant i. The dummy variable

takes value 1 if the plant is certified ISO and 0 otherwise;

+

76

Markit Listing on Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE) of plant i in

year t, proxy for the firm’s visibility. The dummy variable

takes value 1 if the plant is listed at BSE and 0 otherwise;

+

PCIkt Per capita income for each region k in the year t , a proxy for

local informal regulatory pressure, education and citizen

activism;

+

CRPt Corruption index of the country in year t; -

Community characteristics variables

UnEmpjt Unemployment rate of county j in year t as a proxy for

population welfare ;

-

RSHkt Population with university studies of region k in year t as a

proxy for population skills;

+

Regulatory intensity variables

PollSectit Pollution industry sectors as a proxy for intensity of

regulation and environmental policy instruments. Dummy

variable which takes value 1 if the production of the plant i

in year t is dirty and 0 otherwise;

+

EnvNGOjt Number of environmental non-governmental organisations of

county j in year t;

+

Locpresit The existence of the local pressure on the plant i in year t.

Dummy variable which takes value 1 if the plant i in year t

was subject to a local pressure and 0 otherwise;

+

EnvGuardkt Environmental penalties in region k in the year t, proxy for

the formal regulatory pressure to adopt an environmental

behaviour- liability environmental policy instruments;

+

EnvTxit Environmental taxes of plant i in year t , proxy for the

economic incentives to adopt an environmental behaviour –

economic environmental policy instruments;

+

EnvSubit Environmental subsidies of plant i in year t, policy

instruments to promote plant environmental behaviour-

economic environmental policy instruments;

+

Acomt Communitary aquis. Dummy variable which takes value 1 if

the country adopted the aquis in year t and 0 otherwise;

+

77

Thus, the econometric specification used is the following: (6)

log(PACEit ) = β0 + β1 log(Profitit ) + β 2 log(Productit ) + β3 log(Debtit ) + β 4 log(Turnoverit ) + + β5 log(Svbit ) + β6 Lqtit + β7 CSit + β8CPit + β9 CMit + β10 Frgnit + β11 Locit + β12 Efnit + β13 Isoit + β14 log(Markit ) + β15 log(PCIkt ) + β16 log(CRPt ) + β17 log(UnEmpjt ) + β18 PollSectit + + β19 log(EnvNGOjt ) + β 20 Locpresit + β 21 log(EnvGuardkt ) + β 22 log(EnvTxit ) + β 23 log(EnvSubit ) + β 24 Acomt + uit

where: PACEit = pollution abatement expenditure incurred by plant i in year t and uit is the

error term. Some details about our sample and the data sources are provided below.

4.3 Data

The analysis has been carried out for Romania in the period 2002 – 2005. The data are

taken from the yearly survey of plant pollution abatement effort conducted by the Romanian

National Institute of Statistic which inquires about capital expenditures and operating cost

associated with pollution abatement efforts. Data in the survey are tabulated by industry.

The data are in the form of a panel providing environmental and financial information

at establishment level (on pollution abatement and control expenditure, environmental taxes

and subsidies) and community characteristics and regulation intensity data at county level for

the period 2002-2005. The sample contains plants covering almost all industrial sectors. We

selected only the plants with continuous activity over the sample period (1422 plants).

The establishment characteristics (economic and financial information) are taken from

plant financial reports. Also, we identified the firms that were traded on the capital market

and listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange, and those certified ISO 14001, using information

from the Romanian Accreditation Association. The community characteristics were obtained

from the Romanian National Institute of Statistics, except for the number of environmental

ONG which comes from the Ministry of Environment. Using the information from

Environmental Guard we constructed a proxy variable for regulation intensity (environmental

penalties levied).

4.4 Empirical results and policy implications

First, we run a regression for total environmental expenditure, and then we model the

pollution abatement effort separately for air and water. Subsequently, we also analyse

pollution abatement at the regional level, so as to highlight the different determinants for each

region.

78

4.4.1 Abatement pollution effort

The econometric results from the model are reported in Table 2. Table 2: Econometric results of determinants of abatement pollution effort

OLS OLS OLS MRM (1) (2) (3) (4)

Variables

PACEit PACEit PACEit PACEit 0.087 0.092 0.090 0.075 Productit

(5.19)*** (5.51)*** (5.36)*** (4.58)*** 0.032 -0.040 0.052 0.024 Svbit (0.66) (0.82) (1.08) (0.50) 0.150 0.122 0.125 0.103 Lqtit

(4.57)*** (3.70)*** (3.63)*** (3.02)*** 0.837 0.843 0.851 0.795 Turnoverit

(48.03)*** (48.06)*** (48.19)*** (4.51)*** 0.042 0.046 0.144 0.138 Profitit

(3.04)*** (3.34)*** (3.20)*** (2.79)*** 0.437 0.412 0.387 0.375 Frgnit

(5.15)*** (4.85)*** (4.57)*** (4.03)*** 0.455 0.492 0.510 0.492 ISOit

(5.23)*** (5.65)*** (5.85)*** (5.52)*** 0.858 0.831 0.826 0.800 Markit

(22.87)*** (22.12)*** (22.02)*** (20.52)*** 0.199 0.196 0.192 0.182 PollSectit

(6.64)*** (6.54)*** (6.44)*** (5.32)*** 0.295 0.294 0.294 0.293 EnvSubit

(10.45)*** (10.41)*** (10.45)*** (10.58)*** 0.393 0.390 0.382 0.320 Efnt

(6.91)*** (6.86)*** (6.75)*** (6.12)*** -0.328 -0.327 -0.325 -0.324 Debtit

(6.36)*** (6.35)*** (6.33)*** (6.00)*** -0.628 -0.587 -0.617 -0.362 CSit

(5.99)*** (5.60)*** (5.90)*** (6.38)*** 0.347 0.338 0.329 0.210 CMit

(4.91)*** (4.77)*** (4.66)*** (2.70)*** 0.324 0.328 0.336 0.377 CPit

(4.09)*** (4.14)*** (4.25)*** (4.31)*** 0.151 0.158 0.151 0.125 EnvTXit

(15.85)*** (16.42)*** (15.58)*** (4.50)*** - -0.145 -0.076 -0.014 UnEmpjt

(1.63) (0.73) (1.34) - 0.168 -0.064 -0.073 Locit

(1.67)* (1.14) (0.13) - 0.066 -0.050 0.072 EnvNGOjt

(1.49) (1.05) (1.29) - -0.061 0.203 0.126 LocPresit

(1.39) (0.11) (1.03) PCIkt - - 1.481 5.277

79

(7.71)*** (5.53)*** - - 0.085 0.020 Acomt

(2.53)** (1.61)* - - 0.035 0.255 EnvGUARDkt

(2.59)*** (6.51)*** - - -0.126 -0.069 CRPt

(2.11)** (1.20)* -3.044 -3.669 1.518 20.071 Constant

(20.29)*** (20.56)*** (2.01)** (5.39)*** Observations 5688 5688 5688 5688 R-squared 0.30 0.31 0.31 - Log restricted-likelihood - - - -34871.95 Sd_reg - - - 0.88 IC_reg - - - 0.33 Sd_jud - - - 0.75 IC_jud - - - 0.26 Sd_residual - - - 1.26 LR test vs. OLS chi2 - - - 807.22 Prob>chi2 (0.00) Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Note: the regressions (1→3) are performed using the ordinary least squares (OLS) and 4 is performed with

multilevel regression (MRM).

Sd_reg = Standard deviation at the region level (3);

Sd_jud = Standard deviation at the county level (2);

Sd_residual = Standard deviation at the plant level (1);

IC_reg = Intraclass_ correlation (region – fiscal) = Sd

Sd _ reg

reg 2 + Sd

2 residual 2

IC_jud = Intraclass_ correlation (county – fiscal) = Sd

Sd _ jud jud 2 + Sd

2 residual 2

If the interclass correlation (IC) approaches 0 then the grouping by counties (or regions) is not of any use (one

might as well run a simple regression). If IC approaches 1 then there is no variance to explain at the individual

level, every unit being the same.

We focus in particular on the results obtained through the multilevel method (column

4). It can be seen that the signs of the statistically significant variables are in general as

expected. The large and successful firms with capital availability are more likely to adopt an

environmental behaviour and invest in environmental protection. The competitiveness

variables have a positive and significant effect. Thus, if the plants are more competitive (i.e.,

profitable) they abate pollution more aggressively, presumably because they can afford to

invest more to improve their environmental performance. Plants with good solvency and

liquidity and not too indebted can invest more in cleaner technologies. Size also matters As

80

already mentioned, this is proxied by turnover. From our results it is clear that the largest

plants are more aggressive in abating pollution.

Plant ownership also plays an important role. We find a negative correlation between

state-owned plants and abatement efforts and a positive one in the case of privately owned or

mixed capital enterprises. Most enterprises in our sample have private or mixed capital, the

state owned plants representing only 5 % of the total. After 1989, Romania privatised many

state owned enterprises. This wave of privatisation has increased the competitiveness and

efficiency of plants and thus has improved their environmental performance. Our results show

clearly that private enterprises (domestic or foreign) make more significant abatement efforts.

Concerning the relationship between geographical location and abatement efforts, our results

show that clean technologies are more common in the urban areas, whilst more pollution is

found in the rural ones. Financial or foreign aid is also positively correlated with abatement

effort.

Market pressure from consumers, investors and competing firms, estimated by the

adoption of ISO 14001 and by the listing on the Bucharest Stock Exchange, has a significant

positive impact. Good visibility of a plant and the adoption of environmental management

standards are two important determinants of abatement efforts and indicate that the

management of these plants are more responsive to environmental regulations.

There is a positive relationship between regional per capita income and abatement

effort. Our sample includes eight regions as specified in table A1 in the appendix. Regions

with a higher income are more environmentally aware and invest more in pollution

abatement. The corruption index is instead negatively correlated with abatement effort.

Community groups, proxied by unemployment and the number of environmental non-

governmental organisations, have no statistically significant impact on PACE. EnvNGOs do

not appear to have an important role either. In general, in the transition economies the concern

for the environment is not a top priority for the community, which is confronted with

economical and financial problems.

Concerning the government pressure on plants we used three proxies for formal

regulatory pressure, namely environmental penalties, taxes and subsidies. Public authorities

which are concerned with regulatory enforcement and monitoring are critical factors

influencing plants’ decisions to take an environmental approach and undertake environmental

investment. Environmental penalties and subsidies and environmental taxes are found to have

a statistically significant positive impact. These results show that, although formal regulations

81

are still only partially developed, they have measurably beneficial effects on abatement efforts

in the case of Romania.

4.4.2. Water and Air Pollution Abatement Effort

Environmental standards are typically drafted by research institutes or ministries. A

system of environmental authorisations has been created consisting of environmental

agreements and environmental permits. All environmental permits specify that enterprises are

responsible for monitoring emissions. The authorities (environmental protection agencies)

have the right to amend, suspend and revoke environmental authorisations but they prefer to

be more collaborative to obtain compliance. If an enterprise is unable to meet the discharge

levels specified in its permits, a plan is developed containing the steps that must be

undertaken within a specified time. There are penalties for exceeding permitted emission, but

these are not linked to pollution quantities and are not an effective deterrent.

Water resources in Romania are managed according to the principals of integrated

water management. Therefore, policies to promote sustainability try specifically to

incorporate linkages between water quality and water quantity. These are potentially

important, because excessive usage can lower underground and surface water levels and

increase concentration of contaminants.

Water charges exist in Romania, both for direct consumption or use and for

discharges. Their aim is to encourage the sustainable use of this resource and to generate

revenues to finance water supply and sewage treatment and disposal. They were introduced at

the beginning of 1991 and rates are indexed quarterly. There are separate national prices for

each category and user of raw water, with the industry sector paying more than agriculture,

and agriculture paying more than households.

Penalties are levied on twenty substances divided into two general categories. The first

contains substances such as chlorine, sulphates, nitrates, detergents for which allowable levels

are established to meet concentrations standards. The second group contains substances such

as mercury, pesticides, radioactive residues for which no discharges are permitted.

Next, we estimate separate regressions for water and air pollution abatement effort. The

variables are generally the same as in the previous regression, but there are a few additional

ones specific to water and air respectively. Thus, the econometric specifications are the

following:

82

• for water pollution abatement (7)

log(PACEwit ) = β0 + β1 log(Profitit ) + β 2 log(Productit ) + β3 log(Debtit ) + β 4 log(Turnoverit ) + + β5 log(Svbit ) + β6 Lqtit + β7 CSit + β8CPit + β9 CMit + β10 Frgnit + β11 Efnwit + β12 Isoit + + β13 log(Markit ) + β14 log(PCIkt ) + β15 log(UnEmpjt ) + β16 PollSectwit + β17 log(EnvNGOjt ) + β18 log(EnvGuardkt ) + β19 log(EnvTxwit ) + β20 log(EnvSubwit ) + β21 LWwt + uit

where : PACEwit = water pollution abatement expenditure incurred by plant i in year t;

EnvTxwit = environmental taxes incurred by plant i in year t for water pollution abatement;

EnvSubwit = environmental subsidies received by plant i in year t for water pollution

abatement; Efnwit = foreign financing aid received by plant i in year t for water pollution

abatement; LWwt = number of laws adopted concerning water pollution in year t and uit –

error term.

• for air pollution abatement (8)

log(PACEait ) = β0 + β1 log(Profitit ) + β 2 log(Productit ) + β3 log(Debtit ) + β 4 log(Turnoverit ) + β5 log(Svbit ) + β6 Lqtit + β7 CSit + β8 CPit + β9 CMit + β10 Frgnit + β11 Efnait + β12 Isoit + + β13 log(Markit ) + β14 log(PCIkt ) + β15 log(UnEmpjt ) + β16 PollSectait + β17 log(EnvNGOjt ) β18 log(EnvGuardkt ) + β19 log(EnvTxait ) + β 20 log(EnvSubait ) + β 21LWat + uit

where : PACEait = air pollution abatement expenditure incurred by plant i in year t for air ;

EnvTxait = environmental taxes incurred by plant i in year t for air pollution abatement;

EnvSubait = environmental subsidies received by plant i in year t for air pollution abatement;

Efnait = foreign financing aid received by plant i in year t for air pollution abatement; LWat =

number of laws adopted concerning air pollution in year t and uit – error term.

The econometric results are reported in Table 3.

Table 3: Econometric results for air and water pollution abatement effort

AIR ABATEMENT EFFORT (MRM)

WATER ABATEMENT EFFORT (MRM)

Variables Coefficient z Coefficient z Productit 0.078 ( -4.69)*** 0.081 (-4.85)*** Svbit 0.016 ( -0.32) 0.009 (-0.19) Lqtit 0.108 ( -3.13)*** 0.095 ( -2.73)*** Turnoverit 0.772 ( 41.37)*** 0.811 ( 43.04)*** Profitit 0.037 ( 2.92)*** 0.041 ( 2.95)*** Frgnit 0.331 ( -3.51)*** 0.349 (-3.64)*** ISOit 0.489 ( 5.42)*** 0.556 ( 6.12)*** Markit 0.858 ( 19.27)*** 0.936 ( 20.66)*** Debtit -0.336 ( -6.15)*** -0.335 (-6.06)***

83

CSit -0.762 ( 6.29)*** -0.908 (7.37)*** CMit 0.172 ( 2.18)** 0.246 (3.07)*** CPit 0.363 ( -4.10)*** 0.346 ( -3.82)*** EnvTXwit - - 0.004 (-0.26) PollSectwit - - 0.148 ( 4.50)*** EnvSubwit - - 0.292 (7.29)*** Efnwit - - 0.341 ( 4.56)*** LWwt - - 0.211 (3.27)*** EnvTXait 0.285 (16.26)*** - - PollSectait 0.215 ( 5.46)*** - - EnvSubait 0.244 ( 5.70)*** - - Efnait 0.370 ( 3.92)*** - - LWat 0.322 (6.72)*** - - PCIkt 3.542 ( -3.46)*** 4.358 ( -4.22)*** UnEmpjt -0.611 (-1.21) -0.819 (1.61)* EnvNGOjt 0.007 ( -0.61) 0.089 (-1.16) EnvGUARDkt 0.301 ( 6.61)*** 0.345 (7.54)*** Constant 2.687 (-0.61) 5.426 (-1.22) R-squared 0.67 - 0.78 - Observations 5688 - 5688 - Log restricted-likelihood -32175.62 - -30117.35 - Sd_reg 0.89 - 0.91 - IS_reg 0.33 - 0.30 - Sd_jud 0.63 - 0.73 - IS_jud 0.16 - 0.21 - Sd_residual 1.41 - 1.39 -

906.13 - 786.34 - LR test vs. OLS chi2 Prob>chi2 (0.00) - (0.00) - Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

One can see that the determinants of air and water pollution abatement effort are

approximately the same and have the same signs as before. Environmental taxes seem to be

more important for the former, indicating that formal regulation plays a bigger role in the case

of air pollution abatement effort, while for the latter environmental taxes becomes

insignificant. For both the effects of informal regulation are weak.

4.4.3 Abatement effort at the regional level

Next, we estimate the following equation at the regional level, still carrying out multilevel

analysis (MRM): (9) log(PACEit ) = β0 + β1 log(Profitit ) + β 2 log(Productit ) + β3 log(Debtit ) + β 4 log(Turnoverit ) + + β5 log(Svbit ) + β6 Lqtit + β7 CSit + β8 CPit + β9 CMit + β10 Frgnit + β11 Locit + β12 Efnit + β13

84

Isoit + + β14 log(Markit ) + β15 log(PCIkt ) + β16 log(UnEmpjt ) + β17 PollSectit + β18 log(EnvNGOjt ) + + β19 Locpresit + β 20 log(EnvGuardkt ) + β 21 log(EnvTxit ) + β 22 log(EnvSubit ) + β 23log(RSHkt ) + uit

The variable added RSH is a proxy for human resource quality. The results are displayed

in Table 4.

85

Table 4. Econometric results of the abatement pollution effort at the regional level (eight regions) by multilevel regression

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Variables

PACEit PACEit PACEit PACEit PACEit PACEit PACEit PACEit 0.122 0.179 0.140 0.130 0.071 0.096 0.021 0.053 Productit

(2.86)*** (4.54)*** (3.31)*** (2.15)** (1.67)* (2.52)** (0.51) (1.28) -0.098 -0.008 0.036 -0.038 -0.064 -0.037 -0.143 0.163 Svbit (0.81) (0.07) (0.34) (0.26) (0.56) (0.32) (1.19) (1.30) 0.142 0.034 0.136 0.045 0.025 0.146 0.015 0.188 Lqtit

(1.65)* (0.42) (1.71)* (0.41) (0.30) (1.88)* (0.18) (2.02)** 0.755 0.672 0.578 0.551 0.390 0.611 0.706 0.573 Turnoverit

(16.74)*** (15.00)*** (14.36)*** (10.30)*** (9.69)*** (14.62)*** (14.45)*** (11.52)*** 0.043 0.097 0.074 0.114 0.046 0.074 0.022 0.112 Profitit (1.25) (2.92)*** (2.14)** (2.37)** (1.31) (2.28)** (0.64) (0.34) 0.214 0.443 0.010 0.486 0.111 0.610 0.407 0.121 Frgnit (0.77) (2.07)** (0.05) (1.75)* (0.49) (3.41)*** (2.13)** (0.59) 0.046 0.214 0.185 0.228 0.507 0.434 -0.058 0.203 ISOit (0.20) (0.90) (0.99) (1.01) (2.06)** (1.86)* (0.24) (1.11) 0.552 0.345 0.461 0.690 0.643 0.465 0.654 0.384 Markit

(6.59)*** (3.70)*** (5.63)*** (6.42)*** (5.50)*** (5.54)*** (6.74)*** (3.84)*** 0.004 0.153 0.029 0.009 0.104 0.150 0.042 0.044 PollSectit (0.06) (2.16)** (0.42) (0.09) (1.39) (2.34)** (0.59) (0.54) -0.035 0.217 0.042 0.124 0.026 0.076 0.066 0.081 EnvSubit (0.52) (2.48)** (0.50) (1.51) (0.36) (0.91) (0.96) (1.54) 0.041 0.097 0.153 0.210 0.001 0.195 0.125 0.015 Efnit (0.43) (0.62) (0.42) (0.97) (0.78.) (1.66)* (0.85) (0.15) 0.012 -0.022 0.147 0.015 0.123 0.031 0.026 0.057 EnvTXit (0.51) (0.97) (6.24)*** (0.45) (4.45)*** (2.32)** (1.71)* (2.13)** -0.343 0.050 -0.305 -0.072 -0.253 -0.295 -0.145 -0.482 Debtit

(2.46)** (0.48) (2.93)*** (0.38) (1.84)* (2.62)*** (1.05) (3.62)*** -1.028 -0.272 -0.677 -0.020 0.408 -0.121 -0.367 -0.253 CSit

(3.15)*** (1.11) (2.84)*** (0.07) (1.48) (0.50) (1.59) (0.91)

86

0.316 0.348 0.192 -0.082 -0.383 0.057 0.293 0.416 CMit (1.49) (1.78)* (1.15) (0.32) (2.38)** (0.34) (1.73)* (2.59)*** 0.061 0.332 0.063 0.688 0.438 0.561 0.292 0.157 CPit (0.24) (1.84)* (0.34) (2.82)*** (1.97)** (3.63)*** (1.74)* (0.74) -2.000 -2.546 -1.378 -0.751 2.900 -0.330 -1.809 -2.722 Unempjt

(2.68)*** (5.41)*** (3.25)*** (0.70) (4.79)*** (0.98) (3.92)*** (1.57) -1.388 -2.476 0.764 -5.483 -2.707 -2.896 -6.880 -7.175 Locit

(6.91)*** (9.43)*** (1.41) (4.19)*** (2.67)*** (3.96)*** (11.04)*** (2.50)** 0.017 0.072 0.067 0.032 0.148 1.096 2.241 6.431 EnvNGOjt (1.30) (0.65) (1.20) (0.44) (2.64)*** (2.13)** (3.72)*** (6.42)*** 0.010 0.0178 0.106 0.154 0.102 0.094 0.131 0.197 Locpresit (0.09) (0.30) (1.00) (0.94) (1.90)* (2.01)* (2.43)** (2.10)** 7.673 11.869 10.529 -7.470 17.110 13.651 20.128 23.993 PCIkt

(2.78)*** (1.73)* (1.42) (1.59) (3.02)*** (2.82)*** (4.16)*** (1.76)* 0.758 0.213 0.683 0.229 0.846 1.010 5.005 0.638 EnvGUARDkt (1.31) (0.70) (1.43) (0.48) (3.50)*** (3.55)*** (4.24)*** (5.46)*** 0.091 0.101 0.113 0.107 0.187 0.162 0.178 0.253 RSHkt (1.31) (1.87)* (1.43) (1.98)* (2.12)** (1.73)* (1.82)* (2.48)***

-67.230 37.000 22.931 22.278 -73.277 97.973 -354.923 125.385 Constant (2.26)** (1.40) (1.07) (1.08) (3.98)*** (3.71)*** (4.72)*** (1.91)*

Observations 816 632 760 508 568 748 936 720 R-squared 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.50 0.46 0.42 Log restricted-likelihood -30245.12 -32175.62 -29413.21 -26625.67 -34215.54 -34414.13 -29313.25 -31442.46 Sd_reg 0.79 0.87 0.91 0.89 0.90 0.79 0.88 0.90 IS_reg 0.24 0.30 0.34 0.30 0.36 0.30 0.28 0.33 Sd_residual 1.41 1.32 1.27 1.35 1.19 1.22 1.40 1.28

806.18 779.21 675.32 917.45 825.30 715.89 698.74 914.38 LR test vs. OLS chi2 Prob>chi2 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Note: 1 = North – East; 2 = South – East; 3 = South; 4 = South – West; 5 = West; 6 = North – West; 7 = Center 8 = Bucharest – Ilfov.

87

As expected, in the regions with high income (West, Centre and Bucharest-Ilfov)

informal pressure is more important and the population more reactive. Thus, local pressure and

ONGs have a significant impact on pollution abatement. In contrast, in the poorer regions

(North-East, South -West) informal pressure is weak, the population being less educated and

having limited access to information.

Besides, formal regulations have a different impact on the eight regions. Specifically,

environmental taxes and penalties are statistically insignificant for the low-income regions and

become significant for the regions with high income per capita. Bucharest-Ilfov has the highest

income per capita, the North-East region the lowest. Bucharest-Ilfov is also characterised by

the availability of qualified human resources, and the presence of an important number of

environmental ONG. Moreover, almost all plants in this region are clean (see table A2). In

contrast, the poorest region is characterised by a high unemployment rate, a low percentage of

skilled population and a low number of environmental non-governmental organisations. Plants

polluting more are located in poorer regions (see table A1 and A3).

Overall, although Romania has improved its environmental performance considerably,

formal and informal regulations are still only partially developed due to the difficulties of

economic transition, and heterogeneity across regions remains considerable.

5. Conclusions

This paper has tested some hypotheses formulated in the environmental literature about

PACE patterns at plant level. Its original contribution is to examine them using survey data in

the case of a country such as Romania, which has undergone a process of economic and

political transition and has been a EU member since 2007; also, we apply an appropriate

econometric method, namely MRM.

Our results are generally consistent with the literature suggesting that plant

characteristics, formal pressure through substantial regulatory actions and informal pressure

through market incentives and community aspects may be important drivers of the level of

plant PACE. However, unlike in the case of developed countries, we find that in Romania the

potential for collective action in the environmental area is not significant. Whether the

influence of stakeholders on PACE will strengthen as Romania completes its development

process remains to be seen. Also, there is no evidence that environmental taxes work as

incentives to adopt an environmental behaviour at plant level. As expected, the actions of

regulators (command and control and liability instruments), market pressure and plant

characteristics are the most important determinants of the level of PACE. Thus, the largest,

88

most competitive and profitable private owned enterprises have made more efforts to reduce pollution.

These findings enable us to gain a better understanding of the factors affecting the level

of plant PACE in the case of transition economies in general and Romania in particular. Even

partially developed formal and informal regulations appear to increase abatement efforts. An

increase in income per capita also increases local pressure on intensive pollution plants. From a

policy perspective, this evidence points to the need to redesign environmental taxes in order to

achieve better outcomes. Further, measures to increase environmental awareness would also be

useful in this respect.

89

References

[1] Chan E S W, Wong S C K (2006), “Motivations for ISO 14001 in the hotel industry”,

Tourism Management, 27(3), 481-492

[2] Chávez C, Stranlund J (2009), "A Note on Emissions Taxes and Incomplete Information,"

Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource

Economists, 44(1), 137-144.

[3] Coase R H (1960), “The problem of social cost”, Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1-44

[4] Corbett C J, Kirsch D A (2004), “Response to “Revisiting ISO 14000 Diffusion: A New

“Look” at the Drivers of Certification’’, Production and Operations Management, 13(3), 268-

271.

[5] Delmas M (2003), “In search of ISO: an Institutional Perspective on the Adoption of

International Management Standard”, Standford Graduate School of Business, Working Paper

1784

[6] DiMaggio P J, Powell W W (1983), “The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and

collective rationality in organizational fields”, American Sociological Review, 48(2), 147-160.

[7] Ferraz C, Seroa da Motta R (2002), “Regulação Mercado ou Pressão Social? Os

Determinantes do Investimento Ambiental na Industria”, Proceedings ANPEC- XXIX Encontro

Nacional de Economia Salvador

[8] Fredriksson P G, Wollscheid, Jim R. (2008), "The political economy of investment: The

case of pollution control technology," European Journal of Political Economy, 24(1), 53-72.

[9] Fredriksson P G, Neumayer E, Damania R, Gates S (2005), “Environmentalism,

democracy, and pollution control”, Journal of environmental economics and management, 49

(2). 343 -365.

[10] Greene WH (2002), “Econometric Analysis”, Prentice Hall New Jersey

[11] Guler I, Guillen M F, MacPherson J M (2002), “Global competition institutions and the

diffusion of organizational practices: the international spread of the ISO 9000 quality

certificates”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 47(2), 207-232

[12] Gunningham N (1995), “Environment self-regulation and the chemical industry: Assessing

Responsible Care”, Law and Policy 17(1), 57-108

[13] Hoffman A J (2001), “Linking organizational and field-level analyses – The diffusion of

corporate environmental practice”, Organization & Environment, 14(2), 133-156

[14] Jones B S, Steenburgen M R (2002), “Modelling Multilevel data structures”, American

Journal of Political Science, 46(1),218-237.

90

[15] Neumayer E, Perkins R (2004), “What explains the uneven take-up of ISO 14001 at the

global level? A panel-data analysis”, Environment and Planning, 36(5), 823-839

[16] OECD (2001), “The firm, the environment and Public Policy Working Party on National

Environmental Policy”, ENV/EPOC/WPNET 31/FINAL

[17] Panayotou T, Schatzki T, Limvorapitak Q (1997), “Differential industry response to

formal and informal environmental regulations in newly industrializing economies: The case of

Thailand”, Mimeo Harvard Institute for International Development

[18] Pigou A C, {1920), “The Economics of Welfare”, Macmillan, London

[19] Rivera J (2004), “Institutional pressures and voluntary environmental behaviour in

developing countries: Evidence from the Costa Rican hotel industry”, Society and Natural

Resources, 17(9), 779-797

[20] Rivera J, de Leon P (2004), “Is greener whiter? Voluntary Environmental Performance of

Western Ski Areas”, Policy Studies Journal, 32 (3), 417-437

[21] Rivera J, de Leon P, Koerber C (2006), “Is greener whiter yet? The sustainable slopes

program after five years”, Policy Studies Journal, 34(2), 195-221

[22] Seroa da Motta R (2006), “Analyzing the environmental performance of the Brazilian

industrial sector”, Ecological Economics, 57(2), 269-281.

[23] Shin S (2005), “The Role of the Government in Voluntary Environmental Protection

Schemes: The Case of ISO 14001 in China”, Issues & Studies, 41(4), 141-173

[24] Shimshack, J P, Ward M B (2008), "Enforcement and over-compliance," Journal of

Environmental Economics and Management, 55(1), 90-105,

[25] Vastag G, Corbett C J, Kirsch D A (2004), “Revisiting ISO 14000 Diffusion: A New

‘Look’ at the Drivers of Certification/Response”, Production and Operations Management, 13

(3),268-271

[26] Viadiu M F, Casadesús F M, Saizarbitoria M H (2006), “ISO 9000 and ISO 14000

standards: An international diffusion model”, International Journal of Operations and

Production Management 26(1-2), 141-165

91

Table A1: Characteristics of the regions - 2005

APPENDIX

Regions Per capita

GDP (RON/year)

Unemployment

rate (%)

Population

Density of Population (Hab/km2)

Surface (Km2)

Population with

university studies (%)

1 North- East 8907,6 7.6 3737246 101 36850 9.4 2 South - East 11541,7 6.4 2841362 79 35762 10.4 3 South 11068,5 6.8 3325576 97 34453 8.9 4 South - West 10371,1 7.0 2305913 79 29212 11.1 5 West 15064,7 5.3 1931759 60 32034 13.2 6 North - West 12538,6 3.9 2728967 80 34159 10.7 7 Center 13097,6 6.8 2536211 74 34100 12.1 8 Bucharest- Ilfov 29572,6 2.7 2205393 1211 1821 30.2

Source: Romanian National Institute of Statistics (INSSE) – Statistical Yearbook 2008

Table A2: Distribution of plants by region and ownership - 2005 Region Total

Plants Dirty Plants

Domestic Plants

Foreign Plants

Air Pollution

Plants

Water Pollution

Plants

Air and Water

Pollution Plants

Others Pollution

Plants

1 North - East 618 409 380 29 66 204 84 55 2 South - East 530 351 327 24 38 181 79 53 3 South 608 397 344 53 48 204 90 55 4 South -West 391 259 233 26 32 141 51 35 5 West 476 304 240 64 37 165 61 41 6 North -West 654 424 365 59 64 203 96 61 7 Center 669 444 390 54 63 202 108 71 8 Bucharest - Ilfov 520 275 205 70 33 128 75 39

Total 4466 2863 2484 379 381 1428 644 410 Source: environmental survey

92

Regions

ONG / million Habitant

ONG /

region

1 North- East 5 17 2 South - East 7 21 3 South 2 5 4 South - West 5 11 5 West 5 10 6 North - West 8 21 7 Center 9 24 8 Bucharest- Ilfov 16 35

Table A3: Number of environmental non-governmental organisations (2005)

Source: Ministry of Environment

93

D I

S C

U S

S I

O N

P

A P

E R

S

E R

I E

S

5.5 Environmental Regulation and Competitiveness: Evidence from Romania (articol publicat in IZA Working paper, idexata RePec, si aflat in process de evaluare, faza de revizuire in revista Ecological Economics, editata de Elsevier, Cotata ISI cu factor impact 2.422, ISSN 0921-8009)

IZA DP No. 5029

Environmental Regulation and Competitiveness: Evidence from Romania

Guglielmo Maria Caporale Christophe Rault Robert Sova Anamaria Sova

June 2010

94

Environmental Regulation and Competitiveness:

Evidence from Romania

Guglielmo Maria Caporale Brunel University, CESifo and DIW Berlin

Christophe Rault Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orléans (LEO), CESifo, WDI and IZA

Robert Sova CES, Sorbonne University, A.S.E. and E.B.R.C

Anamaria Sova CES, Sorbonne University and E.B.R.C

Discussion Paper No. 5029 June 2010

IZA

P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn

Germany

Phone: +49-228-3894-0 Fax: +49-228-3894-180

E-mail: iza@iza.org

95

Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions.

The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.

IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.

96

IZA Discussion Paper No. 5029 June 2010

ABSTRACT

Environmental Regulation and Competitiveness: Evidence from Romania*

According to the pollution haven hypotheses differences in environmental regulation affect trade flows and plant location. Specifically, environmental stringency should decrease exports and increase imports of “dirty” goods. This paper estimates a gravity model to establish whether the implementation of more stringent regulations in Romania has indeed affected its competitiveness and decreased exports towards its European trading partners. Our findings do not provide empirical support to the pollution haven hypothesis, i.e. environmental stringency is not found to affect significantly total trade, or its components (pollution intensive trade and pollution intensive trade related to non-resource-based trade).

JEL Classification: F14, Q28

Keywords: environmental stringency, competiveness, gravity model

Corresponding author:

Christophe Rault CNRS UMR 6221 University of Orleans Rue de Blois-B.P.6739 45067 Orléans Cedex 2 France E-mail: chrault@hotmail.com

* This paper has been realised within the project 92-120 (CNMP).

97

IZA Discussion Paper No. 5029 June 2010

NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY

The transition process in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has brought about significant changes in their economic structure. It has also been associated with growing environmental awareness: rising pollution levels due to the development of heavy industries have increased the interest in cost-effective regulation. Romania in particular has embarked on a radical course of environmental reform, and the accession into the European Union has created a new policy focus for appropriate action. An important topic in this context is the relationship between environment and international trade, which has recently been analysed in various empirical studies investigating the effects of environmental regulation on trade flows and export competitiveness. The issue is whether more stringent regulations might increase production costs and make pollution-intensive industries less competitive in international markets, thereby affecting the development strategies of the countries concerned. Further, according to the so-called “pollution haven” hypothesis, differences between countries in terms of environmental standards lead to a reallocation of polluting industries from those with strict environmental regulations to those with less strict policies. Thus, countries with weak environmental policies (generally with low income) become a pollution haven for those with environmental stringency, exporting the “dirty” goods and importing the “clean” ones. In contrast, the developed (high income) countries improve the quality of their environment by developing a comparative advantage in the clean goods. Typical empirical issues encountered in this type of analysis are limited data availability, measuring environmental stringency and the endogeneity of this variable. The present study focuses on the effect of environment regulation on trade flows (exports and imports) in the case of Romania, using a gravity equation. It examines empirically whether more stringent domestic environmental policies reduce international competitiveness (more specifically, exports of the pollution-intensive products), and their general impact on trade patterns. In most cases the environmental stringency variable in exporting countries is found to have a positive and significant effect, in contrast with the haven hypothesis which implies that stricter environmental regulation decreases exports and increases imports. However, there is no evidence of such an effect in the case of “dirty” trade, possibly because of a comparative advantage such that stricter environmental policies do not affect competitiveness significantly. Other factors, such a labour costs, presumably play a much more important role, environmental costs representing a very small percentage of total production costs.

98

1. Introduction

The transition process in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has brought

about significant changes in their economic structure. It has also been associated with growing

environmental awareness: rising pollution levels due to the development of heavy industries have

increased the interest in cost-effective regulation. Romania in particular has embarked on a

radical course of environmental reform, and the accession into the European Union has created a

new policy focus for appropriate action.

An important topic in this context is the relationship between environment and

international trade, which has recently been analysed in various empirical studies investigating

the effects of environmental regulation on trade flows and export competitiveness. The issue is

whether more stringent regulations might increase production costs and make pollution-intensive

industries less competitive in international markets, thereby affecting the development strategies

of the countries concerned. Further, according to the so-called “pollution haven” hypothesis,

differences between countries in terms of environmental standards lead to a reallocation of

polluting industries from those with strict environmental regulations to those with less strict

policies. Thus, countries with weak environmental policies (generally with low income) become

a pollution haven for those with environmental stringency, exporting the “dirty” goods and

importing the “clean” ones. In contrast, the developed (high income) countries improve the

quality of their environment by developing a comparative advantage in the clean goods. Typical

empirical issues encountered in this type of analysis are limited data availability, measuring

environmental stringency and the endogeneity of this variable.

The present study focuses on the effect of environment regulation on trade flows (exports

and imports) in the case of Romania, using a gravity equation. It examines empirically whether

more stringent domestic environmental policies reduce international competitiveness (more

specifically, exports of the pollution-intensive products), and their general impact on trade

patterns. The layout of paper is as follows. Section 2 and 3 provide a brief review of the existing

empirical and theoretical literature respectively. Section 4 describes the econometric framework

used for the analysis. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 offers some concluding

remarks.

4

99

2. Empirical studies

The empirical evidence on the environment-trade nexus is mixed. The most common

finding is that strict environmental regulations do not affect trade flows and international

competitiveness (Tobey, 1990; Harris and al., 2002). Only a few studies conclude that they lead

to a loss of competiveness for pollution-intensive goods (Van Beers and van den Bergh, 1997).

However, even if more stringent regulations initially mean lower competitiveness and smaller

market shares reflecting higher production costs, they might also stimulate innovation, improve

productivity and increase exports in the long run (this is the so-called Porter hypothesis – see

Porter and van der Linde, 1995).

Tobey (1990) used a cross-section Heekscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model of international

trade and found that the introduction of stringent environmental measures had not caused trade

patterns to deviate from the HOV predictions. Van Beers and van den Bergh (1997) estimated an

equation for bilateral trade flows introducing two variables for environmental stringency (a broad

one and a narrow one based on the energy intensity) in a gravity model. The results, using a

sample of 21 OECD countries, indicate that the impact of stricter regulations on export and

import flows is negative. Van Beers and van den Bergh (2000) revisited the analysis of Tobey

(1990) using more disaggregated data and partly confirmed his results. Xu (2000) also estimated

a gravity model, finding evidence that new trade barriers emerge to offset the effects of more

stringent environmental regulations, and that the trade pattern of environmentally sensitive goods

remain unchanged. Harris et al. (2002) used a triple indexed fixed effects model (import, export

and time effects), and showed that, once these effects are taken into consideration, the impact of

environmental stringency on international trade becomes statistically insignificant.

Jug and Mirza (2005) proposed an alternative explanation for the low and insignificant

effect of strict environmental policies on trade flows which is not related to environmental

features but rather to the degree of product differentiation. They showed that stringency matters

less in the case of trade in highly differentiated products due to their lower price elasticity.

Ederington and Minier (2003) investigated the hypothesis that environmental policy has

been used as a secondary trade barrier, and estimated the impact of environmental regulation on

trade flows when environmental policy is modelled endogenously, finding that its estimated

5

100

effect on trade flows is significantly higher than reported in previous studies affected by

endogeneity bias.

Levinson and Taylor (2008) showed how unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity and

aggregation issues generate biases when estimating the relationship between regulatory costs and

trade. They used data on US regulations and net trade flows between the US, Canada and Mexico

for 130 manufacturing industries from 1977 to 1986, and reported that the estimated effects of

pollution costs on net imports are positive and statistically significant. Also, the 2SLS estimates

are larger than the fixed-effects ones.

3. Theory

In the theoretical literature there are two major hypotheses linking the environment and

trade flows, more precisely the pollution haven and the factor endowments ones. The former

predicts that countries where environmental policy (regulation) is relatively weak will tend to

specialise in pollution intensive (or “dirty”) industries. Generally, countries with lax

environmental regulations are low-income countries. By contrast, the latter predicts that

differences in factor endowments determine trade patterns and environmental policy has only a

minor effect. Thus, this hypothesis suggests that countries with abundant capital will specialise

in and export capital intensive goods, and countries with abundant labour will export labour

intensive good, regardless of environmental regulations5 .

Let us consider the haven pollution theory using a model with production –generated pollution.

The model assumes that there are two goods, X and Y, where X is the dirty good (which

generates pollution during the production) and Y is the clean good (which does not pollute).

The production function for good Y using the two factors capital and labour takes the following

form:

Y= F(K, L) (1)

5 In this paper we will only focus on the haven hypothesis and will not test empirically the factor endowment hypothesis.

6

101

and for good X:

X = (1-θ)G(K, L) (2)

where: θ represents the abatement effort and lies in the interval between 0 and 1 (0< θ<1): if θ

=0, there is no abatement effort and pollution rises with the output of the dirty good (X); if θ

rises, this leads to an increase in the abatement effort and a decrease in the production of X and

implicitly pollution. If it is assumed that X produces emissions and these are generated in the production process,

then total emissions are given by E=eX, where e represents emission intensity. The model also

assumes that there are two countries, one rich (A - high income) and the other poor (B - low

income). A simple supply and demand analysis is used to determine the price under autarchy in

the two countries. The pollution haven model assumes that trading countries are identical with the exception of the

differences in emission intensity. Therefore their supply curves will also differ, being a function

of the price (p), emission intensity (e), capital/labour (K/L) and taking the following form:

RS ( p, e, K / L) X ( p, e, K / L) Y ( p, e, K / L)

(3)

When the price and emission intensity increase, the supply of good X relative to good Y

increases. In contrast, the demand curve is the same for the two countries because preferences over goods

are supposed to be homothetic. Specifically, the demand curve for good X relative to good Y is a

function of the prices in the two countries:

RDX / Y ( p) bx ( p) b y ( p)

(4)

If countries are identical, their supply curve (RS) is the same and so are prices, implying that

there is no trade. If emission intensity differs and is higher in the low-income country, then weak

7

102

environmental regulation will lead to more production of the dirty good in this country (B) and to

a decline in the production of the clean good due to the reallocation of resources from Y to X. The pollution haven hypothesis can be illustrated as in the figure below:

Source: Copeland and Taylor (2003) The price of the dirty good (X) in the developed country is higher then in the developing country

(PA >PA*)6 due to the fact that in the former pollution taxes are higher, and therefore the price of

X under autarchy is higher. Consequently, the production of X declines in the developed country

but increases in the developing country. Thus, the relative supply of the country with weak

environmental regulations will shift out to the right (RS*). Hence, the high income country will

produce and export more of the clean good Y and will import the dirty good X from the low

income country, whilst the low income country will export X. The pollution level will increase in

the developing countries with weak pollution policy and will decrease in the developed countries

with stringent pollution policy, and the former will provide pollution havens for dirty industries.

6 We use the asterisk for the developing country variables.

8

103

'

The differences in pollution policy could lead to the migration of the pollution intensive

industries from developed to developing economies in the presence of less stringent

environmental regulations, low wages and resource abundance in the latter. Then, an increase in

the stringency of environmental regulations will imply a loss of competitiveness for dirty

industries and lower exports of dirty goods. Clearly, if the effects of changes in pollution

regulations (pollution abatement costs) are modest, then it becomes difficult to maintain the

pollution haven hypothesis.

4. The econometric framework

The gravity model is extensively used in the empirical literature on international trade.

The first studies estimating it were those of Linnemann (1966) and Tinbergen (1962). Its

theoretical foundations were developed later by Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985) and

Helpman and Krugman (1985). This model is also used to test the link between the

environmental stringency and trade flows (Van Beers and Van den Bergh, 1997, Harris et al.

2002; Jug and Mirza, 2005). The standard equation takes the following form:

Tijt 0 1 S ijt X uijt (5) where Tijt represents trade flows between trading partners (i and j), Sijt is a measure of

environmental stringency, X1 stands for other variables which differ across countries, β0 is the

constant and uijt is the error term which captures the measurement errors and is assumed to be independently identically distributed.

To examine the impact of environmental regulations on trade flows (export and imports),

we follow Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), whose model takes into account multilateral trade

resistance (MTR) unlike the "classic version" of the gravity model. As they argue, it is essential

to analyse not only bilateral resistance to trade (trade barriers between two countries i and j) but

also multilateral resistance, i.e. trade barriers between each country i or j and all its partners.

Intuitively, a country has more incentives to trade with a partner when its trade resistance with

all other partners is higher. This results in price differences between countries, ignoring which

may bias the estimates of all the other variables in the gravity equation.

9

104

X

1

4.1 The Anderson and van Wincoop model

The Anderson and van Wincoop model (2003) is based on assumptions such as constant

elasticity of substitution, differentiation of goods by origin and country specialisation in their

variety. Exports costs (transport costs, information costs, differences in legislation, etc.) are

borne by the importer and are symmetrical. The model introduces multilateral resistance to trade

in addition to the bilateral one. The former represents the average cost of imports whatever their

origin, while the latter concerns import costs between a pair of countries. The modified gravity

equation has the following form:

Y Y T 1 ij w P P

(6)

t j ij

Y i j where Xij represents exports of country i towards country j ; Yt, Yj stand for income of country i

and j respectively and Y w

K

Yk

is total income; Tij represents bilateral resistance (import

k 1

costs between country i and j); Pi, Pj are the price index of country i and j respectively and

represent multilateral resistance for the two countries ; σ is the demand elasticity which is

assumed to be greater than unity.

Bilateral trade resistance (Tij) is a vector of observable variables affecting bilateral trade

costs between country i and country j such as geographical distance (Dij), common border

(FRTij), common language (LANGij), existence of colonial relations (RLij) and membership of

trade agreements (ACRij).

Tij (Dij ) e 2 RLij 3 FRTij 3 LANGij 4 ACRij (7)

Bilateral resistence (Tij) represents the price of the foreign variety relative to the local

variety and it is assumed to be symmetric (Tij =Tji). The price indices for consumption (Pi, Pj) for

country i and j are defined as follows:

10

105

1

N

Pi

j p j t ij

1 (1 ) Pj

N 1

i p i t ij

1 (1

)

(8) j 1 i 1

where

1 i ( j )

j (i )

Y j (i )

Y w

is the share of country j (i) in total income. Anderson and van

Wincoop (2003) interpret Pi and Pj as multilateral trade resistance since each is a function of all

bilateral resistance variables (e.g., Pi for country I is the average of Tij)

Thus, the gravity equation used to control for the effects of multilateral resistance takes the

following form:

log(X ijt ) a0 a1 log(GDPit ) a2 log(GDPjt ) a3 log(DISTij ) a4 BRDij a5 ETNij uij t ijt (9)

where :

Xijt = exports from country i towards country j, in year t ; millions of dollars,

(database : COMTRADE) ;

GDPit (jt) = Gross domestic product of countries i and j, in year t, at purchasing power parity

(PPP); millions of dollars, (database : Chelem-CEPII) ;

DISTij = geographical distance between the capitals of country i and country j respectively;

kilometers, (Chelem-CEPII) ;

BRDij = dummy variable for common border ; FRT = 1 if i and j have a common border and

0 otherwise ;

ETNij = dummy variable for the existence of a common minority group; ETNij = 1 if the two

countries i and j have a common minority group and 0 otherwise ;

uij = couple fixed effects for controlling multilateral resistance;

λt = time fixed effects;

εijt : error term

The expected signs for the coefficients of the variables included in the model are based on

theory. For instance, we expect a positive effect on trade flows of variables such as the size of a

country, common border and common minority group and a negative impact of geographic

11

106

distance (which is a proxy for transport costs, tariffs, non-tariff barriers and informal barriers).

Supply of exports and demand for imports are a positive function of the income level in the

partner countries. As for the coefficient of environmental stringency for exporter and importer,

STi and SCj are expected to have a negative and positive effect respectively on the basis of the

pollution haven hypothesis.

4.2 Data

Our panel spans over a period of 9 years (1999-2007) and includes 20 countries, namely

Germany, Austria, Italy, United Kingdom, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Finland,

Sweden, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,

Cyprus.

As data for environmental stringency are not generally available, proxies are normally

used in empirical studies, for instance an index based on energy intensity (Harris et al., 2002), an

index developed by the World Bank (Xu, 2000), PACE as a fraction of value added (Levinson

and Taylor, 2008) or an index developed by Eurostat ( Jug and Mirza, 2005). We use data from

Eurostat which provides environmental data for the European Union countries (EU-27). Total

current expenditure, which represents expenditure for environmental protection activities, is the

chosen proxy for environmental stringency and a measure of abatement costs. We exclude from

our sample some countries such as France, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Czech Republic

and Greece due to data constraints. Data on bilateral trade (exports and imports) are extracted

from the COMTRADE database at total level and by sectors. The GDP data are obtained from

the IMF, while distance, common border come from CEPII database.

We consider the following pollution intensive sectors (“dirty” sectors): (251) pulp and

waste paper, (334) petroleum products, (335) residual petroleum products, (51) organic

chemicals, (52) inorganic chemicals, (562) fertilizers, (59) chemical materials, (634) veneers,

plywood, (635) wood manufactures; (64) paper paperboard, (68) non-ferrous metals; (661) lime,

cement, construction materials, (67) iron and steel, (69) metal manufactures (we use the

classification of dirty industries of Low, 1992). For the pollution intensive trade related to non-

resource-based trade (footloose sectors) we include the following sectors: (59) chemical

materials, (661) lime, cement, construction materials and (69) metals manufactures. 12

107

An important econometric issue is the potential endogeneity of the

environmental stringency variable. Some studies try to deal with it by using the 2SLS method

(Ederington and Minier, 2003, Levinson and Taylor, 2008) or a three –way fixed effect model

which allows for exporter, importer and time specific effects (Harris and al. 2002). In the

present study, we shall use instead the fixed effect vector decomposition method (FEVD)

proposed by Plümper and Tröeger (2004). This estimator controls for the potential

endogeneity of all right-hand-side variables, including environmental stringency, thereby

removing this possible bias source, and also yields more efficient estimates. Also, the

presence of fixed effects allows to take into account multilateral resistance. Further, it has

desirable finite-sample properties.

5. Empirical results

In order to analyse the impact of environmental stringency on the trade flows we

estimate models for total trade flows (exports and imports) as well as trade of the pollution

intensive sectors only; we also distinguish between pollution intensive sectors and non-

resource-based sectors (footloose). The results for total trade (exports and imports) are reported

in Table 1.

Table 1: Estimation results of the impact of environmental stringency on total trade

Variables

Total trade (FEVD)

Export (FEVD)

Import (FEVD)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) xijt xijt xijt xijt xijt xijt

1.216 1.056 0.751 0.621 2.297 1.900 GDPit (62.09)*** (10.02)*** (1.93)* (2.31)** (67.47)*** (9.43)***

2.739 2.746 1.961 1.803 1.837 2.119 GDPjt (84.13)*** (25.41)*** (23.87)*** (20.14)*** (14.62)*** (12.05)***

-1.048 -1.098 -1.620 -1.508 -1.265 -1.605 DISTij (39.57)*** (36.06)*** (54.05)*** (31.04)*** (28.36)*** (25.78)***

0.072 0.107 0.242 0.216 0.206 0.134 BRDij (2.31)** (17.84)*** (34.92)*** (39.91)*** (5.59)*** (11.76)***

0.237 0.219 0.046 0.032 0.386 0.322 ETNit (8.12)*** (42.39)*** (51.88)*** (49.20)*** (11.57)*** (44.16)***

- 0.239 - 0.021 - 0.344 STit - (18.05)*** - (0.46) - (30.43)*** - 0.059 - 0.083 - -0.140 STjt - (4.45)*** - (9.03)*** - (0.96)

108

λt yes Yes yes yes yes yes 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Residuals

(49.90)*** (29.99)*** (63.15)*** (60.14)*** (29.18)*** (54.78)*** -0.302 -0.409 7.167 6.807 0.037 -1.674 Constant

(2.01)** (42.06)*** (89.45)*** (69.83)*** (0.10) (24.13)*** Observations 342 342 171 171 171 171 R-squared 0.81 0.87 0.89 0.93 0.92 0.98 t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Note: FEVD stands for the Fixed Effects Decomposition method.

As can be seen, the estimated coefficients are almost always significant and have the

expected theoretical signs. The size variable of the exporting country and the partner country

appear to be two of the main determinants of trade flows between Romania and the EU-27.

The proxy for environmental stringency in the exporter country has a positive impact on trade

flows in all cases, implying that the hypothesis that stricter environmental regulation decreases

exports and affects competiveness can be rejected. Besides, this variable becomes

insignificant when exports of Romania towards its trading partners in the EU-27 are

considered. Presumably there are more important factors affecting trade, such as low

wages, regardless of environmental regulations. Environmental costs appear to play a

marginal role and do not affect trade flows significantly. Environmental stringency in the

importer country has a positive and significant effect on trade flows and exports, but a

negative and insignificant one on imports. As for the other variables, their estimated effects

are consistent with the predictions of the gravity model.

Geographical distance has a negative impact on trade volume, whilst common border or common

minority group have a positive one.

Next, we focus our attention on the impact of environmental stringency on the pollution

intensive sectors. Following the classification of the “dirty” industries of Low (1992) we

consider the 14 “dirty” sectors. Both the sample and the econometric methods used are the same

as before. The results are presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Estimation results of the impact of environmental stringency on the “dirty” trade

Total trade (FEVD)

Export (FEVD)

Import (FEVD)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Variables

xijt xijt Xijt xijt xijt xijt

109

1.217 1.257 1.665 1.846 0.580 0.546 GDPit (48.88)*** (49.33)*** (12.23)*** (11.42)*** (21.83)*** (20.13)***

0.798 0.832 0.269 0.281 1.294 1.287 GDPjt (34.69)*** (35.94)*** (11.73)*** (11.77)*** (9.03)*** (7.17)***

-1.491 -1.286 -0.445 -0.399 -1.126 -1.077 DISTij (25.34)*** (23.91)*** (5.55)*** (4.46)*** (13.29)*** (11.38)***

0.321 0.254 0.308 0.297 0.402 0.368 BRDij (17.13)*** (17.53)*** (8.58)*** (7.69)*** (8.43)*** (8.16)***

0.005 0.017 0.228 0.211 0.246 0.269 ETNij (0.16) (0.49) (4.95)*** (4.37)*** (5.38)*** (5.12)***

- 0.115 - 0.284 - 0.076 STit - (2.53)*** - (2.16)** - (0.24)

- 0.037 - 0.112 - -0.053 STjt - (0.78) - (1.80)* - (0.34)

λt yes yes Yes yes yes yes 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Residuals

(110.84)*** (106.62)*** (75.31)*** (74.92)*** (68.92)*** (68.71)*** 0.558 0.441 -2.246 -2.964 -0.589 -0.650 Constant

(3.25)*** (2.48)** (5.75)*** (6.41)*** (1.43) (1.34) Observations 4788 4788 2394 2394 2394 2394 R-squared 0.74 0.79 0.73 0.80 0.79 0.84 t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Note: FEVD stands for the Fixed Effects Decomposition method.

As before, size, common border and common minority group have a positive effect,

whilst geographical distance has a negative one. Concerning the impact of environmental

stringency, it is estimated to be positive in the case of the exporting countries, perhaps because

these have a comparative advantage for dirty exports such that stricter environmental policies do

not affect their competitiveness. The sign is the same for importing countries. No statistically

significant effect on “dirty” imports is found.

Finally, we estimated the model for “dirty” and footloose sectors separately. From the

former we selected those with a sizeable weight in total trade, namely for exports iron and steel

(67), petroleum products (334) and non-ferrous metals (68), and for imports metals manufactures

(69), sectors iron and steel (67) and paper paperboard (64). The footloose sectors are chemical

materials, lime, cement, construction materials and metals manufactures. These sectors are

supposed to respond significantly to changes in the stringency of environmental regulations.

The results are shown in Table 3 and 4 respectively. In the case of “dirty” trade, environmental

110

regulations in exporting and importing countries have a positive and significant effect on exports of

each sector but no effect on imports. As for the footloose sectors, the coefficients are not

statistically significant, indicating that environmental costs do not have an impact on such trade

flows between Romania and its European partners.

Table 3: Estimation results of the impact of environmental stringency on “dirty” exports

and imports

Export (FEVD)

Import (FEVD)

67 334 68 69 67 64

Sectors Variables

xijt xijt xijt xijt xijt xijt GDPit 1.079 1.210 0.819 0.964 2.028 1.091

(2.54)*** (4.30)*** (9.17)*** (10.42)*** (13.29)*** (4.70)*** GDPjt 1.186 1.343 1.105 1.172 1.039 1.633

(10.21)*** (9.31)*** (10.16)*** (11.75)*** (1.87)* (3.11)*** STit 1.292 1.159 0.885 -0.045 0.019 -0.077

(2.54)** (3.17)*** (2.65)*** (0.36) (0.11) (0.44) STjt 0.185 0.314 0.278 0.381 -0.116 0.402

(0.75) (2.20)** (1.13) (1.00) (0.21) (0.76) DISTij -1.907 -1.232 -1.455 -0.302 -1.264 -1.373

(12.70)*** (5.36)*** (5.79)*** (1.81)* (11.74)*** (4.34)*** BRDij 0.149 0.207 0.126 0.573 0.621 0.478

(12.45)*** (4.37)*** (3.87)*** (5.65)*** (7.10)*** (6.80)*** ETNij 0.169 0.153 0.117 0.051 0.208 0.194

(2.81)*** (3.49)*** (3.13)*** (0.42) (1.96)* (1.15) Residuals 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000

(17.61)*** (10.85)*** (14.84)*** (32.79)*** (21.33)*** (22.17)*** Constant 2.550 -2.064 -1.518 -2.399 4.185 -0.055

(3.44)*** (0.98) (0.70) (8.03)*** (2.94)*** (0.03) Observations 171 171 171 171 171 171 R-squared 0.73 0.62 0.69 0.91 0.78 0.80 t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Note: FEVD stands for the Fixed Effects Decomposition method.

111

17

112

Table 4: Estimation results of the environmental stringency impact on the export and

import non resources based sectors

Total trade (FEVD)

Export (FEVD)

Import (FEVD)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Variables

xijt xijt xijt xijt xijt xijt 0.768 0.821 1.439 1.307 1.973 2.053 GDPit

(18.12)*** (19.69)*** (5.93)*** (4.76)*** (21.13)*** (19.04)*** 1.982 2.020 0.415 0.477 1.501 1.474 GDPjt

(40.30)*** (39.58)*** (9.25)*** (7.33)*** (6.40)*** (5.93)*** -1.781 -1.629 -0.791 -0.612 -2.383 -2.131 DISTij

(17.21)*** (16.33)*** (5.25)*** (5.82)*** (16.49)*** (15.91)*** 0.235 0.219 0.194 0.163 1.172 1.695 BRDij

(11.95)*** (12.05)*** (5.30)*** (5.65)*** (10.87)*** (10.93)*** 0.049 0.038 0.203 0.221 0.123 -0.115 ETNij (0.83) (0.63) (2.31)** (2.76)** (1.56) (1.04)

- 0.287 0.510 -0.048 STit - (3.52)*** (0.83) (0.58)

- -0.113 0.057 -0.037 STjt - (1.35) (0.60) (0.15)

λt yes yes yes yes yes yes 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Residuals

(68.88)*** (65.97)*** (41.96)*** (40.82)*** (49.38)*** (48.86)*** -0.035 -0.195 -1.104 -1.576 -0.018 0.182 Constant (0.12) (0.61) (1.49) (1.85)* (0.03) (0.24)

Observations 1026 1026 513 513 513 513 R-squared 0.80 0.83 0.71 0.75 0.82 0.87 t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Note: FEVD stands for the Fixed Effects Decomposition method.

6. Conclusions

The aim of this paper was to analyse the relationship between environmental regulation

and trade flows, more precisely whether the implementation of more stringent

regulations has affected international competitiveness and decreased the exports of Romania

towards its trading

partners in the EU-27. We estimated gravity models to investigate separately the effects of

environmental stringency on total trade (exports and imports), on pollution intensive trade and on

113

pollution intensive trade related to non-resource-based trade.

In most cases the environmental stringency variable in exporting countries is found to have a

positive and significant effect, in contrast with the haven hypothesis which implies that stricter

environmental regulation decreases exports and increases imports. However, there is no evidence

of such an effect in the case of “dirty” trade, possibly because of a comparative advantage such

that stricter environmental policies do not affect competitiveness significantly. Other factors,

such a labour costs, presumably play a much more important role, environmental costs

representing a very small percentage of total production costs.

114

References

[1] Anderson, J. E. (1979), ‘A Theoretical Foundation for the Gravity Equation’, American

Economic Review 69(1), 106–116.

[2] Anderson, J. E. and E. van Wincoop, 2003. "Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the

Border Puzzle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1),

pages 170-192.

[3] Copeland, B.R. and S. Taylor (2003) “Trade and the Environment: Theory and Evidence”.

Princeton Series in International Economics. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University

Press

[4] Ederington, J. and J. Minier (2003). “Is Environmental Policy a Secondary Trade Barrier?

An Empirical Analysis”. Canadian Journal of Economics 36(1), 137-154

[5] Ederington J, Levinson A and Minier J, 2005. "Footloose and Pollution-Free," The Review

of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(1), pages 92-99, 01

[6] Harris M.N., L. Kónya, and L. Mátyás (2002) “Modelling the Impact of Environmental

Regulations on Bilateral Trade Flows: OECD, 1990–1996”. The World Economy,25(3),

387-405.

[7] Helpman, E. and P. Krugman (1985), Market Structure and Foreign Trade. Cambridge,

Massachusetts:MIT Press

[8] Jug J. and D. Mirza, 2005. "Environmental Regulations in Gravity Equations: Evidence

from Europe," The World Economy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(11), 1591-1615.

[9] Levinson A and M. S. Taylor, 2008. "Unmasking The Pollution Haven Effect,"

International Economic Review, 49(1), pages 223-254, 02

[10] Linnemann, H. (1966), An Econometric Study of International Trade Flows. Netherlands:

North- Holland Publishing Company.

[11] Low, P. and A. Yeats (1992), “Do “Dirty” Industries Migrate?” In: P. Low, ed.

“International Trade and the Environment”, World Bank Discussion Papers, 159

[12] Plumper, T. and Troeger, V.E. (2004). “The estimation of time-invariant variables in panel

analyses with unit fixed effects”. Social Science Research Network, Working Paper.

115

[13] Tinbergen, J. (1962), Shaping the World Economy: Suggestions for an International

Economic Policy. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund.

[14] Tobey, J. A. (1990). “The Effects of Domestic Environmental Policies on Patterns of

World Trade: An Empirical Test”. Kyklos 43(2), 191-209.

[15] Van Beers, C. and J.C.J.M Van den Bergh (1997), “An Empirical Multi-Country

Analysis of the Impact of Environmental Regulations on Foreign Trade Flows”, Kyklos

50(1), 29-46

[16] Van Beers, C. and J.C.J.M Van den Bergh (2000), "The Impact of Environmental

Policy on Foreign Trade: Tobey revisited with a Bilateral Flow Model," Tinbergen

Institute Discussion Papers 00-069/3, Tinbergen Institute

[17] Xu, X. (2000). “International Trade and Environmental Regulation: Time Series Evidence

and Cross Section Test”. Environmental and Resource Economics 17,233-257

116

E. Concluzii generale (se prezinta punctual)

Elaborarea politicilor de mediu este fundamentata pe doua teorii si anume

teoria Pigouviana si cea Coasiana.

Abordarea Pigouviana plaseaza responsabilitatea pentru externalitati exclusiv

pe generator (poluatorul) si ii impune acestuia o taxa in conformitate cu

prevederile legale. Determinarea nivelului optim al acesteia se bazeaza pe un set de

presupuneri de natura neoclasica. Cel mai important, lucru de retinut in abordarea

Pigouviana este ca aceasta nu considera externalitatile de natura reciproca si nici

nu analizeaza comportamentul de reducere a poluarii induse de fiscalitatea

Pigouviana

În contrast, abordare Coasiana presupune că externalitatea este reciproca

adica, atât poluatorul şi poluatul genereaza externalitatea, că normele juridice şi

instituţiile ar trebui să se schimba pentru a eficientiza internalizarea externalitatilor

si ca factorii de decizie politică ar trebui să se concentreze asupra dinamicii

problemei de eliminare a externalitatilor. Prin încorporarea acestor aspecte in

analiză, abordarea Coasiana poate ajunge la politica optima.

Avand in vedere faptul ca in tarile in dezvoltare, cazul Romaniei,

reglementarea directa este destul de slaba, atat din punct de vedere legal cat si

institutional, este de asteptat ca pentru elaborarea politicilor de mediu sa se apeleze

la abordarea Coasiana care presupune aplicarea teoriei neo-instituţionala.

Optimizarea politicilor de mediu ramane inca un deziderat, avand in vedere ca

atat ipotezele Pigouviene cat si cele Coasiene nu se regasesc in realitatea

economica si sociala. In aceste conditii, opinia noastra este ca in studiile empirice

trebuie sa exite o abordare holistica a celor doua problematici abordate in cadrul

proiectului respectiv RCM si PCM, imbinand abordarile existente in cadrul celor

doua teorii. Pornind de la aceasta abordare, in cadrul acestei etape, bazandu-ne pe

117

cercetarea calitativa am definit o serie de ipoteze care vor fi testate ulterior prin

cele doua instrumente care vor fi realizate. Pornind de la acest set de ipoteze in

urmatoarea etapa se va defini cadrul conceptual de analiza.

Analiza empirica dezvoltata in cadrul acestei etape a proiectului a avut

menirea de a verifica pentru Romania, intr-o abordare holistica, “care sunt factorii

cheie care determina companii să-şi asume responsabilitatea lor socială?” si “Care

sunt aşteptările generate de un astfel de angajament?”

S-au realizat 5 studii, toate bazadu-se pe date individuale la nivel de firma

furnizate de Institutul National de Statistica referitoare la investitiile si cheltuielile

legate de protectia mediului.

Rezultatele sustin caracterul stimulativ al subventiilor Pigouviene asupra

comportamentului intreprinzatorului in sensul determinarii luarii deciziei de a

realiza investitii in protejarea mediului, dar releva faptul ca sistemul de taxe

Pigouviene nu are o influenta stabila asupra comportamentului responsabil fata de

mediu. Acest fapt implica realizarea unei analize calitative asupra acestui sistem

pentru a identifica punctele sale slabe, activitate ce se va desfasura in etapele

viitoare ale proiectului. De asemenea rezultatele releva faptul ca reglementarile

informale, cu exceptia presiunilor institutionale venite din piata, nu au o influenta

semnificativa asupra comportamentului responsabil fata de mediu. Referitor la

efectele asumarii responsabilitatii sociale corporative, de catre firmele romanesti,

studiul a reliefat ca ipoteza win-win nu se confirma in cazul Romaniei.

Avand in vedere cele prezentate in prezentul raport de cercetare putem

concluziona ca obiectivul etapei a fost realizat.

118

F. Bibliografie;

Baldwin R.E., Forslid R. (1999). “The Core-Periphery Model and Endogenous

Growth : Stabilising and De-Stabilising Integration”, NBER Working Paper, No

6899 vol. III, Elsevier Science

Blomström, M., Kokko, A. (1997). “Regional integration and foreign direct

investment” Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER

Working Paper (No. 6019) Chan E S W, Wong S C K (2006) Motivations for ISO

14001 in the hotel industry.Tourism Management 27(3):481-492

Delmas M (2003) In search of ISO: an Institutional Perspective on the Adoption of

International Management Standard. Standford Graduate School of Business

Working Paper 1784

DiMaggio P J, Powell, W W (1983) The iron cage revisited: Institutional

isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American

Sociological Review 48 (2):147-160.

Demiray, D. A. (1994) “The Movement of Goods in a Green Market.” Legal

Issues of European Integration 1:73–110.

Fernandez R. (1997), "Returns to Regionalism: An Evaluation of Nontraditional

Gains from Regional Trade Agreement", World Bank Policy Research Working

Paper, 1816

Flores, R. (1997), "The Gains from MERCOSUR: A General Equilibrium,

Imperfect Competition Evaluation.", Journal of Policy Modeling 19: 1–18

Frankel J.A., Wei S., (1998), “Open Regionalism in a World of Continental Trade

Blocs”,IMF Working Paper W-TI 98110

Frankel, J.A., Stein E., Wei S., (1998), “Continental Trading Blocs : Are They

Natural or Supernatural”, .J.A. Frankel (ed), The Regionalization of the World

Economy, National Bureau of Economic Research Project Report Series, Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 91-120.

119

Ferraz C, Seroa da Motta R (2002) Regulação Mercado ou Pressão Social? Os

Determinantes do Investimento Ambiental na Industria. Proceedings ANPEC-

XXIX Encontro Nacional de Economia Salvador

Garrett, G. 1992. “International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The

European Community’s Internal Market.” International Organization 46:533–60

Grossman, G. Helpman E., (1995), "The Politics of Free-Trade Agreements.",

American Economic Review 85 (4): 667–90

Greene WH (2002) Econometric Analysis. Prentice Hall New Jersey

Guler I, Guillen M F, MacPherson J M (2002) Global competition institutions

and the diffusion of organizational practices: the international spread of the ISO

9000 quality certificates. Administrative Science Quarterly 47(2):207-232

Gunningham N (1995) Environment self-regulation and the chemical industry:

Assessing Responsible Care. Law and Policy 17 (1): 57-108

Hoffman A J (2001) Linking organizational and field-level analyses – The

diffusion of corporate environmental practice. Organization & Environment 14(2):

133-156

Helpman E, Krugman P.R. (1985), "Market Structure and Foreign Trade:

Increasing Returns, Imperfect Competition, and the International Economy",

Cambridge/Mass.: MIT Press

Horn H., Lang H., Lundgren S. (1995), "Managerial Effort Incentive, X-

Inefficiency and International Trade", European Economic Review 39, 117-138.

Krämer L.,”EU Environmental Law”, Ed. Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2000.

Krugman P., Venables A.J. (1990) " Integration and the competitiveness of the

peripheral industry", Bliss, C. and J. Braga de Macedo (eds.), Unity with Diversity

in the European Economy, Cambridge/ London: Cambridge University

Press/CEPR, 55-77

120

Krugman P. R. (1980), “Scale economies, product differentiation, and the pattern

of trade “, American Economic Review, 70, 950-59

Krugman P. R. (1991-b), "Geography and trade", Cambridge, MIT Press.

Martin, P. Ottaviano G.I.P., (1999) "Growing locations: Industry location in a

model of endogenous growth", European Economic Review 43, 281-302.

Mattli, W., Slaughter A. M. (1995), “Law and Politics in the European Union: A

Reply to Garrett.”, International Organization 49:183–90.

Neumayer E, Perkins R (2004) What explains the uneven take-up of ISO 14001

at the global level? A panel-data analysis. Environment and Planning 36(5): 823-

839

OECD (2001) The firm The environment and Public Policy Working Party on

National Environmental Policy. ENV/EPOC/WPNET 31/FINAL

Panayotou T, Schatzki T, Limvorapitak Q (1997) Differential industry response

to formal and informal environmental regulations in newly industrializing

economies: The case of Thailand Mimeo Harvard Institute for International

Development

Rivera J (2004) Institutional pressures and voluntary environmental behavior in

developing countries: Evidence from the Costa Rican hotel industry. Society and

Natural Resources 17(9):779-797

Rivera J, de Leon P (2004) Is greener whiter? Voluntary Environmental

Performance of Western Ski Areas. Policy Studies Journal 32 (3): 417-437

Rivera J, de Leon P, Koerber C (2006) Is greener whiter yet? The sustainable

slopes program after five years. Policy Studies Journal 34(2): 195-221

Sova R., Sova A.(2007) „Modeling international trade flows between CEEC and

OECD countries” Applied Economics Letter, indexata in ISI - Thomson ISI

Journal Citation Reports 2007, Volum 15 /2008, ISSN: 1350-4851

121

Sova R., Sova .A. (2008), "The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in the Host

Country", EABR & TLC Conferences Rothenburg ob der Tauber, Germany, June

18-20

Sager M. (1997), "Regional Trade Agreements:Their Role and Their Economic

Impact on the Trade Flows", The World Economy, 20 (2),239-252

Seroa da Motta R (2006) Analyzing the environmental performance of the

Brazilian industrial sector. Ecological Economics 57(2):269-281

Shin S (2005) The Role of the Government in Voluntary Environmental Protection

Schemes: The Case of ISO 14001 in China. Issues & Studies 41(4): 141-173

Venables A.J (1999), ” Regional integration agreements : a force for convergence

or divergence? “, Paper presented at the ABCDE Conference, World Bank, Juin,

Paris.

Vogel, D. 1993. “Environmental Policy in the European Community.”,S.

Kamienecki ed., Environmental Politics in the International Arena. Albany, N.Y.:

SUNY Press.

Vastag G, Corbett C J, Kirsch D A (2004) Revisiting ISO 14000 Diffusion: A

New ‘Look’

at the Drivers of Certification/Response. Production and Operations Management

13 (3): 268-

271

Viadiu M F, Casadesús F M, Saizarbitoria M H (2006) ISO 9000 and ISO

14000 standards: An international diffusion model. International Journal of

Operations and Production Management 26(1-2):141-165

Whalley J. (1996), ” Why do countries seek regional trade agreements ? “, in

Frankel J. (éd.), The regionalization of the world economy, University of Chicago

Press, Chicago.

122

Indicatorii de rezultat generali si specifici pentru etapa raportata ________________________________________________________________________ | Indicatori de | Denumirea indicatorilor | UM | | rezultat | | | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 1. Număr de produse şi tehnologii rezultate din | Nr. | | | activitatea de cercetare, bazate pe brevete, | | | | omologări sau inovaţii proprii. | | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 2. Număr de cereri de brevete depuse în urma | Nr. | | | proiectelor | | | | din care: | | | | a) Naţionale | | | | b) EPO (Europa) | | | | c) USPTO (SUA) | | | | d) Triadice (Europa, SUA, Japonia) | | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 3. Număr de cereri de brevete acordate (în urma | Nr. | | | proiectelor) | | | | din care: | | | | a) Naţionale | | | | b) EPO | | | | c) USPTO | | | | d) Triadice | | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 4. Număr de articole publicate în urma | Nr. | | | proiectelor, | | | | din care: | | | | a) în reviste indexate ISI | | | | b) în reviste indexate în alte baze de date | 3 | | | internaţionale recunoscute | | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 5. Număr de articole acceptate spre publicare în| Nr. | | | urma proiectelor, | | | | din care: | | | | a) în reviste indexate ISI | 1 | | | b) în reviste indexate în alte baze de date | 1 | | | internaţionale recunoscute | | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 6. Număr de produse transferabile | | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 7. Număr de studii de necesitate publică | Nr. | | | din care: | | | | a) de interes naţional | 1 | | | b) de interes regional | | | | c) de interes local | | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 8. Număr de IMM participante | % | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 9. Ponderea contribuţiei financiare private pe | % | | | proiecte din care contribuţie financiară directă| | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 10. Numărul mediu de poziţii echivalente cu | Nr. | | | normă întreagă pe proiect, din care: | 8 | | | a) doctoranzi | 2 | | | b) postdoctorat | 6 | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 11. Mobilităţi |1 Lună | | | din care internaţionale | 1-om | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 12. Valoarea investiţiilor în echipamente |Mii RON| | | pentru proiecte | | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 13. Rata de succes în depunerile de proiecte | % | | |_________________________________________________|_______| | | 14. Număr reţele de cercetare susţinute | Nr. | |____________________|_________________________________________________|_______|

Cod: PO-04-Ed3-R1-F5

123

Indicatorii specifici fiecarei directii de cercetare:

Domeniul de cercetare

Denumirea indicatorului Numarul Informatii despre indicator

DC 1 Tehnologiile societăţii informaţionale

Nr. de tehnologii IT performante Nr. tehnologii suport pentru comunicatii; Nr. metode/sisteme de inteligenta

artificiala; Nr. produse nanoelectronice si fotonice; Nr.nano- si microsisteme

DC 2: Energie

Nr.concepte de utilizare de noi surse energetice Nr. de tehnologii de reducere a pretului

in domeniul energetic Nr. de tehnologii/produse in domeniul

securitatii energetice

DC 3: Mediu

Nr. de sisteme şi tehnologii energetice durabile Nr. de tehnologii curate de produs si

proces pentru reducerea poluării mediului (green chemistry) Din care: in transporturi Nr.de tehnologii eco-eficiente de

valorificare a deseurilor; Nr.concepte si tehnologii de consolidare

a diversitatii biologice si ecologice; Nr. de metode si solutii tehnice in domeniul amenajarii teritoriului

DC 4:Sănătate

Nr.concepte/studii ale mecanismelor de adaptare ale organismului; Nr. metode pe baze moderne de

investigatie in medicina; Nr. terapii moderne;

Nr. de metode de preventie si interventionale la nivel naţional, arondate la spaţiul european de operare

DC 5: Agricultura, securitatea şi siguranţa alimentară

Nr. de produse corespunzătoare principiilor dezvoltării durabile şi securităţii alimentare, inclusiv alimente funcţionale; Nr. de metodologii de detectare a

reziduurilor şi contaminanţilor din întreg lanţul alimentar

DC 6: Biotehnologii

Nr.de medicamente noi; Nr.protocoale de diagnostic şi

tratamente medicale; Nr.de tehnologii pentru producţia de

alimente cu siguranţă maximă asupra sănătăţii umane; Nr.de tehnologii avansate in domeniul

produselor farmaceutice;

grupurilor biocatalitice;

124

noi enzime şi microorganisme

Nr. de sisteme bioinformatice DC 7: Materiale, procese şi produse inovative

Nr. de materiale avansate Nr.de tehnologii de reciclare a

materialelor avansate Nr. de tehnologii avansate de conducere

a proceselor industriale Nr. de tehnologii şi produse mecanice de

înaltă precizie şi sisteme mecatronice Nr. de tehnologii nucleare Nr. de produse şi tehnologii inovative

destinate transporturilor şi producţiei de automobile

DC 8:Spaţiu şi securitate

Nr. de aplicaţii spaţiale integrate Nr. de tehnici aeronautice Nr. de tehnologii aerospaţiale Nr. de tehnici pentru securitate

DC 9:Cercetări socio-economice şi umaniste

Nr. de noi metode manageriale, de marketing şi dezvoltare antreprenorială; Nr. de studii referitoare la calitatea

educatiei si a ocuparii; Nr. de studii referitoare la capitalul

uman, cultural şi social; Nr. de tehnici de conservare a

patrimoniului

1

Nota: La completarea acestor indicatori se va tine seama de domeniul de cercetare si de obiectivele proiectului. Acesti indicatori se vor completa acolo unde este cazul.

125

Procesele verbale de avizare si receptie a lucrarilor

In cazul ultimei etape pentru sectiunea stiintifica si tehnica se vor prezenta documente ca si pentru raportarea intermediara, si, in plus:

o Raportul final de activitate (conform modelului) o Rezumatul publicabil in romana si in engleza (maxim 3 pagini), din

care sa rezulte gradul de noutate si elementele de dezvoltare economica ale intregului proiect

Scurt raport despre deplasarea (deplasarile) in strainatate privind activitatea de diseminare si/sau formare profesionala (se vor prezenta informatiireferitoare la simpozion/congres: denumire, perioada desfasurare, locul de desfasurare, programul evenimentului, titlul lucrarii care s-a prezentat, autorii, perspective de colaborare, noutati pentru proiect